


**HISTORICAL SKETCHES
OF THE
SOUTH INDIAN HISTORY**

HISTORICAL SKETCHES OF THE SOUTH INDIAN HISTORY

*From the earliest times to
the last Muhammadan Dynasty.*

Vol. III

**MARK WILKS
and
MURRAY HAMMICK**



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THE prevalent impression is erroneous, although fairly deducible from the records of Madras, that Hyder, on his first descent, perpetrated the wanton and indiscriminate destruction of the whole country; a measure directly subversive of his ultimate views of permanent conquest. He calculated on the lapse of a long interval, before the operations of war, and the aid of a French corps, should put him in possession of Fort St. George; and around that centre of the British power, and its maritime communications, he certainly drew a line of merciless desolation, marked by the continuous blaze of flaming towns and villages. He directed the indiscriminate mutilation of every human being who should linger near the ashes, in disobedience of the mandate for instant emigration, accompanied by their flocks and herds; thus consigning to the exclusive dominion of the beasts of the forest, the desert which he interposed between himself and his enemies. This line extended inland, from thirty to fifty-five miles, according to circumstances, and from the head of the lake of Paliacate in the north, to a southern limit, within a few miles of Pondicherry, which of course was

included within the scope of his immediate protection. Round Vellore, of which he expected an earlier surrender, he drew a similar circle, not exceeding a radius of thirteen miles. With these exceptions, and the operations necessary for the siege of the few places which did not immediately surrender, and for impeding the subsequent movements of British troops, the whole of the country occupied by the invader, was as well protected, as his possessions above the ghauts.

Black columns of smoke were every where in view, from St. Thomas's Mount, distant only nine miles from Madras, before an order was issued for the movement of a single soldier. The corps under Colonel Harper in Gunttoor, afterwards commanded by Colonel Baillie, was directed to move southwards by the route of Calastry and Tripetti, an order founded in dangerous error, which the superior knowledge of its commandant induced him to disobey, and to pursue a more easterly course to which we must presently return. Colonel Brathwaite¹ who commanded at Pondicherry, was ordered to move northwards to Chingleput, a fort within two marches of Madras, and ultimately to the latter place ; and a select corps of nineteen chosen companies of sepoys, two regiments of Mahommed Ali's cavalry, and two light guns from Trichinopoly under Colonel Cosby, was destined to act on the enemy's communications through the passes, but was afterwards ordered to join the main army.² The description of minor preparations, or the

¹ Major John Brathwaite reduced the Poligars of Madura and Tinnevely in 1772 and, as Lieutenant-Colonel took Mahé from the French in 1779. When commanding in Tanjore in 1782 he was badly defeated by Tippu, taken prisoner and carried to Seringapatam, whence he was released at the peace of 1784. General Brathwaite was Commander-in-Chief, Madras, for four years from 1792, and captured Pondicherry in 1793. (*Report on the Palk Manuscripts*, p. 176, note.)

² Brathwaite's force was composed of—
 One battalion European infantry.
 Detachment of artillery.

complex results of treachery in the officers commanding forts, or mutiny in the troops of Mahommed Ali, when it was attempted to organize them for field service, would perplex without informing the reader. Such only as mark peculiar character, or aid in a distinctive picture of the times shall be selected for notice. Mahommed Ali had as usual no money for public purposes ; an excellent regiment of cavalry at St. Thomas's Mount mutinied, if mutiny it might be called, to withhold their services in the field, while their families must perish in consequence of an arrear of nearly two years pay. Mahommed Ali's favorite son came on the ground to affect the employment of his influence, but professing inability to pay any portion of their arrears. To save the horses the regiment was disbanded ; eighty of the men adhered to their European officers without pay ; but the same person who had no money to expedite the public service, had abundance to reinlist all the remainder as his own personal guard, on the very next day. The little corps of excellent cavalry afterwards received into the service of the Company was embodied by the patriotism of their English officers, who found the means of satisfying the troops from their own resources and private credit.¹

It was a proposition too familiar to require

One regiment of Nawab's cavalry.

The 14th, 15th, 16th and 17th battalions of Sepoys.

Cosby's force was composed of—

Two regiments Native cavalry under Captain Jourdain.

Grenadiers of the 9th, 13th and 18th battalions from Tanjore.

Grenadiers of the 6th and 19th battalions from Trichinopoly.

Three battalion companies 19th.

(Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, p. 2, note.)

¹ On the 25th August 1780, when Sir Hector Munro was about to march from the Mount to Conjeveram, the regiment of cavalry then in camp suddenly refused to move unless their pay, then 14 months in arrears, was immediately disbursed. The

discussion, that not one native officer intrusted by Mahommed Ali with the defence of a fortress, would be faithful to the general cause, and it became an urgent consideration to commit them to English officers. A reinforcement from Vellore was sent to Arcot, the reputed capital of Mahommed Ali's dominions; and the scope of our design requires the notice of four other places, to each of which an officer was sent, either alone, or with one or two companies as a guard of example, and a rallying point to the disorderly rabble of Mahommed Ali.

To Warriapollam,¹ 60 miles south-west from Cuddalore, a fort in the centre of an extensive and nearly impenetrable forest, the seat of a dispossessed poligar, still occupying the woods in hostility to Mahommed Ali, Ensign Allan was sent with one company; the fort was commanded by an European in the service of Mahommed Ali, who made no unnecessary difficulty in transferring the command of his mutinous charge. Ensign Allan, a youth of seventeen, left to the unaided resources of his own mind, reclaimed this disorderly and unpaid rabble to obedience and energy; and in a varied defence of six months against the efforts of the poligar, exhibited all the vigour and enterprize of manly youth, guided by the prudence and wisdom of age; and when ordered, at the expiration of that period, to evacuate

Nawab having refused to comply with the demand, and the government being without the means of doing so, the men were disarmed and sent into Madras with the exception of 56, most of whom were officers and non-commissioned officers.

Owing to this defection, the cavalry with the army was reduced to the party of natives specified above and 33 European troopers under Lieutenant Younge. (Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, p. 106.)

¹ *Warriapollam*.—Udaiyarpalaiyam, a small zamindari, in Trichinopoly District. The English had driven the Poligar out of his estate for refusing to assist them in Madura and he had taken refuge in Mysore with Hyder. He was afterwards reinstated.

the place, made good his retreat to Tanjore, in February 1781. Although this interesting youth continued in a short and brilliant career to justify and augment these first impressions of extraordinary talent, exertions disproportioned to his strength in the campaign of 1783 produced a dangerous disease, and he did not live to fulfil the promise of his early excellence.

Ensign Macaulay had a similar mission to Gingee. The lower fortress was carried by assault, a Monsieur Burette in Mahommed Ali's service, having given up his post, without firing a shot. Ensign Macaulay deliberately retired to the upper and impregnable rock, assigning to his own company the post of honour nearest the line of ascent. In visiting the upper guards, his mutinous garrison demanded that he should instantly surrender the place, and while attempting to persuade them to a better spirit, they made a direct attempt to assassinate him. He escaped to the protection of his own company; but being out-numbered by the mutineers, was compelled to capitulate, on the condition of being sent to Madras. This condition was violated, and he was sent a prisoner to Seringapatam, and according to my manuscript (the journal of a Serjeant, afterwards Captain Smith,) "they did not leave him a shirt."

Lieutenant Parr was sent to Carnatic Ghurr,¹ but could neither obtain from Mahommed Ali's kelledar, the command of the place, nor even a decent lodging. The fort was sold, and some decorous observances remained previously to its surrender. He had reached the place from Wandewash, through a country occupied by the enemy, singly, blackened and disguised as a native: he left it at the expiration

¹ *Carnatic Ghurr*.—Karnatigur, a fort in the Polur Taluq North Arcot District, Madras, about 20 miles south of Vellore situated on a spur of the Javadi hills, which terminates in a huge rock on which the citadel was built.

of a month, in the same garb, and had only descended three hundred yards by the western face of the rock, when Hyderis troops entering, by the eastern gate, appeared upon the rampart above him. After four nights and three days concealment in the woods, attended by a faithful native servant, he arrived at Vellore, with his feet bleeding and swoln, a beard of ample growth, an aspect scarcely human, and nearly famished for want of food.

An officer was detached by Colonel Brathwaite, when at Carangooly on his march from Pondicherry to Chingleput to take the command of Wandewash.

Hyder was known to be in force in the neighbourhood of that place: its surrender was probable; the distance was thirty miles; and a body of four thousand horse was stated to be interposed: but the great importance of the enterprize justified the attempt under these slender chances of success. Lieutenant Flint was selected for this service, and after a fatiguing march on the morning of the 10th of August, he moved at eleven on the same night, with one hundred firelocks. By deviating to unfrequented paths, he arrived without interruption in the vicinity of Wandewash, late in the forenoon of the 11th. After ascertaining that the place was still in the possession of Mahommed Ali's troops, he sent a message to the kelledar announcing his approach; but was answered, that he would be fired at, if he attempted to come within range of the guns; and met a picket sent to stop him at the verge of the esplanade. He had the address to persuade the officer that he had misapprehended his orders; which could only have been to stop the party till he was satisfied they were friends, of which fact he could entertain no doubts; and during the remaining parley, continued to advance, persuading every successive messenger to return with another reference, until within musquet shot of the ramparts, which were manned with troops, and the gates distinctly seen to

be shut. Here he halted; announced that he had a letter from the nabob Mahommed Ali to the kelledar, which he was ordered to deliver into his own hands, and demanded admission for that purpose with a few attendants. With this demand the kelledar positively refused to comply, but at length agreed to receive the letter in the space between the gate and the barrier of the sortie. Lieutenant Flint was admitted with four attendants, faithful and well instructed sepoy, and found the kelledar seated on a carpet, attended by several men of rank, thirty swordsmen, his usual personal guard, and one hundred sepoy, drawn up to protect him. After the first compliments, Lieutenant Flint avowed that he had no letter from Mahommed Ali, but possessed that which in the exigency of the times ought to be deemed equivalent; the order of his own government written in communication with Mahommed Ali; this order the kelledar treated with the utmost contempt, and his arguments with derision; desired him to return to the place from whence he came; and to the proposition of impossibility from the increased distance of the corps from which he was detached, and the country being in possession of the enemy, he was answered with fresh sarcasm. He mildly replied, that he was placed in a desperate situation, and as the kelledar rose to depart, he suddenly seized him, and announced his instant death if any person should move a hand for his rescue; the bayonets of the four sepoy were in the same instant at his breast, and their countenances announced a firm decision to share the fate of their officer. The consternation of the moment afforded time for the remainder of the little detachment to rush in at the concerted signal and effectually secure the kelledar. Lieutenant Flint then addressed the troops in the language of conciliation, explained the conditions on which the kelledar should retain all the honours of command, while he himself should provide for effectual defence: and

finally the gates were opened, and the whole party entered together as friends.

The act of surrendering the place to Hyder, had been prepared to receive the seal of the kelledar on that very day; and during the interval in which Lieutenant Flint waited the authority of his government to exclude him from the fort, his efforts at incessant counteraction were foiled, by the address of the new commandant, who found means gradually and rapidly to secure the attachment of the better portion of the garrison.

Strange as in these days the proposition may sound, this lieutenant was an officer of very considerable experience. To a scientific knowledge of the theory, he added some practical acquaintance with the business of a siege; and to military talents of no ordinary rank, a mind fertile in resources, and a mild confidence of manner, which, as his troops were wont to say, rendered it impossible to feel alarm in his presence. He found the place in a ruinous state, furnished with abundance of cannon, but no carriages, and little powder; he repaired the works, constructed carriages, and manufactured powder. He had not one artilleryman, but he prevailed on the silversmiths, who, according to the routine of Hindoo warfare, are the apology for cannoneers, not only to attend regularly to be instructed in the exercise, but in the subsequent siege to perform their duties in a respectable manner. From the 12th of August 1780 until the 12th of February 1783, an eventful period, during which the flower of Hyder's army were before the place, seventy-eight days of open trenches, and after being foiled in open force, made repeated attempts to seize it by stratagem, or starve it into surrender, this officer, never once casting off his clothes at the uncertain periods of repose, not only provided the means of internal defence, but raised a little corps of cavalry for exterior enterprize; and during a protracted period of famine and diversified misery

elsewhere, not only fed his own garrison, but procured important supplies for the use of the main army, for which he was justly deemed to be the centre of all correct intelligence. The model proposed by the experienced, for the imitation of the young and aspiring; the theme of general applause; honourable in private life, as he was distinguished in public conduct; the barren glory has remained to him, of preserving the letters on service, written in Sir Eyre Coote's own hand, full of affectionate attachment and admiration. Colonel Flint is living, and in London. Fancy would associate with the retirement of such a man, marks of public approbation and dignified competency: but human affairs too often reflect an inverted copy of the pictures of imagination.

With the exception of such other places as must necessarily occupy a place in our future narrative, every fort opened its gates, and the whole country, north of the Coleroon, submitted at once to the conqueror.

Hyder had descended through the pass of Changanama on the 20th of July, and from thence detached a select corps of five thousand horse, under his second son Kurreem Saheb, to plunder Porto Novo, a sea-port, about forty miles south of Pondicherry: a larger body of cavalry was allotted to the work of desolation which has already been described, and the advance of the main army was only retarded by the embarrassing number of places to be occupied. It was not before the 21st of August that he invested Arcot, and on the 29th moved from thence in consequence of intelligence that the English army had made its first march from the neighbourhood of Madras on the 26th.

From the state of party in the unhappy counsels of that day, the Governor found it impossible, by the ordinary constitution of the government, to secure a majority, without requiring the aid of the

Commander-in-chief, Sir Hector Munro,¹ in council, while the command of the field army should devolve on Lord Macleod,² who had recently arrived from England in command of one of His Majesty's regiments. No local experience was necessary to demonstrate, that the order which he received to assemble the army at Conjeveram, an open town forty miles in advance, through a country every where occupied by the enemy, was contrary to the ordinary suggestions of military prudence, as risking, without an adequate object, the safety of all its detachments and equipments; and in a judicious letter, almost prophetic of the fate of Baillie, this officer recommended the vicinity of Madras as the only safe point of junction until the army should be in sufficient force by the union of its detachments to meet the enemy in the field. The Commander-in-chief was of a different opinion: he pledged himself to form the junction at the place originally proposed, and accordingly assumed the command of the army, a majority in the council being secured by the appointment of an additional member,³ a measure against which the minority protested as unlawful.

The important corps from Guntoor, under

¹ Sir Hector Munro was the son of Hugh Munro of Novar, born in 1726. He went to India in 1761 as Major of the 89th Foot, was in command of the troops at Patna, and won the battle of Buxar. He was after a period in England appointed to the chief command in Madras, and arrived in 1778.

² In 1779 *the King's* regiment was dispatched to Madras. The corps selected was "the 73rd regiment of Foot commanded by John Mackenzie, Esquire, commonly called Lord Macleod" (*P. from England*. Vol. LXXXII, 23rd December 1778.) The regiment soon after arrival was quartered at Poonamallee, about 15 miles west of Madras. Lord Macleod was in command at Poonamallee, when sent for to Madras in order to take command of the army.

³ The additional member was Alexander Davidson, who had joined the service as writer in 1760. He acted as Lord Macartney's second in his duel with Anthony Sadleir in September 1784.

Aug. 24. Colonel Baillie,¹ had on the 24th of August arrived without interruption, at an encampment, six miles to the southward of the village of Goomrapoondy,² a situation within twenty-eight miles of the General's encampment at St. Thomas's Mount, and rather a shorter distance from Madras. Admitting the absolute necessity, which, however, is not apparent, of moving the army precisely on the 26th, there was no probable impediment to the junction of Colonel Baillie by one forced march on the 25th, or by two easy marches at the General's encampment near Conniltoor³ on the 26th; the force under Sir Hector Munro being 5,209⁴ strong, that under Baillie, 2,813. These

Colonel Baillie's detachment was—

Artillery—4 officers, 77 non-commissioned officers and men.
European infantry—7 officers, 2 cadets, 104 non-commissioned officers and men.

Sepoys—36 officers, 24 serjeants, 2,606 native officers and men.

One company of guides.

(Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, p. 5, note.)

² *Goomrapoondy*.—Gummadipundi, a village in the north of Ponneri Taluq, Chingleput District, on the trunk road from Madras to the north.

³ *Conniltoor*.—Kunnattur, a village about 15 miles south-west of Madras on the road to Conjevaram.

⁴ The following is an abstract of the return of the Company's troops at the Mount on the 26th August 1780:—

	Officers	Conductors	Cadets	Serjeants	Drummers	Native Officers	Rank and file	Fucalties	Total
Cavalry ...	2	3	30	...	35
Artillery ...	17	2	2	26	18	...	250	...	315
2nd Battalion, 1st Regiment.	23	...	5	24	28	...	271	...	351
Grenadiers, 2nd Battalion, 2nd Regiment.	5	5	3	...	92	...	105
Cadet Company ...	1	...	27	3	1	...	32
Total Europeans ...	48	2	24	61	49	...	644	...	828

obvious means of placing beyond the reach of accident the immediate formation of a respectable army, were wantonly abandoned, by directing that officer to pursue an independent route of upwards of fifty miles to Conjeveram, a measure not recommended by any speculative advantage that has ever been stated, and inexplicable by any conjecture, excepting that of attempting practically to justify an erroneous opinion.

Sir Hector Munro arrived at Conjeveram on the 29th, the day on which Hyder broke up from Arcot, Aug. 29. after having, on the first intelligence of the deviation to the south-west of Baillie's corps, detached a select corps of 5000 infantry, 6000 horse, 12 light, and six heavy guns, with a large body of irregulars, under his son, Tippoo Sultaun, to intercept its approach, and endeavour to destroy it. Sir Hector Munro marched from St. Thomas's Mount with eight days' provisions for his own corps only, with the view of raising the siege of Arcot, distant seven ordinary marches. On his arrival at Conjeveram, as the remaining four days' stock for his own corps would

	Officers	Conductors	Cadets	Serjeants	Drummers	Native Officers	Rank and file	Puchalkies	Total
B. F. ...	48	2	34	61	49	...	644	...	833
14th, 16th, 16th, 17th and 21st Bat- talions of Sepoys:	36	28	55	82	3,143	47	3,391
Company of Marks- men.	2	2	5	3	98	1	111
Grand Total ...	86	2	34	91	109	85	3,885	48	4,340

Not included in the above. — 23 Europeans and 153 Natives sick.
56 Native cavalry.

No return of H.M. 73rd Regiment for August has been found, but Sir Hector Munro estimated his whole force, including officers, at 5,209 when he left the Mount. This would make the strength of the 73rd to have been 638, all ranks included. (Wilson : *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, p. 4, note.)

furnish little more than two for the army which he expected to unite at that place, he applied to the Mahommedan *gentleman* deputed to provide for all his wants by Mahommed Ali, a name for ever associated with recollections of disgust at his own character, and of indignation and contempt for those who could still continue to trust him. This deputed non-descript gravely answered Sir Hector Munro* "that he was ordered by Mahommed Ali to attend him; but had no powers given him to procure either provisions or intelligence," and the General was left on the fourth day of the campaign to live by the contingencies of the day, and continued fixed to the spot, gradually collecting from this large but ruined town, a small supply of food, which he deposited within the walls of the Hindoo temple, a place capable of being rendered in two days defensible against a coup-de-main.

- Aug. 25. On the 25th, Colonel Baillie arrived on the bank of the river Cortelaur, then nearly dry, but liable to be swoln by the mountain rains, and committed the great military fault of encamping on the northern instead of the southern bank: the floods descended on the night of the 25th, and prevented his crossing until the 4th¹ of September. On the 1st of that month perceiving by the usual indications that the river would not soon fall, he proposed in a letter to the Government to descend to its mouth and be ferried over to Ennoré, thirteen miles to the north of Madras, as the most expeditious, though the most circuitous route; but to this letter he appears to have received
- Sept. 4th. no reply. He crossed the river on the 4th of September, with a corps consisting of 207 Europeans, 2,606 sepoy, six six-pounders, and four three-pounder guns.

* "As I wanted neither a valet nor a cook," said the General, "I told the gentleman I would dispense with his services."

¹ Baillie crossed the river on the 3rd September according to his report to Sir Hector Munro.

The vicinity of the fort of Trippasore¹ rendered it imprudent for Tippoo on either that or the following day to attempt any operation beyond the customary annoyances during the march; on the 6th, in the morning, he appeared making dispositions for an immediate attack on Colonel Baillie, who took post in the vicinity of Perambaucum, distant fourteen miles* from the ground occupied by Sir Hector Munro on the same day near to Conjeveram. The action is described in a short note from Colonel Baillie to have lasted from eleven to two; "near 100 Europeans and sepoys were killed and wounded by the guns of the enemy, who never came near enough for musquetry;"† and on the same evening he wrote to Sir Hector Munro, that on a review‡ of his corps after the action, he found it was not in his power to join, but hoped to see the General at Perambaucum; while on the other hand Tippoo, who had suffered much more severely in the cannonade, reported to Hyder that he could make no impression on Baillie without a farther reinforcement.

Sept. 6.

During this day (6th September) Hyder who had occupied an encampment strengthened with redoubts, about six miles to the westward of Sir Hector Munro, made a demonstration of turning his right, with the view of covering the operation against Baillie, and this movement induced a change of position in the English army, which now fronted the north on the road by which Colonel Baillie was expected. The hostile armies remained during that day

¹ *Trippasore*.—Tiruppachur. The village is about five miles south of the Kortalaiyar river, about two miles west of Tiruvallur, just north of the railway from Madras to Arkonam. An old fort stood there which served as a protection to the surrounding country.

* Sir Hector Munro's official letter.

[*Perambaucum*.—Perumbakkam, a village seven miles south of Tiruppachur, about twelve miles south of the river.]

† Manuscript journal of one of the survivors.

‡ Sir Hector Munro's official letter.

drawn up in order of battle opposite to each other, at the distance of about two miles, without an effort on either part. About noon a heavy firing was heard, which from a change of wind, soon became inaudible. It was evident that Baillie was attacked, and equally plain that Hyder had interposed his whole army to prevent the junction. Either the detachment was expected to fight its way through the troops allotted for its destruction, and afterwards through the united force of the enemy, or it was necessary to make an effort for its relief. But the pagoda at Conjeveram, which contained the provisions, the heavy guns, and most of the baggage of the army, had not been made capable (in Sir Hector Munro's opinion) of maintaining itself for one day. The army lay on its arms Sept. 7th, 8th. without an effort during the 6th, 7th, and 8th. On the latter day the note from Colonel Baillie written after the affair of the 6th, was received. Sir Hector Munro, still adhering to the vital importance of protecting his provisions and stores in the pagoda, which in the event he was compelled to abandon, adopted the determination (in concurrence* with the opinion of his principal officers) of detaching the flank companies of the army on the night of the 8th, to unite with Colonel Baillie, and enable him to form the junction. The original and needless error of any disunion, was thus aggravated by the farther risk of a third division, subjecting 1007 men, the flower of the army, to be cut off in detail, and leaving the main army itself in a state of dangerous weakness. Contrary to all reasonable calculation, Colonel Fletcher, the officer in command of the detachment, by changing his route during the march, and thus deceiving his own guides, who were all in Hyder's pay, passed unperceived by the numerous troops interposed, and joined Colonel Baillie at Perambau- 9th. cum early on the morning of the 9th. The arrival of

* Sir Hector Munro's official letter.

this reinforcement encreasing the strength to 3,720* men (allowing a deduction of 100 for the casualties of the 6th), "inspired the greatest confidence in Baillie's troops; no doubt was entertained of his being able to make his way good to Conjeveram, and he marched agreeably to the orders he had received, about eight o'clock on the night of the 9th."

Hyder was full of indignation at the strange negligence by which the detachment had been permitted to pass, without observation, across a country covered with his light troops. The French officers in his service, deemed it to be a profound and skilful manœuvre, by which Hyder's army was to be entangled between two powerful bodies, by a joint operation on the night of the 9th, and strongly urged him to move from the dangerous position which he occupied. Hyder forming a more correct estimate of the actual operation, maintained his ground, but yielded so far to the suggestions of his advisers, as to make dispositions, and even prepare the roads for each column to retire to the westward, in the event of their conjectures being verified. Both armies continued immovable on the 9th, and, towards the close of the day, Hyder having ascertained from his spies that the English army were not preparing to march, sent off immediately after dark, in the direction of Baillie, the great body of his infantry and guns remaining himself on the ground, ready to move at a moment's warning, with a few light guns and the whole of the cavalry, if his camp should be attacked, and with the same means to harrass and impede the march, if a movement should be made in the direction of Baillie. At four o'clock finding the same torpor still

* The manuscript journal makes the strength about 3,500. The number stated in the text, is taken from Sir Hector Munro's official statement, and of course from the last returns. The numbers sufficiently correspond, allowing for the sick, and supposing the manuscript to reckon the firelocks only, the returns of course including artillery men.

to prevail in the English camp, he silently followed his infantry.

Colonel Baillie had not proceeded half a mile from his position at Perambaucum, before he was challenged by the enemy's videttes, and as no order had been given to avoid firing, a platoon from the advanced guard, announced to the enemy that all was in motion. The rocket men and irregulars opposed no more than a teizing impediment for five or six miles. The baggage being on the left of the column of march, and a heavy body of horse approaching in that direction from the rear, the officer commanding the rear guard unlimbered his guns, and a halt was ordered for the purpose of making a disposition to place the baggage on the right. This being effected, and the troops resuming their order of march, the halt was unaccountably continued, and some guns which had been covered by the Mysorean cavalry on the left, soon afterwards opened on the centre of the British troops. A detachment sent to seize them were stopped by an impediment peculiar to that vicinity, although occasionally found in other parts of the south. Water is found at the depth of from five to ten feet below the surface of these extensive sandy plains: and the industrious husbandmen, taking advantage of the slightest deviation from the horizontal line, cut trenches for an extent of several miles to the requisite depth of a stratum impermeable by water, along which the produce of a succession of springs gradually augmented to a streamlet is conducted to a reservoir, or led at once to the fields for the purposes of irrigation. The bank formed by the excavation, added to the depth of the ditch, renders the impediment in many places insurmountable for troops, and presents a cover of the greatest importance to military operations. The whole route of the British troops had been every where previously examined by the enemy, and where the trench was nearest the road occasional openings had been cut in

the bank: the whole thus affording an excellent ditch with parapet and embrasures for the cover of Tippoo's troops and guns. From one of these impediments the detachment returned with some loss, and not in good order; but the guns, although frequently shifting their position to avoid becoming a mark for the aim of their opponents, were soon silenced by the superior skill and steadiness of the English artillery: a body of infantry, in ambuscade behind a winding of the same work near the head of the column, was soon afterwards discovered and dislodged: all annoyance was removed, the guns were again limbered, and every thing was prepared to continue the march in the most perfect order; but Colonel Baillie, contrary to the declared and earnest opinion of Colonel Fletcher his second in command, and with no other motive that has ever been conjectured, excepting the expected distinction of exhibiting in the morning the junction of his corps without the loss of any of its equipments, a credit of which he might be deprived by errors inseparable from the obscurity of the night, adopted the fatal resolution of remaining where he was until daylight, and a disposition being made for that purpose, the troops actually lay upon their arms during the remainder of the night, without the slightest molestation from the enemy. This ground was distant no more than eight or nine miles from Sir Hector Munro, and had the precious time thus unhappily wasted, been employed in pursuing the march, although every part of the road had been reconnoitred, and impediments every where prepared, there can be no ground of reasonable doubt, that superiority of discipline, always most decided in operations by night, would have enabled him to surmount all opposition, or at least to have continued his march to a point so near to the main army, as to compel the Commander-in-chief, by placing the enemy between two fires, to realize the apprehensions of the French officers.

Sept.10. At day light on the morning of the 10th, the detachment marched, the enemy was soon perceived on the left moving in nearly a parallel direction, and after advancing about two miles through an avenue of trees to a spot where the road inclined to the left on the plain; four or five guns were opened by the enemy in that quarter from a considerable distance. A village was in sight three quarters of a mile in front, which presented a good post with no impediment to its immediate occupation: but instead of seizing this position, or quickening his pace to approach the guns, the line again halted and formed, and this distant cannonade was returned. "The troops remained in crowded order, partly in the avenue, and partly under cover of some banks and a hollow way at the entrance of the plain, the rocket men and irregulars advancing as usual, and the main body keeping at a great distance among some trees and jungul in the rear of their guns."

Shortly afterwards, ten companies of sepoy grenadiers under Captains Rumley and Gowdie were ordered to storm these guns, and three were accordingly carried with the utmost gallantry, when large bodies of horse threatened to cut off the return of the grenadiers: and the cavalry of Hyder's whole army was seen rapidly approaching from the right, almost as near to the main body as was this its detachment. A hurried retreat caused by these appearances had an ill effect on the remainder of the troops, but with the exception of casualties not very numerous, the sepoys resumed their former stations in the position. The demonstration of Hyder's main body of cavalry to charge the line, only masked, as was usual, the movement of his infantry and guns, which by the recession of the cavalry soon became apparent fast approaching from the right: "but although a considerable period intervened during which there was no cannonade, nor body of horse on the plain to prevent it, no manœuvre was undertaken, no attempt

to seize the village, nor any other disposition, but the detachment remained crowded up just as it had entered the plain. Colonel Baillie himself not being on horseback, by running about and over fatigue, rendered himself incapable of deliberate thinking or cool action; and not only the occupation of the village, but a tolerably strong position, which might have supported the left by an adjacent bank and ditch, and the right by a thick part of the avenue, were equally unobserved or neglected. Hyder's guns opened as they got within distance, aided by those which Tippoo had re-taken, until upwards of fifty from different quarters directed a cross fire on this devoted corps, whilst it remained in a helpless posture, presenting the fairest mark: the ten field pieces indeed returned this unequal fire with powerful effect, until their ammunition was exhausted, an event which was hastened by the blowing up of two tumbrils which stood exposed to the enemy's shot. The impression seemed to prevail among the troops of being subjected to destruction without an effort for defence or retaliation. An audible murmur ran through the ranks, many of the grenadiers crying out to be led on. The cannonade had by this time done considerable execution, the enemy's guns drawing nearer and nearer until almost every shot told. The pressure on the rear appeared to be most serious, and Colonel Fletcher caused a company of European grenadiers to move to its support. The whole of the troops had been previously ordered to lie down in their ranks, and as the grenadiers rose to obey the order, the sepoys rose also, and crowded to the rear."

In Hyder's stable horse was an officer named Biccajee Sindia, commanding a *dusta*, (or 1,000 cavalry,) who had been placed in command of a larger division of troops, to the northward of the English army, under Sir Hector Munro, to watch its movements, on the night on which Colonel Fletcher had marched without molestation to join

Baillie; and Hyder had personally and publicly reprobated this misconduct with his usual coarseness and contumely. Biccagee Sindia, stung by this public disgrace, resolved to wipe off the opprobrium, or die in the attempt. On observing the crowding of the sepoys, which has been stated, without waiting for orders, he made a desperate charge at the head of his dusta. Himself, fifteen of his family, and a large portion of his corps fell; but the example, supposed to be the result of an order, was instantly followed by the rest of the cavalry. The European companies of the British corps still preserved their order, but the residue of the sepoys, not destroyed in the charge, became mixed in irretrievable confusion with the carts and other baggage, and either stripped for flight, or kept up a straggling fire without an object, the strange but ordinary effect of panic. "Colonel Baillie, after ordering this fire to cease, went forwards to ask for quarter, by waving his handkerchief, and supposing acquiescence to be signified, he ordered the Europeans, who to the last moment preserved an undaunted aspect and compact order, to lay down their arms. The enemy, although they at first paused, and received him as a prisoner, after being slightly wounded, perceiving the same unauthorized straggling fire to continue, rushed forwards to an unresisted slaughter. Of 86 officers, 36 were killed, or died of their wounds, 34 were wounded and taken; and sixteen were taken not wounded; the carnage among the soldiers, being nearly in the same proportion." Hyder's young soldiers in particular amused themselves with fleshing their swords, and exhibiting their skill on men already most inhumanly mangled; on the sick and wounded in the doolies; and even on women and children; and the lower order of horsemen plundered their victims of the last remnant of clothing: none escaped this brutal treatment, excepting the few who were saved by the humane interposition of the French officers,

and particularly Monsieur Pimorin, of the regular French line, who had joined with a small detachment from Mahé, a short time previous to its capture in 1779; and Monsieur Lally, who has already been introduced to the reader's notice. It is scarcely necessary to add that the whole corps, with all its equipments of every description, was irretrievably and totally lost.

The fatal influence of this disaster on the subsequent events of the war, has induced a more detailed description than accords with the general plan of this work. In the respectable publications which have narrated this transaction, and in the first of that class the historical branch of the Annual Register for 1782, the conduct of Colonel Baillie has been the theme of nearly unqualified applause. Obeying, with painful reluctance, the duties of historical truth, I have transcribed from the journal of one of the survivors, the passages marked by inverted commas, with no other alteration than the merely verbal adaptations which were necessary to connect them with the text; and these quotations correspond in the most material facts, with the oral information of others. It may be added, that Colonel Baillie, an officer hitherto of high reputation, but now exercising for the first time an independent command, had appeared from the moment of his receiving orders to deviate to the westward, to be under the influence of some anticipation of disaster, which disturbed his usual faculties: he loitered three days in advancing the distance of fourteen miles, to the bank of the river, by which his progress was arrested. Even on the 26th, that river, although swollen, was reported by the officer commanding the artillery, to be still passable for his guns; but the passage was delayed till on the next day it became altogether impracticable.

The distance of Sir Hector Munro from this detachment on the morning of the 9th was, according

to his own statement, fourteen miles. At daylight on the 10th, when he discovered that Hyder had departed, he moved also in the direction of Perambaucum. After marching about four miles he fired three signal guns, saw the smoke of the action and moved to the left in a direct line towards it; after marching one mile and a half more he repeated the signals, but had no return; saw a great smoke (the explosion of the tumbrils), and suddenly the firing ceased, but according to the manuscript journal which has been quoted, a considerable period of time would seem to have intervened between the explosion and the ultimate massacre.

Assuming however these measurements to be correct, and taking those in the manuscript journal at the lowest of the estimate, the distance of Sir Hector Munro at the time of the ultimate disaster, was two miles at the most. The facts have been purposely related with a minuteness which renders comment nearly superfluous. But without recurring to prior errors, if any doubt should exist, that during a period of several days, in which the smaller body was in danger from superior numbers, the larger ought to have moved for its preservation: it will probably be inferred by most of my readers, that if the commander of either of these bodies had on the night of the 9th been guided by the ordinary dictates of military experience, both bodies would probably have been saved, and if both had acted aright, that the Mysoreans instead of the English might have suffered discomfiture.

The movements of Sir Hector Munro had been correctly and incessantly reported to Hyder during the action. At its close he distinctly saw the head of an approaching column, and was about to order the accustomed manœuvre of threatening it with large bodies of horse to cover the retreat of his infantry, guns, booty and prisoners, when he had the satisfaction to see it point in nearly an opposite

direction* to the east, and soon afterwards to the south towards Conjeveram. Without attempting to molest these movements, he directed his tents to be pitched about six miles to the westward of the field of action, and sat in state to distribute rewards for the production of captives, and the heads of the slain which were presented before him, "although, to say the truth, he seemed to take no great pleasure in this horrid spectacle, but rather shewed disgust when prisoners were brought in mangled and covered with wounds."† Such surgical aid as his French

* Sir H. Munro's official letter states that he had moved to the left, in the direction of the smoke ; when the firing ceased he moved to the *right*, towards the Trepasore road, and then to Conjeveram, which corresponds with the statement in the text taken from the Mysorean narratives.

† Manuscript journal.

[The Manuscript journal, referred to by Wilks, was the manuscript of "The Life of Hyder Ally" by Francis Robson, Late Captain in the Honorable East India Company's forces. This was published in 1786. Wilks apparently transcribed his extracts from the manuscript, and Robson seems to have abbreviated and altered his manuscript before he published his book. Wilks apparently did not use the book itself. Wilks considers Sir Hector Munro made an inexcusable mistake in detaching Colonel Fletcher and his small force ; most authorities agree with him. But Captain Innes Munro in his *Narrative of the Military Operations against Hyder Ally Cawn*, defended the course taken. However, whether Sir Hector Munro was right in detaching the small force under Colonel Fletcher or not, the conduct of the campaign in other respects must be condemned. Colonel Baillie's decision to rest on the night of the 9th, instead of pushing on, was fatal to success, and Sir Hector Munro's failure to support Colonel Baillie on the 10th was inexcusable. The whole campaign, beginning from the extraordinary confusion of orders from headquarters, which led Colonel Baillie first to set out to the west towards Cuddapah, and then to contemplate marching by the western route by Tirupati, then finally to advance by Tiruvallur and Perumbakkam, instead of direct to Madras, was pursued by ill fortune. Every step was vitiated by error, and yet, with good generalship, the chances were all in favour of the English. Robson remarked : "This victory cost the Mysore army very dear, as the slaughter of their best troops was immense ; and

establishments enabled him to afford, was chiefly the result of their own spontaneous humanity; tolerated rather than commanded.

The barbarism of Hyder's mind, and his strange ignorance of the practical effects of civilization, are evinced in the following incident. Among the prisoners was a son of Colonel Lang,¹ who commanded Vellore, a child rather than a youth, born in India, who was serving as a volunteer. He sent for the boy, and ordered him instantly to write a letter

nothing but the accident of the tumbrils could have saved Hyder from a total defeat. Had the good genius of the English brought up their troops from Conjiveram, during the battle, the Mysore army must have been inevitably ruined—not one battalion of foot or a single gun, would have probably escaped." A curious painting illustrating the defeat of the English was placed on the walls of the Daryá Daulat at Seringapatam. Colonel Baillie is shown sitting in his palanquin biting his thumb in vexation and the tumbrils are seen exploding in the background.]

¹ Colonel Ross Lang commanded at Vellore. He was a Lieutenant in the Madras European regiment in 1758. As a Captain he commanded a battalion of native infantry at the siege of Madura in 1763 and as Lieutenant-Colonel served in the first Mysore War in 1768. In 1777 he acted as Commander-in-Chief during the suspension of Colonel James Stuart, and in 1780 defended Vellore. (*Report on the Palk Manuscripts*, p. 365, note 2.) He married in 1773, Mrs. Anne Oats, widow of Captain Thomas Oats. His son who, if the son of Anne Oats, must have been about six years old, when this story was told of him, was Lieutenant Ross Lang, who entered the army in 1787, became a Major-General in 1813 and died in 1822. (Love: *Vestiges of Old Madras*, Vol. III, p. 225, note 2, and p. 565.) The ecclesiastical records in the India Office show that Colonel Ross Lang married Anne Oats on 15th March 1773, and the Madras baptismal returns give the names of four children, George, Elizabeth, Robert Charles, and Sophia, who were the offspring of their marriage. There is no trace of the baptism of Ross Lang, junior; he must have been born before the 1773 marriage, either out of wedlock or as the result of a previous marriage of which apparently there is no record. His cadet papers are unfortunately missing. But, as he entered the army in 1787, it may well be that he was 15 or 16 in 1780, and Wilks's story of him may be correct. (Information supplied by Mr. W. Foster, India Office, 24th June 1924.)

to his father, offering him a splendid establishment, on the condition of surrendering the place, and announcing that his own death would be the result of refusal. The boy at first received the proposition with a cool rejection; but on being pressed with direct threats, he burst into tears, and addressing Hyder in his own language, "If you consider *me* (said he) base enough to write such a letter; on what ground can you think so meanly of *my father*? It is in your power to present me before the ramparts of Vellore, and cut me into a thousand pieces in my father's presence; but it is out of your power to make him a traitor."* The threats were however renewed by the attendants in a separate tent; but being found ineffectual, the child was remanded to the quarters of the other prisoners.

Among the wounded of this unhappy day were two cases, in the British, and in Hyder's army, the one remarkable from mere fact, the other from characteristic imagination; both individuals were well known to the author upwards of twenty years afterwards, and the facts were confirmed by the testimony of numerous observers. An English artillery man† had received a sabre wound in the back of the neck, which separated the muscles destined to support the head, and it fell accordingly on his chest‡; on being roused by threats and other wounds, this extraordinary man raised his head to its proper position with the aid of his hands, and supporting it in this manner actually performed the march of six miles, and was perfectly cured.

The other was Mahomed Booden, commandant

* The present Major General Lang; I give *the words* as stated by the Mysorean officers present.

† Named Twig, well known afterwards as ordnance serjeant at Amboor.

‡ A medical friend explains, that the *Cucullaris* and *Splini capitis* must have been cut through, and the *biventre*s had also probably received a gash.

of Hyder's artillery. A cannon shot had grazed the back of the occiput, and numerous exfoliations of the skull, which he describes to have afterwards occurred, seem to evince that the contact was severe. He fell, and was supposed to be killed, but almost instantly arose, put on his turban and mounted his horse,* and was found to have received no other apparent injury than a small contusion surmounted by a tumour. The escape of this man became a subject of general conversation in Hyder's army; there could be no doubt of his possessing a charm to avert cannon-balls, and the secret must be invaluable. Tippoo sent for him some days afterwards, and questioned him regarding the charm. He replied (as he always continued to believe) that it was the root of a small plant, which he had purchased from a travelling Hindoo mendicant, to be worn at all times wrapped up in his turban, as an infallible protection to the head. Tippoo desired to see this precious treasure, and after a deliberate scrutiny, very coolly wrapped it up in his own turban for the future defence of his own head, regardless of the fate of Mahommed Booden's, who was perfectly aware, that serious remonstrance would put his head in greater danger than the cannon-balls of the next battle.

Hyder, before day-light on the ensuing morning, moved into his former fortified camp at Mooserwauk,¹ where he was advantageously placed for every event that might occur. He found that his losses, from the resistance of a detachment, did not leave his troops in temper to renew the conflict with the larger body, a measure which every military consideration would otherwise have dictated: the retreat of that body from Conjeeveram at the same hour, left him free to the choice of other measures, and detach-

* He describes the great inconvenience he sustained from seeing objects double, for some time after he mounted.

¹ *Mooserwauk*.—Musaravakkam, a village six miles west of Conjeeveram.

ing a considerable corps to annoy its march, he remained for several days in his fixed camp, making arrangements for the disposal of his prisoners and for resuming the siege of Arcot.

Sir Hector Munro, as we have seen, after the cessation of the firing to the left, had moved to the right, with the expectation (whence derived he does not state) of meeting Colonel Baillie; but a short interval only elapsed before a wounded sepoy unfolded the fatal truth: "the security of the army determined him to return to Conjeeveram," where he arrived about six o'clock. He found that the grain, which had so long bound him to this fatal spot, now amounted to barely one day's consumption, and that he must starve if he remained. At three o'clock in the morning of the 11th, after throwing his heavy Sept. 11. guns and stores into the great tank, he commenced his retreat to Chingleput, where, in consequence of incessant annoyance on the march, involving the loss of a large portion of the stores and baggage, the rear guard did not arrive until nine in the morning of the 12th¹. At this place he expected provisions stored by 12. Mahommed Ali, and, as usual, found none; but was fortunately joined, on the same day, by the important detachment from the south, under Lieutenant Colonel Cosby.

This judicious and enterprizing officer, on receiving orders to join the army, had in his route, made a gallant but unsuccessful attempt, on the morning of the 7th, to recover the strong and important fort of Chittapet, which had been one of the first to open its gates to the enemy: and on approaching Conjeeveram, had timely intelligence by his spies, which induced him to deviate to his right, and join his commander-in-chief, a few hours after his arrival at Chingleput. This place is distant thirty-six miles S. W. from

¹ The distance from Conjeeveram to Chingleput by road is twenty miles, a flat road without obstacles.

Madras, and twenty-seven from St. Thomas's Mount. The Dutch fort of Sadras, on the coast of Coromandel, is distant one easy march along or near to the left bank of the Palâr, in a direction to the southward of east : a movement to this place, would necessarily increase the distance from Madras, and must have been suggested by considerations connected with eventual embarkation. However this may be, the Commander-in-chief could not determine on the 12th,* by which of these two routes he should move, and requested rice in boats, to be sent to the latter place, and to be ready by other conveyance to meet him at St. Thomas's Mount. Happily he adopted the latter alternative : two days food were collected with difficulty from the adjacent villages ; and at six
 Sept. 13. in the evening of the 13th, after depositing his sick in the fort of Chingleput, he marched in the direction of St. Thomas's Mount, which he reached at two
 14. p. m. on the 14th ; and the English army retired in
 15. the morning of the 15th, to a more secure position at Marmalong,¹ with a river covering its front (while Hyder remained in his fortified camp, distant upwards of forty miles) ; thus terminating a campaign of twenty-one days, of which, even at this distance of time, every recollection is associated with sorrow.

A vessel dispatched for the express purpose, conveyed to Bengal this melancholy picture of disaster

* Official letter to Government.

[The letter, dated, Chingleput, 12th September 1780, said : " Please, on receipt of this, to send Rice to meet us at the Mount, and some in Boats to Sadras, as I cannot determine the route I shall take till some Hircarrahs come from the Enemy's Camp or near it, who are gone to bring Intelligence of their Motions. I will march on their Arrival. or as soon as I can get two days' Rice beat out of Paddy."]

¹ Marmalong, about six miles from the Fort, Madras, on the Adyar river where the road to St. Thomas's Mount crosses the river. The bridge over the river here was built in 1786.

and dismay. The Governor-general, as we have already seen, had motives of displeasure and distrust; exclusive of the mere imbecility of this subordinate government, and on the first intelligence of the invasion, waited for further information, before he should offer aid where he could not possibly repose confidence.¹

In the ordinary routine of public business, the mind of Mr. Hastings, elegant, mild, and enlightened, exhibited merely a clear simplicity of means adapted to their end ; it was only in the face of overwhelming danger, that, spurning the puny impediments of faction, he burst through the trammels of vulgar resource, and shewed a master spirit, fitted to grapple with every emergency, and equally capable of saving or creating an empire. The *saviour of India*, (a title conferred on this great man, by the general voice of civilized Europe,) became the convenient sacrifice to political manœuvre; a trial of seven years' duration, terminated in his honourable acquittal, at the bar of his country, of every accusation with which his character had been blackened.

¹ The conduct of Warren Hastings, as regards Sir Thomas Rumbold, who resigned the Governorship of Madras in April 1780, and John Whitehill, who succeeded him as provisional Governor until the 8th November 1780, when he was suspended, is criticized in *A Vindication of the Character and Administration of Sir Thomas Rumbold* by his daughter, Elizabeth Anne Rumbold (1866, Longmans). It is clear, from the papers referred to in this publication, that the Governor-General, as early as June 1780, must have been aware from the information transmitted to him from Madras, that the position then was critical. No attention was paid to the warnings sent to Bengal by Whitehill, and no assistance was sent until the news of Baillie's defeat arrived. It seems not impossible that Warren Hastings himself aided Wilks by his advice, and may have induced Wilks, as the *Vindication* suggests, to make the strong defence of the Governor-General, which he inserts here. As late as January, 1780, Hastings wrote, "I am convinced from Hyder's conduct and disposition, that he will never molest us while we preserve a good understanding with him." (Minute dated 17th January 1780)

To the charge of oppression, an universal people made answer with their astonishment, their blessings, and their prayers. To the crime of receiving corrupt presents, and clandestine extortions, equal to the price of a kingdom, he answered with poverty; and to the accusation of violating his duty to the East India Company and his country, was opposed the simple fact of preserving unimpaired, the territories committed to his charge, during a period, which elsewhere exhibited nothing but national humiliation. The dregs of calumny and prejudice remained unexhausted for eighteen years, for such was the interval, after an honourable acquittal, before the tardy verdict of truth and justice, brought his wisdom and venerable age to aid in the councils of his country. Recollections too strong and too recent to be easily suppressed, must be the apology, if any be required, for this digressive anticipation of subsequent events.

To the financial pressure resulting from the extensive military operations of the Mahratta war on the establishments of Bengal and Bombay, was now added the still more serious weight of a new war in Coromandel and a general confederacy of the principal states for the final extermination of the British power in India. The emergency was met by corresponding energies and new resources, but Mr. Hastings declared his deliberate opinion, that there was no hope of the proper application of these means, "unless Sir Eyre Coote would at this crisis stand forth and vindicate in his own person the rights and honour of the British arms."¹ That officer occupied at this period the situation of Commander-in-chief in India, and member of the Supreme Council. He was advanced in years,² and oppressed by precarious

¹ Minute of the Governor-General read at Council on the 25th September 1780. (*Forest: Selections from State Papers, 1772-85*, Vol. II, pp. 718-20.)

² Sir Eyre Coote was born in 1726 and so was 54.

health; but he obeyed, with what remained of life, this honourable summons to the scene of his early glory. Age and sickness had impaired, in a certain degree, the physical strength and mental energy of this distinguished veteran; but enough remained of both to place him in a high rank among the first generals of his age. He arrived at Madras on the fifth of November, accompanied by such reinforcement of European troops as could be immediately spared;¹ a considerable body of native infantry was ordered to proceed by land, through the territories of Moodajee Bhounsia, one of the Mahratta confederates whom Mr. Hastings found means to neutralize. Sir Eyre Coote was charged with the exclusive direction of the treasure transmitted for the prosecution of the war, and above all he was furnished with orders for the suspension of the governor, Mr. Whitehill, who was succeeded by Mr. Smith, the senior member of council, the same person who had at an early period before the invasion, remonstrated against the apathy of the government in neglecting every branch of military preparation. Nov. 5.

This new administration gave an early pledge of zealous co-operation with the measures of Bengal, by investing Sir Eyre Coote with the sole direction of the war. A spirit of hope, vigour, and emulation, succeeded to torpor and despondency; and the season of the periodical monsoon, when nearly the whole country is inundated by rains, of which the inhabitants of Europe can scarcely form an adequate conception, afforded leisure for equipment, without exhibiting to the enemy the lamentable defects in every department, which remained to be palliated or cured, before the army could move from the cantonments to which

¹ He brought with him a detachment of 330 men of the Bengal European regiment, two companies of artillery, and 630 lascars, (Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, p. 17); also a corps of volunteers numbering 45, mostly Irish. (Wylly: *Life of Sir Eyre Coote*, p. 191.)

they were ostensibly confined by the severity of the season : and during this period, Sir Eyre Coote took the precaution of assembling a council of war, who were unanimous in their opinion " that the army was so far from being properly equipped for a campaign, that the utmost to be expected from taking the field, was the relief of some of the garrisons invested by the enemy ; and this effected, that it ought to return for the security of Madras, the grand national object."

It was the 19th of September before Hyder's arrangements admitted of his moving from his fortified camp near Conjeveram, to resume his ground before Arcot. Mahommed Ali had expended a considerable treasure in surrounding this populous and extensive town with a regular rampart, bastions, and ditch, some miles in circuit, constructed under the direction of an European engineer, according to the most approved principles of modern science, but still destitute of the essential addition of ravelins and lunettes. Hyder's approaches and batteries were formed under the guidance of French officers ; and

Oct. 31. after six weeks' open trenches, having effected two practicable breaches, he ordered a simultaneous assault by two columns, one under the direction of his son Tippoo, and the other under Maha Mirza Khân. The former was repulsed with considerable loss, but the latter penetrated, and enabled Tippoo's column to rally, and succeed in a second attempt. The entrance of the enemy at two separate and distant points, made it necessary for the European troops to retire to the citadel, the same spot, and in nearly the same condition, as when defended for fifty days by the great Clive, with a garrison numerically inferior to that by which it was now occupied : but Hyder's political address was ever superior to his military skill. Mahommed Ali's bramin governor, and viceroy of the province, Raja Beerbur,* was taken prisoner

* A title given by Mahommed Ali, his former name being Achena Pundit.

in the assault; and instead of experiencing the brutality exhibited towards the English prisoners, this governor, and all the Hindoo and Mahomedan prisoners of rank, were treated with distinguished consideration; most of them were restored to their former rank, and Raja Beerbur to the same elevated and confidential office under Hyder, which a few days before he had held under his enemy. These measures were infinitely more efficient than open force; and, through the direct influence of Raja Beerbur himself, a spirit was excited in the native troops of the citadel which left to the European officers no alternative but Nov. 3. a capitulation on favourable terms, which the same policy induced Hyder to execute with fidelity.

It was the 17th of January before Sir Eyre Coote 1781. was enabled to move, with an equipment necessarily Jan. 17 crippled, and inefficient, from the difficulty of obtaining draught and carriage cattle through a country everywhere overspread by hostile cavalry. A partial resource against these essential defects was provided by small vessels, with provisions and stores, to accompany the movements of the army, which, by confining its operations within certain limits, might, at this season of the year, move, in the event of necessity, to its resources at any point on the coast to which the vessels should be directed to repair.

Hyder was engaged at one and the same time, in the siege or the investment of five different fortresses, commanded by English officers, Amboor, Vellore, Wandewash, Permacoil,¹ and Chingleput. The first of these had surrendered on the 13th, the others were still unsubdued. On the 19th, Sir Eyre Coote relieved 19. Chingleput, in which only fifteen days' provisions remained, and on the same day, contrary to general anticipation, crossed the broad and sandy bed of the river Palâr, unmolested by the enemy. About thirteen

¹ *Permacoil*.—Perumukkal, a hill about 7 miles E.S.E. of Tindivanam in South Arcot District, on the road from Tindivanam to Marakkanam on the sea coast.

miles south-west of Chingleput, is the fort of Carrangooly, in the centre of a fertile country ; the works of this place had been improved by Hyder, and furnished with a garrison of 700 men : erroneous intelligence had been conveyed to Sir Eyre Coote that the enemy was in the act of removing the provisions and the garrison ; and for the purpose of securing the largest possible portion of the former precious article, he made a detachment at midnight of the 20th, of 1000 men, under Captain Davis, and followed with the army at the usual hour of marching. Instead of a dismantled post, Captain Davis found, on approaching it, about five in the morning, an adequate garrison perfectly prepared for his reception. He pushed on however in obedience to his orders, and the place being unprovided with a draw-bridge ; a twelve pounder was rapidly run up to the first gate, which was blown open at the second discharge, so as to admit a single man ; after clearing this impediment, a second and a third gate presented themselves, and were forced with augmented difficulty, in a similar manner ; the assailants in the traverses of the gate, being, during the whole period exposed to the enemy's musquetry from above. With the exception of about one hundred killed, most of the enemy escaped on the opposite side, by ladders previously provided for such an event ; a precaution which probably weakened the energy of defence. The loss of the assailants was comparatively heavy,¹ but the effect produced on the English army, by this opening of the campaign, was highly useful after the late disasters ; and a respectable quantity of grain found in the place tended

¹ The army under Sir Eyre Coote consisted of 4 regiments of Nawab's cavalry and a European troop, 4 5½-inch howitzers, 2 18-pounders, 4 12-pounders and 34 6-pounders ; the 73rd regiment and one battalion of the Madras European regiment ; seven battalions of sepoy, the Trichinopoly detachment, 8 companies of grenadiers from the Northern Circars, a company of marksmen, and one company of pioneers, making up in all

farther to improve the impressions arising from this first enterprize.

The next object was Wandewash, distant twenty-three miles, in a direction nearly west, the actual condition of which it will be necessary to describe. On the first preparation for the investment of the place early in December, the wives and families of the sepoys had, contrary to Lieutenant Flint's wishes and remonstrances, departed with the hope of being permitted to reside without molestation among their friends in the villages of the protected part of the country. Hyder caused all these unhappy persons to be collected, and (the approaches having been previously carried to within fifty yards of the ditch) at daylight in the morning of the 30th December, this motley crowd, surrounded by guards, and preceded by a flag of truce, were perceived approaching the place, the women and children screaming, and the old men imploring the troops to deliver up the place as the only means of preserving them from the most barbarous treatment. The moment was critical: besides the commandant there was only one European in garrison; every other man had either a wife or some other object of affection in the groupe; the few who were on that face of the works strongly objected to the use of cannon, which were all loaded, and whatever should be done was to be effected by the single hand of the commandant. Fortunately the bearer of the flag was considerably advanced, and in a direction which admitted of pointing at him clear of the crowd: after due notice, Lieutenant Flint, regardless of the remonstrances of his sepoys, fired and had the satisfaction to see the flag fall, and a few

almost 8,000 infantry, 800 cavalry and 62 pieces of artillery. 1,600 of these were Europeans. The losses at Karunguli were, killed 3 Europeans and 8 sepoys, wounded 59. (Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*.) The Government of Fort St. George on the 29th November reported to the Directors that Haidar's force consisted probably of 700 Europeans, 70,000 foot. 30,000 horse and 100 pieces of cannon.

additional discharges close over the heads of the crowd, caused the whole to retire with the utmost precipitation. All this was effected, and the whole had disappeared, before the principal part of the garrison, resting from the fatigues of the night, were apprized of the circumstance : their presence would probably have caused it to terminate in a different manner.

- The subsequent operations were in the ordinary routine of a siege, and of sorties, planned and executed with such skill and coolness, as to be always
- Jan. 16. successful without material loss. On the 16th of January the enemy had entered the ditch by galleries in two places on the west face, and another gallery from the south was nearly ready for the same operation ; but in the course of this day great bustle appeared among the besiegers, a large proportion of the tents were struck and many of the troops marched. At two o'clock on the morning of the
17. 17th, a heavy fire of musquetry and cannon was heard in the direction of the expected relief, and was continued with every indication of a severe action until day break, when a column of about 3000 infantry, dressed and accoutred like British sepoys, approached with English colours flying, drew up behind a village near to the east face, and discharged their cannon at bodies of horse making demonstrations of preparing to charge. At the same moment the troops in the two attacks abandoned their trenches with precipitation, and marched off in the direction of Arcot. Every individual in the garrison was deceived with the single exception of the commandant ; one part of the operation was performed in a manner which could not escape his scrutinizing and experienced eye. The cannon shot discharged at the approaching bodies of horse were seen to graze in directions clear of their object, and were fired at distances not belonging to the practice of British artillery. He had the greatest difficulty in undeceiving

his garrison and keeping them at their posts; but they were ultimately convinced by the evident hesitation of the pretended relief; at this moment Lieutenant Flint ventured to detach a large portion of his little garrison unperceived into the works of the western attack; the galleries into the ditch were destroyed, the materials for filling the ditch set on fire, and the smoke arising from this operation was the first indication to large bodies of the enemy who were in ambush in every direction, and pushed for the recovery of their works. The signal for the return of the sortie was promptly observed, their prescribed route was by the southern attack, the trenches of which they scoured, killing or making prisoners every man who had been left concealed in both attacks. All this was effected without the loss of a man; but a small guard which had been sent to watch the pretended friends on being accosted by men whom they personally knew, were in spite of previous warning completely deceived and prevailed on to enter the village where they were made prisoners. Two of the number were sent back with proposals for a capitulation, an answer was returned from the cannon of the place, and the enemy hastened to re-occupy their cover.¹ The five succeeding days were employed in repairing the damages resulting from this abortive attempt; but on the 22d, movements were observed evidently of a serious nature occasioned by intelligence then unknown to the garrison of the capture of Carangooly by assault on the preceding morning; the batteries and trenches were evacuated on this day, and the tents and baggage sent off in the direction of Arcott. On the 23d, Jan. 23. the enemy disappeared, and on the succeeding day Sir Eyre Coote had the satisfaction of seeing the

¹ An interesting account of this attempt to take Wandewash is given in *The History of Hyder Naik Kirmani*, where the scheme is said to have been the work of Lally and the French soldiers in Hyder's army. Pp. 434, 435.

British colours still flying on the ramparts while only one day's ammunition remained to the garrison.¹

The admiration of this experienced soldier was unbounded, at all he saw of the resources which had been employed, and at the little which he heard in the modest recital of Lieutenant Flint: the interest of the scene was heightened, by a coincidence which this veteran deemed worthy of notice in his public dispatches, that the siege had been raised on the 22d of January, the same day of the same month, on which, twenty-one years before, he had raised the siege of the same place by a memorable battle: and to complete the association of ideas, he encamped upon the same field. Sir Eyre Coote recommended the immediate promotion of Lieutenant Flint to the rank of captain, which was acceded to by his government; but this distinction was rendered nugatory by a subsequent determination* of the Court of Directors, as an inconvenient deviation from the established routine of their service—the rise by seniority alone: a rule upon the whole, perhaps, wisely adapted to actual circumstances, but at best productive of negative good; repressing, without question, the vice of partiality and favoritism, but crushing the legitimate excitements to military enterprize. It is true, that some highly distinguished branches of the royal army, are governed by this rule: but it is relieved by particular brevets for distinguished service; similar to that of

¹ The garrison consisted of—

14th battalion, one company,

15th battalion, one company,

12th battalion, one officer and 37 men.

The only English were Lieutenant Flint and Ensign Moore. Innes Munro estimated the attacking force at 11,000 foot and 22,000 horse and artillery. (Innes Munro: *Narrative of the Military Operations against Hyder Ally Cawn*, pp. 209-210.)

* Lieutenant Bishop, commanding Permaccoll, and Ensign Moore, the only officer with Lieutenant Flint, were in the same predicament.

which the benefit was most unwisely denied to Captain Flint, and the same unqualified rule of seniority alone continues its depressing influence over the Indian army to the present day.

As the course of our narrative will not again lead to any detailed notice of Wandewash, it may be interesting to explain one of the modes by which grain was obtained for the consumption of the garrison, and an occasional aid to the supplies of the army; the villages under Hyder's protection, and in full culture, were sufficiently near to admit of occasional enterprize by night, but instead of desultory success which would dry up the source of supply, Lieutenant Flint conceived, and absolutely executed the idea, of laying them all under a secret, but regular contribution, on the condition of leaving them unmolested; these contributions were faithfully and punctually delivered by night, and were managed with such address, as completely to elude the knowledge or the suspicion of Hyder during the whole course of the war.

Before Sir Eyre Coote left Wandewash, he ascertained that Hyder had raised the sieges of Permacoil, and even of Vellore, indicating the intention of a general action, which circumstances induced him to postpone.

On the 25th, a French fleet appeared off Madras, Jan. 25. the intelligence was rapidly conveyed to Hyder, who anticipated with confidence the arrival of the expected co-operation, and a farther interval elapsed before he was apprized that no land forces were on board. The appearance of this fleet was announced to Sir Eyre Coote on the day of his departure from Wandewash for the relief of Permacoil. He instantly retraced his steps towards Madras, but on farther intelligence relieved Permacoil, and from thence moved towards Pondicherry with the view of destroying the boats, an operation which was eminently useful in impeding the communications of the hostile

fleet through a surf nearly impassable by boats of European construction, and for the necessary purpose of demolishing what remained of military resources, which had been employed in a manner inconsistent with the terms of the capitulation, the political condition of the place, and the peculiar indulgence which had been extended to the inhabitants, for such is the character involved in the levy and equipment of troops for the service of the enemy.

Feb. 7. These services were still imperfectly accomplished, when Hyder's army appeared in great force. On receiving intelligence of the appearance of the French fleet, and of Sir Eyre Coote having in consequence commenced his march to Madras, Hyder, with the view of throwing himself by forced marches between the General and that place, moved rapidly to Conjeveram; but on his arrival learning that Sir Eyre Coote, instead of pursuing his march in the direction of the capital, had resumed a southern route, he followed, by forced marches, with his cavalry, select infantry, and all his lighter equipments. The presence of the enemy's fleet had frustrated the project of supplying the English army by sea; and in moving to Pondicherry Sir Eyre Coote had calculated, from intelligence doubly defective, not only on finding a few days' provisions in that populous town, but from Hyder's reported position, on being enabled to reach the fertile countries south of the Coleroon before him, and thereby to obviate every risk of want. There was but one day's rice in camp, it was impossible, with this stock, to attempt a movement to the northward: the direction of Hyder's march pointed south towards Cuddalore, and nothing remained but the desperate alternative of moving still farther from the main source of supply at Madras to cover Cuddalore, which it was of main importance either to dismantle or protect, to prevent its becoming a *dépôt* and point of support for the future operations of the land forces expected from

France. The supplies at that place were known not to exceed three days' food, but in any other direction he could have found none. Sir Eyre Coote accordingly moved in a direction parallel to that of the enemy about two p. m.; while day-light continued he experienced little annoyance, and a heavy and continued cannonade throughout the night neither materially impeded his march, nor produced any serious casualties, excepting the loss of some stores. Arrived at Cuddalore (the French fleet being still at Feb. 8. Pondicherry) his situation became critical, and may most suitably be described in his own words. "I cannot command rice enough to move either to the northward or the southward. I offered him (Hyder) battle yesterday, but I no sooner shewed myself, than he moved off, and has taken possession of and strengthened all the roads leading to the southward. I have written to Nagore in the most pressing terms 11. for supplies—I depend upon every effort in your power—every thing must be risked to assist me—my difficulties are great indeed. I need say no more to induce you to take such steps as will speedily enable me to act as becomes a soldier." Hyder perfectly 12. apprized of these facts had made detachments to the southward to lay waste the country round Nagore, and cut off its communications with the sources of supply in the interior, and he depended on the services of the French fleet to augment the difficulties of the British army. Without possessing the means of forming a correct judgment regarding the motives which may have influenced the measures of the French admiral, Monsieur d'Orves, the proposition is unquestionable, that had he continued his co-operation in these measures by preventing supplies in any direction by sea, the campaign and the existence of the British army must in the opinion of its commander-in-chief, and according to all human calculation, have soon been brought to a fatal close. The sudden elation at an unexpected relief from these

gloomy forebodings is strongly depicted in the following brief dispatch. "The French fleet under sail standing to the eastward: there is not a moment to be lost in sending me provisions—that supplied, I will answer for the rest."

The intermediate days before the arrival of supplies, like many of the preceding, were passed in a precarious dependence for food on the skill and industry of the persons employed to discover subterranean hoards of grain,* and when these difficulties were in some degree relieved by the arrival of supplies by sea from Madras and Nagore, the reduced state of the draught and carriage cattle, rendered it impracticable to carry even one day's provisions, and fixed the army to the ground which it occupied. Hyder deemed it imprudent to attempt a decisive attack on an army, which, in the event of discomfiture, could retire on a fortress in its rear. Contemplating also the hilly and confined space which must bound his own rear in any attack, as unfavourable to the precaution which he uniformly adopted, of preparing, as the first preliminary to an action, clear, open, and well-finished roads for the retreat of his guns; he determined to leave in the vicinity of Cuddalore, such a body as was sufficient to prevent its deriving any supplies from the interior. He reduced and occupied in force all the intermediate posts between the English army and the southern provinces, and proceeded with the main army to the northern bank of the Coleroon, from whence he made large detachments into the territory of Tanjore. Without attempting the capital of that country, he occupied such posts as commanded its territorial revenues, and enabled him to apply its resources to the support of his own army, and still farther to augment the difficulties of his enemy in any operation to be attempted in that direction. Sir Eyre Coote had no

* See p. 552, Vol. I.

prospect of relief from the embarrassments of his situation, excepting from the opportunity of a general action, which it was highly improbable that the enemy would afford. His force, originally insufficient, had been reduced by casualties and by detachments to garrison Carangooly, and reinforce Wandewash. Some native troops from the south had been prepared to join by land, but were effectually prevented by the dispositions which have been stated. Mr. Huddleston, of the civil service, had, however, managed with energy and skill the collection and embarkation of grain and other supplies at Nagore; and an arrangement was made for embarking the detachment at this place, to be conveyed by sea to join the main army. The vicinity had previously been laid waste by Hyder, to prevent communication with the interior; and a small redoubt, hastily constructed for the purpose, was the sole protection of the factory, and the only cover to eventual embarkation.

Immediately after the embarkation of this detachment, consisting of two battalions, a considerable force of infantry and guns under Mons. Lally entered the town, but the previous dispositions had been made with such care, that not only the troops on shore were saved, but all the public and private property was embarked without loss. A detachment which had been serving under Colonel Goddard in the Mahratta war, consisting of a battalion and a May half of native troops and two companies of Europeans also accompanied Admiral Hughes's fleet on his return from the western coast of the peninsula, and farther strengthened the army. But numerical force 25. without the means of movement tended little to relieve its complicated embarrassments. All that vigilance and energy could accomplish was incessantly attempted to procure immediate supply or the means of future equipment; and among the losses sustained by the enemy, was that of Sidee Hellal the commandant, an Abyssinian, and an officer of distinguished

reputation. From the 8th of February till the 16th of June, the army was certainly stationary, with the exception of one ineffectual demonstration of a single march to relieve Tiagar,¹ a hill fort fifty miles to the westward, commanded by Lieutenant Roberts, which June 7. fell on the 7th of June for want of ammunition; but during the whole of that period few nights elapsed in which detachments were not abroad, supported on the ensuing day by the whole or various portions of the line, which, by varying their directions and modes of proceeding, frequently succeeded in procuring from distances supposed to be too great for a forced march, flocks of sheep and droves of cattle, which not only furnished food for the troops, but gradually, although slowly, added a few oxen of a proper description for the departments of ordnance, stores, and provisions.

During this long and mortifying delay,² the government of Madras naturally regretting a state of apparent inaction, which consumed the resources of the state as rapidly as an active campaign, transmitted to Sir Eyre Coote an elaborate exposition of his present military situation, disclaiming however any intention of interfering with the conduct of the war, which they had committed to his guidance, and meaning to aid his decisions, by submitting to his judgment the result of their own deliberations on the

¹ *Tiagar*.—Tyaga Drug, almost due west of Cuddalore, in the Kallakurchi Taluq, South Arcot District, on the road to Salem. The rock rises almost perpendicularly, 740 feet above the plain. It was captured by the French in 1759. Roberts held the fort with two companies of the Company's sepoys and two of the Nawab's. It surrendered, Roberts having exhausted all his ammunition.

² Sir Thomas Munro, probably correctly, thought that Sir Eyre Coote remained at Cuddalore, for good reasons. His army was small, insufficiently furnished with cavalry and cattle, and he desired to keep Haidar in the south, while Colonel Pearse, with the Bengal reinforcements, was marching south. He reached Ellore on the 20th May. (Gleig: *The Life of Sir Thomas Munro*, Vol. I, pp. 35-36.)

actual state of public affairs, and the reasoning which might affect his adoption of a northern or a southern movement. Among the most perceptible changes superinduced by years and ill health, was a defect in that admirable serenity of temper which had strengthened and embellished his earlier military virtues. Surrounded by difficulties, which appeared to be insuperable, he had frequently seemed to ascribe to the Government impediments which they were strenuously labouring to remove; and as suddenly acknowledged their zeal on the receipt of any unexpected supply. This exposition was treated, justly perhaps, but with unnecessary asperity, as a covert attack on his military character, by persons unqualified to form a military opinion. Nothing, he said, but his zeal for the interests of his country could have originally induced him to undertake the charge of an army so miserably equipped, as to be pronounced unfit for service before it had moved. After reciting the motives and results of the few measures he had been enabled to risk, and the utility of his present position with reference to the expected French forces, and preventing Hyder from undertaking the sieges of either Trichinopoly or Tanjour, he intimates that if he had been invested with any powers besides those which he derived from his commission as Commander-in-chief of the British forces in India, such powers had only loaded him with labour and anxiety foreign to his duties, and appertaining to themselves. "Having stated, (he adds,) the circumstances which proved the impossibility of marching this army at all, it does not seem immediately necessary that I should enter upon an enquiry, whether a southern or a northern movement is to be preferred." If a movement of necessity should be made, (and by the non-arrival of supplies which ought to have been sent, that necessity appeared to be approaching,) he must move northwards, which he adds "I am happy in thinking I shall do without

apprehending any material danger from even a more formidable enemy than a body of horse, which you have, with so much precision, pointed out as the only impediment I am likely to meet with in taking a northern route. In justice to both myself and the service, I promise you that the army I now command, shall not remain a moment unemployed, if you will only supply me with provisions, and the means of carrying them." While thus animadverting on opinions drawn from crude and partial views, it is instructive to observe this respectable veteran, uniting with the Government whose suggestions he condemns, in the most decisive inferences with regard to the general policy of the British state in India, drawn from the insulated application of that policy to the affairs of Fort St. George alone, while the interests of the other establishments, and the difficulty of adopting the measures proposed, were either overlooked or treated as points of minor consideration. The Government of Bombay deprecated the war with Hyder. The Government of Fort St. George, uniformly affected to consider the Mahratta war as the efficient cause of Hyder's invasion. Sir Eyre Coote dissented from this opinion, but anxiously concurred in the positive necessity of a Mahratta peace. He severely arraigned the conduct of Colonel Goddard, his military inferior, on the western side of India, who was invested with diplomatic powers from the Government-general, for not employing those powers to terminate the Mahratta war, a criticism which, if their relative situations had admitted the retort, might have formed a pretty exact parallel in recommending to Sir Eyre Coote an immediate peace with Hyder, who, like the Mahrattas, and most other powers, would be averse to peace in the direct ratio of his success in war; a proposition which the conduct of the Mahratta nation had made familiar at Bombay.

Colonel Goddard had in effect made very

strenuous efforts for the termination of the Mahratta war. On receiving his diplomatic instructions towards the close of 1780, he had offered to the consideration of that state reasonable terms to serve as the basis of a treaty, and proposed a general cessation of hostilities: these propositions were treated with silence and contempt, exactly because the affairs of the English were deemed to be in an unprosperous state. Colonel Goddard concentrated every possible means at his disposal to remove that impression; and in February 1781 made a demonstration of attacking the enemy's capital by ascending the Bore ghaut, when he hoped to treat with better effect. He was permitted to ascend, but the whole force of the state was prepared, if he should advance, to prevent his return. He was in greater force than the army which surrendered at Worgaum in 1779; and the Mahrattas, deeming it possible that he would be able to reach Poona, deliberately prepared to set the capital on fire, together with every thing intermediate that could furnish forage or subsistence, in order that they might insure his unconditional surrender. The experience of 1779; the unexpected numbers and quality of the troops by which he perceived himself to be opposed; the utter hopelessness of advance to any useful purpose, and the determined rejection of negotiation, except on terms which it was impossible to admit; all combined to convince Colonel Goddard of the expediency of retracing his steps. His first retrograde movement was the signal for determined attack, and he effected his retreat with the utmost difficulty. Having practically ascertained that the resources at his disposal, were not sufficient for an effective diversion into the interior, he reserved such troops as were necessary for the operations on the coast, and returned those of the Madras establishment, which at the period in question, were actually on their voyage to join Sir Eyre Coote. Of the local and subordinate authorities, Colonel Goddard thus

appears to have taken the most impartial view of the general interests of the state.¹

Each presidency seemed to attach a paramount importance to its own local objects; and the Government of Madras seconding the opinions of the Commander-in-chief, reiterated their condemnation of the origin, the continuance, and the consequences of the Mahratta war, and stated to the Government-general the urgent necessity of its termination; as if the case had no parallel to the war in which they were themselves engaged, or could be terminated by different measures, or by an opposite consideration of the motives which influence human conduct. Mr. Hastings, placed in a situation which gave him a more enlarged view, and possessing a scope of mind adapted to the high and perilous station which he occupied, answered to the propositions which accompanied this recommendation. "We (viz. the Governor-general and council) wish for peace with the Mahratta state, but we will not make it on terms dishonourable to ourselves; we will not disgrace the English name, by submitting to conditions which cannot be complied with, without a sacrifice both of our honour and our interest: yet such are the conditions prescribed in the paper before us (prepared by Mahommed Ali). The distress which the Company's arms had suffered, and their belief of our consequent inability to support the war against them, has raised their presumption, and induced them to insist on terms

¹ General Goddard was pressed in March 1781 by Sir Eyre Coote to bring about a peace with the Mahrattas. (Letter in Forest's *Selections, Marātha Series*, Vol. I, p. 446.) Colonel Goddard in 1778 had been entrusted by Warren Hastings with instructions to treat with the Mahrattas and the power of the Bombay Government over the army under him was suspended. In 1780 Colonel (now General) Goddard was appointed Commander-in-Chief of Bombay, but he was still entrusted with his former powers from Bengal. (For an account of his dealings with the Mahrattas, see Grant Duff: *History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. II, Chap. XXIX.)

which the worst state of our affairs would not warrant us in yielding to. We are now morally convinced, that nothing but a vigorous and successful prosecution of the war, will prevail on them to make peace, or overcome their present disinclination to it. Peace is our object, and we are determined to pursue the only means which appear to us to lead to its honourable accomplishment."

The wretched equipment of Sir Eyre Coote's army kept him stationary in the neighbourhood of Cuddalore until the middle of June: its march to June. any distance from the sea was literally impracticable; and along the coast was only possible, with the substitution of ships for an ordinary commissariat. Every movement to be attempted, was consequently dependent on the co-operation of the British admiral, for the protection of the transports; and for the more awful purpose which entered into the cool calculations of this interesting veteran, of saving the wreck of his army, in the event of total discomfiture in that general action, which it was the uniform object of all his measures to force upon the enemy.

The village of Porto Novo¹ (or Feringepet) is situated on the north bank of the river Vellaar close to the sea. The fortified pagoda of Chillumbrum² is three miles south of that river, and about twenty-six miles

¹ Porto Novo, from Portuguese, (Tamil name, *Farangi-pettai*, European town) 15 miles south of Cuddalore, 32 miles south of Pondicherry, at the mouth of the river Vellar. Formerly of considerable prosperity. An agreement for making a settlement was obtained for the English in 1681, from the then ruler of Ginji. The Danes and Portuguese were already there. In 1748 an English Resident was appointed. In 1758 it was captured by the French, who were driven out in 1760. In 1824 iron works were established here, with iron ore brought down from the Salem District, but the enterprise was soon abandoned. The place proved very unhealthy, and cast iron tomb stones with inscriptions and the ruins of furnaces are all that remain of the venture.

Chillumbrum.—Chidambaram, a town with 18,000 inhabitants, 21 miles S.S.W. from Cuddalore. A Siva temple occupies 39 acres in the centre of the town. In the centre is the shrine of

in the same direction from Cuddalore. This pagoda was one of the posts materially strengthened by Hyder, for the double purpose of arresting his enemy's progress to the southward, and serving as a *depôt* for provisions for the eventual use of his own army, and that of his French allies; purposes which rendered it of corresponding importance to Sir Eyre Coote, that he should attempt its reduction. He moved on 16. the 16th June, and on the 18th at noon, crossed the 18. Vellaar. Finding that the enemy was nowhere near it in considerable force, and being greatly misinformed regarding its garrison, which was reported to be but a few hundred irregulars, and actually consisted of nearly three thousand men, partly regulars, and the remainder the distinguished peons of Chittledroog under Jehan Khân,* an officer of reputation; he determined in pursuance of this defective information, to attempt carrying it on the same night by a *coup de main*. Four battalions of sepoys with eight† pieces of ordnance, moved under his own immediate direction at dusk; they carried the pettah or town without difficulty, and pushed on with rapidity to a second line of defence, which surrounded the place at the distance of about one hundred yards: the gate of this line of works was forced by a twelve pounder, and the troops advanced under a heavy fire, with the greatest spirit to the body of the place, the entrance into which was protected by the usual Indian apparatus of winding traverses, and three successive gates, built up behind with a few feet of masonry to prevent

Parvati, a building of great beauty. The temple is the property of the local Brahmins, and the Hindus of Ceylon and Madura contribute largely to its support. It is held in great sanctity by the Hindus of South India.

In 1753 the French occupied the temple of Chidambaram, on its being evacuated by the English. In 1760 it surrendered to the English. Hyder took it, and in 1780 improved the defences.

* The officer mentioned in page xxix of the preface, and from whom I received the details, which relate to his own measures.

† Two 12 pounders, four 6 pounders, and two howitzers.

their being blown open. The first gate was forced after some difficulty, and the outer area between the first and second, being as usual inadequately flanked or commanded, the troops succeeded in forcing the second gate also; but for the area between the second and third gates, commanded by the rampart of the body of the place, and lined with thatched huts, where a portion of the garrison usually resided, a better preparation was arranged. Exclusively of the ordinary means of defence, bundles of straw had been placed on the rampart in reserve, with vessels of oil ready to moisten them and encrease the combustion: a few lighted port-fires dropped down on the straw roofs, gave a commencement to the flame, and the bundles of oiled straw successively thrown down, converted into a mass of flame nearly the whole area to be passed: as a farther defence, if even the third gate should be forced, a select body of Chittledroog spearmen were placed in reserve on each side of the interior of the gate. But the retreat of the assailants rendered this reserve unnecessary; nothing could prevail on the sepoys to rally, and the officers and artillery-men compelled to abandon one gun drew off the remainder with great difficulty and serious loss. The small amount of the European troops, and a desire of reserving them for greater emergencies, had prevented their employment in this enterprize; but on being thus foiled, Sir Eyre Coote ordered up the grenadiers of the army with the intention of resuming the assault; but before their arrival, being better informed of the actual means of defence possessed by the garrison, he drew off the whole in the course of the night, carrying with him a small supply of grain which had been found in the pettah; and after the lapse of four days re-crossed the river, and encamped near the village of Porto Novo.¹

¹ The casualties in this attack were—

Killed.—1 Sergeant, 1 rank and file.—Europeans.

1 Subadar and 72 rank and file.—Natives.

Admiral Sir Edward Hughes in the *Superb*, June 24. arrived from Madras on the 24th, and was visited by the General on the ensuing day. He brought intelligence of the arrival of Lord Macartney to assume the government of Madras; and of his being charged with orders for the immediate commencement of hostilities against the Dutch possessions in India. On proceeding to consult regarding the measures which became requisite in consequence of this important intelligence, the admiral's first suggestion was a descent on Negapatam, aided by a detachment from the army; but on examining their resources, it was found that exclusively of the danger of detaching from a body already too small, if the object should not be accomplished within twelve days, the army would be left without food. It was therefore resolved, that the united efforts of the fleet and army should be directed to the early reduction of Chillumbrum; and the preparation of fascines and gabions having already commenced with this view, arrangements were immediately ordered for landing the battering train. Sir Eyre Coote had however scarcely returned to camp, when he received intelligence of the presence of Hyder's whole army within the distance of a few miles.

During the four months in which Sir Eyre Coote had necessarily been fixed at Cuddalore, Hyder, expecting to draw him from that position by his proceedings to the southward, had abstained from the regular siege of Tanjore or Trichinopoly, as an operation which might embarrass the rapid movements essential to his future plans. Exclusively of minor interprizes, in which he was generally successful, he considered his time to be not unprofitably

Wounded.—2 Captains, 3 Lieutenants, 2 Lieutenant fire workers, 1 Ensign, 2 Sergeants and 6 rank and file.—Europeans.

7 Native officers, 105 other Natives.

Missing.—3 Europeans and 34 Natives. (Wylly: *Life of Sir Eyre Coote*, p. 221.)

employed in the occupation of every tenable post, and the means of realizing the revenues of the whole country, the collection of an enormous booty in money and merchandize, and the transmission to the upper country of all that was moveable, including immense herds of cattle. The human race was made the unrelenting object of similar calculation; weavers and their families were collected and forcibly sent to people the island of Seringapatam. Captive boys destined to the exterior honour of Islam, were driven to the same place with equal numbers of females, the associates of the present, and the mothers of a future race of military slaves. On receiving from Jehan Khân the intelligence of what had occurred at Chillumbrum, a forced movement of one hundred miles in two days and a half, placed him between the English army and Cuddalore, and he immediately began to fortify a position scarcely three miles from the English encampment, covering the whole country with cavalry, to prevent the possibility of intelligence, regarding either its strength or situation, and thus rendering the camp guards "the boundary and limited extent of their knowledge."* This position was taken with the view not only of frustrating the intended operations against Chillumbrum, but of covering his own against the fort of Cuddalore, the destined depôt of his French allies, while his position should render it impracticable for the English army to move in any direction, or receive any supply, excepting from the sea.

In these critical circumstances, Sir Eyre Coote had recourse to the opinion of a council of war. The June 27. preparations for the siege were discontinued; the battering guns, and every possible impediment embarked, and four days' rice, to be carried on the soldiers' backs, was landed for the purpose of enabling the army to manœuvre for turning or forcing the

* Sir Eyre Coote's words.

[From his account of the Battle dated 6th July 1781.]

enemy's position, or bringing on a general action. Sir Edward Hughes being requested to cover Cuddalore with a portion of the squadron, and with the remainder to watch over the operations of the army, or the embarkation of its wreck during the few ensuing days which were to determine its eventual triumph or possible annihilation.

July 1. By seven o'clock on the 1st of July, the British army had drawn out of its ground of encampment. The direction of the road to Cuddalore pointed north north-west, leaving on its left the termination of a lagoon.* Considerable bodies of cavalry, with this lagoon in the rear of their right and centre, appeared covering the plain, but were destined to retreat, as the English army should advance. Hyder's select cavalry, accompanied by some light artillery, was drawn up behind this lagoon, fronting the north, ready to operate on the British army in flank, when it should have passed the end of the lagoon, and be embarrassed by the batteries in front. Sir Eyre Coote, utterly uninformed of the nature and position of the enemy's works, could only reconnoitre at the head of his little army, which he formed into two lines fronting north a little west, and advanced in order of battle over the plain, his numbers being necessarily diminished by a strong baggage-guard which moved between his right and the sea. After marching in this order little more than a mile and a half, the position of the enemy's works was clearly distinguished. The ground which they occupied was strengthened with great judgment and skill, by front and flanking batteries, in a line which crossing the road to Cuddalore, extended from commanding grounds on the right, to a point on the left, where the sand hills of the shore were thought to oppose sufficient difficulties, and form a support to that flank. An hour was passed by Sir Eyre Coote, in examining

* Noticed in the Mysorean, but not in the English narratives, althot gh inserted in Pringle's topographical manuscript map.

with his accustomed coolness and penetration, the critical circumstances in which he was placed, the army being during that period, exposed to a distant but incessant cannonade on their front, from the batteries and guns advanced from that position, and on the left flank from the guns which had been moved from behind the lagoon; but in order that their limited store of ammunition might be reserved for more decisive purposes, the English artillery was strictly prohibited from returning a single shot.

At nine o'clock Sir Eyre Coote had determined on his measures; and without any previous movement among the troops that should indicate a change of disposition, he ordered both his lines to break into column, by the simple tactic of that day, of facing to the right, a battalion from the left of each line changing their front, for the purpose of protecting that most exposed flank, and covering the whole interval between the lines. In this order he moved with rapidity and precision to the right, to the eastward of the range of sand hills which follow the direction of the coast, at the distance of about eleven hundred yards from the sea, and which covered the greater portion of this movement, until he reached an opening in that range, where it was discovered that a practicable road had been made by Hyder, for far other purposes than the approach of his enemy: a commanding sand hill close to this opening was also fortunately unoccupied. The British general penetrated this pass with the first line; and after clearing it of a strong corps charged with its defence, deployed again into order of battle, with his front to the west, and waiting with impatience under a heavy fire until the sand hill should be effectually possessed by the artillery of his second line, he moved on with the first, as fast as order and an advancing fire of artillery would admit; a long and thick caldera*

* *Pandanus odoratissima*. Ainslie, page 145.

hedge covering his right, and his left being protected by a corps and some guns in column. The artillery in Hyder's batteries had already been withdrawn to a new line at right angles with the first, formed with considerable promptitude, and defended with great obstinacy. After a long and tremendous cannonade, the British line still slowly and gradually advancing, and availing themselves, with the greatest military address, of every successive advantage of ground; an attempt was made to break and overwhelm it by a general charge of cavalry, directed diagonally on the angle of the left: this also failed by the superior fire and steadiness of the British troops; and it was not until four o'clock that Sir Eyre Coote succeeded in forcing the enemy's line and compelling it to a precipitate retreat.

In the mean while, the advantage of the judicious position so promptly and ably assigned to the second line became eminently conspicuous. A strong body of infantry with their guns, and a very large mass of cavalry were detached to fall upon the rear of the British army. A close and severe contest ensued between this body and the second line, which obstinately disputed every point, drove them from the contiguous heights which they attempted to seize, and foiled all their efforts to charge and force this most important position; the occupation of which enabled the first line to advance, not only without apprehension for their rear, but with the most important aid from the artillery which occupied the heights: and the same position enabled the baggage guard to take post without molestation between the northern extremity of this range and the sea. The success of these efforts, in which the select corps of Hyder's army were employed, was necessary to the developement of a more general operation, and Hyder becoming impatient at this obstinate resistance, and the consequent progress of the first line, ordered a simultaneous and desperate charge of the whole

cavalry upon both lines. The stable horse under Hyder's immediate direction was destined to act against the first line, and Meer Saheb against the second. The stable horse advanced with a good countenance, but were repelled as we have already seen. Their standard elephant, on approaching, received a slight wound, took fright, and fled with precipitation off the field, and the horsemen suffering severely from the English grape, which probably would in every event have foiled their efforts, were furnished with the convenient apology of following their colours. The general charge on the second line was observed by Hyder to be prepared but suspended, and a floating to take place along the whole mass ; impatient at this want of concert, he sent successive messages to Meer Saheb, and all his commanders, ordering them, as they valued their heads, instantly to charge ; and some interval elapsed before the fall of Meer Saheb by a mortal wound was added to the report of other causes of delay. A small* schooner from the British squadron approaching the shore as near as soundings would admit, opportunely and judiciously opened her fire upon this mass of cavalry ; the loss of their commander, and a considerable number of men from the broadside of one little vessel, was magnified in the imaginations of men unsuspicious of annoyance from another element, into a dreadful fire from the whole squadron ; which is to this day represented as a fact, by some of those who witnessed the transaction. But this flanking fire, highly important and effective, without any exaggeration, disposed the second in command to seek the cover of a sand bank, from whence he reported this new impediment.

This double disappointment in the efforts of his cavalry, added to the very near approach of Sir Eyre Coote's first line to his own person, induced Hyder

* The Intelligence.

to listen to the suggestions of some of his officers, and to order the successive retreat, first of his guns, and afterwards of his infantry and cavalry. Men who have witnessed similar scenes, as well as those who are indebted to the artist for a pictured representation, will figure to themselves an image of this oriental chief seated on an elephant, for the advantage of surveying the operations of the field, on horse-back, for the convenience of closer inspection; or peradventure on foot, to lead and animate the efforts of his infantry. Hyder, from the commencement to the close of this action, was seated cross-legged, on a choukee (a portable stool about nine inches high, covered with a carpet), and placed on a gentle eminence in the rear of the centre of his line of works, and now a little to the southward of the line of fire. When in the course of the operations of the day, he could scarcely believe the evidence of his senses which indicated the danger of this situation; he received, with that torrent of obscene abuse which formed the character of his eloquence, the first suggestions to move, and obstinately stupid with vexation, continued in his seat, until a groom who had long served him, and was in some sort a privileged man, had the audacity to seize his legs one after the other, and put on his slippers. "We will beat them to-morrow," (said he,) "in the meanwhile mount your horse," and he was quickly out of sight, leaving his attendant chiefs, (whom oriental etiquette would not admit of being on horse-back while their Sovereign was dismounted; and whose grooms and horses had disappeared, on the near approach of the English line,) to the unaccustomed effort of a long and hurried pedestrian march.

Sir Eyre Coote's first line rested for the present on the ground which the enemy had abandoned, and it was not until midnight that a due attention to the casualties of the day admitted of its being joined by the second, when the whole moved on by the road by

which the enemy had retired, and after crossing without molestation a strong pass formed by a ravine, most injudiciously unoccupied by the enemy, took up their ground near to the village of Mootypolliam, the name by which the Mysoreans distinguish this day's action, as Porto Novo, the village from the vicinity of which the opposing army marched in the morning, is made to designate the same battle in the English narratives. If the accident had not intervened, of a heavy rain, which rendered it impossible for the miserable cattle of the English army to move their tents, this action would have been fought on the 30th June, and happily the same circumstances did not postpone it to the 2d of July. The road which facilitated the able manœuvre of the British general, had been prepared by Hyder, for the purpose of drawing his guns to a large work for the reception of twenty guns, lined out on the best principles of European science, situated within three hundred and fifty yards of the sea, and commanding every part of the ground on which Sir Eyre Coote's masterly movement had been made. The work was so far advanced as to require but a day more for its completion; and had it been finished and occupied, the extrication of the British army would have become nearly an hopeless enterprize.

The artillery brought into action by Hyder on this day, was no more than 47 pieces, chiefly long guns, of heavy calibre, and well served: the English guns of lighter metal, were 55, served with an energy and precision beyond all praise. The most moderate computation of comparative numbers * will make the force of Hyder eight times greater than that of his

* English force.

Cavalry	830
Artillery	598
Infantry	7048

Total ... 8476, or exclusive of artillery, 7878.

opponent, although a large corps under the command of his son Tippoo was absent on another service.

Sir Hector Munro, who commanded the first line, deserved and obtained the praise of his general, for "conduct equally spirited and active." Brigadier General Stuart's determined occupation and defence of the heights with the second line, was declared to have been highly meritorious. "Every individual (says Sir Eyre Coote) of this little army, seemed to feel the critical situation of our national concerns: our falling interests required uncommon exertions for their support, and to the honour of this army, every nerve was exerted to the very extent of possibility."

The loss of the English army, lessened by the peculiar skill with which the operations were conducted, was comparatively trifling, being 306 killed and wounded, exceeding not much above one-fourth the loss sustained in the unfortunate attempt on Chillumbrum. It is at all times difficult to ascertain the casualties of an Indian army; but, on a comparison of statements, I am disposed to estimate the lowest amount of Hyder's loss on this day, at ten thousand men killed and wounded; the density of the masses, and the immense extent occupied by irregulars in the rear, giving certain repetition of effect to the flight of every shot.

The physical means of the English army had been in no respect augmented by the events of this extraordinary day; the same difficulties with regard to money, provisions, and equipment, and the same impossibility of following the enemy continued without diminution, and are described with peculiar force in the dispatch which announced the victory, (an achievement calculated to exalt the imagination and disturb the judgment of an ordinary mind), and are closed with the following modest and appropriate reflection: "If Hyder Ali, buoyed up with former success, had not come down to seek us, I could not have moved the army to follow him; and this is a

situation so trying to the responsible military commander, that an officer of character shudders at the idea of being placed in such a predicament." But the moral energies of the troops exhibited the most lively contrast to their former despondency, and had increased in an incalculable ratio, means far more efficacious than physical force for sustaining difficulties, which it was impossible to surmount.

During the period of Hyder's operations to the southward, Tiagar had surrendered to his son Tippoo Sultaun, who had now been ordered to resume the siege of Wandewash, with an equipment of thirteen battering cannon, supported by an adequate force, and he invested the place on the 22d June. The respectable detachment from Bengal had arrived at Nellore on its route to Madras, and the importance of covering its junction, added to the danger of Wandewash, induced Sir Eyre Coote to move in a northerly direction, receiving his food from the ships. On every successive day's march by Cuddalore and Pondicherry, he had reason to conclude that the enemy was preparing for another general action, and from the vicinity of the latter place he made a move- July 15.
 ment which placed him in view of Hyder's encampment, for the purpose of inviting and ascertaining that issue. Hyder however struck his tents and moved off to the westward, without attempting any operation of consequence: and Sir Eyre Coote, quitting the sea-side, moved in the direction of Permacoil and Carangooly, into the former of which places a small store of provisions had been thrown by the unremitting zeal of Captain Flint, while Hyder was occupied to the southward, and Tippoo at Tiagar, and into the latter from the resources almost under the protection of its guns. At Carangooly Sir Eyre Coote received intelligence that Tippoo, largely 21.
 reinforced, had moved to intercept the approach of the detachment from Bengal, having raised the siege of Wandewash. With the aid of requisitions on the

villages of the whole surrounding country, Tippoo had formed round that place a line of nearly complete circumvallation, and batteries were in readiness to have opened, when he received from his father the new destination which has been stated, with positive orders first to attempt the place by an escalade at all accessible points, of which the number was considerable. The construction of ladders was not only reported, but their distribution to every corps distinctly seen, and Captain Flint had intelligence of the exact

- July 16. hour of the night of the 16th of July at which he was to expect the escalade. Every post listened in silence, and all heard a low murmuring noise gradually approaching: at the proper period every column was received with a discharge of grape: the noise was for a time exceedingly increased, but it gradually diminished until all was silence. The moral influence of Hyder's late defeat, and the evidence of perfect preparation in the garrison, rendered it impracticable to retrieve the confusion occasioned by this timely check. Attempts to compel the resumption of the escalade on that and the ensuing day produced indications approaching to mutiny, and on the same day
18. that Sir Eyre Coote arrived at Carangooly, Tippoo decamped from Wandewash, leaving to Captain Flint the laborious care of demolishing his batteries and approaches, together with an extensive line of circumvallation. The event was reported to his Commander-in-chief in an unassuming letter of eight lines, five more being allotted to an unaffected congratulation on the late victory and its consequences. The relief of a place, rendered interesting by so many recollections, was announced by Sir Eyre Coote to the Government of Madras, in the following terms.
 20. "Wandewash is safe, being the third time in my life I have had the honour to relieve it." Nothing now remaining to detain him from prosecuting his union with the detachment from Bengal, he moved by Chingleput, to St. Thomas's Mount.

The lake of Pulicat, nearly forty miles in length from north to south, and six in its greatest breadth, is an inlet of the sea, formed by a narrow insulated stripe of land, separated from the continent by small openings at each extremity, which form the communication between the lake and the sea. The small fort of Pulicat,¹ recently captured from the Dutch, is situated on the southern bank of the southern strait, and is distant about thirty miles from Madras. The ordinary road from Nellore to Madras passes to the westward of this lake, at the distance of from fifteen to twenty miles from the sea; but travellers lightly equipped, sometimes prefer the shorter route along the shore, and are ferried over these openings. It had not entered into Tippoo's calculations, that the latter route was practicable for troops and military equipments, and while he was preparing impediments and ambush on the upper road, the detachment had crossed the northern opening, distant nearly seventy miles from Madras, into the insulated spot which has been described, and were successively transported across the strait at Pulicat, without the necessity of firing a shot. Sir Eyre Coote, however, would not even risk the separate movement of this corps for the remaining thirty miles: he made two marches, in that direction, from St. Thomas's Mount, and on the third day had the satisfaction of inspecting at Pulicat, Aug. 2.

¹ *Pulicat*.—(derivation of the Tamil word is probably *pasha*, old, *vel*, babul tree, (*acacia, arabica*), *kadu*—forest) A small village at the southern extremity of an island in the inlet between the sea and the Pulicat lake, which runs north and south in the Chingleput and Nellore Districts, Madras. The Dutch erected a factory here in 1609. They called the fort Geldria. Lord Macartney arrived at Madras on the 22nd June 1781, and under his orders Major Elphinston of the 73rd Regiment seized Pulicat and destroyed its fortifications. Two Dutch ships were taken. [Letter from Major Elphinston to Lord Macartney, dated 2nd July 1781. (*Mackenzie Collections*, Vol. lxxv, 3rd July 1781.)]

this important reinforcement, which added nearly one third to his numerical strength.¹

It is difficult to contemplate these cautious operations without reverting to the unhappy fate of Baillie, whom, in advancing from the same quarter, a very inferior degree of military prudence would have placed in equal security. The faults of Hyder in permitting the unmolested march of Sir Eyre Coote one hundred and fifty one miles from Porto Novo to Pulicat with a crippled equipment, with numbers daily and rapidly diminishing from sickness, to form a junction so important in its consequences, when in each of sixteen successive marches he might have offered serious annoyance without the risk of material loss, can only be explained by his imperfect knowledge of facts, and by the necessity of consulting the temper of his army.²

¹ Colonel Pearse's detachment, which had marched from Midnapur, Bengal, in January 1781, suffered severely from cholera and desertion on its way south. It was formed of one Company of European and one Company Native Artillery and the 12th, 13th, 24th, 25th and 26th Regiments, Bengal Native Infantry. Each Regiment was composed of two battalions of 500 men each. It is doubtful what number joined Coote. In the *History of the Bengal Artillery*, it is put at about 4,000. In the *Life of Sir Thomas Munro* (Vol. I, p. 43) it is said to have been little more than 2,000. (Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, p. 28.)

² The united forces were formed into brigades on the 8th August 1781.

The four regiments of cavalry formed a brigade of cavalry under Colonel Cosby:

1st Brigade of Infantry—

73rd Regiment, Bengal European Infantry,

2nd battalion, 1st Madras European Infantry,

9 12-pounders and five howitzers.

2nd Brigade of Infantry—

12th and 25th Regiments, Bengal Sepoys,

8th, 16th and 21st Carnatic battalions,

1 18-pounder, 1 5½-inch howitzer, 10 6-pounders.

3rd Brigade of Infantry—

13th Regiment Bengal Sepoys.

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- 9th, 17th and 18th Carnatic battalions,
Trichinopoly Detachment (5 companies of the 19th, 2
of the 6th, 2 of the 12th and 2 of the 13th Carnatic
battalions),
1 18-pounder, 1 5½-inch howitzer, 10 6-pounders.
- 4th Brigade of Infantry—
24th Regiment, Bengal Sepoys,
2nd and 14th Carnatic battalions,
7th and 8th Circar battalions,
1 5½-inch howitzer, 10 6-pounders.
- 5th Brigade of Infantry—
26th Regiment, Bengal Sepoys,
4th, 15th and 20th Carnatic battalions,
1 5½-inch howitzer and 10 6-pounders
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CHAPTER XXIII.

Wretched state of military equipment—Sir Eyre Coote turns his attention to Tripassore—Hyder attempts to relieve it—without success—The place falls—Negotiation regarding prisoners—shewed Sir Eyre Coote's imperfect knowledge of Hyder's character—Fights Hyder on ground chosen by himself—Battle of Polliloor described—Dubious victory—does not improve the aspect of English affairs—New means of carrying grain—Western and Chittoor poligars—promise supplies—Sir Eyre Coote determines to relinquish the command—but is prevailed on by Lord Macartney to resume it on the faith of these promises—disappointed—perseveres—Battle of Sholinghur—Poligars come over from Hyder to Sir Eyre Coote—enters the Pollams—erroneously supposed to be inexhausted and abundant—reason—Hyder sends a detachment to ruin the Pollams—defeated and dispersed by Sir Eyre Coote in person—Detaches Colonel Owen—Hyder attacks him in person—dangerous retreat—junction of Sir Eyre Coote—Distress of Vellore—relieved—Retrospective account of Hyder's operations against that place—and its gallant defence—Sir Eyre Coote returns to the Pollams—takes Chittoor—Defective intelligence—Loses his depôt in the Pollams—distress—necessity of returning to Tripassore—Serious loss from the monsoon—Misconduct of Mahommed Ali—Assigns the country for the support of the war—Strange misinformation regarding Chanderghery and Mahommed Ali's brother—Facts related—Hyder's brutal outrage—Affairs of Tanjour during this campaign—

Hyder's treaty with the Dutch at Negapatam—Colonel Brathwaite's assault of two successive posts—wounded—succeeded by Colonel Nixon—more successful—Colonel Brathwaite resumes the command—defeats Hyder's provincial field force—Sir Hector Munro besieges Negapatam—Effective co-operation of the fleet—Capture of the place—Monsoon—Critical situation of the fleet—Capture of Trincomalee—Renewed distress of Vellore—Sir Eyre Coote marches to relieve it—Alarm for his life—recovers and effects the service—Cannonaded on his approach and return—Ineffective attempt to pursue Hyder—who makes a fresh demonstration near Sholingur—the English army returns to Madras.

THE detachment from Bengal had moved through a country untouched by the enemy, and was expected to be accompanied by the requisite number of draught and carriage oxen to complete the deficiencies of the army; but owing to the difficulties of the times, added to the most serious defects in the whole system of the commissariat, the supplies were not only lamentably defective in number, but every animal, wild from the pastures, was still to be trained before his services could be of value. Of the cattle officially reported to have been collected at Madras during the absence of the army, not one half was forthcoming; and after a plain calculation it was discovered, that exclusively of what the men could carry on their backs, the actual means provided from all these sources was capable of carrying no more than one and a half day's rice for the consumption of the army. It was not only impracticable to attempt either of the great objects of the campaign, the relief of Vellore or the siege of Arcot, but with an army of 12,000 men, capable with proper equipments of achieving any service, and drawn together from the most distant quarters, it did not seem very obvious

by what possible means it was to accomplish any thing. Under circumstances thus "heart breaking," as Sir Eyre Coote emphatically designates them, he turned his attention to Tripassore, a fortress important from position but defective in strength, situated about thirty-three miles to the westward on one of the roads leading to Arcot and Vellore. This place was in the occupation of the enemy, but the intermediate post of Poonamalee¹ was still possessed by the English. By encamping between Madras and Poonamalee, and subsequently between the latter place and Tripassore, he was enabled to employ the cattle of all his departments to bring successively into advance a sufficiency of grain to attempt Tripassore.

Aug. 19. On the 19th of August he arrived before the place, which had been much improved, and was garrisoned by fifteen hundred men, but inadequately provided with cannon. On the morning of the 22d a good breach having been effected, and preparations made for the assault, a flag of truce appeared, offering to surrender the place on terms previously offered but now rejected, with a demand that they should surrender unconditionally within a quarter of an hour, or await the consequences of the assault. In the instant after dispatching this answer, intelligence was brought of large bodies of the enemy being in sight, and Sir Eyre Coote, on going to an eminence to reconnoitre, perceived the advanced guard of Hyder's whole army in full approach: there was not a moment to lose; he sent orders to storm instantly, and the troops had just emerged from the trenches when the flag of truce returned with the declaration of surrender, and left the assailants to ascend the breach without opposition, Hyder drawing off as soon

¹ *Poonamalee*.—Poonamallee, a village 13 miles west of Madras. It was granted to the English in 1750, by Anwar-ud-din. It is now a cantonment for European recruits and invalids. The old fort is used for keeping stores. It is now a healthy well-drained village, with a good water supply.

as he discovered the event. With only one day's provisions in camp, Sir Eyre Coote had risked the consequences of an assault, in all cases a doubtful operation, on the single question whether the garrison should or should not be prisoners of war, and was so ill apprized of Hyder's character as to expect his assent to an exchange of these prisoners for an equal number of British troops in his custody. "The men taken at Tripassore (said Hyder in reply) are faithless and unworthy; they know that they dare not approach me; they are your prisoners, and I advise you to put every one of them to death speedily." To feed 1,400 prisoners did not accord with the state of the English commissariat; and Sir Eyre Coote, instructed by this feature of barbarous policy in his future estimation of the value of prisoners, had no alternative but to release them on parole, an obligation to which he could scarcely have ascribed any real force. The store of grain found in the fort was so trifling, that it became necessary, on the night of its capture, to send a convoy for a fresh supply to Poonamalee; and having, by the 25th, obtained a sufficiency of rice for a few days to be carried on the men's backs, the English general marched on the 26th, with the view of bringing Hyder to action on ground selected by himself.

During the period in which Sir Eyre Coote had been employed in forming the junction so judiciously effected, Hyder had moved into the *fortunate* encampment of Mooserwauck which he had occupied in the preceding year, when opposed by Sir Hector Munro. He examined with renewed care, and made himself more completely master of the *fortunate* ground on which Baillie had been defeated; and in determining to offer battle to Sir Eyre Coote on the same spot, and if possible on the same auspicious day of the same lunar month, the 11th of Ramzan; (coinciding in this year with the 31st of August, as it had done in the preceding with the 10th of September) his

military judgment was supported by the concurring predictions of all the astrologers, whose prognostics were favourable for every day, but were deemed certain for the 11th. Had an invitation been conveyed to his opponent for that particular day, there can be no doubt that Sir Eyre Coote, to whom all days were indifferent, provided he could obtain close action, would cheerfully have indulged him in every coincidence required by every astrologer; for on the particular scene of Hyder's former triumph, he was most anxious to obliterate the remembrance of that unfortunate event.

- Aug. 26. His first day's march brought him to the vicinity of Perambaucum, where large bodies of cavalry to the south-west indicated the presence of the enemy
27. on the expected ground. On the 27th he was again in motion, and about nine o'clock the advanced guard, on reaching the precise spot on which Colonel Baillie had taken the fatal resolution of passing the night of the 9th of September, 1780, perceived the enemy's army in force in front, and extending towards both flanks. The column of march was pointing nearly west. A strong land-wind raised clouds of dust which rendered distant objects imperceptible, but a small thick grove on a gentle eminence, with a water course encompassing its front and right, about 800 yards to the left of the advanced guard, appeared to be a position of so much importance, that it was immediately occupied by a battalion of native troops and its guns: the first line being directed to form in order of battle, fronting what then appeared to be the chief mass of the enemy's force, to the south-west, to the right of the great avenue of banyan trees by which the English army had approached, and at about an angle of forty-five degrees with that avenue; the second line being destined to support the first, and to reinforce the post at the grove. This formation, necessarily slow from being made over broken ground, and among patches

of underwood, had been scarcely completed, when a heavy but rather distant cannonade from a grove and village on the right, was found nearly to enfilade the first line, by a troublesome ricochet along its whole extent, and a rapid manœuvre became necessary for throwing back the right, and changing front. A jungul or underwood was interposed between the new position, and this division of the enemy's army commanded by Tippoo; and the cannonade was returned until it could be discovered whether the intervening jungul were penetrable: this point being ascertained in the affirmative, the British troops moved through in columns, after considerable delay in removing impediments, and formed fronting the west, on the opposite side, where a commanding bank gave such superiority to their cannonade, that the enemy's guns drew off, and seemed, by a circuitous movement, in a southern direction, to be joining the main body.

In the meanwhile, the grove first occupied on the left, had been cannonaded by an increasing number of guns, from a position of great strength and extent, formed by the occupation of a bank and water-course, previously prepared with embrazures, receding on its left, towards the pagoda and village of Pollilore, which formed the support of that flank; the right resting on another village, with vast masses of troops extending in the rear beyond the right of that cover. Every corps of the second line, together with an entire brigade from the first, had successively been ordered to strengthen and extend the position at the grove, against which, as the day cleared, the main force of the enemy was found to be directing its principal efforts. These operations varying their aspect according to the points successively occupied on either side were certainly wearing an appearance far from cheering to the British army; a battalion of native troops lately raised, had been ordered to dislodge the enemy from a village, which galled with musquetry the left of the position at the grove, and

returned in disgraceful confusion, in spite of the efforts of their officers ; but this disaster was repaired by the veteran 20th,* which effected the object with the precision of a parade movement, and the steadiness of the best European troops.

It was three o'clock when Sir Eyre Coote, after the movements on the right which have been described, came to the left, for the purpose of examining the whole of his situation, and ascertaining whether any mode could be devised, of extricating himself from a formation disjointed in all its parts. He had hitherto been foiled by cross or enfilading fires, in every successive movement undertaken throughout the day, and, with the single exception of the grove, every point successively seized, was found to be within range of more commanding ground. The village of Pollilore, that which, according to the manuscript journal of Colonel Baillie's operations, ought to have been occupied by that officer, was now evidently the support of the enemy's left ; but before attempting to carry that point, it was necessary to have a connected line of sufficient extent, to take advantage of the success of a flank movement. The first line had by its efforts against Tippoo's division, been drawn off from the real point of attack, and had become separated by a considerable interval, from the troops which were most severely pressed. It was now therefore directed, to form a third change of position, which brought its front to face the south, the line being drawn up in the avenue with its left about 1300 yards farther to the west, than the point from which it had issued for the first formation, and its right exactly opposite the village of Pollilore. The post at the grove was consequently about 1,400 yards in a diagonal direction in front of its extreme left, and the same post formed a support to the right of the second line, which extended to the left of that post, nearly opposite to the enemy's right. These forma-

* Sepoys.

tions being effected, a brigade from the right of the first line moved in compact order, and with a rapid step, under cover of an animated cannonade from every gun along both lines, to seize the village of Pollilore, and turn the enemy's left; and the success of this movement, which was soon determined, was the signal for the second line, by a similar operation, to force the right, supported by a forward movement of the remainder of the army, preceded by their guns, with the exception of three battalions left at the grove to cover the rear while advancing, and to command the ground occupied by the baggage guard, which was so posted as to give and receive reciprocal support.

Upwards of eight hours had elapsed from the commencement of the action before the decisive movement of the right brigade was completed; the direct advance of the first line to support and unite with that brigade, led them over the unburied remains of their comrades, who had perished on the same ground in the preceding year; but this movement on the right, drew the enemy's attention from the second line, which ultimately succeeded in forcing their right, and attaining an eminence from which it was enabled about sunset, to cannonade the retreating columns of the enemy. The impediments, however, which had been prepared, against the advance of every portion of the English troops throughout the day, had been such as merely to admit of their occupying before dusk, the ground abandoned by the enemy, and in so far claiming the usual criterion of victory.

Sir Eyre Coote's varied experience had never placed him in embarrassments so serious, and had never excited in his mind the gloomy forebodings, which for the first and last time in his military life, were distinctly depicted on his countenance when in the presence of an enemy, and from which he was ultimately relieved, contrary to his best expectations.

The Mysorean manuscripts invariably admit the action of Porto Novo to have been a severe defeat; that of Pollilore is as invariably claimed as a drawn battle. The losses on either side were prevented from being so considerable as might be anticipated from the length of the action, in consequence of the nature of the ground, and particularly the cover afforded by the intersection of the water-courses and banks, which have already been described. The English army, which went into action eleven thousand strong, lost no more than 421 killed, wounded, and missing; among them were Captain Hislop, the General's aid-de-camp, an officer of much promise, killed, and Brigadier-General Stuart, and Colonel Brown, officers of approved merit and long experience, who by a singular coincidence, each lost a leg from the same cannon shot; the former recovered, but the latter died on the same night. The force under Hyder's command had been augmented by the division under his son, and comprised his whole disposable force. He had on this day fired from 80 pieces of cannon, but had found no opportunity of employing with effect the services of his numerous cavalry. The loss of the Mysoreans probably did not exceed two thousand; the general impression was far from that of defeat; and the effect upon their minds was, to recover in a considerable degree from the humiliating sense of inferiority which had followed

Aug. 28. the events of the 1st of July. A portion of the 28th was employed not only in due attention to the casualties of the preceding day, but in the melancholy task of gathering together and interring the remains of 29. Colonel Baillie's detachment; and on the 29th, Sir Eyre Coote returned to Tripassore, not having a single day's provision left for the fighting men, and the natives attached to the public departments, having been without food for the two preceding days.

'This dubious victory' had in no respect improved

¹ Wilks's account of this "dubious victory" follows the

the aspect of English affairs; and, in the necessity of having recourse to some untried expedient, the active mind of Lord Macartney suggested to him the possibility of employing some portion of the fugitive population which had taken refuge at Madras, in carrying loads of grain on their heads for the use of the army. Considerable numbers were easily found to engage their services, but in the scarcity of food which prevailed at Madras, the temptation of such a

account given in Sir Eyre Coote's official report of the action. Mill in his account exaggerates the losses suffered by the English, and speaks of the mismanagement of the battle. Mill also refers to the differences of opinion between Sir Eyre Coote and Sir Hector Munro on the field, and to a conference of officers after the battle, when a "retreat" was suggested, to which Sir Eyre Coote replied that he had never "retreated," but added that he would allow the army "to fall back." Robson says, Sir Eyre Coote in the result "drove Hyder's people from all their strong posts, and obliged them to retreat with precipitation, leaving him in full possession of the field of battle." *The History of Hydur Naick*, (Kirmani), remarks: "In short, it went very near that the storm of defeat and dispersion would fall among the troops of the General, when gloomy night suddenly arrived, and cast a veil of darkness over the world, and closed the contest of the two fierce lions." Sir Thomas Munro, who was present, says that Haider's army fled in confusion beyond Conjeevaram. Wilks's account of the battle gives probably an accurate account of what actually occurred. It was a victory, so far that Haider's army was driven from the field. Sir Eyre Coote's small force had achieved what few armies could have done, and he had again demonstrated his wonderful ability and knowledge of the temperament of the troops opposed to him. It was no fault of his that he could not follow up the battle by a further advance but had to fall back on Tripassur. (Robson: *The Life of Hyder Ally*, p. 196; Mill: *History of British India*, Book V, p. 506; Miles: *The History of Hyder Naick Kirmany*, pp. 441-442; Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, pp. 31-42; Wyly: *Life of Sir Eyre Coote*, pp. 236-241; Gleig: *Life of Sir Thomas Munro*, Vol. I, p. 40.)

The battalion of native troops mentioned as retiring in disgraceful confusion, was a Circar battalion, enlisted in the north of Madras in one of the Northern Circar districts. Sir Eyre Coote in consequence formed a very bad opinion of these regiments. It was nearly a century after his time, that all recruiting

load was too powerful to be resisted ; numbers disappeared on the road, and of the remainder who arrived with loads uniformly diminished, a very large proportion took alarm at what they saw and heard of their new situation, and absconded in the night ; but by occupying a position between Tripassore and Poonamalee, and throwing grain forward into the former place, it became practicable by all these united means, at length to move from Tripassore.¹

for the Madras Army from the Telugu speaking districts north of Madras was stopped, the result of the experience gained since that General expressed his opinion so forcibly. He anticipated the views taken by the military authorities at the close of the nineteenth century.

¹ " The relief of Vellore became therefore an object of Lord Macartney's most anxious attention, well knowing that the fall of that fortress to the enemy would establish him in complete possession of the greater part of the Carnatic. But the army was unable to move for want of provisions and about to return to the neighbourhood of Madras, whose situation was truly alarming, the wretched inhabitants being at that moment agitated by every afflicting symptom of an inevitable famine. It was considered however by Sir Eyre Coote as absolutely necessary for the safety of the army, should it keep the field, to be supplied with twelve days' rice ; to effect this was a task of infinite difficulty ; but great difficulties are only to be overcome by great exertion ; and Lord Macartney was resolved that no exertion should be wanting, no effort remain untried to avert the fatal consequences which must inevitably follow the loss of Vellore. Coolies to the amount of six thousand were pressed into the service by military force, to carry from Madras to Poonamalee the quantity of rice required. The extreme necessity of the case could alone justify the risk incurred to the settlement by these exertions, for at the time the army was again put in motion for the relief of Vellore on the 19th September, there was not actually at Madras a grain of rice left in store ; they trusted solely to three thousand bags on board different vessels in the road, and to future supplies for their support." (John Barrow : *Public Life of the Earl of Macartney*, 1807, pp. 100-101.) Lord Macartney landed in Madras and took over the Government on the 22nd June 1781, having heard from Sir Edward Hughes, the Admiral, who was at anchor with his squadron off Pondicherry, of the war with Haider, the invasion of the Carnatic and the ill success of the English.

To the north-west of the road leading from Madras to Arcot, is situated the strong country usually denominated that of the western and *Chittoor* poligars,¹ placed between the range of hills which bound the Balaghaut, and a second chain, which approaching within a few miles of the sea, near the lake of Pulicat, forms an irregularly indented concave sweep of varied elevation until its south-western extremity overlooks, at the distance of a few miles, the town of Arcot.

The chiefs or poligars of these countries, varying in strength and extent of territory, had sought to conciliate the belligerents, to extend their possessions at the expence of their neighbours, or by neutrality to save their countries from devastation, as suited their respective views of their own relative strength and interest. The poligars of Vencatigherry, Calastry, and Bomrauze, were the most powerful of these chieftains; the spearmen of the former had joined Sir Eyre Coote, and had formed a portion of his baggage guard in the late action; but their expenditure of provision much outweighed their utility. Calastry and Bomrauze were both with Hyder; but had, with a very pardonable prudence, assured his adversary that the junction was of mere necessity, to save their countries from devastation, and that they awaited the opportunity when they might safely change sides, and place their resources at his disposal. The numerous minor chieftains had also, after the first symptoms of a favourable change, sent deputations of similar character, and all were profuse

¹ The western poligars comprised Venkatagiri, in the Nellore District, and Kalahasti and Karvetnagar in the Chittoor District. Karvetnagar was also called formerly from the Telugu name of the ruling family, Bomraz. The title "poligar" was given by the Vijayanagar kings to the chiefs of the Telugu colonies planted in the provinces for the purpose of controlling the inhabitants of the districts assigned to them. (*Madras Manual of Administration*. Also see article "Poligar," in *Hobson Jobson*. 1903.)

of assurances that the English army would find abundance of provisions by moving in that direction. Sir Eyre Coote, feeling the conviction, that he was wasting his large store of character, and what little remained of life, by continuing in command of troops unprovided with all but arms, that really constitutes an army, had gone down to Madras to confer with the Government, to resign his charge, and to declare the inutility of keeping together a nominal army, incapable of movement: but had been prevailed upon by Lord Macartney's representation of these prospects to make one further trial.

Sept. 21. On the 21st of September he moved from Tripassore, two days march, to Tritany,¹ through the skirts of these countries; where he sought in vain for the realization of any one promise, made by men, who were actuated chiefly by fear, in making and in breaking their engagements. In the vicinity of his encampment was the little fort of Poloor,² which he captured, with two hundred prisoners to be liberated; and with the aid of a small store found in this place, but more from the skill of his searchers for subterranean hoards, he continued to subsist from day to day, constantly receiving fresh promises, and reiterated disappointments. On this ground, he received from Colonel Lang the commandant at Vellore, an account of the reduced state of his provisions and the necessity of an early surrender of the place, if not relieved. Hyder was also reported to be distant only ten or twelve miles, near to the hill of Sholingur,³ and to be strengthening a position to obstruct the farther

¹ *Tritany*.—Tiruttani, a village and hill 47 miles from Madras, on the Madras and Southern Mahratta Railway, north of Arkonam. It is in the south of the Karvetnagar Zamindari.

² *Poloor*.—Polur, a small village in North Arcot District, 4 miles south of Tiruttani.

³ *Sholingur*.—Sholinghur, 15 miles west of Polur, a town containing about 7,000 inhabitants. Near it is a steep hill with a temple at the summit. The town is 8 miles north of the railway station of the same name, on the line from Madras to Calicut.

approach of the English army towards Vellore. Sir Eyre Coote reckoning on exactly a sufficiency of provisions to carry him back to Tripassore, determined to try the effect of another action, and wrote to the Government, describing his situation, and requesting that at least one day's rice should, if possible, be advanced to Tripassore, to provide for the event of the enemy declining the meeting, or of its result not opening such unlooked for prospects as might afford the hope of relieving Vellore.

Throwing his heavy guns and every impediment with a small garrison into Poloor, he made a short movement of seven miles on the evening of the 26th. Sept. 26. The night proved tempestuous; and with his miserable cattle, it was impracticable in the ensuing morning to move the tents, drenched and doubled in weight by rain. Hyder, whose encampment was near, and considerably in advance of the position which he was preparing, being accurately apprized of every circumstance, announced to his army that there would be no movement on that day; all the cattle of the army were in consequence sent to a better pasture at the distance of some miles, and many of the troops, together with most of the drivers and followers, dispersed, as was usual on such intimations, to seek for grain, or to supply their other wants in the adjacent villages; for the want of cavalry in the English army left them free to wander at large without the apprehension of danger.

Sir Eyre Coote, lightly escorted, went out in 27. the morning to examine the country in his front, and from an eminence which he ascended, a long ridge of rocks was observed possessed by the enemy's troops; being desirous of farther examination, he ordered a brigade from camp, and proceeded to dislodge the troops from the ridge, on ascending which Hyder's whole army was clearly discovered in a southern direction, distant about three miles, with some strong corps a mile in front, and an advanced encampment

of cavalry close under the ridge, who struck their tents on the first appearance of the brigade. Orders were immediately dispatched for the army to join without delay ; the camp was struck and the troops were in motion with all practicable dispatch, the baggage under cover of two battalions with their guns skirted the hills, and was conducted to an eligible spot on the right of the ridge described, where it remained secure during the operations of the day. The army told off as usual for forming into two lines, but marching by files in one column, moved after doubling the left extremity of the ridge, in a direction parallel to the line of the enemy's encampment, until the centre of the first line, when faced to the front, should be opposite the main body of the enemy, distant about two miles, and drawn up in front of their encampment then in the act of being struck : a small rock in front of the right, and a grove and eminence on the future left of the first line, offered supports for each flank, while a ridge advantageously placed in the direction of the baggage-guard would protect the rear ; the oblique direction of this position would in some degree turn the enemy's left, and might thus offer an opportunity of taking advantage of any awkward movement : the second line forming an extension of the first when the movement commenced, successively broke into echellon of corps, partly in consequence of previous orders, but with increased intervals from the difficulty of the ground : a disposition which was necessary for the double purpose of watching powerful bodies of cavalry on the left flank, and observing and supporting the baggage-guard.

While the troops were in motion to take up these positions, Sir Eyre Coote, with a small escort, advanced midway between the two armies, more thoroughly to reconnoitre. The country was comparatively open, but ridges and groupes of rocks, irregularly scattered over the plain, and emerging to

unequal heights, admitted of each party availing itself of the advantages of ground. Hyder's main force was judiciously drawn up behind the crest of a long ridge, not rocky; its front, covered with swampy rice fields, while his guns were placed on the summit of this ridge, or on commanding positions among the more advanced groups of rocks. Exclusively of the advanced corps in position, several detached bodies, exceeding in numerical strength the whole of the English army, were seen in motion towards each flank, and large masses of cavalry were collected on various points, evidently prepared to charge on an appointed signal. In fact the whole movement had operated as a surprise on Hyder; he had reckoned with certainty on the impossibility of Sir Eyre Coote's marching on that day. The movement of the brigade he treated merely as a reconnoissance; and it was not until intelligence was brought of the English army having struck their encampment, that he ordered horsemen to be dispatched in every direction to recal his cattle, drivers, and followers; and they had but just begun to strike the tents, when the head of the English column had reached a point nearly opposite the centre of his encampment.

Thus circumstanced, it was Hyder's design to act on the defensive as long as possible, and to make such demonstrations as should delay the movements of his adversary, and give time for repairing the confusion of this unexpected event; and above all, for yoking the cattle to the limbers, with a view to the leading principle of all his tactics, never to risk a gun. The day was far spent; the English army had not yet completed the formation which has been described; nor had Hyder shewn the least indication of changing his front. The two leading brigades of the English army had, in preparing to take up their ground, extended farther to the right than ordered, and an interval was thus opened between them and the remainder of the line. Hyder, on perceiving this

error, opened a general cannonade along his whole front, and from the advanced positions ; and Sir Eyre Coote, deeming the moment too critical, to suffer the enemy's posted guns to annoy him, while performing any thing but a forward movement, ordered the whole line instantly to front and advance, the divided corps being ordered to bring forward its right, as it moved on.—The enemy's guns were ill pointed, during a steady but not rapid advance of both lines, which, as they approached, are described to have had the appearance of diminutive corps almost surrounded by several separate armies. The necessity of defiling to pass the groups of rocks, had at one time caused several temporary openings in different parts of the line, and at this moment the two principal masses of the enemy's cavalry charged these points with a determination hitherto unexhibited ; each mass as it reached the opening, wheeling to the right and left, to overturn the naked flanks, but no flank was found exposed, the very act of defiling had provided the required protection, which was formed with the greatest coolness and precision at obtuse angles with the line, and received the masses with a cross fire. These masses had sensibly thinned in their approach, from the havoc effected by grape and musquetry in the front, and by the consequent hesitation of the rear, and when, on reaching their object, they found the fresh and unexpected annoyance of a cross fire : one of these masses fairly galloped through, and went off to the rear, sustaining additional loss from the fire of the rear rank of the line, everywhere faced about for the purpose. The other mass sustained a direct repulse with still severer loss. The charges had been ordered, with the double view of direct and complete success, or in the event of failure, they would cover the retreat of the guns, which were ordered to limber up at the moment of the charge, and to retire the instant it was found to have failed ; and the unavoidable suspension thus produced in the advance of the

English army, enabled them to draw off the whole excepting one 6 pounder. The right brigades had by the movement described, gained the left flank of the enemy's position, and were enabled to bring their guns to bear with considerable effect on the retreating columns from the ridge abandoned by the enemy ; the remainder of the first line, adapting its movements to that of the detached brigades, by gradually bringing forward its right, and forming an extension of their line of front.

During these operations of the first line, the second making little advance on its left, was also gradually bringing up its right, as the movements of the enemy threatened the left, which in the course of a severe struggle, and several charges of cavalry, was at one time nearly turned, but on completing a partial change of front with celerity and precision, the enemy, not equally expert in the corresponding movement, suffered severely from the English guns, and finally drew off about the same period as their main body ; an attempt on the baggage-guard, consisting of two battalions and four guns, by a large body of infantry and cavalry with twelve guns, having proved equally abortive from the judicious dispositions of that guard and of the second line. It was midnight before the English army was re-united on the ground occupied by the advanced brigade. The acquisitions of the day were three cavalry standards and one gun ; but as Sir Eyre Coote states in a note written from the field of battle, he would willingly have exchanged these trophies, together with the credit of the victory, for five days' rice. The strength of the British army in this day's action, was 11,500 men, and their loss no more than 100 men killed and wounded ; the unexpected events of the day, had even left many of the enemy's bazar tents still standing, and the shopkeepers actually ignorant of the result, were selling their wares to the English followers, who mistook them for their own people, for some time before

the error was reciprocally discovered. Hyder's whole force was in the field, with the exception of ten guns, for he fired only from seventy. The Mysoreans uniformly describe the battle of Sholingur as a surprise, and admit it to have been a severe defeat, in which their loss probably exceeded 5,000 men.¹

Sept. The poligars of Calastray and Vencatigherry, weary of military dangers which promised them little advantage, and ascribing to this victory consequences which their defection from the enemy might render decisive, agreed to avail themselves of the events of the evening. A thick mass of spears was observed going off towards the hills at the close of the action, and in the morning messengers arrived in camp to announce the event. With a sufficiency of rice barely to carry back the army to Tripassore, Sir Eyre Coote on this intelligence incurred the risk of increasing his distance from that post, and moved through a pass to the westward of Sholingur, into a country supposed to be unexhausted and abundant. These expectations were found in the event to have been greatly exaggerated; the market of the Mysorean army had furnished a certain and ready vent for surplus produce; and prices sufficient to tempt the more provident husbandmen to spare even a portion of their secret hoards. The English army therefore found a precarious subsistence from day to day, and the hopes of throwing a scanty supply into Vellore depended on the actual crop. Hyder full of indignation at the defection of these chiefs, detached a

¹ The despatch of Sir Eyre Coote to Lord Macartney, dated 6th October 1781, on the battle of Sholinghur, will be found in Wylly's *Life of Sir Eyre Coote*, pp. 415-420. Mill calls it "A slight action in the attempt to supply Vellore." (Book V, p. 507.) Had Sir Eyre Coote been able to press Hyder after the battle, the result might have been an early peace, but as invariably happened in this campaign, Sir Eyre Coote, owing to want of supplies, was unable to follow up his victory and had to fall back again on Madras. It is not surprising that the General began to show "a susceptibility of temper."

select and experienced corps of six thousand men, without guns, who, by forcing another pass, commenced the devastation of the rich intermediate vales, and the conflagration of every village. This unfortunate event produced most unfavourable impressions, seriously affecting all Sir Eyre Coote's prospects of Oct. supply; and the animated veteran, although suffering from severe illness, feeling the importance of counter-acting these effects, placed himself at the head of a light corps, and after an absence of thirty-eight hours, during thirty-two of which he had never dismounted from his horse, returned to camp, having completely surprised, discomfited, and dispersed the enemy, and compelled them to leave behind, not only the whole of their plunder, but the few tents and light equipments with which they had entered the woods.¹

The extreme urgency of the relief of Vellore, induced the English general, to risk a detachment under Colonel Owen, consisting of five battalions with their guns, two flank companies of an European regiment of the Bengal establishment, and a portion of his small corps of cavalry, twenty miles in advance²; for the purpose of commanding the resources of a greater extent of country, and affording the chance of intercepting some of the convoys of grain, frequently descending the pass of Damalcherry, for the supply of the enemy's army. On the 23d of October, about 23. eleven o'clock, he received intelligence from Colonel Owen of the enemy's first appearance. About two o'clock, (being as soon as circumstances would admit,)

Sir Eyre Coote dated his report on the battle of Sholingur at Attimunjeri, 6th October 1781. Attimunjeri is about 8 miles north of Sholingur in the Chittoor District, 6 miles south of Pallipattu, then the headquarters of Bomraz, the Poligar of Karvetnagar.

² Colonel Owen had camped at a village, south of Devalampeta, at the southern end of a pass from the north, 20 miles north of Sholingur, and the same distance west of Pallipattu and east of Chittoor. (Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, p. 50.)

he moved forward with a select body, ordering the remainder of the army to follow as soon as possible. After marching about four miles, he met a few of his own irregular horse, who had fled from the field of battle, and reported the detachment to be entirely destroyed. The impressions excited by such intelligence, may easily be imagined ; judging however, from experience, of the credit due to the reports of early fugitives, he quickened his pace, and sent corresponding orders to the army ; and, after a further advance of two miles, he had the happiness to receive a note from Colonel Owen, intimating his safety in a strong position, where the army joined him on the same night.

This detachment encamped considerably in advance of a strong pass, situated between it and the main army, had at daylight been attacked at all points by Hyder in person, at the head of nearly his whole regular infantry, and light guns, and all his select cavalry, who made the most vigorous efforts for the destruction of this corps before it could reach the pass, or be relieved by the army. Although the position of the encampment would appear to have been selected with too much confidence, the exertions of Colonel Owen, and the excellent conduct of the troops, extricated him from a perilous predicament, and enabled him to gain the pass between one and two o'clock in the afternoon, with the loss of all his camp equipage and baggage. In the course of his retreat, one gun had fallen into the possession of the enemy, by a furious attack on the native corps which protected it: but this disaster was instantly repaired by the promptitude and decision of Captain Moore,¹ who, at the head of his two flank companies of Europeans, supported by a veteran corps of

¹ Captain Moore and four officers commanded the Grenadier Company, Bengal European Regiment. For a detailed account of Colonel Owen's operations, see Wyllie : *Life of Sir Eyre Coote*, pp. 248-249.

sepoys, forced his way with the bayonet, through the masses which were bearing it away, and brought it back in triumph to the protection of the detachment. The services of the artillery under Captain Moorehouse,¹ an officer eminently distinguished on every occasion, had essentially contributed to the success of this arduous day; by the uncommon judgment, coolness, and decision evinced in taking up the great variety of points successively destined to cover the retreat of the troops; and although the casualties of the detachment amounted to three hundred and seventeen men, the loss of the enemy was computed by themselves, to have exceeded three thousand.

The distresses of Vellore had by this time approached their last crisis. During all the difficulties of the times, faithful sepoys had been found, who made good their way in disguise, with small sums of money entrusted to their care at Madras; and throughout the whole of this eventful war, not one example occurred, either in this case, or the more arduous service of conveying aid to the English prisoners in Mysoor, of one individual having betrayed his trust. The garrison of Vellore had for some time past subsisted on grain purchased in the distant villages, and carried in by stealth, on dark nights. Not one day's grain was in store: the approaching moon-light nights, and the expected filling of the river, would decide their fate, and the commandant stated to Sir Eyre Coote, the inevitable alternative of immediately throwing in a supply, or making a movement to cover the escape of the garrison, from the only remaining

¹ Captain Moorhouse was a Lieutenant and Commissary of Stores in 1780 and obtained sanction for a scheme for raising two native companies of Pioneers. He was killed at the storming of Bangalore in 1791. The Government then directed that his remains should be interred in the church of Fort St. George at the Company's expense and a suitable inscription placed on a marble tablet in commemoration of his merits. The body was placed close to the spot where Sir Eyre Coote was buried. (*Madras Courier*, 22nd December 1791.)

fortress which could favour the eventual hope of recovering the possession of the country. The exertions for collecting grain in the Pollams, had procured a small surplus, the whole of which was destined to the
 3. relief of this important garrison; and on the 3d of November, Sir Eyre Coote had by three marches from his encampment among the hills, thrown in six weeks' rice; Hyder having, on his approach, retired to the opposite side of the river Palâr, a weak determination, ascribed by Sir Eyre Coote to the discouragement of having recently been foiled with great loss, in an attempt on a detachment only.

The situation of Vellore since the commencement of the war had been critical and highly interesting. Hyder had, after the capture of Arcot in the preceding year, allotted the largest portion of his army and his best battering train for the siege of Vellore. This fortress, nearly an exact square, still exhibiting in its antique battlements, for match-locks, and bows and arrows, the evidence of no modern date,* was built, according to the ideas of strength which prevailed at the period of its erection, when the use of cannon was little understood, close to a range of hills, to favour the introduction of supplies, or the eventual escape of the garrison; and thus situated, it is also commanded by those hills; a defect, which its Mahratta and Mahommedan conquerors† remedied in part, by fortifying the points

* Vide vol. i. page 21.

† The evidence of the names by which they are distinguished, shews that two points were fortified by the Mahrattas, and one by the Muhammadans. See vol. i. page 100.

[Vellore fort is a perfect specimen of military architecture, nearly an exact square. The old entrance was by a winding road way with massive gates, and protected by a drawbridge. The ditch is supplied with water by a subterranean drain connecting with a bathing tank. Of the three peaks which overlook the town, two, Sajjaraogharh and Gajaraogharh, were fortified by the Mahrattas, one, Murtazagarh, by the last Mahommedan Killedar of Vellore. (Dr. Macleane: *Madras Manual of Administration.*)]

which overlooked it. These points, as the use of artillery came to determine the defence of places, became accordingly the keys of the fort below ; for, although surrounded by a rampart of masonry which might be deemed Cyclopean, and a wet ditch of great breadth, the possession of these points command in flank and reverse (although at too great a distance for certain effect), three faces of the fort, and leave but one face affording good cover. The arrangements of the siege, directed by French officers, were judiciously directed to two simultaneous operations, the principal hill-fort being the primary object, while approaches and batteries from the west were pushed on to the proper positions for breaching the southwestern face of the lower fort, and enfilading that next to the hill, which in the event of success in the primary object, would alone afford adequate cover to the garrison from the fire of the hill.

The operations against the principal hill fort were conducted with great skill, overwhelming numbers, and an abundant artillery, for five weeks. The post was commanded by Lieutenant Champness, and his second in command Lieutenant Parr, whose adventures at Carnatickghur have already been recited, officiated as his engineer. The greater portion of two faces, of a rather extensive post, were razed to the foundation by the enemy's fire, and the breaches were completely accessible ; approaches over the bare rock, were carried on by means of wooden frames filled with fascines ; and on the 13th January, about nine at night, the assailants issued from points distant only twenty yards from the breaches : but every thing had been completely retrenched with infinite labour and skill ; and, on ascending the breach, and almost filling the place with assailants, up to the ditches of the retrenchment, the impediments in every direction, and the masked fire which had been prepared, and well reserved, drove them back with great slaughter : a second, and third attempt

was made, with the aid of ladders, and repelled with the same steadiness and gallantry; the imperfect construction of the place gave the defenders no flanking command over the foot of the breaches, where the enemy remained completely covered; and they now began to form lodgements on the breaches and successively to fill the ditches of the retrenchment with fascines. Lieutenant Parr, perceiving that all was lost, if this work was permitted to proceed, obtained the permission of this commanding officer to attempt to dislodge them: and descending about two o'clock by the very ladders which had been placed by the enemy to ascend the retrenchment, commenced a close encounter with the bayonet, which terminated in the entire expulsion of the assailants; and a powerful sortie of European and native troops from the lower fort, a few nights afterwards succeeded in entering the flank of the enemy's parallel, spiking his guns and damaging his approaches. This extraordinary energy of native troops (for there were no other on the hill) induced Hyder to proceed from Arcot, for the purpose of personally examining the state of the siege, and giving his own directions, accompanied by several French officers: but the intelligence of Sir Eyre Coote's march from Madras at that exact period, determined him, as we have already seen, to raise the siege, which from that period had been converted into a blockade. Colonel Lang the commandant (together with a portion of the garrison for the purpose of reducing the expenditure of provisions) joined the army, and the command devolved on Captain Cuppage, Sir Eyre marching off on the day succeeding his arrival to seek for subsistence for his own army.

His first object on returning to the Pollams, was the fort of Chittoor, situated N.W. of the spot lately occupied by Colonel Owen, reported to be the intermediate depôt of provisions descending the pass of Damalcherry; and it fell after a siege of four days on

the 11th of November. But no character of the war Nov. was more conspicuous, than the almost invariable defects of Sir Eyre Coote's intelligence, with the exception of that received through Lieutenant Flint, or by means of sepoys disguised for specific purposes. This defect is frequently stated in his official correspondence, but he does not appear to have suspected, that all his guides and spies were in the service of the enemy. There was no grain in Chittoor; it was a weak place; and Sir Eyre Coote seemed to be acting in opposition to his own principles of military conduct, in throwing into it a battalion which was eventually sacrificed, as were the heavy guns which he had thrown into Polloor previously to the action of Sholinghur; the garrison however of the latter place, having in conformity to provisional orders, made good their retreat into the woods. Before moving to the relief of Vellore, Sir Eyre Coote had left a battalion, with some guns, in a good position near to his former encampment at Polipet, to protect his sick and cover the collection of grain. On the second day after the capture of Chittoor, he had the mortification to learn, that this battalion had been obliged to retreat to the woods with severe loss, and the capture of its cannon and stores, including the important article of grain, not without suspicion of treachery on the part of the officers of Bomrauze.

There was now no hope of being able to subsist the army in these countries during the monsoon, if indeed it had been prudent to expose the troops to the usual inclemency of that season. Two rivers¹ daily expected to be impassable were interposed between the army and Tripassore. Intelligence of the investment of that place, communicated in an express from its commandant, was audibly confirmed by the firing of the siege. On the 22d of November, he 22. crossed the Cortelaur (which had so long stopped the

¹ The Palar and Kortalaiyar rivers, both liable to sudden heavy floods in November and December.

progress of Colonel Baillie in the preceding year), and encamped on the same day in the neighbourhood of Tripassore, after a forced march over an incipient inundation. His whole march from Chittoor had been a series of difficulties, surmounted from day to day, by one half of the army being alternately without food, and these distresses were aggravated by the bursting of the monsoon on the latter days of the march; not only cattle and their loads were lost, but the excellent little corps of cavalry, formed from the ruins of those in Mahommed Ali's service, was deprived of nearly half its numbers; and a considerable proportion of human beings, chiefly followers, were destroyed by the united effects of flood and famine. The Commander-in-chief had for many days been confined to his bed,* and had announced to the Government the necessity of appointing a successor: and thus, after a campaign interspersed with the most dazzling triumphs, the English army entered into cantonments in the neighbourhood of Madras, with prospects for the ensuing year, which offered little of cheerful expectation to the most sanguine observer.¹

One prominent topic pervades the official correspondence of Sir Eyre Coote throughout the whole of this campaign, namely, "the duplicity and iniquity of the nabob Mahommed Ali's government." The few remaining resources of the country, placed beyond

* Palankeen in marching.

¹ Sir Eyre Coote wrote on the 29th November 1781 to the Supreme Council in Bengal: "Such was the distress to which the army was reduced for provisions in the march from Chittore to the relief of Tripasore, one half was three successive days alternately without rice. The followers of the army from the last time of their leaving Madras until they came back to Tripasore had had two seers (4 lbs.) of paddy served out to them. Numbers have died by hunger and the inclemency of the weather." . . . "In short the scene exhibited was more like a field of battle than a line of march." (*Selections from State Papers* preserved in the Foreign Department, Vol. III, p. 827, quoted in Wyllie's *Life of Sir Eyre Coote*, p. 254.)

the control of the power which directed the war, were employed not to support but to counteract the general cause. To the ordinary misrule of a wretched native government was now added, in all cases to which the power extended, the clandestine sale of the grain, which might have mitigated the distresses of the army, and the remittance of the pecuniary amount to the privy coffers of Mahommed Ali. Not one soldier paid by this sovereign prince accompanied, as a mere demonstration, the army which was now fighting for his nominal sovereignty; and while this army was actually sustaining the severest privations, Mahommed Ali, with an audacity of falsehood, and ingratitude to a great and early benefactor, destined as Sir Eyre Coote supposes to mislead the English* cabinet, addressed a letter to Lord Macartney, announcing his having supplied the army with an abundant store; and intimating that nothing but unnecessary delay prevented the expulsion of the enemy. Sir Eyre Coote had reiterated, and the Governor-general had strongly impressed on Lord Macartney the necessity of assuming the direct management of what remained of this misgoverned country; and Mahommed Ali skilfully anticipated the event about the close of the year, by most graciously *assigning* a country which, if *assumed* on undisguised grounds, might not have been so easily restored by the baneful influence so often deplored.¹

* Letter 29th October, 1781.

¹ For a fuller account of the conduct of the Nawab of Arcot and the differences between the Governments of Bengal and Madras, reference should be made to Mill's *History*, Book V, pp. 512-516, and *The Life of the Earl of Macartney* by Barrow. In the latter book, in the appendices, the correspondence will be found: 'The Nawab served us badly in the war with Hyder, but it must never be forgotten in dealing with these transactions, that both in Bengal and Madras, Civilians and Military officers alike had had illegal dealings with him; the unfortunate Nawab did not know where to look for funds to meet his liabilities, and many officers in high position both in Madras and Calcutta

In perusing the voluminous correspondence of Sir Eyre Coote from these woods, it is not a little remarkable, that he seems to have been entirely uninformed regarding the locality or strength of Chandergherry,¹ a fortress situated in the centre of those resources whose fragments had subsisted his army for nearly two months, and enabled him to relieve Vellore; one cursory mention is made of the kelledar of Chandergherry, as concurring with the aumil² of Tripety, in counteracting his collection of supplies; but without any indication of being aware

were interested in securing their position as creditors. Early in 1781, the Supreme Government had advised the Madras Government that they would be amply justified in demanding from the Nawab the immediate transfer of all the districts in his charge to them, and considered that they should insist on this being done. Then, a few months later, the Nawab deputed his Dewan Kwajah Hashim Khan and Richard Joseph Sullivan, a Madras Civil servant, who acted as the Nawab's friend, without orders from his Government, to go to Calcutta. They succeeded in obtaining from the Bengal Government, a reply to their representations, which the Governor-General communicated to the Government of Madras on April 2nd, 1781, with an extraordinary intimation that he had appointed Richard Sullivan to be his representative and minister at the court of the Nawab in Madras. The Madras Government replied in a letter dated 8th September 1781, after Lord Macartney had become Governor, strongly objecting to the arrangement. However the quarrel closed for a time, owing to the Nawab, having consented to assign the revenue of his districts to the Company for a period of five years, reserving one-sixth part for his own personal expenditure, the revenue being administered by a carefully selected Board of Commissioners. This the Nawab did by a document signed by him and Lord Macartney, dated December 2, 1781.

¹ *Chandergherry*.—Chandragiri, a small town in the Chittoor District, 29 miles N.N.E. from Chittoor. The fort was originally built in 1000 A.D. In 1758 it was held by Abd-ul-Wahab Khan, son of Anwar-ud-din, brother of Muhammad Ali Khan, the Nawab, who also assumed the protection of the sacred town of Tirupati, seven miles to the east. The style of the fort is similar to that of Vellore.

² *Aumil*.—Amil, Amildar, is the title of the native collector in charge of a taluq.

that this kelledar was Abd-ul-Wahab Khān, Mahommed Ali's brother, or that the place was nearly impregnable, and calculated, if placed at his disposal, to have a material influence over his future operations. The Government at Madras seemed to have been unaccountably kept in the same ignorance: they received the account of its surrender from Sir Eyre Coote, and notice it in their narrative of transactions, merely as "a fort garrisoned by the nabob's troops." Hyder's more than half-Hindoo propensities had induced him to grant unqualified indemnity to the sacred temple of Tripety, only nine miles distant from Chandergherry, to the extent of not even interfering with the payment of a tribute to Mahommed Ali for similar indemnity; but his connection with Abd-ul-Wahab is involved in some obscurity. It can only be ascertained with certainty, that before the invasion, this person had corresponded with Hyder; that his vakeel, Mahommed Secunder, was seen in camp on the first day of the invasion; and having soon afterwards, in public durbar, communicated his master's answer to a letter he had written by Hyder's desire, (probably to demand his presence in camp at the head of his troops,) Hyder, after hearing the contents in a low tone, flew into a passion, and exclaimed aloud, "Is this the end of your invitations? and have I expended crores for the purpose of feeding a fat, lazy fakeer*? Return to your worthless master, and tell him to expect me at his mōkan."† Immediately after the return of Mahommed Secunder, Abd-ul-Wahab, who usually resided at Chittoor, suddenly retired to the droog of Chandergherry, which he prepared for defence. Hyder was not at leisure to undertake the siege until January, 1782, when Abd-ul-Wahab Khān, possessing a superabundant store of grain, capitulated without the most remote necessity,

* A religious mendicant.

† The residence of a religious mendicant. It also means a place of importance.

on the condition* of being permitted to retire with his property to Madras. A previous breach of faith (of what nature we can now only conjecture,) was Hyder's apology for disregarding his own; and he ordered the whole family to be sent to Seringapatam, with the exception of two grand-daughters, who were detained at Arcot for his own future pleasures. This brutal outrage was, however, not accomplished by Hyder. The children were of too early an age, and the consummation meditated by the father, remained to be exacted as an hereditary claim.

During the operations which had occupied Hyder's personal attention to the army of Sir Eyre Coote, his troops in the southern provinces of Trichinopoly and Tanjour had not been inactive. After his departure from these countries in June, considerable exertions had been made to collect a field force at Tanjour, whither Colonel Brathwaite had been sent to command. Hyder had drawn his accustomed circle of desolation about twelve miles round that fort; but with the exception of the capital, the whole country was in his undisturbed possession; the revenues were collected with the greatest regularity; every fort was well garrisoned, almost every pagoda fortified, and a well equipped field corps was prepared to act as circumstances might require. On the commencement of hostilities against the Dutch, a defensive treaty was concluded between Hyder and the Governor of Negapatam, by which the English district of Nagore and other places were ceded to the Dutch, and measures of reciprocal co-operation were concerted—on the one part, for the security of Negapatam; and on the other, to procure for Hyder any aid from that garrison which might be necessary for maintaining his ground in the province, or eventually for the reduction of the capital. So soon as

* The author saw this person on his return from prison in 1784, and heard him relate Hyder's breach of the capitulation, but not its alledged cause.

the forces under Colonel Brathwaite had become, by successive reinforcements, sufficiently strong to leave the protection of the capital, his first object was to attempt the extension of his resources, by the capture of the nearest posts, but his troops being exclusively native, and those of the enemy chiefly select spearmen, peculiarly adapted to the defence of places, he failed in two successive attempts at carrying by assault two different places, the first having been dismantled and the garrison removed after the assault to the second. In the latter of these operations, he had himself been wounded, and had ordered Colonel Nixon from Trichinopoly, to assume the intermediate command of the troops, which had been recently augmented by the arrival of two corps from the more southern districts, to about 3,500 men. The first efforts of this officer were more successful. He besieged and took two places, by placing his officers and serjeants at the head of the forlorn hope, losing in the latter of these operations upwards of three hundred officers and men; and it is remarkable, that he assigns as a reason for not besieging another place, that it was defended by the "famous Papinairoo" of *Chittledroog*, who, with his own hardy irregulars, had defended both the places from which Colonel Brathwaite had been repulsed.¹

Colonel Brathwaite was soon afterwards sufficiently recovered to resume the command, and proceeded towards the enemy's field force, which was

¹ Major John Brathwaite reduced the Poligars of Madura and Tinnevely in 1772, and, as Lieutenant-Colonel, took Mahé from the French in 1779. When commanding in Tanjore in 1782 he was badly defeated by Tippu, taken prisoner and carried to Seringapatam, whence he was released at the peace of 1784. General Brathwaite was Commander-in-Chief, Madras, for four years from 1792, and captured Pondicherry in 1793. (*Report on the Palk Manuscripts*, p. 176, note 3.) The two places where Colonel Brathwaite was repulsed were Tirukkattupalli and Pattukottai in the Tanjore District; at the latter place he was wounded.

Sept. 30 strongly posted at the village of Mahadapatam,¹ an insulated spot, covered by field works, and surrounded by rice swamps: the attack was judiciously planned and well executed, with only 2,500 men and eight guns, against nearly double the number of men, and six guns strongly posted. After a close encounter of several hours, in which every street was defended, Hyder's forces retreated in disorder, with great loss, and leaving behind them two guns.

Sir Hector Munro's health had been so much impaired, that soon after the battle of Pollilore, he was advised by his medical friends to proceed to England for its re-establishment; and Sir Eyre Coote, who had uniformly found him an excellent second in command, assented with great reluctance, to the necessity of his departure.* While waiting at Madras for an opportunity to embark, he had yielded to the wishes of Lord Macartney, that he should assume the direction of the siege of Negapatam; for which the requisite equipments were embarked on the fleet under Sir Edward Hughes, and arrived off Nagore, situated a few miles to the northward of Negapatam,

Oct. 20. about the 20th of October. The English field corps, which had been operating in the province of Tanjore, and had, as we have seen, established its superiority over that of the enemy, was destined to form a large numerical portion of the besieging force; and Colonel Brathwaite, returning to the charge of the capital of the province, detached all his disposable troops, under the command of Colonel Nixon, who arrived
21. at Nagore on the 21st, and in view of the fleet, made

¹ *Mahadapatam*.—Mahadevapatnam, a village five miles south-west of Mannargudi in the Tanjore District. Wilks makes an error here. Colonel Brathwaite did not command; he was not present. Colonel Nixon commanded. (Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, p. 59, note 6.)

* His departure is said to have been influenced by a harsh reply, to a suggestion offered during the battle of Pollilore.

[For the incident see Mill: *History of British India*, Book V, pp. 506-507.]

a spirited and eminently successful attack on the enemy's troops, in the act of their evacuating Nagore. Sir Hector Munro went immediately on shore for the purpose of concerting the requisite measures: the marines of the fleet, and a large detachment of seamen were landed, and the engineer and senior officer of artillery commenced the preparations necessary in their respective departments. A chain of five redoubts, connected by lines to the northward of Negapatam must necessarily be forced before trenches could be opened before the place; and this operation having been effected by a combined attack, planned and executed in a masterly manner, and with little comparative loss, on the 29th of Oct. 29. October; trenches were opened on the 3d of Nov. 3. November, and the place surrendered by capitulation on the 12th. In this very remarkable service, the 12. numbers of the besieged doubled those of the besiegers, who at no time exceeded 4000 men; while the besieged, including Hyder's troops, who had joined according to treaty, amounted to full 8000. The rapid success of this operation is chiefly to be ascribed to the impression produced by the peculiar energy and intrepidity of the seamen and marines, in the assault of the redoubts; and the immovable steadiness with which they repelled two determined sorties made with the whole disposeable force of the garrison. The result of this invaluable co-operation of the fleet, was not only the possession of a place intended to be a principal depôt for the expected French forces, but the evacuation by Hyder's troops of all the posts in that part of the country, and the consequent command of considerable resources.

The monsoon set in with such violence, immediately after the surrender of the place, that the Admiral was for upwards of three weeks unable to embark the seamen and marines, who had performed these valuable services; and the ships were during the same period placed in the most critical situation, from

the fury of an incessant storm, and the absence of a considerable portion of their crews. Towards the close of the year, the moderate weather admitted of embarking a detachment of volunteer sepoys, and artillery-men, to aid in the reduction of Trincomalee and fort Ostenburgh, in the island of Ceylon; forts which command the harbour of the former name, deemed of essential importance to naval operations, by enabling the power which possessed it to remain, during the tempestuous season in the vicinity of that scene, on which the national interests in India were about to be contested: and in this operation the Admiral was successful.

1782.

The period to which the garrison of Vellore was provisioned expired on the 15th of December, but some reliance was placed on a scanty addition to this store by the means which have already been described. Sir Eyre Coote had, as already noticed, made his arrangements for embarking to proceed to Bengal, partly to concert with the Governor-general the possibility of some remedy, for the succession of wretched expedients, which served as apologies for equipment; but chiefly because his health had sunk under the pressure of bodily fatigue and mental anxiety, to a degree that had induced his medical advisers to protest against the fatal consequences of his continuing in the field. The public importance which the Government attached to his presence, added to reports of serious urgency from the commandant at Vellore, induced him to acquiesce in their desire: and although the Government, from a solicitude for his health, rather wished that the immediate relief of that place should be committed to subordinate hands, the General conceived it a service of such paramount importance, that he resolved to incur all risks and every mortification to ensure its accomplishment, and joined the army for that purpose

Jan. 2. on the 2d of January.

5. On the morning of the 5th, a little before the

break of day, when the army had struck their encampment then about a mile west from Tripassore, Sir Eyre Coote's valet, on entering his tent to awake his master, found him senseless; medical assistance was instantly called, and he was found to be in a fit of apoplexy. For nearly two hours, during which little hope was entertained of his recovery, the despondency painted on every countenance, and particularly on those of the native troops, whose attachment and confidence exceeded the bounds of human veneration, and who could with difficulty be restrained from transgressing the limits of decorum, to satisfy their anxiety, presented altogether a scene of mournful interest. Expresses to Madras, excited a corresponding degree of apprehension: an earnest intreaty from the Government urged his immediate return, "for the preservation of a life so valuable to the state," and Colonel Lang was ordered to take eventual charge of the army. While the Government waited with impatience for the return of the general, intelligence was brought, that he had marched on the next morning for the relief of Vellore, so far recovered, Jan. 6. as to admit of his being carried in a palanquin. Nothing material occurred until the 9th, when about 9. to cross the dry bed of the river Poony, the enemy appeared in force, on the opposite bank. The confluence of this river with the Palâr, which flows from the west, is immediately opposite to Arcot. Vellore is situated on the same bank of the Palâr, about fifteen miles farther to the westward, and the course of the Poony being from the north-west, the English army was now at nearly the same distance from Vellore and Arcot. The arrangements of Sir Eyre Coote, for passing the river, were made with so much caution and skill, that Hyder desisted from his intended attack, but on the ensuing day, after marching about five miles, his army appeared in two powerful columns, pointing towards the left and the rear, just as the convoy were entering a swamp of

rice grounds, which must necessarily be passed. Sir Eyre Coote, directing his exclusive attention to the preservation of the convoy, caused each brigade to take separate but connected positions, to keep the enemy in check, at a suitable distance, and scarcely condescending to notice a distant but incessant can-

Jan. 10. nonade of four hours, which produced few casualties, passed over the whole in safety, encamping on the same evening, about four miles from Vellore, and close

11. under its walls on the 11th, being the precise day on which the commandant had announced by express, that he must necessarily surrender, if not relieved, and the general had the satisfaction to deposit unimpaired, a store of provisions equal to three months' consumption.

13. On the 13th he commenced his return towards Madras, and Hyder appeared in full force, to dispute his passage over the same swamp, one division of his army making a disposition to oppose the head of the principal column of march, while another was in rapid motion to fall on the rear, while it should still be entangled in the morass; there was now less of impediment than had been experienced on the 10th, and the leading corps were enabled to cross with rapidity, and occupy a position beyond the morass, which checked the enemy in front, and covered the passage of the rear. The troops sustained a heavy but distant cannonade, with little comparative loss, (the casualties of both days not exceeding 120 men,) for about three hours, when the whole having passed to the firm ground, formed and advanced on the enemy, about four o'clock in the afternoon. Hyder's line of infantry stood until the advancing fire of the English artillery did some execution; but Sir Eyre Coote had the mortification to see the cannon already far retired before the infantry gave way: the pursuit was continued until dark, but the guns kept encreasing their distance; and it was midnight before the English army reached the encampment to which the

position of the baggage obliged them to return. On the 16th in the morning, the army having on the Jan. 16. preceding night occupied the same encampment from which it moved to the action of Sholingur, Hyder appeared in full force, with an apparent intention of offering battle on the same ground. The invitation was not declined, but after ten hours spent in unavailing manœuvres, the army pursued its march to Tritany, and the remainder of the route to Tripassore, was without incident.¹

¹ For a fuller account of the march to Vellore, see Wylly: *Life of Sir Eyre Cooté*, pp. 264-268. "Cooté, shaken by age and disease, and haunted at every step by the spectre of famine, marching, manœuvring, fighting unceasingly to relieve his beleaguered comrades." (Fortescue: *History of the Army*, Vol. III, p. 464.)

CHAPTER XXIV.

Affairs of Malabar—Siege of Tellicherry—from 1780 to 1782—relieved—Besieging army defeated and taken—Peculiar plan of the siege—Defeat and capture of Colonel Brathwaite's corps in Tanjour—Despondency of each belligerent from causes unknown to the other—stated—Sindea detached from the Mahratta confederacy—Nature of the influence of this event on the connexion between Hyder and the Mahrattas, concealed from the English—explained—Digressive illustration of Sindea's mixed character of dependency and superiority, in a sketch of the Mahratta constitution—Origin of Choute, &c.—Return from the digression—Hyder seriously reviews his actual situation—determines to concentrate his force and move to the westward—Commences the destruction of the posts and the desolation of the country—Speech to Pornea—Detaches to Malabar—Coorg and Bullum—Spoliation of Coromandel in full progress—Unexpected arrival of the French at Porto Novo, and difficulty of supplies in consequence—Efforts of the French and English nations in India—Bussy—capture of his first division by Admiral Kempenfeldt in 1781—of a second in 1782—arrives at the Isle of France—troops sent to India before his arrival—Suffrein—Sir Edward Hughes—First naval action off Madras, 17th February—English equipments—Commodore Johnson, and General Medows—Naval action at Porto Praya—Capture of the Dutch merchantmen in Saldanha bay—Commodore Johnson returns with the frigates—Remainder of the expedition proceed to India—

and had joined before the above action—Dis-sensions between Sir Eyre Coote and Lord Macartney—explained—discussed—Second naval action, 12th April—French take Cuddalore—Appear with Hyder before Permacoil—March of Sir Eyre Coote for its relief—dreadful storm—Permacoil falls—Enemy advance to Wandewash—relieved by Sir Eyre Coote, who offers them battle—moves to Arnee—Battle of Arnee—Question of the baggage of an Indian army, discussed and described—Connected incidents—Dallas—Grand guard cut off—Singular plan for the relief of Vellore—succeeds—The escort taken in its return—Suffrein appears before Negapatam—Sir E. Hughes sails—Third naval action July 16—Suffrein takes Trincomalee—Fourth naval action September 3—Erroneous estimate of the importance of Trincomalee—Suffrein winters at Acheen—Farther relief of Vellore—Sir Eyre Coote plans the re-capture of Cuddalore—Precarious nature of naval co-operation—returns to Madras—Sir E. Hughes sails for Bombay—Arrival of Sir R. Bickerton—Hyder's advances for peace—Strange result of English dissensions—Suffrein's scandalous transfer of his prisoners to Hyder—Sir Eyre Coote proceeds to Bengal—hostile fleets as already stated—Hyder to the neighbourhood of Arcot for the monsoon.

THE commencement of the year, unpropitious to Hyder in Coromandel, was attended with events still more unfavourable to his interests on the coast of Malabar. At an early period of the war, in 1780, an adequate force had been allotted and successively increased for the reduction of Tellicherry, the only possession of the English on that coast, a mere mercantile factory fortified according to the early practice of European nations, against the ordinary insults of banditti. But as the population had

increased from the superior protection experienced by the inhabitants, an extensive but indefensible line surrounded the limits of the town. The English troops were entirely inadequate in numbers to furnish even sentinels for such a line; but a timely reinforcement conveyed from Bombay by Sir Edward Hughes, and the zeal of the inhabitants and adjacent chiefs, who detested the Mysorean rule, enabled them to continue a protracted and highly meritorious defence, deserving a more ample description than the records

Jan. 18. afford, until the early part of this year; when the arrival of reinforcements under Major Abington, enabled them by a determined sortie to raise the siege, by the capture of all the enemy's cannon, amounting to sixty pieces, with the whole of their baggage equipments. The Mysorean general, Sirdar Khân, was wounded and taken prisoner, with about 1,200 men who failed in effecting their retreat; and in a few days afterwards the remaining fugitives who had taken post at the dismantled French settlement of Mahè, surrendered at discretion.

Sirdar Khân, whose conduct at Nidgegul* in 1770, has already introduced him to the reader's notice, had no acquaintance with the European science of attack and defence, but after failing in several assaults which were repelled by the bravery of the defenders, and finding every ordinary battery opposed by corresponding and more skilful defensive means, or destroyed by sorties; adopted a species of offensive work, which from its height should enable him to see and counteract the designs of the besieged, and from its construction be exempt from the dangers of assault. An immense extent of base served as the foundation for several successive stories, constructed of the trunks of trees, in successive layers crossing each other, and compacted by earth rammed between the intervals; the contrivances in the rear for raising the guns were removed when the erection was

* Vol. i. page 690.

complete, and enormous inaccessible towers rearing up their summits by the successive addition of another story, as the besieged covered themselves from the proceeding, exhibited a system of attack too curious to be dismissed in silence, but too imperfectly impressed by distant recollection* to be well described. Hyder distinctly perceived the danger to which his affairs on that coast would be exposed by the ruin of this corps, and the necessity which might ensue for detaching a large portion of his army, or moving the whole, if the English should sufficiently augment their force on his western frontier: and his anxiety on this and other accounts, although softened, was Feb. not relieved by the success of his son against Colonel Brathwaite, who since the capture of Negapatam had been enabled to re-establish the Rajah's government over the territory of Tanjore. This officer, encamped in a plain with about 2000 men, and trusting to a system of intelligence actually conducted by Hyder's agency, continued to disbelieve the approach of an enemy as announced to him by an intelligent native,† until he perceived himself to be surrounded by superior numbers. The attempt to retreat was found to be unavailing, and the highest efforts of gallantry, skill, and perseverance in the commander and his troops could not avert a fate similar in most respects to that of Baillie. Mons. Lally, who as usual, attended Tippoo with his corps, establishing in a still more distinguished manner, by his endeavours to arrest an unavailing carnage, and by such attentions to the wounded as he was permitted to extend, a character too amiable for the savage scene in which he was doomed to participate.

Although the behaviour of all the English

* From the relation of the late Sir Barry Close, one of the besieged.

† This native, an opulent man, after solemnly protesting against the Colonel's incredulity, mounted his horse and escaped to Tanjour.

officers in this unfortunate affair was highly creditable to the national character, one coincidence is too remarkable to be overlooked. Lieutenant Sampson, who commanded the little corps of cavalry with Colonel Brathwaite, had so peculiarly distinguished himself, as to cause his name to be united by the enemy with that of his chief; and to this day the Mysoreans, in narrating the campaign of Tanjour, continue thus to associate the name of this gallant young man, *Brathwaite Sampson*, as if it were one name.¹

The temporary exultation produced by this intelligence, and his consequent command over a large portion of the Tanjorean territory, could not remove the settled dejection of Hyder's mind. He and his English opponents reciprocally apprized of events unknown to the other, and each ignorant of facts which the other knew, were severally disposed to gloomy anticipations. The English knew of the powerful body of French troops which might be soon expected on the coast, and feared an indefinite protraction of the Mahratta war: Hyder, whose original plan of conquest essentially depended on French co-operation, ascribed to insincerity and evasion, delays, which had arisen from causes which that people could not control, and certainly from no disinclination to aid in the destruction of the English power. Added to this distrust of the French, he had reasons too unequivocal, for knowing, that he was immediately to lose the co-operation of the Poona Mahrattas, as he had already been disappointed of the aid of Nizam Ali, and two branches of the Mahratta confederacy, Moodajee Bhoomla and Sindea, by the commanding talents of Mr. Hastings.

¹ Brathwaite was defeated at Anakkudi, a village about 6 miles north-east of Kumbakonam in the Tanjore District. The cavalry, 200 in number, were commanded by Lieutenant Sampson and Bowles. The whole force, about 1,600, surrendered at discretion.

The first and second of these had been neutralized by means to which we have already adverted, and Sindia had been converted into a friend, by the influence of the same great mind. While that chief continued to give the weight of his talents and military force, to the Mahratta operations on the western side of the peninsula, the efforts of Colonel Goddard, although conducted with skill and energy, had led to no decisive result; and Mr. Hastings, while pressed for exertions on the eastern and western coasts, of a magnitude which would have appalled an ordinary mind, conceived the masterly design of detaching this chief also from the Mahratta confederacy, by attacking from the side of Bengal, the seat of his resources in the centre of the peninsula. A respectable detachment, under Colonel Carnac,¹ conducted the service in a manner worthy of its original conception: and the junction of an additional force under Colonel Muir, having placed the latter officer in command, he concluded a treaty of peace with Sindia, on the 13th October 1781, by which that chief "*agreed, if it should be deemed advisable, that he would endeavour to mediate a peace between the English and Hyder, and also between them and the Pêshwa, but if these objects should not be effected, he engaged not to assist or oppose either party.*"²

The importance of detaching Sindia from the alliance, by weakening the power of the Mahratta confederacy, was sufficiently obvious; and the influence of this secession in determining the Poona Mahrattas to pacific views was merely probable; but the exact nature of the influence of these preliminary events on the connexion between Hyder and the Mahrattas appears to have been known to themselves alone, and so dexterously concealed by both, as apparently to

¹ Major, afterwards Colonel, Jacob Carnac.

² For an account of the operations in Gujerat and the Concan under General Goddard see Edwards: *Grant Duff's History of the Mahrattas*. Vol. II, Chap. XXIX.

have escaped the observation of the English diplomatic agents. The nature of the treaty with Sindia was soon discovered by Noor-u-Deen the Mysorean vakeel at Poona, and late in the preceding year Hyder had become apprized of all its intended bearings. It will be recollected, that as a preliminary to the war, the territories formerly Mahratta, north of the river Toombuddra, occupied by Hyder in consequence of his connexion with Ragoba, had, in 1779, been confirmed to him, on certain conditions, by the existing government at Poona, and when Noor-u-Deen requested an explanation of the views of the minister Nana Furnavese, consequent on the treaty concluded between Sindia and the English, he was distinctly informed of Nana's intention to accept the mediation in its fullest extent; and to unite with the English in compelling Hyder to make a reasonable peace: but it was added, that Hyder had still one method left of averting an arrangement, rendered necessary by the interests of the Mahratta state. If he would immediately evacuate the territories north of the Toombuddra, and abandon his claims on the poligars south of that river, which had also been the subject of negotiation in 1779, the Poona Mahrattas would not only continue the English war with renewed vigor, but find means of regaining the co-operation of Sindia; and before concluding any treaty, time would be given for Noor-u-Deen to receive his master's instructions on this overture. Hyder's answer was of course of a nature to protract the negotiations, but the treaty of *Salbey* between the English and Mahratta states was concluded on the

May 17. 17th of May, 1782; and by one of the stipulations, the Mahrattas cautiously avoiding any notice of the territories abovementioned, engaged that within six months after the ratification, Hyder should be obliged to relinquish to the English and to their allies all territories taken from them since the date of his treaty with the Pêshwa (Madoo Row) on the 10th of

February, 1767. The diplomatic oversight was committed of not limiting a time for the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty : that of the Governor-general is dated on the 7th of June, 1782. The delay of Nana Furnavese, the Poona minister, at that period the topic of various conjecture, is now for the first time developed by the facts above recited: the date of his ratification being the 20th Dec. 1782, immediately after he had been secretly apprized of the death of Hyder on the 7th of the same month.¹

The treaty of Salbey was negotiated with great ability, by Mr. David Anderson, as English plenipotentiary on one part, with Sindea, ostensibly a military chief, and subordinate member of the Mahratta confederacy, in the strange and anomalous capacity, not only of plenipotentiary on behalf of the Pêshwa, as head of the Mahratta state, but also of guarantee, mutually chosen by both parties, and bound by this treaty to unite with either against the other, in the event of its infraction. An attempt to unravel these complex relations, so often represented as unintelligible,* may be acceptable to some of my readers, and will afford the opportunity of endeavouring to trace from its source the true character of those relations between the various branches of the Mahratta state, which have sometimes been dignified with the name of Constitution.

When the results of the early predatory habits of Sevajee began to assume the character of importance which pointed him out to the Mahratta people, as the deliverer predicted in their numerous prophecies ; the force which he acquired from their re-union, from the gorgeous improvidence of the kings of Decan, which compelled them to disband their means

¹ The treaty of Salbai consisted of seventeen articles. It was ratified at Calcutta on the 6th June 1782, at Poona on the 20th December, and was finally exchanged on the 24th February 1783.

* See particularly the very able historical branch of the Annual Register, on this subject.

of safety ; and subsequently from the false policy of Aurengzebe, who transferred the remnants of subdued armies into the most formidable enemies of the state* ; these united means enabled Sevajee to seize an extensive portion of territory both above and below the western ghauts, which, as his power assumed a more solid consistence, he converted into a sort of national domain, a new and enlarged centre, for a more widely extended plan of universal plunder. A range of forts erected or improved along the summits of the lofty granite mountains, composing the various chains, which issue from the great range of western ghauts, served as depositories for spoil, and of security for the families of the chiefs. These chiefs almost exclusively arose from among the agricultural or pastoral tribes ; and during the periods unfavourable for military operation, on the original pursuits of their forefathers was engrafted the care of military equipment, and chiefly of rearing among the mountains, that hardy race of horses, which, mounted by a more iron race of men, carried from the abodes of peace, and of a simplicity of manners still not extinct, the horrors of indiscriminate desolation and murder over the other portions of India. Such were the Mahratta horse ; and the infantry, which could even outstrip them, in a rapid course of several hundred miles, was composed of a lower class, named Malhoutees,¹ the inhabitants of the more elevated hills, hardy as they were poor.

* The reader is requested to consider the application of these observations, and of the early history of Sevajee, sketched in the 1st vol. p. 80, and 112 et seq : to the condition, in 1817, of the Pindareers, of Malwa and Candeish.

¹ "The Mavalis, or Mavales (Mawnlees) are the inhabitants of the hilly portion of the modern Satara and Poona Districts. They are usually dark-skinned, small and active, and able to endure much fatigue. During the last sixty years they have become orderly and have adopted agricultural pursuits. It is probable that the Kotis, as distinct from the Kuntis, formed the bulk of Sivaji's fighting Mavalis." (I. G. Bom. 1909, Vol. I, p. 538 ; Edwardes : *Grant Duff's History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. I, p. 7, note 1.)

The successive adventures of the followers of Sevajee, led them to consider this hilly tract as their place of refuge, and their home ; and more distant countries in the single light of a fund, on which they might draw at pleasure. These primitive ideas, of simple, unqualified, and unlimited rapine, gradually led to a policy unexampled in the history of the world, and interesting, as it explains the claim of *choute*, to which modern Mahrattas have ascribed a fictitious origin. Experience enabled them to discover, that a regulated portion of plunder from another country, was ultimately more profitable than an inconsiderate system of occasional rapine ; which, by letting loose the instruments of destruction for the extinction of the capital stock, should disqualify it for many years from administering to their future rapacity. A fourth part of the crop was the portion,* which the sovereign, in conformity to the Hindoo law, was entitled to demand from his subjects, in time of public distress. The heaven-inspired sovereign of all India, fixed upon this fourth, or *choute*, as the regular amount of his demand, a war-tax in preference to the peaceful sixth ; and we find him forcibly levying this fourth by means of officers regularly appointed, on countries as regularly occupied by the revenue establishments of Aurengzebe ; and even on the property of mercantile travellers, passing the Mahratta fortresses. Every year, Sevajee and his immediate successors, issued forth to levy this contribution, to the utmost extent that the nature of the resistance, and the physical strength of his troops enabled him to travel ; resistance being always deemed to justify the largest attainable booty. At a late period of the most successful efforts of Aurengzebe, when he had obtained possession of the person of Sahoo, the Mahratta Raja, that captive attempted, but failed, in a negotiation for the submission of his people, on the condition

* Menu, and Digest passim.

of allowing to them the *dêshmookee*¹ (tenth handful), the most antient Hindoo assessment, as a sort of national quit-rent.

On the death of Aurungzebe, Zulfecar Khân,² who had possession of the person of the prisoner, released him, on obtaining a considerable ransom, and the services of a body of Mahrattas to aid his own party in the wars of the succession, (from 1707 to 1713) and the Raja, restored to liberty, spurned at the proposed *dêshmookee*, and exacted the *choute* of Decan without opposition. In the still weaker reign of Furruckseere, when the two *Seyeds of Barah*³ had usurped nearly the whole powers of the state; the younger brother, as governor of Decan, not only acquiesced in the *choute*, but when proceeding to Delhi (A.D. 1719) for the dethronement of his sovereign, this rebel conceded to Sahoo, the double tax of *choute* and *dêshmookee*, as a reward for the services of a Mahratta army, under the command of Balajee Visoonauth, the first *pêshwa*, not by the authority of the sovereign, but to purchase the means of dethroning the sovereign. Such is the true history of the corrupt transaction on which the Mahrattas have, in all subsequent times, affected to found their claims to the *choute*, as a royal grant of the Mogul emperor, abandoning the original ground of national exaction.*

¹ The *Chauth* (one-fourth) and *Sardesmukhi* (one-tenth) developed into a regular system of blackmail imposed by the Marathas upon districts under the government of other powers, which desired protection from plunder. These payments of one-fourth and one-tenth of the revenue, coupled with the proceeds of pure marauding, represented a considerable portion of the Maratha state revenues. (O.H.I. p. 434.)

² *Zulfecar Khân*.—Zulfikar Khan. (*Vide* Grant Duff: *History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. I, p. 314.)

³ Abdulla Khan Sayyid, and Husein Ali Khan Sayyid. For the latter's negotiations with the Marathas, *vide* Grant Duff: *History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. I, pp. 333-335.

* This explanation, founded on a variety of manuscript

According to the hereditary tendency of all Hindoo institutions, Balajee was succeeded in the office of pēshwa (or head of the administration) by his son Bājee Row, who, under the weak government of Mahommed Shāh, after burning the very suburbs of Delhi, was not only bought off by that feeble prince by a confirmation of the ignominious stipulation of the choute of Decan, but was even appointed the imperial governor of that province, in the vain hope of terminating the depredations of his countrymen (1735). Subsequently to the invasion of Nadir Shah, (1739) Bājee Row employed his increased power and influence to terrify the unhappy Mahommed Shah into an extension over the whole of Hindostan of the double grant of choute and deshmooken; but these regions being too far removed from the original centre of the Mahratta state to admit of an annual enforcement of the demand, Bājee Row found it expedient to establish his nation, by conquest or connivance, in the provinces of Gujjerat and Mālwa. Goandwana and Berar were seized for the same purpose by a branch of the house of Sevajee, and these possessions served as new centres of new orbits, moving in harmony and correspondence with the original system. Gooty formed a new centre farther south; and the little states of Tanjore on the east, and Colapoor* on the western coast, branches of the authorities, will be found confirmed in all its principal facts, by reference to Scott's *Ferishta*, vol. ii. page 150 to 153; and in the passages quoted from that publication, in the first volume of this work.

* The origin of the house of Tanjore has been already explained; that of Colapoor is more complex. Sevajee had two sons, Sambha and Rama; the first of these had two sons, Sahoo and Sambha; Sahoo died without issue; Sambha adopted a son, from whom is descended the family of Colapoor, and according to Hindoo law, the present Raja of that place is unquestionably the lineal heir of Sevajee in the elder branch; the line of pageant Rajas still kept in Sittāra, being as unquestionably descended from Rama, the second son of Sevajee.

[In 1839 the Chief at Satara was deposed, and his brother,

house of Shahjee, maintained pretensions, sometimes subordinate and sometimes independent of the Poona state, but generally concurring in its national objects. From these new centres new armies issued forth to perform their annual circuits of exaction: Gujjerat extended its demands from the mouths of the Nerbudda to those of the Indus: Málwa stretched to the north, until ultimately, under Ragoba, a Mahratta army established a Mahratta post at Lahore, the capital of Penjab*: Goandwana took the circuit of Berar to the south-west, and looking to the north-eastward, extended its depredations across the Hoogly to the capital of Bengal.

These expeditions originally miscalled *mulk geeree, territorial conquest*, came in process of time to justify the name; and this people, by seeking for the permanent occupation of territory, subverted the original principle of Mahratta domination, by absorbing in establishments which seldom leave a surplus, that abundant fund which had been cheaply realized at the expence of others, and served to keep the army in a state of constant and active efficiency. So long as the old and new centres preserved their primitive destinations, the national domains of each flourished by the accumulation of the wealth of the surrounding states: but in proportion as the appetite for fixed territory was indulged, the hardy habits of the people gradually declined, the growth of the English power, and the severe defeats sustained from the Abdalli Afgháns of the north at length began to limit the extension of the *choute*; the chiefs of the new centres of plunder began to forget their subordinate character; the Pêshwa himself had usurped the power of the head of the state, which had become

placed on the musnud, died without heirs in 1848. The State was resumed by the British. The Kolhapur Chief still rules in Kolhapur State in Bombay Presidency.]

* Literally five waters; the country watered by the five branches of the Indus.

hereditary in his family; and at the period of the treaty of Salbey, this hereditary usurper was as infant; a minister (Nana Furnavese) acting in his name even before his birth,* himself founded a second hereditary usurpation, by rendering the Pêshwa a pageant, and assuming the title and pretension of hereditary Dewan, or minister. This old man did not till the last relinquish the hope of heirs from his own body, and left a virgin widow† who was to have fulfilled his vows; if these hopes had been realized, the infant minister must have had his guardian; that guardian must necessarily have been himself the minister, and would have been embarrassed with the custody, 1st, of the hereditary Raja, 2d, the hereditary Pêshwa, 3d, the hereditary Dewan; and would without much doubt have been himself prepared to add another link to the chain of usurpation. In such a conflict of pretensions every way defective, the chiefs were embarrassed in the choice of parties; and each,

* See Hyder's curious comments on this event, pages 761-762 of volume i.

† This lady continued to hold possession of the impregnable rock of Loughur, (the iron fort,) until she surrendered after a lapse of upwards of twenty years, to the Duke of Wellington, on obtaining the English protection for her person and treasures.

It may here be observed, with reference to subsequent transactions, that the Pêshwa, continuing to be the acknowledged head of the Mahratta empire, was nevertheless, from this period forward, sometimes actually, but always virtually, a prisoner, in the hands of successive parties of his subjects, and never felt himself to be really liberated from that degrading and perilous thralldom, until restored, if not to imperial dominion, at least to liberty and free agency; and to the enjoyment of a more moderate, but a safer power than that of his predecessors, by the consequences of the treaty of Bassein, concluded on the 31st December, 1802. A short abstract is annexed of the fate of the Peshwas subsequent to Madoo Row. Narain Row fell by the consequences of intestine commotion. Sevai Madoo Row, the infant above described, from the miseries of his situation, was guilty of suicide: the present Peshwa, alternately a prisoner and pageant, lived from his infancy in the hourly dread of assassination; and after being tossed about as the prize of combatants and

as was natural, thought himself as well entitled as Nana, to the custody of the pageant, and the office of usurper. The character therefore of political independence, and the quality of guarantee, engrafted by Sindea on his military and diplomatic powers, in the treaty of Salbey, was not so much an assumption of authority over his acknowledged superior the Pêshwa, as over the person who governed in the name of that infant, and whom Sindea, as a soldier possessed of substantial power, thought himself qualified at any time to supplant.

We return from this digressive illustration of the treaty of Salbey, to the military operations of the Mysoreans and the English.

Hyder, in reviewing his actual situation, felt himself foiled in every battle with Sir Eyre Coote. Disappointed, and as he thought, deceived by the French; assailed in a vulnerable part of his western territories, where a detached army was destroyed, and

intriguers, he finally escaped in 1802, to the protection of the English, from a pitched battle fought by the troops of Dowlut Row Sindea, and Holcar, for the possession of his person. It was the national character of the English, and the known treachery of his countrymen, that determined his preference; those who may doubt the policy, are at least not entitled to question the humanity of this arrangement. The author has the most unquestionable grounds *to know*, that the feeling which determined his choice, had, up to the departure of the late Sir B. Close from that court, continued daily to encrease, and from the character of his successor, there is no reason to doubt of its continuance.

[Loughur (Lohogarh) is a fort lying at the edge of the Western Ghats, four miles west of Khandala, in the Bombay Presidency. Baji Rao II, the Peshwa, in 1802, after the battle of Poona, in which Jaswant Rao Holkar defeated Daulat Rao Sindia, fled with about 7,000 followers and accepted the treaty pressed upon him by the Governor-General. He was sent to Bassein. He was installed as Peshwa by General Sir Arthur Wellesley at Poona. In 1818, the office and title of Peshwa were abolished by the Governor-General, and the perpetual exclusion of the family of Baji Rao from any share of influence or dominion decreed,]

farther reinforcements threatened more extensive operations ; a general insurrection of the Nairs over the whole province of Malabar, aggravated by a rebellion in Bullum and Coorg, two districts on the summit of the hills which overlook that province, might be deemed in the ordinary course of Indian warfare ; but in addition to all these misfortunes, he was now openly threatened with the more embarrassing danger of a Mahratta invasion from the north. Deeply reflecting on this unprosperous aspect of affairs, he determined to concentrate his force, to abandon his scheme of conquest in Coromandel, and to direct his undivided efforts, first, for the expulsion of the English from the western coast, and afterwards for the preservation of his dominions, and for watching the course of events. With these views, he commenced in December 1781, the destruction of most of the minor posts of Coromandel in his possession, mined the fortifications of Arcot, preparatory to its demolition ; sent off by large convoys all the heavy guns and stores, and compelled the population of the country, hitherto well protected, to emigrate, with their flocks and herds to Mysoor.

It was about this period that Hyder being much indisposed, was either by accident or design, left entirely alone with his minister Poornea : after being for some time apparently immersed in deep thought, he addressed himself to Poornea, in the following words :*

"I have committed a great error, I have purchased a draught of Seandee, at the price of a lac of pagodas : " (Seandee, the fermented juice of the wild date tree,† produces the most frantic species of intoxication, and a draught of it is sold for the smallest copper coin ;) he intended to intimate by this

* Related to the author by Poornea.

† *Elate Sylvestris*. Ainslie.

[*Phoenix Sylvestris* : *Seandee* is the Maratha *Shindi*, the juice obtained from the wild date tree]

forcible idiom, that the war was an act of intoxication; and that its advantages and disadvantages bore to each other, the relation of a farthing and a lac of pagodas, (40,000%.) "I shall pay dearly for my arrogance; between me and the English there were perhaps mutual grounds of dissatisfaction, but no sufficient cause for war, and I might have made them my friends in spite of Mahommed Ali the most treacherous of men. The defeat of many Baillies and Brathwaites will not destroy them. I can ruin their resources by land, but I cannot dry up the sea; and I must be first weary of a war in which I can gain nothing by fighting. I ought to have reflected that no man of common sense will trust a Mahratta, and that they themselves do not expect to be trusted. I have been amused by idle expectations of a French force from Europe, but supposing it to arrive, and to be successful here, I must go alone against the Mahrattas, and incur the reproach of the French for distrusting them; for I dare not admit them in force to Mysoor."

Preparatory to his own ultimate movement, a force under Muckdoom Ali was appointed for the restoration of his affairs in Malabar, and another under Woffadâr (a Chêla) to Coorg, while a still more remarkable Chêla, Sheick Ayâz, (Vol. i. page 741, and Appendix to chap. 18.), was ordered from Bednore for the recovery of Bullum. The spoliation of every moveable property in Coromandel was in rapid progress, and a few days only remained before he should have completed his arrangements for springing the mines at Arcot and evacuating the country;

Mar. 10. when intelligence was received of the actual arrival and landing at Porto Novo of the long expected succours from France, amounting to about 3000* men including a regiment of Africans. Tippoo, whose corps still operated in the southern countries, was immediately ordered to proceed thither, and

* Histoire de la dernière guerre, page 297.

confer with the chiefs. Hyder had soon afterwards a personal interview with Monsieur Cossigny and Admiral Suffrein, and being entirely satisfied of the expected arrival of Monsieur Bussy at the head of a larger division, it was agreed that while waiting the junction of these troops, the fort of Cuddalore should be reduced and prepared as a French dépôt, and that on the arrival of Monsieur Bussy, the united forces should seek a decisive action with the English army. In the mean while, the difficulty of providing supplies consequent on his late arrangements for desolating the country, aggravated the ordinary causes for mutual distrust, and prevented that cordial intercourse so indispensable to the success of conjoint operations.

The French and English nations had severally made the greatest exertions to obtain that pre-eminence in Coromandel, which in two successive wars, continued to be a main object of national policy; and the French government had wisely committed the supreme direction of their affairs in the East to the able and experienced hands of Monsieur Bussy. The first impediment to the execution of his plans arose from the capture, by Admiral Kempenfelt, of a convoy, on which was embarked the first division of his troops, in December 1781, and a second convoy experienced a similar fate in April 1782. Monsieur Bussy arrived at the Isle of France, in June of the same year, and found that the governor, unapprized of these disasters, had already, in the preceding December, before it was possible to have received the consequent orders dispatched by Monsieur Bussy from the Cape of Good Hope, embarked the first division of the troops destined for Coromandel, on the fleet under Monsieur D'Orves, by whose death on the passage, the command devolved on Admiral Suffrein, an officer for activity, enterprize, and resource, not exceeded by any of his coteremporaries. He made the coast with 12 ships of the line, and 18 other ships, chiefly transports, considerably to the

northward of Pulicate, on the same day that Sir Edward Hughes, after the capture of Trincomalee, had returned to anchor at Madras with six; but by a fortunate coincidence, he was on the very next day joined by three ships of the line from England, and ventured with these unequal numbers to encounter the French fleet. Mons. Suffrein, whose intelligence indicated only six ships of the line, hoped by a decisive
 Feb. 17. blow, to have destroyed the English squadron in the open roads of Fort St. George, and thus to have been in a condition for the complete investment of the place by sea and land; but on approaching the roads in this confidence, and perceiving the unexpected reinforcement of three ships, he hesitated in his manœuvres, and ultimately stood away to the southward, followed without any hesitation by the British fleet: the action terminated without the capture on either side of a ship of war; but the masterly conduct of Admiral Hughes, who commenced the battle, by bearing down upon the transports, left him in possession of six vessels, five being merely re-captures; but the sixth, a transport laden with troops, which operated as a farther reduction of the means possessed by Mons. Bussy. The French fleet after this action, proceeded to land at Porto Novo the troops already adverted to, and afterwards to the rendezvous of the scattered convoy at Point de Galle, while Admiral Sir E. Hughes, whose ships had suffered severely, repaired his damages at Trincomalee, and returned to Madras early in March.¹

Although similar disasters did not befall the reinforcements of troops dispatched by the English government, a variety of causes contributed to render

¹ The account of the action of the 17th February, 1782, is given in a letter from Admiral Hughes to Lord Macartney, dated March 9, 1782, given in Wyllly's *Life of Sir Eyre Coote*, pp. 317-318. The letter from the Madras Government to the Company reporting the action is given in Love's *Vestiges of Old Madras*, Vol. III, pp. 259-260.)

them ineffective. About the same time that Admiral Suffrein left France with a naval reinforcement for Mons. d'Orves, carrying also a division of the troops to be employed under Mons. Bussy, a similar expedition under Commodore Johnson and General Meadows sailed from England. The intermediate object of both, was the Dutch settlement of the Cape of Good Hope; of the French to secure it to their new allies; of the English to wrest it from both. The English expedition watering at Porto Praya, in one of the Cape de Verd Islands, was actually surprised on the 16th of April 1781, by the squadron of Mons. Suffrein, who by a precipitate confidence in the facility of success against a state of defective preparation, failed by the same disregard of careful disposition, and retired after a confused and irregular action without the capture of any vessel on either side. It was late in June before the British squadron, after the repair of their damages, obtained by the capture of a Dutch ship as they approached the latitude of the Cape of Good Hope, the requisite information for their future guidance. In the winter of the southern hemisphere, Table Bay, or the port of Cape Town, the capital of the colony, situated to the westward of that promontory is an unsafe anchorage; while Simon's Bay, at the bottom of False Bay, to the eastward of the Cape, affords a secure harbour. Admiral Suffrein had anticipated the English by repairing to the latter port; but the homeward bound merchant ships of the Dutch, who always considered Simon's Bay a hazardous inlet for unwieldy vessels, preferred to encounter the dangers of an hostile squadron by anchoring in the eminently secure, but ill watered and nearly uninhabited haven of Saldanha bay, on the western coast, and there, in consequence of the intelligence obtained from the prize, they were captured by Commodore Johnstone. The prior arrival of Mons. Suffrein at the Cape having disconcerted the first part of the English plan, Commodore Johnstone

returned with his prizes and three frigates to England, while the remainder of the squadron prosecuted their voyage to Bombay: an arrangement to which the French* attributed much of their own success, and the want of frigates with the British squadron in India was equally unfortunate to the national commerce as unfavourable to its maritime and military operations. A fifty gun ship,¹ accidentally separated, was captured by the French, and occupied a place in their line on the 17th February, 1782, while the three ships² already mentioned of the same squadron joined Sir Edward Hughes a few days previous to that engagement. A portion of the troops with General Medows arrived in these ships; and by a singular determination, that general officer continued to serve on ship-board, instead of occupying his proper place in the army, which Sir Eyre Coote had declared his intention of resigning to his charge.† The remaining troops of this expedition intended by Sir Eyre Coote to reinforce the army under his own command, had, in consequence of an open rupture between him and Lord Macartney, been employed on operations on the western coast, to which our narrative will return.

Sir Eyre Coote, Commander-in-chief of all the King's and Company's troops in India, and member of the Supreme Council of Bengal, was, when acting

* Histoire de la dernière guerre, note to page 313.

¹ This was the *Hannibal*. On the 17th December 1781, the French fleet under Suffrein sailed from the Ile de France for the Madras coast, and on the way captured the *Hannibal*. He joined D'Orves, who was with the French fleet off Pulicat on the 7th February 1782, where D'Orves was attacked by illness and died, leaving Suffrein in command.

² These ships were the *Hero*, *Monmouth* and *Iris*, under Commodore Almo, which were sent with the transports to India, by Commodore Johnstone from the Cape, to reinforce Admiral Hughes. The transports had on board 400 men of the 98th Regiment under Fullarton, and General Medows. Some of the troops with Almo had been landed on the Malabar coast.

† "It is not with me," (said the General, in a private letter to a friend at Bengal,) "as it was with the Duke of Marlborough

within the territories of Fort St. George, a member of that council, and considered by them to be constitutionally subject to the orders of its majority. Although Lord Macartney professed to follow the example of his predecessors, in committing to Sir Eyre Coote the military conduct of the war, it was argued, that the cession by a Government of all controul over its military measures, would, with the extinction of its powers, involve a dereliction of its duties ; and the very orders requisite for the remedy of those defects of supply, of which they received such incessant complaints, necessarily involved operations not alone collaterally, but directly of a military nature. The arrangements for the capture of the Dutch settlements had been made without the participation of Sir Eyre Coote, and during his absence in the field. The abstract propriety of these measures was justified by their success ; and military instructions to the distant provinces, (when the absence of the Commander-in-chief rendered it impracticable to consult him,) was not deemed to be an undue interference with the conduct of the army under the immediate orders of Sir Eyre Coote. On the part of the Commander-in-chief, it was argued, that all interference in military command, was an invasion of his constitutional authority as Commander-in-chief of the troops of all the Presidencies ; and that every such interference of the local Government had a direct tendency to

after the battle of Blenheim, who, seeing a French soldier fall wounded, after bravely defending himself, rode up to him, and said, my brave fellow, had all the French been like you ; '— 'no General,' (said the soldier,) 'it is not many like me that were wanting, but one like you ;' and it is not one *like me* that you now want, but many *like* those I have brought ; but to be plain with you, I have so little information respecting Indian warfare, being altogether without experience in it, that I should do much more harm in learning my trade, than I could ever compensate for having learnt it. I must, therefore, decline the honour you intend me." This passage, although given from memory, is believed to be literally correct.

obstruct and defeat military plans of a wider range, of which that local Government had neither information nor controul. Although for some time after the arrival of Lord Macartney, an intercourse prevailed, full of reciprocal courtesy and respect, these indications of confidence and co-operation had gradually diminished, and ultimately disappeared. On the last return of Sir Eyre Coote from Vellore, he complained with the greatest asperity of the neglect of the department of supply during his absence; declared, that experience had shewn he could place no reliance on the proper attention being paid to the wants of the army; formally absolved himself from all responsibility; announced his intention of immediately resigning a command which his honour and reputation would no longer allow him to retain, and in a subsequent dispatch, intimated that he waited for that purpose the arrival of General Medows, from Bombay.

He had applied to the Supreme Government of Bengal to restore his authority, without having previously noticed to that of Madras, the points in which he considered it to be invaded, and did not even condescend to explain, when after an admonition from Bengal, that Government requested information; the interposition of the Supreme Government, first, by temperate advice, and ultimately by command, led to a farther distraction in public councils, where unanimity was so urgently required. The employment on the western coast (contrary to the wishes of the general) of the troops to which we have adverted, was a consequence of these dissensions. Mr. Sullivan, political resident at Tanjore, and charged with a general superintendence of all the southern provinces, had from his central situation, and the confidence reposed in his talents, been made the medium of communication between the two coasts, and was authorized by Lord Macartney to open all his dispatches, and make all the communications in duplicate which their contents should require. In the exercise

of this discretionary power, which he inferred to extend to every thing connected with the public service, he was induced by his public zeal to open dispatches addressed to the naval and military commanders-in-chief at Madras; from the officers commanding these reinforcements: and unsuspecting of the existing disunion among the higher authorities, officially knowing from his own Government the importance which they, as well as the Governor-general attached to strengthening the diversion on the western coast, already commenced at Tillicherry, and naturally concluding, that the views of his Government could not be different from those of the Commander-in-chief; ventured to address letters to the naval and military officers on the western coast, unfolding these views, expressing his confidence that they would receive corresponding orders, and communicating such information as he possessed, and such opinions as he had formed, regarding the most advisable plan of operations in that quarter.

Although Sir Edward Hughes, on first receiving from Lord Macartney the dispatches of Mr. Sullivan, expressed his approbation of the whole proceeding and its consequences; yet on communicating with Sir Eyre Coote, they addressed a joint* letter to Lord Macartney, treating the conduct of Mr. Sullivan as an unauthorized violation of their official dispatches, and an illegal assumption of authority which they had not delegated and could not transfer to any man, and much less to a man who must necessarily be uninformed of their intentions and plans: and this unfortunate incident was considered by Sir Eyre Coote as an aggravated invasion of his lawful authority, branching from the head of the Government to its subordinates, although he must have been at the time distinctly aware that from the intermediate country being covered with the enemy's horse, the

* 13th March 1782.

dispatches themselves could not possibly have been sent; and that the extracts in a diminutive hand rolled up to the size of a quill, and successively transmitted by Mr. Sullivan's spies, constituted his only information of his own dispatches, the originals of which he probably did not receive for many months afterwards. Without farther observation on the effects of this unhappy controversy, the reader will probably be disposed to concur in the opinion, that it resulted infinitely more from the defective system of the government, than from the eminent men who were entrusted with its execution; and although this estimable veteran could not fail to discover through the fullest drapery of Lord Macartney's compliments, many intelligible insinuations, that much more might have been done, than was actually accomplished by the army; it must, with whatever reluctance, be allowed that the temper evinced by Sir Eyre Coote on this and other occasions, exhibited mournful evidence of his having outlived some of the most attractive qualities of his earlier character.¹

¹ For further light on this question of the dissensions between Lord Macartney and Sir Eyre Coote, Wyllie's *Life of Sir Eyre Coote*, and Barrow's *Life of the Earl of Macartney*, Vol. I, pp. 138-161, should be consulted. The conclusion at which Wilks arrived was fairer to both parties than that arrived at by either of the above protagonists. Lord Macartney succeeded a number of Governors, who had brought the administration to the lowest ebb of efficiency, and it was only to be expected that his assertion of authority would be resented. On the other hand, Sir Eyre Coote's state of health made him over-critical and ready to take offence, while the incapacity shown by the military administration; for which Lord Macartney was not responsible, gave him ample ground for complaints. The contradictory orders sent from Bengal in their letters of the 10th March and the 4th July did nothing to make the position easier. The length of the letter from Lord Macartney dated 30th August, which excited Colonel Wyllie's astonishment, should not have astonished any one conversant with the minutes and correspondence of the period. The papers that were drawn up in the secretariats of the three governments in India were seldom brief, and the Bengal Govern-

The serious importance which was attached March. to the preservation of Trincomalee, had induced the admiral, late in March, to sail for that place, with a reinforcement of troops, and a supply of military stores. On the 30th of that month, he was 30.

ment could not find fault with Madras on this score. It was the fashion of the time. The responsibility for affairs after all rested with the Governor and his Council, and Lord Macartney cannot be blamed for asserting his authority. Reference may be made to Mill's *History of British India*, Book V, Chap. V. Mill was too ready to criticise anything that came from Warren Hastings, but surely he was right when he wrote: "Instead of interfering with their authority to allay the unreasonable dissatisfactions of the querulous General, and to strengthen the hands, at so perilous a moment, of the Government of Madras, the Supreme Council encouraged his discontent, and laid their exhortations upon the Presidency of Madras, to place themselves in hardly any other capacity than that of commissaries to supply his army." (Mill: *History of British India*, Book V, Chap. V, p. 549.) Lord Macartney's defence of Sullivan's action will be found in a letter from the Government of Madras to the Court of Directors, dated 5th September 1782, paras 47-57. They said: "In our answer to their second complaint against Mr. Sullivan we wrote to Sir Eyre Coote that Mr. Sullivan had imagined that in the disposition of troops and succour of any kind sent by His Majesty to the relief of the East India Company the Persons entrusted with the Government of their Possessions and the management of their Affairs should have at least considerable influence if not a deliberative voice: . . . that on the first intimation of his (Sir Eyre Coote's) and Sir Edward Hughes' dissatisfaction at such an interference in Mr. Sullivan. We had written to that Gentleman to be particularly careful in any thing that might affect either his or the Admiral's Authority, and we should repeat that caution, leaving to higher powers the further consideration of the Offence he had given to the Commanders in Chief, which however heinous it might be considered with respect to them, arose not only from the purest motives of zeal and public spirit but the recommendation in which that Offence consisted appeared to him to correspond with the sentiments of the Governor General and Council of Bengal, and as the General had now ordered Colonel Humberston to obey the Bombay Government, which receives instructions from Bengal, it was probable that so far from Mr. Sullivan's impeding such orders, the early advice he gave, if followed, would have accelerated their good effects."

joined on his passage by two ships¹ of the line from England, whose crews were extremely reduced by the scurvy; but the importance of his immediate object, and the farther view of covering and receiving a convoy with troops and stores from England, at an appointed rendezvous, induced him to keep on his course, with the determination of neither seeking nor shunning the enemy. But the same object, though with different views, which affected the conduct of the English admiral, had a corresponding influence over that of Monsieur Suffrein; for he also knew of the approaching convoy, and the future fate of the campaign made it equally important to the French, that it should be cut off, as to the English, that it should be preserved. The hostile fleets came in sight

- April 8. of each other on the 8th of April, fifteen leagues from Trincomalee, the English line consisting of eleven ships, carrying 732 guns, and the French, of twelve, carrying 770. A sanguinary contest, which, after a
12. variety of manœuvres, took place on the 12th, terminated as before, without any decisive result, and both fleets, crippled to the extent of being unable to renew the contest, continued at anchor, in sight of
19. each other, until the 19th; when the French fleet, after an ineffective demonstration, made sail and disappeared, for the purpose of repairing its damages at Baticolo, a port in Ceylon, while the English proceeded for a similar purpose to Trincomalee, in the same island.²

Every hope of decisive measures by land was necessarily dependent on naval co-operation. Although the embarrassment of a convoy with the French fleet had induced Sir Edward Hughes in the

¹ *The Sultan* and *Magnanime*, sent from England.

² Suffren was on the *Héros*, which with the *L'Orient* engaged the English Admiral's ship, the *Superb*. The British losses amounted to 137 killed and 430 wounded. Admiral Hughes landed 1,462 sick and wounded at Trincomalee, and was obliged to remain inactive for six weeks.

first action to meet it with inferior numbers; the same inferiority of nine to twelve when he left Madras, precluded the attempt to cover the transports necessary for the conjunct operations to the southward, which, with a decided naval superiority, Sir Eyre Coote would have been inclined to propose. The result of these naval contests, therefore, although uniformly honourable to the British character, and productive of the highly important but negative consequence of preventing the contrasted effect of a conjunct operation against Fort St. George, had in the mean while limited the plans of Sir Eyre to movements purely of a defensive nature. On leaving Cuddalore, in the preceding year, he abstained from the effectual demolition of that weak place, in the hope that the naval superiority of the English would preserve its great convenience to his own operations, without risking its being seized and strengthened as an important depôt for the French. The precaution even of mining the place appears to have been omitted; and although two ships had been dispatched from Madras with a reinforcement, it capitulated without even the show of resistance on the 8th of April, before their arrival;¹ the whole April 8.

¹ "Towards the end of March, Tippoo Saib moved with his army within a few miles of the Bound Hedge of Cuddalore, and invested that place the 2nd April, in conjunction with Mr. du Chemin and all the French troops from Porto Novo, with a large train of heavy artillery.

"On the 3rd two French officers came to the Fort with a flag of truce from Mr. du Chemin, and offered terms of capitulation, the substance of which was that the Fort should be delivered up at 5 o'clock that evening to the French troops, private property secured, and the Garrison to proceed to Madras, there to be exchanged for an equal number of French troops.

"Captain Hughes, to whom, agreeably to your orders, the Chief and Council had delivered the command of the place on its being invested, in answer demanded 5 days, and said he would treat for the surrender of the Fort if not relieved by the expiration of that time. This the French General refused, and the place being too weak to make any effectual resistance against

garrison of this extensive town not having exceeded four hundred sepoys and five artillerymen. While the operations of the army were suspended in anxious expectation of the result of the naval action of the 12th of April, of which rumour had conveyed various and contradictory accounts, the united forces of
 May 11. Hyder and the French on the 11th of May suddenly appeared before Permacoil,¹ a hill fort situated about twenty miles N.W. from Pondicherry.

Sir Eyre Coote, on receiving this intelligence, instantly marched for its relief; but one of those violent storms, accompanied by the descent of torrents of rain by night, followed by suffocating heat in the day, which at this season of the year sometimes precede the change of the monsoon, not only arrested his progress, but was eminently destructive to his equipments and his troops; and while witnessing a scene of distress which no human means could relieve, he had the mortification to hear that Perma-
 16. coil had capitulated on the 16th, and that the united forces were advancing towards Wandewash. Sir Eyre Coote, on the first intelligence of the landing of the French, had ordered this place to be mined pre-

so great a force, the Garrison consisting of not more than 400 regular sepoys and 4 or 5 European artillery men, Captain Hughes accepted the terms, and the French took possession of Cuddalore the next morning. . . .

"Upon receiving Intelligence of the Investment of Cuddalore, two ships were despatched to the Assistance of the garrison, but it had surrendered before their Arrival." (Fort St. George to the Company, dated 5th September 1782, quoted in Love's *Vestiges of Old Madras*, Vol. III, p. 240.)

¹ *Permacoil*.—Perumukkal, a small fort on a hill, about 437 feet above the sea level, 15 miles west from the sea, and 6 miles E.S.E. from Tindivanam in the South Arcot District, Madras. The summit is about 400 yards by 200 yards in extent, and ascent on all sides is difficult. In 1761 it was captured by Sir Eyre Coote. In 1780 it was besieged by Haider, and taken by him in 1782, regained by the English in 1783. In 1790 it was taken by Tippu. Only a few ruins remain, to indicate the position of the fort.

paratory to its eventual demolition, if that measure should become necessary ; but although in his public dispatches of this date he describes the aspect of public affairs, in consequence of the destruction of May 19. the southern corps under Colonel Brathwaite ; the junction of the French forces ; the capture of Cuddalore and Permacoil, and the indecisive nature of the last naval combat to be not only embarrassing, but *desperate* ;¹ he determined to present himself before these united forces, and to trust for the rest to the tried valour of his troops, and their confidence in the skill and fortune of their commander. The united armies had been for four days in sight of Wandewash, when on the approach of the English, they withdrew 24. towards Pondicherry. The importance of Wandewash, or rather the inestimable value of its commandant,² may be conceived from the enumeration of one thousand head of cattle and four hundred sheep, among the supplies which waited the acceptance of his general, while his post was invested, and immediately after the whole country had been desolated, preparatory to its evacuation.

Finding that the enemy declined to wait the encounter in the neighbourhood of Wandewash, as from their superior numbers he expected, Sir Eyre Coote marched in the direction of Pondicherry, and came in sight of the united army encamped in a

¹ Sir Eyre Coote when he left Madras, was apparently not aware that Haider had appeared before Permacoil (Wylly: *Life of Sir Eyre Coote*, p. 287). But he suspected that, while Haider would probably desire to go south to Tanjore, the French would be anxious that he should first obtain possession of the three forts, Karanguly, Wandewash and Permacoil, in order to recover Pondicherry as soon as possible. He wrote to Madras when he heard Permacoil had fallen, that "a day's rice more or less may decide the fate of the British Empire in India." Madras was at this time suffering from famine, which lasted all through the year 1782, and the provisioning of Sir Eyre Coote's troops was a matter of immense difficulty. (Love: *Vestiges of Old Madras* Vol. III, pp. 230-236.)

² Captain William Flint.

strong position, deliberately prepared, in the neighbourhood of Kellinoor.¹ Reasons of a powerful nature, of which Sir Eyre Coote was very imperfectly informed, had induced the allies severally to concur in the propriety of avoiding a general action on equal terms. Hyder, as we have seen, had been under the necessity of detaching largely from his best troops for three separate objects. The French, reduced by sickness, and the occupation of Cuddalore and Permacoil, had in the field probably not twelve hundred Europeans; and Monsieur Bussy's directions were imperative, to risk no general action until his own arrival with the last of the reinforcements. It was to be expected from the tried prudence of Sir Eyre Coote, that he would not commit the last stake of his nation in India on the desperate hazard of attacking an enemy eminently superior in numbers, and every way formidable, in a position chosen by themselves, in the vicinity of their resources, and at a distance from his own. It was his practice, on questions of great difficulty, to consult the opinions of his principal officers; and his present situation appeared to be one of the most critical importance. To try the fate of battle on the enemy's chosen ground; to attempt a movement which should draw them from this ground, and compel them to fight on more equal terms, but at a still greater distance from the English resources, was the alternative of active measures; and if both were rejected, it only remained to retire towards Madras, destroying Wandewash, or still risking its occupation.

Arnee, from its central situation relatively to the scene of Hyder's operations, the sources of his supply, and the destination of his plunder, had at this period become the principal depôt of all that remained to him in the lower countries. From the absence

¹ *Kellinoor*.—Kilyanur, a village on the road from Tindivanam to Pondicherry, about 14 miles north-west of the latter place.

of all apprehension of danger, it was loosely garrisoned, and Captain Flint had for some time been in secret treaty with its commandant for the purchase of the place, and obtained from him the most complete and minute information (verified by subsequent inspection after the peace) of the means of carrying the place by surprise. The completion of this conditional arrangement furnished but a collateral prospect of success, liable to be disturbed and anticipated by any alarm which should suggest a reinforcement of the garrison; but it was an object of more certain calculation, that a movement threatening this depôt, and intercepting the enemy's supplies, would draw them from their strong position, and afford the chance of engaging on more favourable terms. In conformity to these views, Sir Eyre Coote marched on the 30th in that direction, and Hyder on the same May 30. evening detached Tippoo, with orders to proceed by forced marches, and throw a strong reinforcement into the place, following himself on the ensuing day, without his allies, whose instructions would not admit of their accompanying his march; and it is a curious illustration of character, that in retaliation for a refusal, the grounds of which he would not understand, the supplies of provisions which he had made to depend on his own daily will and pleasure, were during his absence ordered to be entirely suspended.*

On the 2d of June, about eight o'clock, when June 2. Sir Eyre Coote, after a short march, was preparing to encamp near to the fort of Arnee, a brisk but distant cannonade opened on his rear; and from a variety of distinct points, previously selected by Tippoo, and Monsieur Lally, on his front. A day of severe fatigue and varied cannonade, rather than of battle, and a succession of skilful manœuvres, to combine with the essential protection of the baggage, the means of closing with the enemy, were performed

* Intercepted letter from a French officer, confirmed by the oral information of the Mysoreans.

by the troops with a degree of confident steadiness and alacrity, which were deemed even to surpass all that their veteran commander had before witnessed in their conduct; and the operations terminated a little before sunset, with the capture of one gun and eleven tumbrils, and ammunition carts, secured by a spirited and judicious push of the European grenadiers, supported by a Bengal battalion, at the corps of Monsieur Lally; when covering the retreat of its artillery across the dry bed of a river. A loss of this nature, to which Hyder always attached an importance beyond its value, was ascribed to the misconduct of *Lutf Aly Beg*, who at this critical juncture, had been ordered to make a desperate charge, with a large and select body of cavalry, on the enemy's rear, but suffered himself to be checked by an active and well-directed fire from the horse artillery attached to the English cavalry. The reader may be prepared to hear of decapitation, or public disgrace, as the consequence of Hyder's rage at this imputed misconduct, which was really that of the troops and not of their leader. *Lutf Aly Beg** was committed to the custody of *Jehan Khan*,† then in the temporary command of Chittapet, with orders to inflict on him a corporal punishment prescribed, and after exhibiting the marks to certain witnesses named, to transmit their attestation of the infliction of the sentence: the united wealth of these two most improvident Mahomedan officers could not furnish a bribe for the bramin witnesses named. *Jehan Khan* approached the prison of his friend, threw himself at his feet, and declared that he would rather die than obey the order. *Lutf Aly Beg*, a man of wit and resource, devised a better alternative: procure, said he, some milk-hedge,‡ shut the door, draw the proper number of lines across my back, I shall hollow most dramati-

* The person mentioned in p. xxix. of the preface.

† The person mentioned in p. xxix. of the preface.

‡ *Euphorbia Tiraculli*; the milky juice of which is a caustic

cally, and to-morrow with only a little smarting pain, my back will be in a state to exhibit to your witnesses. The separate personal narration of the two individuals who have been named is the sole authority on which I should have ventured to relate an incident so little according with ordinary credibility.

The usual necessity of allotting the greater portion of the small but efficient corps of English cavalry for the protection of the baggage, deprived Sir Eyre Coote of the opportunity presented by the discomfiture of Lally's corps, of securing a long train of retreating artillery; and the want of depôts, or of any means of commanding food for a few weeks, left him the usual mortification of being unable by a series of active operations to profit by his success. The loss of Europeans and natives, including the wounded, amounted on this day to no more than seventy-four, among whom were seventeen who died of fatigue, chiefly of the 78th regiment. The example of this corps, which joined the army on the 25th of April, furnished a memorable proof of the inexpediency of appointing for field service European troops not habituated to the climate, nor instructed in the arrangements for subsistence peculiar to the country. With no other casualties from the enemy than the few which had occurred on this day, its effective strength was found at the expiration of thirty-eight days to be exactly one-third of its amount at the commencement of that period.¹

familiarly employed by the palanquin bearers, in raising blisters, as a remedy for local pains.

¹ In a letter from Sir Eyre Coote, dated 31st August 1782, he said: "Preference may certainly be given to the Highlanders for their temperance," but he remarks on the fatal effects of the climate on the 78th then lately arrived, "which furnishes strong and recent proof that their constitutions are not adapted to service in this country," and states that he has always observed the sufferings of Highlanders in India to be greater in proportion than those of men of other countries. (*Wylly: Life of Sir Eyre Coote*, p. 202.)

In closing our narrative of the last general action in which either of these eminent commanders were destined to engage, it may be proper to observe with reference to the general character of the tactics of Sir Eyre Coote that one of the obstructions to active operation which has so often been described, as arising from attention to the baggage, may appear to those who have not experienced an Indian campaign, to involve the opprobrium of a too curious attention to the comfort, perhaps the luxury of the troops; terms which certainly had no appropriate existence in these campaigns. These *impedimenta*, (the significant Roman term) consist chiefly of three articles; military stores, camp equipage, and provisions; the first requires no comment; but a short observation on each of the other two may tend to render more intelligible the degree in which these impediments are necessary. Such observations as the author has had an opportunity of making, incline him to the opinion, that a more expensive, but not therefore a more cumbrous camp equipage, than has ever yet been provided for the European soldier in India, would be equally promotive of efficiency, and true economy; and the example of the 78th, who would unquestionably have suffered less under better cover, may tend to illustrate the grounds of this opinion. With regard to the article of provisions, it is necessary to recollect, that the modern system of supply, reduced to a science in the commissariat of European armies, has no application to a country whose resources were uniformly destroyed in every direction approached by the English army; which was thus necessarily dependent on the few depôts it possessed, and primarily on Madras. A ship provisioned for a voyage, or a caravan preparing to traverse the great desert of Arabia, are the most appropriate emblems of the army of Sir Eyre Coote. Stored for the period calculated to elapse from quitting port, until its return to port, it is scarcely a figure to affirm, that in its first march it

was at sea, or more literally, in the desert; with the additional feature of being incessantly surrounded by swarms of irregular horse, presenting individual incidents too remarkable to be entirely excluded from the picture. To approach within speaking distance of the flanking parties, was known by the enemy from experience to be safe for an individual horseman; as the soldiers were expressly prohibited from throwing away their fire: the conversation always assumed the character of contemptuous abuse, of a mode of warfare, which they stigmatised as unmanly, by excluding the exercise of individual prowess and skill; and not unfrequently would terminate in a general challenge to single combat. There was in Sir Eyre Coote's body-guard, a young cavalry officer, distinguished for superior military address; on ordinary service, always foremost, to the very verge of prudence, but never beyond it; of physical strength, seldom equalled; on foot, a figure for a sculptor; when mounted—

—————“ he grew unto his seat,
And to such wondrous doing brought his horse
As he had been incorpsed and demi-natured
With the brave beast.”

In common with the rest of the army, this officer had smiled at the recital of these absurd challenges; but while reconnoitring on the flank of the column of march, one of them was personally addressed to himself by a horseman, who from dress and appearance, seemed to be of some distinction. He accepted the invitation, and the requisite precautions were mutually acceded to: they fought; and he slew his antagonist. After this incident, the challenges were frequently addressed, not as formerly to the whole army, but to *Dallas*, whose name became speedily known to them: and whenever his duty admitted, and his favorite horse* was sufficiently fresh, the

* This singular animal, besides the common duty of carrying his rider, exercised, when required, and sometimes spontaneously,

invitations were accepted, until the Mysoreans became weary of repetition. With a single exception, the result was uniform. On that one occasion, the combatants, after several rounds, feeling a respect for each other, made a significant pause, mutually saluted, and retired. As a fashion among the aspiring young officers, these adventures were not calculated for general adoption; it was found, that in single combat, the address of a native horseman is seldom equalled by an European.

We return from this digressive matter to the operations of the 2d June:—

June 2.

- Sir Eyre Coote encamped at the close of day on the ground which he had prepared to occupy in the morning, and on the ensuing day, made demonstrations of besieging the place, with the hope of adding the influence of his success to the other motives of the kelledar; but the presence of a powerful garrison, and the vicinity of Hyder, rendered the attempt even to communicate, too dangerous to be hazarded by an individual traitor; and as no message was received, and the vigilance of the garrison precluded the hope of surprise, under present circumstances, the object was abandoned, and Sir Eyre
4. Coote moved against the enemy on the 4th, in a south-western direction: Hyder retreated as he
 6. advanced, and he returned to Arnee. On the 6th, Hyder having moved to the eastward, Sir Eyre Coote
 7. again pursued on that day, and on the 7th, but without any other effect than the tantalizing view of an easy retreat, and the capture of some stragglers. The
 8. army halted on the 8th, to refresh the cattle and

all the aggressive force with which he was furnished by nature; and the Mysoreans, whose imaginations had added to the evidence of sight, would make inquiry regarding the extraordinary phenomenon of a gigantic figure mounted on a furious black horse of enormous size and destructive powers; the stature of the man being just six feet, and that of the horse fourteen hands three inches and a half.

troops, and Hyder, anxious to obliterate in some degree the impression of so many defeats, prepared in person an ambuscade which effectually succeeded. Some camels and elephants, insufficiently guarded, were made to pass within a short distance of the grand guard, and the officer commanding, with more zeal than prudence, attempted to carry them off, sending a message to the field officer of the day, Lieutenant Colonel James Stuart, of the 78th, to inform him of the circumstance: that officer instantly mounted, proceeded at speed to stop the imprudence of the young officer, and approached in time to see the guard charged on all sides by clouds of cavalry, within the skirts of which he was himself enveloped: seeing that all was lost, he trusted to the goodness of his horse, and singly escaped, by leaping a ravine, over which none of the enemy could follow him. The loss of the English was 166 men, 54 horses, and two guns: Hyder's, about 60 horses, and as many men, but the achievement was deemed of sufficient importance to justify a salute, on his return to camp, as a demonstration of victory.¹ Sir Eyre Coote mounted on the first alarm, and at the head of his cavalry, proceeded as quickly as possible to the spot, but arrived only in time to direct the interment of the mangled remains of his troops, having the melancholy consolation to observe, that the artillerymen had fallen at the muzzles of their guns, and the infantry in their unbroken ranks. The influence of the climate, and of fatigue, having entreated the number of European sick to an alarming degree, he moved by Wandewash, where the never-failing energies of its commandant, enabled him to remain four days, to refresh, and afterwards returned to the vicinity of Madras.

June 18.

¹ The guard was composed of a detachment of cavalry, two small guns, and 100 sepoy under Lieutenant Cruitzer, who was taken prisoner. He was drawn away from camp and surrounded by 6,000 horse commanded by Hyder. (Wilson. *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, p. 66.)

The distresses of the garrison of Vellore had again assumed a serious aspect, and the commandant had named the 1st of July as the latest period to which the place could be maintained. During the operations which have just been described, Sir Eyre Coote had apprized the Government of the impossibility of affording any succour from the army, and Lord Macartney devised a mode of relief, which was calculated to succeed from its extreme improbability. While Hyder's attention was closely occupied by the movements subsequent to the action of the 2d of June, one hundred irregular sepoy's under the command of an ensign,* escorting five hundred bullocks, twenty-four carts, and two thousand coolies† loaded with provisions, moved on the 6th of June to the skirts of the hills, a detachment of one thousand five hundred poligars there joined them, and by forced marches the whole was deposited in Vellore before the movement was suspected by Hyder. But the feeble escort of this most opportune relief was intercepted in its return, and compelled to surrender at discretion.

The importance already described of acquiring the fort of Negapatam, as a depôt for the future operations of the French, induced Admiral Suffrein to avail himself of the earliest possible opportunity for attempting that enterprize; and Admiral Sir E. Hughes on the first intelligence of his being anchored in that vicinity sailed from Madras to prevent its execution. The number of ships engaged in the naval action which ensued were on each side precisely equal, with a small superiority in favour of the Eng-

* Burn.

[Ensign Byrne, with 100 volunteer sepoy's, 250 horse, and 2,163 sepoy's, with 3,000 cooly loads of rice, 62 kegs of country spirits, 21 kegs of salt provisions, and 250 bullock loads of rice. (Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, p. 662.)]

† Men who make it a trade to carry loads on their heads, or to perform ordinary labour.

lish in the number of guns,* but like all the encounters which occurred between these distinguished officers, it terminated without a capture, but not without results; for the French were in consequence, avowedly compelled to abandon† the design of attempting Negapatam, which the Government of Madras, with a more than doubtful policy, ordered to be destroyed in the following January, during the absence of Sir Eyre Coote, and without his sanction. The next object of Admiral Hughes, was the revictualling of Trincomalee, but in this purpose he was anticipated by the activity of Monsieur Suffrein,¹ who after receiving at an appointed rendezvous off Ceylon, a reinforcement of two ships of the line, a frigate, and eight transports full of troops, aware of the probability of the early arrival of the English fleet, suddenly appeared before Trincomalee, landed two thousand

* French ships	...	11	...	706 guns.
English ditto	...	11	...	732 ditto.

[The British fleet bore down upon the French and engaged ship against ship, and an action ensued which, as Mahan tells us "was the only one of the five fought by Suffren on the coast of India, in which the English admiral was the assailant. There can be found in it no indication of military conceptions, of tactical combinations; but, on the other hand, Hughes is continually showing the aptitude, habits of thought, and foresight of the skilful seaman, as well as a courage beyond all proof." (Wylly: *Life of Sir Eyre Coote*, p. 321.) The British loss was 77 killed and 233 wounded; the French was 178 killed and 601 wounded.]

† Histoire de la dernière guerre.

¹ Wilks generally spells the Admiral's name in this fashion: his full name was Pierre André de Suffren Saint-Tropès, Baille de Suffren. He was born in Provence in 1729; he had fought against the British at Toulon in 1744 and at Cape Breton two years later, being there captured. He was released and again taken prisoner in Boscawen's action in 1759, and spent four years in captivity in England. He was killed in a duel in 1783. (Wylly: *Life of Sir Eyre Coote*, pp. 311-12.) Suffren, after his action of the 6th July, went to Cuddalore to refit, and was ready for sea long before Hughes, who went to Madras and delayed there refitting his vessels. He did not put to sea again until August 20th.

- four hundred men, and pushed the siege with such vigour as to induce the commandant to surrender at
- Aug. 31. a much earlier period than had been anticipated by Sir Eyre Coote. Suffren had scarcely occupied the forts¹ with the garrison intended for their defence, when a signal was made announcing the appearance of the hostile fleet. The English were prevented from desecring their opponents, by the back ground
- Sept. 2 of the land intercepting the light of the horizon, while through the same light their own ships formed opaque objects distinctly visible to the French; * they accordingly stood on with easy sail during the night, and in the morning had the mortification to see the French colours flying on shore as well as in the anchorage. During the interval since the last combat, the French force had been augmented to fifteen ships of the line, while the English was no more than
3. twelve; an action notwithstanding ensued, which terminated as before, without capture, and the fleets respectively returned to Cuddalore and to Madras; the French to deposit at the former place the military stores, and troops received in the transports, and the

¹ Hughes had sent two ships, the *Monmouth* and *Sceptre*, to Trincomalee with a reinforcement of 200 men of the 42nd and 98th regiments under Captain Hay MacDowell, who took command at Trincomalee. Suffren landed 2,500 Europeans under Baron d'Agoult and invested and took the place. The forts were in such a condition as to make defence by the small garrison impossible, and MacDowell capitulated on the terms he asked for.

* I am not acquainted with any terms in ordinary use, to describe these phenomena so familiar to every person who has made a voyage. A seaman would say, that the French fleet was not visible, because it was *under the land*. If Humboldt's terms were in familiar use, they would be sufficiently expressive. He distinguishes between distant objects seen in a positive and in a negative manner. In the first case, the light is reflected from the object; in the second, the object intercepts the light. According to this distinction, the English fleet was seen by the French in a negative manner: and in conformity to Humboldt's doctrine and observations, a much nearer approach was necessary before the French fleet could be seen in a positive manner.

English to concert measures preparatory to their departure to refit at Bombay. But it is worthy of particular remark, that the port of Trincomalee, considered and contested by both nations as the key of all their naval and military operations in the bay of Bengal and the coast of Coromandel, was found to be so utterly destitute of every resource, that Admiral Suffrein was under the necessity of seeking at Acheen, in the island of Sumatra, in the port of an uncivilized chief, those aids during the monsoon, which a conquest of reputed importance achieved for that special purpose was found unfit to supply. Whether in addition to these well known defects, Monsieur Suffrein may have been influenced in his choice of Acheen, by having previously made it the rendezvous of the *Pourvoyeuse* frigate laden with teak-wood from Pegue, and a store-ship from the Isle of France which joined him there, the French author does not enable us to determine. The Annual Register of that year has fallen into the error (apparently derived from the public records) of supposing Monsieur Suffrein to have wintered at Trincomalee, but the very accurate author of *Histoire de la dernière guerre*, who appears from internal evidence to have been a naval officer serving under that admiral, not only places the fact beyond doubt, but enables us to state the singular coincidence of Monsieur Suffrein having sailed from Cuddalore in fair weather on the 15th of October, the same day that the English fleet was driven in the utmost danger from the roads at Madras by a hurricane, which, as usual, soon changing its direction, strewed the shore for several miles with the wreck of country ships, and the dead bodies of their mariners; a loss the more afflicting from their containing a store of grain intended to avert the impending famine.¹

¹ The famine was not "impending" in October 1782. In January 1782, the Madras Government had reported to the Company: "for the country remains in a state of absolute Desolation, nor is there any appearance of cultivation in the Carnatick, except

The hope of each army had for several months been incessantly and anxiously fixed on the consequences of each successive naval combat, and the indecision of each result necessarily extended its influence to the military operations. The views of Hyder were chiefly directed to his distant detachments on the western hills of the peninsula and in Malabar, and to some inefficient operations in Tanjour, which were defeated with very inferior means by the distinguished energy and perseverance of Colonel Nixon.¹ Positive orders, as well as insufficient strength, kept the French on the defensive, and Sir Eyre Coote, estimating the united force opposed to him in Coromandel at higher numbers than their actual amount, gave to his movements a more cautious and defensive character than he might possibly have adopted, had his intelligence been more correct. After, however, depositing in Vellore, in the month of August, a sufficiency of

within the bounds of our different Factories and Garrisons." (P. to Eng. Vol. XXIX, 26th January 1782). In May 1782, there was acute distress in Madras, and as the year advanced, the famine became more acute. In November, the Madras Government wrote to the Company: "On the 15th Ultimo a very severe Gale of Wind happened here, in which most of the vessels were either blown out of the road or lost. All his Majesty's Ships slipped their cables and went to sea. Ten ships and snows of considerable burden were entirely destroyed, besides nearly one hundred country vessels of inferior size." In a letter to the *India Gazette*, it was announced that the admiral who was at anchor in fifteen fathoms, was giving an entertainment on board the flag ship when the gale began at noon on the 15th. He at once slipped his cable, and carried his guests to sea. "In the night the Hertford, the Free Trade, the Shannon, the Nancy, the Essex, and a Moorman's ship were all drove on shore. The Free Mason foundered at her anchors; and near one hundred snows and donies were entirely lost. It is impossible to describe a scene of such horror and distress." (Love: *Vestiges of Old Madras*, Vol. III, pp. 261-262.)

¹ Colonel Nixon was a cavalry officer, who had distinguished himself in Tanjore under Colonel Brathwaite, and had taken over command temporarily after Brathwaite's defeat in February 1782.

provisions to last until the 1st of March, 1783; and accomplishing that object without the slightest molestation from the enemy, he was induced, from this and other circumstances, to avail himself of the interval between the two last naval actions, and the absence of both fleets from the coast, to concert the means of attempting the re-capture of Cuddalore, if on approaching that place he should find the aspect of affairs and of the opposing force to be favourable to the enterprize. The absence of the fleets afforded the advantage of embarking at Madras on transports escorted by a frigate left for that special purpose, the requisite military stores and battering train; but the precarious nature of naval co-operation was never more manifest than on this occasion. On arriving on Sept. 6 the high ground above Pondicherry, he was astonished to find that the ships expected to be there waiting his arrival, were still invisible. The insufficient store 11. of provisions with the army, rendered him dependent on their arrival, and ultimately compelled him to return to Madras without an effort, having first however ascertained that Trincomalee had fallen; that Admiral Sir E. Hughes had returned to Madras after the action of the 3d of September, and that all hope of attacking Cuddalore must for the present be suspended. This mortification was farther aggravated, on the return of Sir Eyre Coote to Madras, by learning that the transports had arrived at Pondicherry on the day succeeding the departure of the army, a disappointment eventually fortunate in its consequences, as from the unexpected return of the French fleet to Cuddalore, the English expedition, if more successful in its early combinations, must have terminated in failure and considerable loss.

The ships of the English fleet had kept the sea during the monsoon of 1781, and from the injuries sustained through the want of periodical repair, and from four subsequent general actions, were in so defective a state, as to render their refitment at

Bombay indispensable in the opinion of their commander-in-chief. Lord Macartney, justly apprehensive for even the safety of Madras, if the hostile fleet should winter at Trincomalee, and be thus on the spot, not only to co-operate with the expected army under Monsieur Bussy; but to intercept the supplies of grain from Bengal, which constituted the sole hope of averting the miseries of famine at Madras, solicited the admiral, in several successive conferences, to risk the English fleet, for the purpose of covering a decisive attempt to reduce Cuddalore, and thus decide the war before the arrival of Monsieur Bussy; and his Lordship ineffectually, and somewhat indecorously, continued to press this measure, and to animadvert on the refusal, after the admiral had more than once declared his professional conviction of the absolute necessity of repairing to Bombay. Sir Edward Hughes accordingly sailed, as we have seen, for Bombay on the 15th of October: about twelve days after his departure, a respectable and long expected armament from England, under Sir R. Bickerton, anchored in the roads: the ships, of course, proceeded to form a junction with their commander-in-chief at Bombay, after having landed at Madras the troops intended to reinforce the army at that presidency.¹

¹ The account given of the attempt on Cuddalore, is given in the *Life of Sir Eyre Coote* and in Mill's *History of British-India*. Sir Eyre Coote arrived at the Red Hills, a group of small hills north of Pondicherry, on September 4, and there expected the frigate the *Medea* and the ships carrying the supplies from Madras. The *Medea* arrived on the 13th September without the ships, which were still off Sadras, some miles to the north. Sir Eyre Coote had to drop any idea of making the attempt on Cuddalore. He had been attacked on the 8th of September with severe illness, which prostrated him. In consequence he made over command to Major General James Stuart, who, hearing of the action between the French and English fleets off Trincomalee on the 3rd September, that Admiral Hughes had returned to Madras, and that reinforcements for the French had arrived under Bussy, decided to return to Madras and left on the 11th September.

During this campaign some advances to negotiation through Colonel Brathwaite a prisoner in Hyder's camp, were no otherwise remarkable than in assuming as the grounds of the present war, the fraud practised by Mahommed Ali on the state of Mysoor, in 1752, without noticing the treaty of 1769, which terminated all preceding differences: these advances were followed by the mission of an envoy to the English camp, charged with no definite proposals, and instructed merely to feel the dispositions and probable demands of that nation upon Hyder, in the event of his finding it expedient to abandon his French allies: and the dissensions among the English authorities were in no case more prominent, than in Sir Eyre Coote's declining to satisfy the official enquiries of Lord Macartney with regard to the nature of these communications.¹

The praise of friends and enemies extorted by the eminent talents and unrivalled energy of Monsieur Suffrein, was tarnished in the course of these operations, by an occurrence which must leave an indelible stain on the memory of that distinguished officer. He had proposed to the English Government, through Monsieur du Chemin, commandant of the troops, a

ber and reached Madras a few days later, Sir Eyre Coote being carried in a palanquin all the way.

¹ In July 1782, it was decided to communicate with Hyder on the matter of the treaty of Salbai, on the terms of which he had not been consulted. Sir Eyre Coote, to whom the negotiations were entrusted, considered that he was acting on behalf of the Bengal Government. Lord Macartney, in the letter from Madras to Bengal dated August 30, 1782, said: "A late plan of Mr. Sullivan's depended much as to its eligibility on a knowledge of Hyder's disposition to refuse or accede to the Mahratta treaty, concluded on the 17th May. At that knowledge we endeavoured to arrive by requesting Sir Eyre Coote to be so obliging as to let us know whether from any later event, he had been able to judge of the present disposition of that chief towards peace, or whether he had received any kind of information from or concerning him, by which we might form an opinion of his intentions to reject or abide by the treaty in which he was included by his allies. But

cartel for the exchange of prisoners ; the dissensions of the time held Lord Macartney to the etiquette of referring the proposition to the commander-in-chief, then absent with the army ; and Sir Eyre Coote, on receiving the reference, expressed his ready concurrence ; desiring however to include in the exchange, the English prisoners in the custody of Hyder, as a member of the allied hostile force, to which he was actually opposed ; which conditions seem to have been rejected by Monsieur Suffrein. Hostile operations rendered the communications extremely precarious, and those relating to the subject of the exchange could not have been conducted through the medium of a flag of truce, as the first letter of Monsieur Du Chemin to Lord Macartney, on that subject, appears never to have reached its destination, and others may have shared a similar fate. However this may be, it is certain that Monsieur Suffrein, shortly before his departure from Cuddalore, on the 1st of August, caused his English prisoners to be delivered to Hyder,* by whom they were marched, chained two and two together, to Mysoor : that Monsieur Motte, the intendant, and several respectable officers and inhabitants of Pondicherry, distinctly announced to

the General, justly enough deeming that the only matters now remaining necessary for our consideration, were such as immediately related to the supply of aids for enabling the army to act, and professing with some degree of humour, his wish to furnish us with every information, keeps back the information we desire on the ground of having communicated whatever occurrences had happened of that nature to your Board, as the only persons who could decide on points of that kind, and in all of which he had acted in a manner strictly conformable to the directions he had received from you." (Barrow : *Life of the Earl of Macartney*, Vol. I, pp. 159-160.) It was hardly to be expected that Lord Macartney would accept a position in which he was kept in ignorance of all the negotiations with Hyder, and also it was not probable that Sir Eyre Coote would prove a successful diplomatist. The negotiations proved fruitless.

* They were landed at Cuddalore on the 30th June, and commenced their march as prisoners on the 12th August.

Monsieur Suffren, and earnestly deprecated, the inhuman treatment to which these unhappy prisoners were destined; and that this Admiral defended the measure on the ground of his having declared to the English Admiral, "that if no exchange took place he should be obliged to keep his prisoners in one of Hyder's forts," or in language more correctly describing the state of the fact, that he would transfer them to the custody of that ally, whose prisoners he refused to include in the exchange: but it is on far other grounds, than a questionable construction of the customary laws of war, among civilized nations, or the imputation of political error, or even the reciprocal accusation of diplomatic subterfuge, that the whole civilized world must unite in its abhorrence, of delivering to the custody of a barbarian, notorious for his contempt of those laws, prisoners of war entitled to honourable treatment from an honourable enemy.¹

¹ It is impossible to justify Admiral Suffren's conduct as regards the handing over of the English prisoners to Hyder. Innes Munro in the *Operations on the Coromandel Coast* blamed the Madras Government for not consenting to the change which the Admiral proposed, and laid the blame on the dissensions between Sir Eyre Coote and the Madras Council. The first communication from Suffren does not appear to have been received. But on the 26th April 1782, Lord Macartney received the proposal for exchange through M. du Chemin, the commandant of the French troops, which was referred to Sir Eyre Coote, who was absent from Madras with the army. Sir Eyre Coote wished that some of the prisoners with Haidar, who were at Seringapatam, should be included in the exchange, and this caused delay in replying to the French. On the 14th of August, the English prisoners who had been landed from the French ships on the 30th June at Cuddalore were sent to Haidar, who sent them on to Mysore. In the *Memoirs of William Hickey*, 1782 to 1790, (p. 59), the explanation, which Admiral Suffren gave to Hickey at Trincomalee in January 1783 is given. He said he twice wrote to Lord Macartney and was insulted by "his insolence and rude silence," that he then addressed Admiral Sir Edward Hughes, who wrote regretting that it was not in his power to promote the desired exchange; Suffren said he again

The daily declining health of Sir Eyre Coote, had compelled him, before his return from the southward, to commit the command of the army to the next in seniority of His Majesty's, as well as the Company's troops, Major-General Stuart*; and in compliance with medical advice, he embarked for the benefit of the sea air, and proceeded to Bengal.¹ The hostile fleets wintered in the ports already noticed; the English army cantoned for the rains, in the neighbourhood of Madras, the French in Cuddalore

wrote to Hughes that he would "be under the disagreeable necessity of handing over the prisoners" to Tipu, and that as he had been treated "with contumely" by Lord Macartney, he desired that no further reference should be made to him. Sir Edward Hughes again wrote that he regretted his inability to treat for the exchange, and begging that Suffren would not adopt his threatened measure of sending the prisoners to Tipu, as he feared that such a step would be worse than condemning the unfortunate men to death. The French Admiral replied that he had no alternative, but would wait for three days to elapse before carrying out his intention. Admiral Suffren then told Hickey that as he understood that the English Admiral had submitted his representations to Lord Macartney without any effect, he was compelled to hand over his prisoners to Tipu. He defended his conduct on the ground that he had no port to receive them on the coast, that he was in great distress for want of provisions, and could not continue to maintain the four or five hundred prisoners he had. The French Admiral's defence of his conduct is certainly not sufficient to justify his conduct, against which a strong protest was raised at the time by several French officers at Cuddalore as repugnant to ordinary humanity. Suffren must have known at the time that Lord Macartney had, just before this, ordered the officer commanding at Negapatam to release eighteen French surgeons, who had been made prisoners off a French hospital ship which had been captured there, and he might in any case have prevented the English prisoners from being removed from the Madras coast to Mysore. Sir Eyre Coote's delay in coming to a decision was lamentable, but in no way justified the French Admiral in the course he took.

* The same officer who had lost a leg in the battle of Polliloor.

¹ Sir Eyre Coote embarked and sailed in the *Medea* frigate on the 28th September, accompanied by his Assistant Secretary Mr. George Tyler, and Lieutenant-Colonel Owen.

and its vicinity, and Hyder selected for the same purpose, an elevated ground on the left bank of the river Poni, about sixteen miles to the northward of Arcot.

CHAPTER XXV.

Affairs of Malabar—since the defeat and destruction of the besieging army at Tellicherry—Reduction of Calicut—Arrival of Colonel Humberstone—lands and assumes the command—defeats Hyder's corps under Muckdoom Ali—Plan for the attack of Palgautcherry—Loss of his stores—Moves to Paniani—Mysoreans rally—Second defeat—Colonel Humberstone moves for better cover to Calicut—his measures contrary to the views of the Government of Bombay—and of Sir Eyre Coote—The latter, however, disappointed, directs Colonel Humberstone to remain under the orders of Bombay—and recommends a concentrated effort—Before the communication of these views, was again in motion against Palgaut—Extreme peril of the attempt—Driven back to Paniani with precipitation. by Tippoo and Lally—Arrival of Colonel Macleod—Circumstances which led to this attack—Colonel Macleod strengthens his position at Paniani—Tippoo attacks it—is repulsed—retires to await the arrival of his heavy guns—disappears in consequence of the death of Hyder—Interesting circumstances attending that event—Concealment of his death—His army marches towards the point of Tippoo's approach—Tippoo's first measures—for Malabar—New Governor of Seringapatam—arrives in camp—Succession acknowledged—Resources to which he succeeded—French connexion—Tippoo obliged to depart to the west, before the arrival of Bussy—Dissensions in Madras, consequent on Hyder's death—Animadversions of Mr. Hastings—Madras army at length takes the field—Lord Macartney

assumes the direction of military measures—their character—General Stuart's conduct—Demolition of Garangoly and Wandewash—Offers battle to the French and Mysoreans—Revictuals Vellore—Change of opinion consequent on the departure of Tippoo—Suffrein's early appearance in the upper part of the bay of Bengal, 1783—rendezvous with Bussy at Trincomalee—lands him and his troops at Cuddalore—his grievous disappointment at the departure of Tippoo—English march for the siege of Cuddalore—Sir Eyre Coote embarks at Bengal—chased—agitation—and death—Review of his military character.

THE operations in Coromandel, during the year 1782, deeply important in their aspect, but inconsequent in their effects, have been described without much reference to cotemporary events in Malabar, in order that we may resume, with greater perspicuity, the narrative of occurrences on that coast, subsequent to the relief of Tellicherry, and the destruction of the Mysorean army under Sirdar Khân, in January 1782.

That event had been followed by the early reduction of Calicut, and by the arrival at that place from Bombay of a portion of the armament originally placed under the orders of General Medows,¹ consist-

¹ William Medows, son of Philip Medows or Meadows, was born in 1738, and entered the army at the age of eighteen. From 1760 to 1764 he served in Germany, and subsequently as a Lieutenant-Colonel in the 55th Regiment in the American War, where he distinguished himself at the Battle of Brandywine. In 1778 he took part in the capture of St. Lucia, and two years later he was placed in command of a secret expedition against the Cape. French action preventing the attainment of the desired object, the transports proceeded to India, and arrived at Madras on the 13th February 1782. Medows was with Colonel Fullarton in his operations against Mysore, and was present at the signing of the Treaty of Mangalore in 1784. He was a brave, high-minded, chivalrous soldier. (Love: *Vestiges of Old Madras*, Vol. III, p. 401.)

ing of about a thousand men under Colonel Humberstone,¹ who states the force to be now "so scattered and dispersed, that it is hardly possible it can ever be assembled, and so diminished in numbers, from disorders incident to a long voyage; that were it assembled, it would not, without reinforcement, be equal to the plan proposed for it;" which appears to have been a conjunct operation with Sir Edward Hughes's squadron, against the Dutch possessions in Ceylon.² The naval and military officers commanding this portion of the armament, having received the communication from Mr. Sullivan which has been described, and deeming the attempt to reach the opposite coast, while the French were understood to have the superiority at sea, as a precarious undertaking, determined that the troops should be landed at Calicut, in aid of the proposed diversion, and that the ships should return to Bombay, in furtherance of the same design. Colonel Humberstone, as senior officer, assumed also the command of the troops which had hitherto served under Major Abington, and being

¹ Colonel Humberstone (or Humberstone Mackenzie) had arrived from England at Calicut with the 100th Regiment and part of the 98th.

² Commodore Johnstone, who was sent out to the Cape in 1781, convoyed ten East Indiamen and a large body of troops, including the 100th Foot under Lieutenant-Colonel Humberstone. When Johnstone returned to England, he sent on the *Hero*, *Monmouth* and *Iris* under Commodore Almo with the transports, having the troops on board, to Bombay. Commodore Almo selected his best sailing transports with 700 of the 98th Regiment, under Fullarton and General Medows, and pushed on to join Admiral Hughes at Madras. The rest of the transports and troops went on to Bombay and arrived there early in February 1782. From there they sailed for the Madras coast; but Lieutenant-Colonel Humberstone, who was in command, thinking that, if he attempted to get round to Madras, he would probably fall into the hands of the French, disembarked his troops at Calicut on the west coast of Madras on the 18th February 1782; viz., part of the 98th Regiment, the 100th Regiment and four independent companies: in all, about one thousand men.

joined by a body of Nairs, anxious to emerge from a long and cruel subjugation, he moved about twenty miles to the southward, and close to Tricalore,¹ came in contact with Hyder's detachment under Muckdoom Ali, already adverted to.* That officer, confident in superior numbers, estimated at seven thousand, waited the result of an action, in a strong but most injudicious position, with a deep and difficult river in the rear of his right: from this position he was dislodged, and the retreat by the left being interrupted by a judicious movement of the English troops, a large portion of the Mysorean right was driven into the river, with a loss in killed alone, estimated by Colonel Humberstone, at between three and four hundred men; and among that number, Muckdoom Ali, their commander: 200 prisoners, and 150 horses were secured; and the total loss, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, may thus be estimated at from 1,500 to 2,000 men, while that of the English was inconsiderable.

Colonel Humberstone followed the route of the fugitives as far as Andicota,² but finding pursuit unavailing, - he resumed his plan of proceeding to the attack of Palgautcherry, by the river Paniani,³ which passing near to that fort, discharges itself into the sea at a town of the same name with the river, distant about sixty miles; and is navigable for boats to distances fluctuating with the season, but sometimes for 30 miles. While moving southward for that purpose, and waiting the arrival of the boats which conveyed his stores, a violent gale of wind,

¹ *Tricalore*. - Trikkalayur, about 16 miles east of Calicut on the Beypore river.

* Page 122.

² I cannot trace this place. It may be Angadipuram, about 20 miles south of Trikkalayur. All this part of the country is hilly, covered with forest, and the home of the Moplahs.

³ *Paniani*. - Ponnani, river and town. The town is about 35 miles south of Calicut, at the mouth of the river. Palghat is about 50 miles east of Ponnani, south of the river.

April 17 attended with five days incessant rain, dispersed the boats, spoiled the provisions, and damaged the ammunition; and the soldiers from exposure to the inclemency of the season becoming sickly, he was induced, as soon as the violence of the weather would allow, to march his troops to the towns of Tanoor,¹ and Paniani. During these events, the Mysoreans rallied at Ramgerry,² a place situated about half way from the coast to Palgautcherry, whence detachments of cavalry were advanced for the usual purposes of annoyance. Colonel Humberstone, being himself seriously indisposed, directed Major Campbell in an interval of fair weather, to advance towards the

May 18. enemy, who again waited the attack in an injudicious position, and were defeated with the loss of two guns. Experience of the nature of the season already commenced, compelled Colonel Humberstone to seek for better cover to shelter his troops during the monsoon, and he availed himself of the first favourable interval to return to Calicut, after a short course of operations, highly creditable to his energies as an executive military officer, but founded on views neither sufficiently matured nor combined by the Governments who were to supply the means necessary to the execution of the service, and finally undertaken at an improper season.

In contemplating the policy of such diversions, the Government of Bombay were wisely of opinion, that no middle course was expedient between measures purely defensive on that coast, and an armament capable not only of penetrating into the interior, but maintaining its communications. Previously to the departure of Colonel Humberstone from Bombay, the Government had distinctly objected to a project which he had suggested for employing the troops under his command in the reduction of Mangalore or

¹ *Tanoor*.—Tanur, a town on the coast about 15 miles north of Ponnani.

² *Ramgerry*.—Ramagiri Kotta.

Cochin, and urged his proceeding to Madras where the reinforcement was expected. The operations which have been described are therefore to be viewed as resulting from a coincidence of circumstances, and not the effect of digested measures, for we shall hereafter have occasion to see that the combinations which might have rendered them safe and efficient were never practically adopted. On receiving intelligence however of his landing at Calicut and sending back the ships, although the Government of Bombay state this determination to have "disconcerted their measures," they nevertheless resolved "to take the proper means to assist him;" afterwards however expressing their regret that "while General Coote is July 2. in want of every European we can collect, as appears by the Madras letter received the 13th ultimo, the force under Colonel Humberstone should be shut up at Calicut in the utmost distress for many necessary articles; in no situation to render any service to the public; and out of the reach of support or supply from hence at this season of the year."

Sir Eyre Coote, however, judiciously converting his own disappointment with regard to this reinforcement, into the means of effecting a secure diversion, placed Colonel Humberstone under the orders of the Government of Bombay, recommending to them such a concentrated and powerful attack on Hyder's western possessions, as should have the effect of compelling him to return for their defence, and thus leave his French allies in Coromandel to their own separate resources. Before, however, these measures could be matured, or the season could admit of conveying to Colonel Humberstone the requisite orders for his guidance, that officer was again in motion for the prosecution of his original design. The river Paniani afforded conveyance for his stores, as far as the post of Tirtalla 30 miles inland, and he soon afterwards obtained possession of Ramgerry, a Sept. 21. place of some capability five miles farther up the

- Sept. 28. river. Fortunately the extreme peril of the expedition was here tempered by the consequences of local inexperience, and apparently inadequate means of communication with the natives; he describes himself to be "ignorant of the road and situation of the country, and could place little dependence on the information of the Nairs," natives of that part of the country, and deeply interested in his success: he consequently determined to leave under the protection of a battalion of sepoys at Ramgerry, the whole of his battering train and heavy equipments, and
- Oct. 11 marched with six six-pounders, two one-pounders, and the remainder of his force "to reconnoitre the country and fortress of Palgautcherry, before he
18. should undertake to attack it." The remains of the Mysorean troops appeared to make a stand in a position not far from the place, but suffered themselves to be easily dislodged, and retreated into the fort. The Colonel proceeded under cover of his troops, to reconnoitre the southern and western works; he moved on the ensuing day to the northward of the fort, and after finding by a complete examination, that it was "every where much stronger
21. than he had reason to apprehend," he returned to his first ground to the westward of the place, but in this movement, a judicious and well-timed sortie produced the loss of nearly the whole of his provisions, and the discomfiture of all his Nairs, who seem to have gone off in a panic, in consequence of being attacked in a morass during a thick fog. On the ensuing day he fell back to a little place named Mangaricota, eight miles distant, where he had left some provisions. An attack in force upon his rear repelled with judgment and spirit, was of less importance than the distress sustained by rains, which fell
24. from the 21st to the 24th, with as great violence, as during any period of the monsoon, and rendered, impassable, for several hours, a rivulet in his rear. It appears by letters, not officially recorded, that on

the 10th Nov. he received at Mangaricota, orders Nov. from Bombay to return to the coast: he commenced his march for that purpose on the 12th. On the 12. 14th, he was at Ramgerry, about half way from 14. Palgaut to the coast. A chasm occurs in the materials which the* public records afford from the 30th of October till the 19th of November, when Colonel 19. Macleod, who had been sent by Sir Eyre Coote to assume the command, landed at Paniani. "On the 20th, Colonel Humberstone,† with his whole force 20. came in, having made a rapid retreat before Tippoo and Lally, who followed him by forced marches with a very superior force;" the last march being from Tirtalla 30 miles. The public dispatches are silent with regard to his numbers, and the fate of the battering train; but the circumstances which led to this attack are better ascertained.

After the defeat of Muckdoom Ali, Hyder had made all the requisite arrangements for endeavouring to repair that misfortune as soon as the season should permit. Tippoo's usual command, including the corps of Monsieur Lally, had been reinforced and improved, and towards the close of the rains in Malabar, affected to be meditating some blow in the neighbourhood of Trichinopoly, in order that when the state of the season and of the roads should be reported favourable, and above all when Colonel Humberstone should have advanced a sufficient distance from the coast, Tippoo might be enabled, by a few forced marches to come unexpectedly upon him. The receipt of orders from Bombay for his return to the coast, considered by himself as a public misfortune, may be deemed the efficient cause of the preservation of the troops under his command. Tippoo commenced his forced march from the vicinity of Caroor, in the confidence of finding Colonel Humberstone at Mangaricota, advancing his stores

* The intermediate dates are derived from unofficial letters.

† Letter from Colonel Macleod, 29th November.

for the siege of Palgaut. Tippoo arrived at the latter place on the 16th,* when his enemy had receded to Ramgerry: it was not however until the 18th, at night, that he had any intelligence which satisfied him of the necessity of retreat at four o'clock on the ensuing morning; but from an official neglect to send the order to a picquet of one hundred and fifty men, stationed at the extraordinary distance of three miles, five hours were lost; incessantly harrassed and cannonaded throughout the day, he attempted, without success, to pursue his route on the right bank of the river, which was not fordable, but found himself stopped by impenetrable swamps. The early part of the night was passed in anxious search for a practicable ford, and at length one was found so deep as to take ordinary men to the chin; yet by clinging together in silence, the tall assisting the short, the whole got across without the loss of a man. Tippoo, supposing the river to be every where impassable, employed the night in making dispositions for destroying his enemy in the snare in which he supposed him to be entrapped; but by day-light on the 20th the detachment had performed the largest portion of the march, and was only overtaken within two miles of Paniani. The hope of intercepting him was thus frustrated by an unexpected event, but Tippoo determined to persevere in the attack.

Colonel Macleod, on examining his position at Paniani, began to strengthen it by some field works, Nov. 25. and on the 25th attempted to surprise Tippoo's camp by night, an enterprise from which he desisted, on forcing a picquet, and discovering regular military arrangements and a strong position. On the morning of the 29th, before day, the field works being still unfinished, Tippoo attempted the strong, but

* The dates are given on the authority mentioned in the preceding page, and do not exactly correspond with those of *Memoirs of the War in Asia*.

weakly occupied position of Colonel Macleod, by a well designed attack in four columns, one of them headed by Lally's corps; but such was the vigilance, discipline, and energy of the English troops, that the more advanced picquets were merely driven in on the outposts, not one of which was actually forced, support to the most vulnerable having been skilfully provided, and Monsieur Lally's corps having fortunately been met by the strongest, each column, before it could penetrate farther, was impetuously charged with the bayonet. The errors incident to operations by night divided the columns but the English tactic was uniform. A single company of Europeans did not hesitate to charge with the bayonet a column of whatever weight, without knowing or calculating numbers. Monsieur Lally's dispositions were excellent if the quality of the troops had been equal, a pretension which could only be claimed by a portion of one column out of the four, and the attempt ended in total discomfiture and confusion, the Mysoreans leaving on the field two hundred men killed, and carrying off about a thousand wounded: the loss of the English was forty-one Europeans, and forty-seven sepoy killed and wounded, including eight officers.

Sir Edward Hughes proceeding with his squadron from Madras to Bombay, came in sight of the Nov. 30. place on the ensuing day;¹ and on learning the circumstances in which the troops were placed, offered to Colonel Macleod the alternative of receiving them on board, or reinforcing him with 450 Europeans. He adopted the latter, from considering that while Tippoo should remain in his front, the small body under his command could not be better employed, than in occupying the attention of so

¹ Hughes sailed from Madras in the middle of October. Lord Macartney protested against Madras being left without the protection of the fleet, while the French squadron was in Trincomalee.

large a portion of the enemy's army; and that while at Paniani, he was equally prepared as at any other part of the coast, to embark and join the concentrated force which he knew to be preparing at Bombay. The return furnished by Colonel Macleod, to the Commander-in-chief at Madras, of his total number, after receiving from Sir Edward Hughes the reinforcement of 450 men, was, Europeans 800, English sepoy 1000, Travancorean troops 1200, shewing that the number of Europeans engaged in the late encounter were fewer than 400 men; and as he had been accompanied in landing by 40 men, the number with which Colonel Humberstone returned to Paniani could not have exceeded 300 men, out of the thousand with which he had landed in the preceding February.

Dec. 12. Tippoo, after this ineffectual attempt, retired to a farther distance, to wait the arrival of his heavy equipments, in order to resume the attack on the position at Paniani: but on the 12th of December, the swarm of light troops, which had continued to watch the English position, was invisible; and successive reports confirmed the intelligence, that the whole Mysorean force was proceeding by forced marches to the eastward, whither our narrative must return.

The health of Hyder during the course of this year, had begun perceptibly to decline, and in the month of November, symptoms appeared of a disease (unknown as far as I am informed in Europe) named by the Hindoos *Raj-pôra* (or the royal sore or boil) from its being, or supposed to be, peculiar to persons of rank; and by the Mahommedans, *Sertân* or *Kher-cheng*, the crab, from the imaginary resemblance to that animal, of the swelling behind the neck, or the upper portion of the back, which is the first indication of this disorder.* The united efforts of Hindoo,

* A surgeon, in performing the operation of opening one of these imposthumes, many years afterwards, happened to have a scratch on one of his fingers, which was accidentally touched by

Mahommedan, and French physicians, made no impression on this fatal disease, and he expired on the 7th of December.¹ It is deemed by the Mahommedans a remarkable coincidence, that the numerical letters, composing the words *Hyder Aly Khán Behauder*, correspond with the year of his death (1197, Hej.)² and the epitaph on his mausoleum, at the Lall Baug, on the island of Seringapatam, is founded on this coincidence, as are all Mahommedan epitaphs, on some particular words, whose numerical powers correspond with the date of decease.

The official situations of Poornea and Kishen Row, two bramins of opposite sects, but corresponding principles, who directed the measures of state on this important occasion, can scarcely be described by corresponding English terms. Hyder himself, being the head of every department, and signing the order for every disbursement, the business of the treasury and exchequer was conducted in two dufters or departments, independent of each other, and meant as a reciprocal check, but parallel and similar in their details, with little other difference, than that

the virus of the wound; and the author had the opportunity of seeing the alarming livid swellings which for some time afterwards successively appeared and subsided on his hands, arms, and forehead.

¹ Haider died in his camp at Narsingh Rayanapet, near Chittoor, on the 7th December 1782.

² The year of Haider's death was Hijri 1195. The process called *abjad*, in which every letter has a numerical value, gives in this case the following :—

(Arabic letter) <i>H</i> = 8	Arabic guttural <i>d</i> = 1
<i>ai</i> = 10	<i>n</i> = 50
<i>da</i> = 4	<i>ba</i> = 2
<i>r</i> = 200	<i>h</i> = 5
(Arabic <i>ain</i>) <i>A</i> = 70	<i>d</i> = 1
<i>l</i> = 30	<i>du</i> = 4
<i>i</i> = 10	<i>r</i> = 200
Arabic guttural <i>kh</i> = 600	
	<hr/> 1,195

(Lewis Bowring: *Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan*, p. 105)

one was conducted in the Mahratta, and the other in the Canarese language, the latter under Poornea, the former under Kishen Row.

It was Poornea's suggestion, when the recovery of Hyder became improbable, that his death should be concealed, as the only possible means of exercising the authority necessary to keep the army together, until the arrival of Tippoo. This project was accordingly concerted with Kishen Row, and with the public officers and domestics, to whom the event must necessarily be known. Immediately after his decease, the body was deposited in a large chest, filled with *abeer*, (a powder composed of various fragrant substances,) and sent off from camp, in the same manner as valuable chests of plunder were usually dispatched, to Seringapatam; and the confidential persons directing the escort, were ordered to deposit their charge at the tomb of his father at Colar.* Successive couriers were at the same time dispatched to Tippoo, to apprize him of the event, and of the consequent measures, and to recommend his joining with all possible dispatch.

The whole of the arrangements of the army, the weekly relief of the 2000 horse which constantly hung round Madras, the issue of pay, the adjustment of military accounts, the answers to letters received from the envoys of the different courts, and all the

* It was afterwards removed by Tippoo's orders to the superb mausoleum, still endowed by the English at Seringapatam; and on that occasion 40,000 pagodas were disbursed in charity, and to the priesthood, for offering up prayers, with views similar to those of the Romish masses, for the souls of the deceased. The removal of the body furnishes an occasion for noticing a determined belief among Mahomedans of the south of India, (whether elsewhere the author has not ascertained,) almost miraculous for its absurdity, in opposition to evidence equally accessible to the ignorant and the wise; that a body committed in due form *to the charge of the earth*, will, without any previous embalming, or other preparation, remain uncorrupted for any length of time, until re-assumed by the person who had deposited the charge.

business of the state, went on as usual. The principal officers of the army, and the foreign envoys made their daily enquiries, and were answered that Hyder, although extremely weak, was in a state of slow, but progressive amendment. The French physicians, sent from Cuddalore to attend him, on the first serious symptoms, had, of course, conveyed to Monsieur Cossigny, who now commanded the troops, confidential intelligence of the whole proceeding. The first impression on that officer's mind was that of immediately marching with all his force, to watch over the interests of his nation, and guard the succession, until Tippoo's arrival; and it was with great difficulty, and after a pecuniary advance on account of subsidy, to prove the sincerity of the persons administering the provisional government, that he was prevailed on by the Mysorean envoy at Cuddalore to abandon a design which would have frustrated all their measures; and after moving a few marches by the route of Ginjee, he forbore to approach, but held his troops ready to march at a moment's notice.

The most trusty chiefs of the army were successively, and without any circumstances to excite suspicion, admitted into Hyder's tent, for the purpose of communicating the plan which had been adopted; all on their return to their respective corps made the concerted reports of the state of his health, and all were faithful to their trust, excepting *Mahommed Ameen*, the son of Ibraheem Saheb, and cousin-german to the deceased. This chief, who commanded 4,000 stable horse, formed a project with Shems-u-Deen (Buckshee) to cut off the persons provisionally exercising the powers of Government, to seize the treasury, and proclaim Abd-ul-Kerreem, Hyder's second son, a person of defective intellect, as a pageant who would permit them to exercise the Government in his name. It was necessary to the execution of this design, that it should be communicated to certain ressalgars (officers commanding battalions), and

a French officer named Boudenot, who commanded a troop of 100 French cavalry, attached as an honorary guard to head quarters, associated himself in their plans. The intelligence of this conspiracy was not long concealed from Poornea, who sent for the French officer to Hyder's tent, where being confronted with some of the ressalgars who had spontaneously revealed the plot, he confessed the whole design on the previous promise of personal security. *Mahommed Ameen*, and Shems-u-Deen were then sent for, on pretence of consultation, and finding it in vain to equivocate, confessed the whole. The disposal of these persons was managed with corresponding address; they were put in irons, and sent off publicly under a strong guard, as if by Hyder's personal orders, for having entered into a conspiracy to overturn the Government in the expectation of his death.

On the 16th day after his decease, the army marched in the direction of Tippoo's approach. The closed palankeen of Hyder with the accustomed retinue, issued at the usual hour from the canvas enclosure of his tents; and the march was performed in the ordinary manner, observing of course the proper attentions, not to disturb the patient in the palankeen; and a few similar marches brought the army to the appointed rendezvous at Chuckmaloor, on the river Pennaar; an intermediate situation between Cuddalore and the pass of Changama, for the convenience of communicating with the French, or of moving to the westward, if that determination should become necessary; and the junction of the French troops was effected in the same encampment a few days after Tippoo's arrival.

Suspicious of Hyder's death had from the first been whispered about the camp with various and fluctuating credit. But it soon became evident, as well to those who believed, as those who were inclined to discredit the report, that whatever might be the state of the fact, the Government was in vigorous

hands, and that obedience was the safest course. Notwithstanding the appearances which have been stated, there were few persons in the army who were not now satisfied of Hyder's death; but the examples which had been made, restrained the disaffected within the bounds of order.

Tippoo received his first dispatches on the afternoon of the 11th, and abandoning for the present all Dec. operations in Malabar was in full march to the eastward on the morning of the 12th. At Coimbetoor he met Arshed Beg Khân, who a short time before Hyder's death had been sent, in the expectation of Tippoo's success and early return, to assume the Government of Malabar; and that officer was ordered to remain on the defensive at Palgautcherry. At the same place he made a selection for the Government of the capital which seemed to afford a favourable earnest of steady gratitude and attachment; *Seyed Mahommed* the associate and protector of his youth who had saved his life in the battle of Chercoolee, and had up to this period, from the unaccountable jealousy of Hyder, continued to serve as a simple horseman in Tippoo's personal guard: and the battalion of Assud Khân, an experienced and trusty officer, was assigned as the escort of the new governor. Tippoo on considering his distance* from the capital and the army, avowed to Seyed Mahommed his despair of an unopposed succession, and gave him two distinct commissions, one to serve under the commandant of Seringapatam, the other to supersede him. The actual commandant was named *Shिताуб*, a Chêla, (slave) a description of persons in whom Hyder, in conformity to the views already explained,† appears for some time past to have placed the most

* The distance from his camp at Paniani, may, on a rough estimate, be stated at from 380 to 400 miles, and the dromedary courier, who brought the first intelligence, must have travelled about 100 miles a day, for four successive days.

† Vol. i. p. 742.

unlimited reliance; and it was not until a month had elapsed, and satisfactory intelligence had arrived from the army, that Seyed Mahommed* found it prudent to produce his second commission.

Tippoo's marches in the early part of his route were of course the longest that his troops could support. On his nearer approach to the army they became gradually shorter, for the purpose of sending confidential messengers and receiving reports. He particularly prohibited the usual procession to go out in advance and receive him;† and declining even the compliment of turning out the line, entered the camp in a private manner after sunset.

1783. Arrived at his father's tent, he made the most ample acknowledgments to the persons who had
Jan. 2. conducted during this most critical interval the charge of public affairs; and particularly to Poornea, who had first suggested the arrangement. On the same evening he gave audience to all the principal officers of his army, seated on a plain carpet; declining to ascend the musnud,‡ from an affectation of grief, by which no one was deceived.

The actual strength of the Mysorean armies in the field, at the time of Hyder's death, exclusively of garrisons and provincial troops, but including a new levy of 5000 horse raised on the northern frontier, subsequently to the intelligence of the Marhatta peace, was, according to the return of actual payments made by Poornea as treasurer, 88,000;§ it will be recollected that the strength with which he

* The personal information of Seyed Mahommed.

† Technically designated by the Arabic term *istekbdl*, which is literally translated by the French idiom *aller au devant*; it is so common that every public officer of rank, on approaching a village, is met at some distance by an *istekbdl* of the villagers.

‡ The elevated seat, or cushion, occupied by the prince. or person in authority.

§ The best military officers of Mysoor, estimate 120,000, but the difference between estimated and effective strength, is familiarly known.

entered that country was 83,000, but the corps of Meer Saheb, then on its route from Kurpa was not included in the number: these authentic statements, so nearly corresponding to each other, are merely intended to correct the exaggerated estimates hitherto published: and it may be added, for the purpose of illustrating the nature of the resources to which Tippoo succeeded, that the treasury at Seringapatam contained at this period, three crores of rupees, (three millions sterling) in cash, besides an accumulated booty of jewels and valuables, in Poornea's language, to a countless amount.

The measures to be adopted by the united French and Mysorean armies, necessarily depended on an enlarged view of the probable events on the western, as well as on the eastern coast; of the latter, the early arrival of Monsieur Bussy was most important; and until that event, it was deemed most prudent to postpone any distant operations, which might interfere with his plan of the campaign. But before the occurrence of this long expected arrival, the alarming aspect of intelligence from the western coast, and the actual capture of Bednoor, was represented as imposing on Tippoo the absolute necessity of proceeding in person, for the preservation of his own dominions; in spite of the brilliant results which might be anticipated* from waiting with his main strength, the certain and early co-operation of Monsieur Bussy, and sending a respectable detachment, for the purpose of a defensive war in his western possessions. It was accordingly resolved, that Monsieur Cossigny, with a French regiment, March 1. should accompany the Mysorean army, to the westward, and that a respectable division† of Tippoo's

* Tippoo represents the proposition of first taking Madras, as a matter of course, and then Bednoor, as a gasconade, by which he was not to be deluded.

† Stated by Budr-u-Zemân Khân, who commanded the infantry, at 3000 horse, 4000 infantry, and 5000 peons.

army, under Seyed Saheb, should be left to co-operate with Monsieur Bussy.

The cotemporary events on either coast will perhaps be rendered most intelligible by continuing for the present the affairs of Coromandel, leaving the operations on the western coast, which terminated this eventful war, to be afterwards resumed in one unbroken narrative.

The rumour of Hyder's death, prevalent in his own camp even before his actual decease, was circulated in every other direction with the same shades of fluctuating credit. But two days after the event, it was reported by the commandant of Vellore to the Government of Madras, as a fact on which he placed reliance; and from every other source of intelligence, the same impressions were received. The well-known condition of every Asiatic army on the death of the prince, aggravated in the present instance by the absence of the heir apparent, furnished an opportunity of presenting a point of support to the intriguing or disaffected, which seldom fails to effect the dismemberment of the army, and ought not to have been neglected by an enemy possessing common energy or wisdom. The immediate march of the English army, however defective its preparations, and however unfavourable the season, was earnestly and urgently pressed on General Stuart by the authority of his Government. He answered his immediate superiors, that he "did not believe that Hyder was dead, and if he were, the army would be ready for every action in proper time;" and on repeating, some days afterwards, their conviction of the fact, the undoubted intelligence of the consternation which prevailed in the enemy's army, and the consequent importance of moving; he answered the same superiors that he "was astonished there could be so little reflection as to talk of undertakings against the enemy," in the actual state of the army and the country; although in a preceding controversy, on

the 17th of November, a resolution of the council of which he was a member declared that "the army on its present establishment ought to be at all times ready to move," and the General assured the members, that "upon any real emergency, the army might and must move and would be ready to do so:" a pledge obviously lax and imprudent, under the circumstances of famine which divided the army and its equipments during the monsoon; but which either ought not to have been given, or ought to have been effectually redeemed on the real emergency of the death of Hyder. The unqualified condemnation of one party, in an unhappy controversy which embraced almost every point of military policy, must not be deemed to imply an unqualified approbation of the other party; of whose conduct and opinions it affords no favourable impression, that they complained of counteraction from all authorities with which they were in any way connected. "Records (say the Government of Bengal on this subject) of laborious altercation, invective, and mutual complaint, are no satisfaction to the public in compensation for a neglect that may cost millions, and upon a field where immense sums had been expended to maintain our footing;"* and in a subsequent letter.† "In reply to our desire of unambiguous explanation on a subject of such public concern (viz. the imputed counteraction) you favour us with a collected mass of complaint, and invective against this Government, against the nabob of Arcot and his ministers; against the Commander-in-chief of all the forces in India, against the Commander-in-chief of His Majesty's fleet, against your own provincial Commander-in-chief, and again against this Government. Had you been pleased, in so general a charge of impeachment, to take cognizance of the co-operative support which

* 11th March, 1783.

† 24th March, 1783, a performance of infinite force, and worthy of perusal, even as a specimen of literary talent.

was till of late withheld from you by the presidency of Bombay, your description of the universal misconduct of the managers of the public affairs in India (the President and Select Committee of Fort St. George excepted) would have been complete." After a dignified reprobation of the temerity of persons in their situation, coming forward as censors of the state, to criminate a superior government, and the conduct of the naval and military commanders in chief: the letter proceeds: "Honours thus detracted, suit not the detractors, nor can they for a moment cover their mismanagement: no artifice of reasoning, no perversion of distorted quotation, no insinuations of delinquency, no stings covered with compliment, no mechanism of the arts of sophistry, can strip Sir Edward Hughes and Sir Eyre Coote, of the glory of having, in repeated and well fought days, defeated the powerful invaders of the Carnatic, on the ocean and the field:" and again, "the reputation which you would wish to ascribe to yourselves particularly, is not founded upon what you have done, but on what you are prevented from doing: your management from the time of Sir Eyre Coote's departure from the coast, at a crisis the most favourable for recovering the Carnatic, and when you had the unparticipated conduct of the war, with an increased army, and the most liberal supplies, your management at such a period, when your efforts have only produced the destruction of three of your own forts,"* &c. &c. &c. These extracts are presented, for the purpose of enabling the reader to form his own reflections on the scene before him; and none shall at present be obtruded on his notice, except that, in so advanced a period of civilization and knowledge, the existence of a constitution of civil and military government, containing in its very structure the elements of discord, insubordination,

* Negapatam, Carangoly, Wandewash.

and inefficiency, furnishes mournful evidence of the slow and difficult progress of practical wisdom.

In effect, the English army made its first march for the purpose of advancing provisions to its first intermediate depôt, (Tripassore,) exactly thirteen days Jan. 15. after Tippoo's arrival and succession had been quietly proclaimed in the united camps; and did not make its first march of departure, for the attainment of any of the objects of the campaign, until thirty-four days after that event, and sixty days after the death of Hyder. After the departure of Sir Eyre Coote, Lord Macartney, assuming the direction of the ensuing campaign, and assigning only the execution to his provincial Commander-in-chief, repeatedly called on that officer, to submit a plan of operations, for the approval of Government, and successively complaining of reserve, and the absence of a specific project, proceeded to propose his own. Offensive operations were little in the contemplation of either, and the reserve of Major-General Stuart, might have been defended in the words ascribed to the greatest captain of this, or perhaps of any age, when pressed by the British cabinet for a plan of operations, "tell me what the enemy will do, and I will tell you what I will do." Of Lord Macartney's political and military plans, it has been seen that his Superior Government expressed no approbation. In policy it was imputed as an error, that he pressed negotiations for peace, with an anxiety which counteracted his own object, by impressing on the enemy his incapacity to continue the war; an error peculiarly dangerous in India, but referable to a principle so incontestably ascertained in all ages, and in all countries, as to extend its operation, not alone to political measures, but to the ordinary transactions of life; for even in those it is peculiarly known, that an urgent desire in any person to obtain, what another has to bestow at an optional price, is the direct means of raising the amount or conditions of that price. Of his military

plans, the demolition of three of his own forts, which Sir Eyre Coote had anxiously desired to preserve, was considered an erroneous branch; and of the remainder it was objected, that they proposed a dangerous dispersion of force, into separate expeditions, too weak to resist a powerful attack, and too distant for reciprocal support.

Feb. General Stuart employed the greater part of the month of February in the demolition of the forts of Carangoly and Wandewash, and while in the vicinity of the latter place offered battle to the united forces of the French and the Mysoreans, then encamped within twelve miles of the place: the invitation was not accepted, although Tippoo in his narrative of the transaction expresses disappointment at the retirement of the English, when he had concerted with the French the plan of an united attack. A large

March. portion of the month of March was occupied in conveying to Vellore a fresh supply of provisions, an operation in which the English army was not interrupted, because in the first week of that month, Tippoo had already ascended the western passes in consequence of the intelligence of the capture of Bednore, having previously destroyed the works of Arcot, and every remaining post in that territory deemed worth the expence of demolition, with the exception of Arnee, which was still preserved as a depôt for the division under Seyed Saheb, left to co-operate with the French at Cuddalore. It appears that Général Stuart had concurred in the expediency of that part of Lord Macartney's plans which involved the demolition of Carangoly and Wandewash, but in less than three weeks after the accomplishment of that object, on the first and still doubtful intelligence of Tippoo's departure, and on recurring to their infinite importance in the scheme of warfare which must consequently ensue, he had the candour to express his regret at that precipitate measure: and yet the departure of Tippoo either was not, or ought not to

have been an unforeseen event, inasmuch as the diversion under General Matthews on the western coast, to which all the Governments had attached the greatest importance, was professedly undertaken for the purpose, (which seemed to have been forgotten), of drawing the Mysorean from his offensive operations in Coromandel, to the defence of his own dominions.

The operations now to be undertaken against the French force at Cuddalore, were necessarily dependent on the return of Sir Edward Hughes from Bombay: and the arrival of Monsieur Bussy, with the last reinforcements, considerably preceded that event.¹ In the meanwhile, Monsieur Suffrein had appeared at the head of the bay of Bengal, and captured a considerable number of vessels, laden with rice, to supply the necessities of Madras. The energy of Mr. Hastings, had however, in the intermediate time, enabled him to dispatch to that place, a store sufficient for all the exigencies of the army, but not for a crowded population, encreased by new fugitives, from the lately desolated countries. It became necessary, in consequence, to remove, under proper protection, the great mass of this population, to the provinces north of Madras, and chiefly to Nellore, where each successive journey northwards, afforded encreasing plenty: but after the adoption of this indispensable measure, a population still greatly exceeding the actual supply, presented on every successive morning the mournful spectacle of numerous dead bodies, on the esplanade, and in the public roads and streets, to be removed for interment by the daily care of the police.

Monsieur Suffrein, having accomplished the chief purposes in his contemplation, on the northern coast, and having left some cruizers to pursue the same

¹ Count de Bussy arrived off the coast with 2,500 men in March 1783. Sir Edward Hughes came to Madras from Bombay in May 1783.

object; calculating on the arrival of Sir Edward Hughes at Madras, at a much earlier period than it actually occurred, and having objects in view to be accomplished before he should seek a naval action, proceeded to his rendezvous, with Monsieur Bussy, at Trincomalee, without looking into the roads at Madras, where he would have either captured or destroyed a considerable number of merchant ships. Monsieur Bussy, with the last reinforcements from the Isle of France, joined him at Trincomalee, whence he proceeded, without delay, to land the troops at

Mar. 17. their ultimate destination, while still uninterrupted by Sir Edward Hughes. The numerous disappointments and reverses have already been noticed, by which the able plans of Monsieur Bussy had hitherto been either frustrated or delayed. On reaching his ultimate destination, with a force probably less than one-fourth of the number required by his original calculations; he had the farther mortification to learn that Hyder was no more; and that the army with which he expected to co-operate, had departed to a far distant country. Still the operations of that army were directed against the common enemy; and however mortifying the contrast of the actual and expected scene—of the existing combinations, and those which his eminent talents would have framed; he had no alternative, but to abide by the event, and make the best use in his power of the slender means remaining at his disposal. Monsieur Suffrein, having opportunely effected the operation of landing the troops and stores at Cuddalore, returned for farther refitment to Trincomalee; from which place, on the evening of the day he entered the harbour, he saw the English fleet pursuing their route to Madras.

April 10.

All the requisite measures having been concerted with Sir Edward Hughes, the army* under General Stuart commenced its march from the second stage

* I find the following statement of its strength on the 29th January:—

beyond Madras, towards Cuddalore, on the 21st of April; almost every individual anxiously expecting the arrival of their venerated Commander-in-chief, who had improved in health by his voyage to Bengal, and had announced his approaching return, accompanied by a large supply of money, with the confidence of bringing to a speedy termination a war, which for the first time in its progress, opened a gleam of reasonable hope. Sir Eyre Coote embarked for this purpose in the armed ship *Resolution*, belonging to the Company, and, unfortunately, towards the close of the voyage, was chased for two days and nights by some French ships of the line. Justly conscious of the deep and irreparable wound which the country would sustain, in being deprived of his services at this critical juncture, the General's anxiety kept him constantly on deck. The influence of excessive heat by day, the dews of night, and above all, extreme agitation of mind during a long period, in which escape appeared improbable, produced a relapse of complaints, rather palliated than cured. The ship with its pecuniary treasure got safe to Madras; but April its most precious freight was lost to the state. Sir 26 Eyre Coote expired two days after his arrival.

Viewing the career of this great man as that of a soldier merely, his character may be deemed as faultless as any that history presents; and if the pressure of years and disease had latterly impaired his physical powers, and even disturbed that mental composure which gave so much of force, and of grace,

Europeans	2945
Natives	11,545
				<hr/>
Total				14,490

Part of a reinforcement from England, which arrived on the 15th of April, followed and joined him; I cannot ascertain the exact amount, but it probably did not make his effective force in Europeans before Cuddalore to exceed 3500 men.

[According to Innes Munro the British numbers were: Europeans 1,660, sepoy 8,340, and cavalry 1,000.]

and of moral influence, to the virtues of his mature life; still, in his last decline, the lowest comparative estimate would place him, with a measureless interval between, above any that the scene presented to supply his place. It may be inferred, from the most superficial observation of the conduct of states, that the degree in which a cabinet ought to direct the operations of the field, has not yet become a settled point in the military policy of nations; and among the various shades of opinion, arising from national habits and constitutions of government, the question can never be totally independent of the personal character of those, who preside over the several branches of public administration. In ascribing therefore to Sir Eyre Coote the nearest imaginable approach to perfection as a soldier, we must be considered to speak of qualities exclusively military: for, if in the requisites of a great general, invested with the powers necessary for giving effect to great talents be included, as they ought, the highest attributes of the statesman, it were injurious to the memory of Sir Eyre Coote, to bring his character, however eminent, to a test from which it must recede.

CHAPTER XXVI.

Want of harmony between the Government of Madras and General Stuart—Description of the fort and vicinity of Cuddalore—General Stuart unexpectedly takes a position to the south—Monsieur Bussy assumes and fortifies a corresponding position—daily becoming more formidable—Attack of this position—Serious contest—and its results—The French retire into Cuddalore—Original misapprehension at Madras, regarding the nature and extent of this service—Reciprocal want of confidence regarding the junction of the southern army—French fleet under Suffrein, appears on the day of the action—Sir E. Hughes covers Cuddalore—quits his station, which is seized by Suffrein—who is reinforced by Bussy, and sails to meet the English fleet—Action—Ostensible superiority and real inferiority of the English—Fleet crippled—Suffrein attains his object—and resumes his station before Cuddalore—Lands a reinforcement of seamen—Monsieur Bussy makes a vigorous sortie—entirely unsuccessful,—Capture of the Crown Prince of Sweden—The force under General Stuart not equal to the service undertaken—Bussy, superior in numbers, determines to march out and attack his camp—General Stuart assuming the tone of being abandoned by his government, determines to abide the result—Crisis averted, by the intelligence of peace, and the arrival of a flag of truce—Commissioners from Madras settle a convention with Monsieur Bussy—Its relation to Tippoo—His intermediate operations.

FROM the specimen which has been presented of the reciprocal feeling of the government of Madras, and its provincial Commander-in-chief, much harmony will not be expected in the narrative of their measures. The General, sneering at theory, declared, that he was advancing, as fast as was practically compatible with the means of transport he possessed, and the Government observe, that with carriage for twenty-four days' provisions, he occupied forty days, at the average of less than three miles a day in performing a distance of twelve ordinary marches.¹

The fort of Cuddalore is a quadrangle of unequal sides, with an indifferent rampart and ditch, and no out-works, excepting one advanced from its north-eastern angle; a bastion covers each of the other angles, and the curtains are furnished with the imperfect kind of flanking defence, obtainable by means of a succession of bastions, placed in a prolongation of one and the same straight line. The ruins of Fort St. David, situated on a peninsula at the mouth of the river Panâar, are about a mile and a half to the north of Cuddalore, and a second river, of smaller size, forming the peninsula, descends close to the fort, and renders difficult the approach from the north. The Bandapollam hills, woody eminences of moderate height, embrace the western face, and

¹ It is impossible to suppose that Stuart had no motive but an obstinate determination to disobey the orders of the Madras Government in making this dilatory march. The country he marched over offers no obstacles to rapid progress, open and flat with nothing to impede except a few rivers, which must have been dry at this time of the year. Sir Thomas Munro defended him, probably on good grounds. "He arrived there (Cuddalore) as soon as the store ships; his going a month sooner would have been to no purpose; for as our intrenching tools and heavy cannon were in them, we could not have begun our operations. We could only carry ten days' provisions, and therefore could only have remained four days before the place, as we must have kept six days to carry us back to Chingleput, the nearest place we could have got a supply." (*Life*, Vol. III, p. 39.)

south-western angle, at distances varying from two to four miles; the space directly between the hills and the western face, being occupied by rice fields, this access is also inconvenient: a little estuary, formed by the sea, and the rivers, runs along the eastern face, and leaves a narrow insular stripe of land opposite the fort, between that water and the sea; and a continuation of the same estuary to the south, inclining however inland, receives the branches of some inconsiderable winter streams: the space between this latter estuary and the Bandapollam hills, is firm ground, too elevated for rice fields, and narrows in extent as it recedes from the fort. General Stuart, approaching from the north, till within an easy march of Cuddalore, made an unexpected circuit behind the Bandapollam hills, and in two marches took up his ground fronting the north, with his right to the estuary last described, and his left resting on the Bandapollam hills: his force, when in position, June 7. occupying the whole space, and leaving a respectable second line. The French narrative,* states the force under Monsieur Bussy, which, according to preceding details, ought, including the garrison of Trincomalee, to have amounted to 10,000 Europeans and Caffres, exclusively of sepoys, to be reduced at this period, in effective men, to 2,300 Europeans and 5,000 sepoys; 3,500 Mysoreans are probably not intended to be included in the latter number.

Monsieur Bussy, on perceiving the ground taken up by the English army nearly two miles to the southward from the fort, assumed an intermediate position, not exactly parallel; with his left on the estuary, about half a mile from the fort; his right, thrown a little back, rested on a gentle eminence where the rice fields commenced, not quite a mile

* Histoire de la dernière guerre, page 330.

¹ According to Innes Munro's account, the French forces were:—Europeans 3,000, French sepoys 3,000, Tippoo's sepoys 3,000, and Tippoo's cavalry 2,000.

from the nearest part of the fort. On inspecting a plan of the works* thrown back en potence from a salient work at this point, this angle was evidently the key of the main position, which may be considered here to terminate; and a line occupied by the Mysoreans, resting its left on nearly the centre of this retired flank, and extending with its right thrown considerably forwards, across the rice fields, now dry, to the Bandapollam hills, appears to have been intended as a subsidiary position, of great advantage while occupied, but which might be carried without endangering the main position. The English army encamped on the ground described, on the 7th of June, and continued until the 13th, employed in arrangements for landing stores and making the preparations which were deemed necessary before commencing serious operations. In the meanwhile Monsieur Bussy proceeded with the skill and rapid execution which distinguish his nation, in covering, with the most judicious field works, the position which he had assumed: every successive day the aspect of these works became more formidable, and on the 12th it was determined in a council of war to attack them on the ensuing morning.

June 13. A division under Colonel Kelly moved long before day-light to turn the extreme right of the subsidiary works on the Bandapollam hills, and arrived at the point of attack between four and five o'clock. The Mysoreans,† after a feeble resistance to an attack which they expected, and did not think themselves able to withstand, fled, and were no more seen in the course of the day; a portion of this subsidiary position, with seven guns, fell accordingly with little loss; Colonel Kelly proceeded to occupy with a detachment, for the purposes of farther reconnoissance,

* Of two plans before me, that which appears to be most correct, was drawn by Captains Warsebe and Du Platt, of the Hanoverian regiments, then in India.

† The information of the officer commanding.

commanding ground farther to the north, which saw in reverse the whole main position, with the exception of the works en potence, partly masked among the mud-walls of a village, and his report from this situation induced the General to persevere in the original plan. A corps of grenadiers under Lieutenant-colonel Cathcart, with the picquets under Lieutenant-colonel Stuart of the 78th, who commanded this attack, was ordered by a circuitous movement to turn the right of the main position, supported by the troops under Colonel Kelly. This division arrived at the intended point of attack about half past eight, and immediately advanced with great order: but they were received with so powerful a fire of grape and musquetry from the masqued works and troops en potence, that Colonel Stuart, after a heavy loss, judiciously desisted, replaced his troops in the cover from which he had made his dispositions for the attack, and made a minute report of the nature of this unexpected impediment, and the means by which it appeared practicable to surmount it. A battery of English guns brought to a proper point of the Bandapollam hills, now directed their fire against these works. A reserve under Colonel Gordon, and another column under Colonel Bruce, who commanded this third attack, was ordered at half past ten, to force with the bayonet the salient work on the right of the enemy's main position, and the trenches immediately to its left, while Colonel Stuart was directed to avail himself of the proper moment to resume his attack. The resistance to this third attack was still more destructive than that experienced in the second by Colonel Stuart; and is described by the General as "the heaviest fire he had ever beheld;" the troops however pushed forward with the finest spirit; the head of one column consisting of a flank company of the 101st actually penetrated within the trenches; the Hanoverians of that column and a portion of the 20th Madras battalion of sepoys are mentioned with

applause, and in the opinion of General Stuart if the remainder of the 101st had seconded the efforts of their flank company, the business of the day would have been decided; "but (he adds) they did not." The usual consequences of a repulse under such circumstances produced the usual carnage, and the French, not satisfied with the effect of their batteries and musquetry, issued in considerable force from the trenches, and charging the fugitives with the greatest fury, continued the pursuit to a considerable distance, until checked by a reserve, and by the troops rallied by Colonel Bruce, who even attempted without success to cut off their retreat. Colonel Stuart in the meanwhile anxiously watching every change of circumstance, observed on the first movement of the two columns, a portion of the troops in the works before him to be drawn off to reinforce the points most seriously threatened; he was accordingly in motion fifteen minutes before the fire of the third attack commenced, and seizing the critical moment when the principal force of the enemy had been seduced to quit their works; by a determined attack in front, and a rapid flank movement round the extremity of the works en potence, carried every thing before him, drove the French right upon its centre, compelled the troops who had rallied to take a circuitous route to regain their lines, and was in possession of nearly one-half of the line of works, when his progress was arrested by fresh troops and superior numbers. On the first moment of carrying a redoubt on the right, he had ordered it to be occupied, to be closed at the gorge, and its defences to be reversed: and now slowly retiring to a position strengthened by the works he had carried, the operations of the day relaxed, as if by mutual consent, and terminated about two o'clock. The French have uniformly ascribed to General Stuart the credit of a profound and able manœuvre, in the well-executed feint which drew them from their works, and enabled Colonel

Stuart to carry his point : but although the operation was somewhat too sanguinary for a feint, and none was really intended, (the failure of the attack being regretted in the public dispatch); the actual combination appears to be entitled to the success it obtained. The number was limited of the troops on each side, closely engaged in this important day, and bore an inconsiderable proportion to the whole : but comparing the actual loss with the numbers actually engaged, few actions have been more sanguinary. The English returns ascertain their loss to have been one thousand and sixteen. The French accounts* state theirs to have been four hundred and fifty, a number considerably below the English† computations. Thirteen guns, and the key of the contested position, remained in possession of the English army. The retirement of the French on the same night, within the walls of Cuddalore, evinced their sense of the operations of the day ; but their being permitted during the night to draw off without molestation, all their heavy guns from the exterior position, furnished equal evidence of the impression made on the English, by a victory so dearly purchased.¹

The tone of opinion in the first circles at Madras, represented the expedition to Cuddalore rather as an operation requisite to satisfy the point of honour for Monsieur Bussy's surrender, than as one which depended for its success or failure on the numerous contingencies of war. General Stuart is represented by the Government before his departure for Madras, as avowing the army he commanded to be sufficient

* Histoire de la dernière guerre, page 332.

† The Annual Register makes it 640.

¹ The returns of the casualties among the British troops

gave—		Killed	Wounded
European officers	18	33
Non-commissioned officers and		147	395
men.			
Native troops, English officers..		4	4
Indians	56	288

for the enemy he had to encounter, but requesting a discretionary authority over an army assembled to the south of the Coleroon, under the command of Colonel Fullarton, a power which was reluctantly granted on the express condition that it should be exercised only in the case of indispensable necessity. Distrust does not usually generate candour, and in the instant of his obtaining this almost extorted authority, he is represented as proceeding to its exercise without the knowledge of the Government, immediately after his departure from Madras; to the insufficient extent, however, in the first instance, of directing Colonel Fullarton to cross the Coleroon, and wait for farther instructions on its northern bank; and this alleged evasion and disobedience of the letter and spirit of his orders, was assigned as the principal cause of General Stuart's subsequent recal* from the command of the army in the field. Whether any and what portion of the necessity for now

* The dissensions terminated in his being placed in close arrest by Lord Macartney, and in that state sent to England. General Stuart was the officer employed as the instrument of the majority in council, who arrested Lord Pigot in 1776. His own arrest, on this occasion, produced many effusions of wit, and among the epigrams of the day, was the observation in broken English, of the second son of Mahommed Ali, on his first hearing the event. *General Stuart catch one Lord; one Lord catch General Stuart.* There is reason to suppose, that the Lord apprehended his own arrest; his Lordship's suspension from the Government having been in the avowed contemplation of Mr. Hastings.

[In the minute which Lord Macartney wrote, dated 17th September 1783, giving his reasons for his action against General Stuart, he specified the following instances of failure on the General's part to do his duty: (a) his failure to follow the orders of the Government to be ready with the army to march immediately on the death of Haidar, (b) his having abused the discretion vested in him in ordering the division of the army under Colonel Fullarton to join him from the south, by which the operations of the southern army against Tipu were impeded, (c) his delay on the march from Madras to Ouddalore, by which the French were enabled to establish themselves in strength

ordering up Colonel Fullarton, arose from mismanagement or delay, is not so obvious as the indisputable existence of that necessity after the action of the 13th of June; and General Stuart, in his communications to the Admiral, after that event, states seven weeks as the period during which he should require the co-operation of the fleet to cover the siege of the place.

On the same day, and towards the close of this severe conflict, the French fleet, under Monsieur Suffrein, appeared in the offing. Sir Edward Hughes, who was anchored nearly off Porto Novo, about eleven miles to the southward, for the combined June 13. purposes of obtaining water, forwarding supplies, and covering the siege of Cuddalore, weighed to assume a nearer position, and to interpose his force to any communication between the hostile fleet and the besieged. The improvements, derived less perhaps from a doubtful application of pneumatic chemistry, than from a systematic attention to ventilation, to

thero and resist the attack on Cuddalore with success, (*d*) his disobedience of the orders of Government in not giving up his command before Cuddalore, (*e*) his refusal to come to Madras in obedience to orders, (*f*) his repeated neglect of the orders of the select committee as regards the appointment of Adjutant-General, and Judge Advocate-General. General Stuart was dismissed on the 17th September by the order of the select committee; but as General Burgoyne, who was appointed to the command, declined, on the ground that he owed obedience to General Stuart until the latter resigned, the committee resolved to arrest General Stuart, and he was arrested the same day. Although the relations between the Madras Government and the Government of Bengal at the time of General Stuart's arrest were strained to the utmost, it seems very improbable that Lord Macartney had any apprehension of his own arrest. In Lord Pigot's case there was a strong party in his own Council who opposed him, and Stuart was thus able to act with impunity. But there was in Lord Macartney's case no opposition in his own Council, and he had no reason to fear that General Stuart would find any support, if he tried extreme measures. Lord Macartney took the only course which was possible in arresting and deporting General Stuart, who had defied his authority.]

scrupulous cleanliness, to dryness and regulated diet, which render not only the comparative, but the positive healthfulness of the British navy, perhaps the most remarkable fact in the history of modern discovery, leave us divided between grief and astonishment, in finding the fleet under Sir E. Hughes, in an easy cruize from the 2d May to the 7th June, diminished in effective strength to the amount of eleven hundred and twenty-five men, by the effects of the scurvy alone, and after disposing of these in hospital, that in the short space of another fortnight, near seventeen hundred* more became incapable of duty, from the same cause. It was obviously the great remaining purpose of the war in India, to ensure the conclusive operation against Cuddalore, but it were injurious to the memory of a distinguished officer, if judging from the event alone, we should pronounce the unqualified condemnation of Sir E. Hughes, however weakened in numbers, because anchored for this purpose with seventeen ships carrying twelve hundred and two guns, he felt himself as a British Admiral, unable to refuse the daily challenge of Monsieur Suffrein, with fifteen ships carrying

June 16. one thousand and eighteen guns. On the 16th he weighed anchor, with the expectation of bringing the enemy to close action, but such was the superior skill or fortune of Monsieur Suffrein, that on the same night at half-past eight,† he anchored abreast of the fort, and the dawn of morning presented to the English army, before Cuddalore, the mortifying spectacle of the French fleet in the exact position abandoned by their own on the preceding day, the English fleet being invisible, and its situation unknown. It was necessary, however, to the purposes of Monsieur Bussy and Suffrein, not only that the English fleet should be prevented from resuming its

* "In the healthiest ships, 70 to 90 men a-piece, and others double that number." Annual Register, 1783.

† Histoire de la dernière guerre, page 333.

position, but that it should be sufficiently crippled, to prevent its disturbing the French Admiral in the debarkation which he contemplated, for the reinforcement of Monsieur Bussy. In the mean while, that General, calculating on a considerable interval before the regular approaches now commenced by the English army, should be sufficiently advanced to cause immediate apprehension, embarked on the 17th at night, a reinforcement of twelve hundred troops on board the fleet, thus augmenting the balance of numbers against Sir Edward Hughes, to the enormous amount of about four thousand men, compared with their relative numbers on the 2d of May; or admitting Monsieur Suffrein's numbers to have diminished during the same period of time, in a degree far exceeding the ordinary proportion, we cannot estimate the comparative balance against the English Admiral, at less than three thousand men.

After a series of manœuvres, exhibiting much reciprocal skill, Suffrein succeeded on the 20th in bringing on the sort of action best suited to his designs. A distant cannonade of three hours cost the English fleet 532. men; and what was of more importance to Suffrein, a large proportion of their spars and rigging. Night terminated the combat, which on the ensuing day Sir E. Hughes anxiously sought to renew, and his adversary to avoid, except at his own distance; and the English Admiral, after receiving the detailed reports of the state of each ship, found the whole of his equipments so entirely crippled, his crews so lamentably reduced, and the want of water so extreme, that he deemed it indispensable to incur the mortification of bearing away for the roads of Madras, while Suffrein, wresting from his enemies the praise of superior address, and even the claim of victory, if victory belong to him who attains his object, resumed his position in the anchorage of Cuddalore, where he not only returned the 1,200 troops, but landed an aid of 2,400 men from the fleet.

June
25.

Monsieur Bussy, thus reinforced, lost no time in making a vigorous sortie with his best troops. The attack commenced with the greatest vivacity before day-light in the morning, while it was still quite dark, and perhaps a short time earlier than was favourable to its success. The darkness afforded no opportunity for distinction of troops; the bayonets of the sepoys of Bengal mingled with eminent success among those of the French regiment of Aquitaine; and not one point of the English trenches, occupied as they were by every variety of troops, suffered itself to be forced. The loss of the French in this well-planned but ill-executed sally was estimated by General Stuart at 450 men; a number probably not exaggerated, when considering the circumstances of a *melée* of this nature; the prisoners actually secured, were found to amount to 150,* including the Chevalier de Damas,† who led the attack. The loss of the English was surprisingly small. Major Cotgrave, who commanded the Madras sepoys in the trenches, was killed; three other officers wounded and missing; and twenty rank and file killed and wounded, chiefly sepoys. Among the wounded prisoners was a young French serjeant, who so particularly attracted the notice of Colonel Wangenheim, commandant of the Hanoverian troops in the English service, by his interesting appearance and manners, that he ordered the young man to be conveyed to his own tents, where he was treated with attention and kindness until his recovery and release. Many years afterwards, when the French army under Bernadotte entered Hanover, General Wangenheim, among others, attended the *levée* of the conqueror.

* *Histoire de la dernière guerre*, page 339, states the prisoners at 80, and the killed at 20; the former is known to be erroneous, and that nation is not restricted, like the English, by the checks of their constitution, from mis-stating the amount of their losses.

† He was inconsolable at not being wounded.

You have served a great deal, said Bernadotte, on his being presented, and as I understand in India.—I have served there. At Cuddalore? I was there. Have you any recollection of a wounded serjeant whom you took under your protection in the course of that service? The circumstance was not immediately present to the General's mind, but on recollection, he resumed. I do indeed remember the circumstance, and a very fine young man he was, I have entirely lost sight of him ever since, but it would give me pleasure to hear of his welfare. That young serjeant, said Bernadotte, was the person who has now the honour to address you, who is happy in this public opportunity of acknowledging the obligation, and will omit no means within his power, of testifying his gratitude to General Wangenheim. It can scarcely be deemed digressive to have presented the sequel of an incident appertaining to our narrative, in illustration of a character since distinguished by a still more extraordinary elevation, and as an evidence of moral worth affording to the Crown Prince of Sweden an honourable claim on other nations for the respect which he is said to possess in his adoptive country.

According to the ordinary rules of war, the force under General Stuart could at no period have been deemed adequate to the siege of Cuddalore, defended by the land forces of Monsieur Bussy, and an equal numerical force of Mysorean auxiliaries; a body, which however unsuited, from discordant habits and defective discipline, to mix with regular troops in the more prominent duties of a siege, performed other essential services within the walls, and as light troops, were eminently useful without. In effect, General Stuart had never been able to attempt the first regular operation of a siege by investing the place. After the reinforcement received by Monsieur Bussy from the fleet, his troops outnumbered the besiegers, whose force was gradually wasting away by casualties

and sickness, and by the performance of duties constantly encreasing, with numbers as constantly and rapidly diminishing. Monsieur Bussy, fully aware of the physical and moral influence of such disproportioned exertions, maintaining a free communication with every part of the adjacent country, except the ground occupied by the English army, and considering his late sortie to have failed merely from errors incident to operations in the dark, determined, after allowing to his enemies a few days more for the exhaustion of their strength, to march out in force by a circuitous route, and attack them in their camp.

General Stuart in the meanwhile, fully aware of the critical circumstances in which he was placed, complaining in his official correspondence of the impenetrable silence of his Government on every subject; and above all, regarding the succours which he had repeatedly demanded from Madras, and from the south, while private correspondence announced these troops to have received counter orders, and a different destination, assumed the tone of being abandoned to his fate by his own Government, and determined to persevere under every difficulty, and to abide the result, whatever it might be. The retreat of the English army, with the loss of its battering train and equipments, is the most favourable result that could possibly have been anticipated from a continuation of hostilities, and a crisis honourable only to the army, and disgraceful to the character of our public councils, was terminated by the arrival of an English frigate bearing a flag of truce, and commissioners deputed by the Government of Madras to announce to Monsieur Bussy the certain intelligence of the conclusion of peace between their respective nations in Europe: perfectly aware of the condition of the army before Cuddalore, these commissioners were instructed to declare that they were charged with positive orders to that army to abstain

from hostilities, whether Monsieur Bussy should accede to an armistice or decline it. Three days however intervened before the terms of a convention could be adjusted, and communication being interdicted between the commissioners and the army, they had no other information than the apparent existence of a flag of truce, and hostilities did not finally cease until the 2d of July. The only difficulty which July 2 occurred in these negotiations, related not to the necessity of due notice to Tippoo Sultaun, as an ally of the French nation, and to the French troops serving in his army, in order that they might withdraw, but proceeded from an attempt to procure an anticipated cessation of hostile movements on the part of the English, before ascertaining whether Tippoo would reciprocally consent to the proposed armistice. This point being at length amicably adjusted, our narrative necessarily returns to the operations on the western coast, which had caused the separation of that prince from his French allies previously to the arrival of Monsieur Bussy at Cuddalore.¹

¹ The English Commissioners were Anthony Sadleir, who had been in the civil service since 1760, (he was a member of the Fort St. George Council,) and George Leonard Staunton, Private Secretary to Lord Macartney.

CHAPTER XXVII.

Resumption of the affairs of the western coast, from the disappearance of Tippoo at Paniani, in December 1782—General Matthews sent from Bombay, to support the troops at that place—hearing of Tippoo's departure, lands at Rajmundroog—Reasons—Carries the place—Colonel Macleod ordered up from Paniani—Capture of Honâver (Onore)—and ships of war—Government of Bombay, hearing the death of Hyder, send positive orders to General Matthews, to quit all operations on the coast, and march to Bednore—Fatality of incessant contention—General Matthews protests and obeys—the letter, not the spirit of these inconsiderate orders—lands at Cundapoor—which he attacks and carries—violating the letter of his orders in the very act of obeying them—marches for the Ghauts—Colonel Macleod carries the works at their foot—Attack of the Ghaut—carried with Hyderghur at its summit—Bednore surrenders on terms—Extraordinary facility of this success—explained by the personal enmity of Tippoo, to the Governor Ayâz, and the design not only to supersede, but destroy him—Singular mode of discovering these designs—which determined the surrender—Lutf Aly, the successor of Ayâz, arrives in the vicinity—reinforces Anantpoor—which is carried by the English by assault—Cruelties imputed to the English on that occasion—disproved—Lutf Aly ordered to Mangalore—General Matthews relieved from the restraint of the positive orders—acts as if they were still in operation—and disperses instead of concentrating his force—Strange superstition

regarding his past and future fortunes—Imputations of corruption and rapacity retorted—Illustrations—Approach of Tippoo—Flight of Aydz—Tippoo takes Hyderghur—assaults and carries the exterior lines of Bednore—siege—capitulation—surrender—Infraction imputable to the English—garrison confined in irons—Tippoo descends for the recovery of Mangalore—Attack of an advanced position—Critical circumstances—The place summoned—Preparations—Cavalry sent above the ghauts, overtaken by the monsoon—Kummer-u-Deen sent to Kurpa, in consequence of a diversion in that quarter ordered from Madras—Brief notice of this diversion—Siege of Mangalore—Excellent defence—Intelligence received by the garrison—Intimation from Tippoo, of the cessation of hostilities at Cuddalore, treacherously postponed—Armistice—Arrival of Brigadier-General Macleod—lands and is entertained and deceived by Tippoo—Disguised plan for gradually starving the garrison—Tippoo throws off the mask—but allows General Macleod to depart—The garrison subsists on short allowance, till November 22d, when General Macleod appears with a large armament for its relief—Extraordinary correspondence with Tippoo—General Macleod departs, having thrown in a nominal month's provision, but without being permitted to communicate with the garrison—Discussion of the reasons assigned for this erroneous conduct—Appears with another insufficient supply, on the 27th December, which is landed, but still no intercourse—Shocking extremities to which the garrison was reduced—Council of war—Capitulation—which was fulfilled—Death of Colonel Campbell—Reflections on Tippoo's conduct—Remarkable incident during the siege—Execution of the late Governor, and death of Mahommed Ali—Explanation of these events.

OUR narrative of operations in Malabar was interrupted by the sudden disappearance of Tippoo's army from Paniani, in December 1782, in consequence of the death of Hyder. The intelligence received at Bombay, of the rapid retreat of Colonel Humberstone to Paniani, and the presence of Tippoo in full force before that place, determined the Government to send their provincial Commander-in-chief, Brigadier General Matthews, for its relief, with such a body of men as could be immediately embarked, and to reinforce him as speedily as possible with other troops, for the general purposes of the service. In his progress down the coast, that officer received intelligence at Goa of the circumstances, but not of the cause which had a few days before removed the danger from Paniani, and consequently determined on making a landing at Rajamundroog, in the northern part of Canara, commanding the entrance into the commodious estuary and navigable river of Mirjee, reputed to afford the best, although not the shortest line of access to Bednore; and when connected with the possession of the fort and river of Honâver (Onore) a few miles to the southward, and the fertile territory between those rivers, to furnish not only security to his rear, but an abundant supply of provisions for the future necessities of the army. Rajamundroog was carried by assault, and almost by surprize, with little loss; and the ships were immediately dispatched to Colonel Macleod, at Paniani, with orders to transport his force to Rajamundroog. Honâver soon fell, with all its dependent posts, and Colonel Macleod, who had arrived, was preparing for the capture of Mirjee, or Mirjân, higher up the river, which would have completed the first part of the plan for the safe ascent to Bednore, by the passes of Bilguy. The easy capture in these operations, of five ships of war, from 50 to 64 guns, and many of smaller dimensions, evinced the extent of Hyder's ambition, rather than the correctness of his political views.

In the meanwhile however the Government of Bombay having received intelligence of the death of Hyder, and acting apparently more on the impulse of the moment, than in the spirit of a grave and deliberate political instruction, sent on the 31st December 1782, *positive orders* to General Matthews, "if the intelligence were confirmed, to relinquish all operations whatever upon the sea-coast, and make an immediate push to take possession of Bednore." Without imputing too much to the defective constitution of the Government at that period, a fatalist might find the most plausible illustrations of his doctrine in the universal tendency to contention between public authorities, which wasted and perverted all their energies, and to ordinary observation had infinitely more the aspect of an unhappy fatality than of the common infirmity of human irritation. General Matthews and all other persons, must on the 12th January, when he received these positive orders, have been well satisfied of the death of Hyder; but after weighing and combining intelligence and observation, he not only at this period, but even at the moment of his greatest subsequent success, declared his deliberate conviction, that the operations in which these orders found him engaged, of securing by a strong occupation of the country in his rear, a secure and easily defensible communication with the sea coast, constituted the only safe plan for the invasion of Bednore. On the receipt of these unconditional orders however, he instantly countermanded the operations which were destined to lead him to Beanore by the longer route of Bilguy, and prepared to obey his orders to their very letter; he remonstrated against the frustration of his plans; disclaimed all responsibility for consequences; upbraided the Government with neglecting the promised reinforcements and supplies; declared that the force at his disposal was utterly inadequate to the service he was ordered to execute; and finally requested, that if they "could not

repose confidence in his military judgment, they would permit him to retire and save his own reputation."

The reciprocal confidence which ought to subsist between a government and the military officer entrusted with the execution of its measures, was most unwisely violated in the first instance, by a positive order to be executed under all circumstances, or rather, literally viewed, by an abandonment of the measures necessary to its safe execution: but the absurdity which its literal accomplishment involved, ought to have suggested to a temperate mind a compliance rather with its spirit, than its letter.* General Matthews, however, obeyed with precipitation: he landed at Cundapoor, the point of the coast nearest to Bednore, and in carrying the place experienced considerable resistance, not from the ordinary garrison, but from a field force of 500 horse, and 2,500 infantry; a part of the reinforcements which had been detached by Hyder from Coromandel, for the protection of his western possessions, and thus in the very act of obeying his orders to "relinquish all operations whatever on the sea coast;" he was obliged

Jan. to undertake new operations on the sea coast, in the mere execution of these orders. Continuing to protest against the insufficiency of his means, and to disclaim all responsibility for consequences, he proceeded in the same spirit of precipitate obedience. Without any regular means of conveying provisions or stores, he was three days in marching 25 miles to the foot of the mountains, opposed every day by encreasing numbers; not in any serious stand, but chiefly by light skirmishing, and the incessant annoyance of rockets. The ascent of the ghauts presented impediments of a more serious nature; the difficulties of a rugged acclivity of seven miles were encreased by a succession of the most formidable works. Hussen-

* They were afterwards explained and rescinded at Bombay on the 6th of February, ten days after General Matthews was in possession of Bednore.

gherry,¹ a place at the foot of the hill called a fort, and assuming that appearance, on approaching it, was in reality no more than a well-built barrier with two flanks, but entirely open in the rear. About three miles in front of this post, the enemy had felled trees across the road, and lined the thick brushwood on each flank; and about 400 yards in front of this abbatis, another breastwork was lined with between two and three thousand men. The 42d, led by Colonel Macleod, and followed by a corps of sepoys attacked these positions with the bayonet, and pursuing them like Highlanders, were in the breastwork before the enemy were aware of it; four hundred were bayoneted and the remainder were pursued close to the walls of the fort; preparations were made for attacking it the next morning, but although furnished with 15 pieces of excellent cannon, it was found abandoned; the first barrier, mounting eleven pieces of cannon, was also evacuated without attempting defence; the second, two miles farther up the hill, mounting nine guns, was carried at the point of the bayonet with a loss of only seven or eight men. "From the second fort, or barrier to the top of the ghaut is almost one continuance of batteries with cannon and breast-works; the firmness and intrepidity of the 15th battalion, who were foremost in the several parts of the conflict, was rewarded with the honour of taking the fort of Hyderghur, on the top of the ghaut, in which were found twenty-five pieces of cannon, &c. &c.; this fort was well constructed, had a good ditch, was extensive, and the other works were defended by 17,000 men. My loss during the day about fifty killed and wounded." * The fort and

¹ *Hussengherry*.—Hosangadi, a village in Coondapoor Taluq, South Canara District, 18 miles E.N.E. of Coondapoor town, at the foot of the hills, over which there is now a good road into Mysore.

* The passages between inverted commas, are extracted from General Matthews's official dispatch, dated 28th January, 1783.

town of Bednore or Hydernuggur was still 14 miles distant: but the numerous bodies above described, are stated to have abandoned its defence; "Hyat Saheb having retired into the fort with no more than 1,350 men, of whom 350 were English sepoys taken in Coromandel, who had enlisted in the service of Hyder. Captain Donald Campbell, a prisoner in irons, was released on the preceding day, and sent to General Matthews, to propose terms, which were to deliver the fort and country, and to remain under the

Jan. 28. English, as he was under the nabob," (Hyder); to which conditions General Matthews immediately assented. On the ensuing morning, although a division of the army under Colonel Macleod, detached from the foot of the ghaut, to endeavour by a circuitous route to turn the works, had not yet arrived, and the troops present for duty (who had not eaten the preceding day) amounted to no more than 360 Europeans and 600 sepoys, without a field gun; he moved forward, and was received without hesitation into the fort, and to the acknowledged command of the capital and territory of Bednore, without farther treaty or capitulation.

Such is in substance the whole amount of the facts already before the public connected with the capture of Bednore. "To what" says General Matthews, "can it be owing, but to the divine will, that my army, without provisions or musquet ammunition, should have our wants supplied as we advanced, for without the enemy's rice, and powder, and ball, we must have stopped until the army could be furnished." "Panic" is the secondary cause assigned by the General for these extraordinary effects, and there can be no question regarding the influence of the attack on the breast work; but the reader will probably have anticipated some further explanation which we shall now endeavour to present.

The considerations have been already stated*

which induced Hyder early in 1782, to make considerable detachments for the restoration of his affairs not only in Malabar, but in Coorg and Bullum, the two last under the command of two *Chêlas*, *Woffadar* and *Sheick Ayâz*, the latter of whom was for this purpose appointed Governor of Bednore, the province adjoining Bullum on the north; and we have had occasion to notice* the early history and character of *Sheick Ayâz*.† In the interval between the death of Hyder, and Tippoo's arrival in camp, a letter arrived from *Ayâz*, reporting the invasion under General Matthews, the capture of Rajamundroog and Onore, and the intention of the Governor to withdraw his troops from Bullum, and march without delay to oppose the enemy. This letter had among others been opened by Poornea, and afterwards dispatched by express to Tippoo Sultaun.

Sheick Ayâz had, while a youth, and a common *chêla* of the palace, rendered himself unacceptable to Tippoo by the independence of his character, and had, in consequence, been treated by that prince with gross and repeated indignity. In mature age, Hyder's extravagant praises of his valour and intellect, and the habit of publicly contrasting the qualities of his slave with those of the heir apparent, perpetually embittered all the feelings of former enmity, and rendered the death of Hyder a crisis which *Ayâz* must necessarily have contemplated with alarm. Immediately after Tippoo's junction with his army, after his father's death, he detached *Lutf Aly Beg*, with a light corps of cavalry, by the shortest route, to supersede *Woffadar* at Coorg; and after making the requisite arrangements in that quarter to assume the government of Bednore, with a larger and heavier corps detached about the same time by the ordinary road. He had however con-

* Vol. i. pp. 741-42, and Appendix to Chapter 18.

† *Ayâz Sahab*, is readily corrupted into *Hyat Sahab*, the name by which he is designated in the records of that period.

siderable doubts whether the fears and the ambition of Ayâz might not induce him to resist, and had accordingly sent secret orders to the officer next in authority to put him to death and assume the government. Whatever may have been the ultimate intentions of Ayâz at this period, it is certain that apprehensions of treachery were mixed with all his deliberations: he had taken the precaution of ordering that no letter of any description from the eastward should be delivered without previous examination; and being entirely illiterate, this scrutiny always took place, with no other person present than the reader and himself, either in a private chamber, or if abroad, retired from hearing and observation in the woods. On the day preceding that on which the ghauts were attacked, and while Ayâz was occupied near Hyderghur, in giving directions regarding their defence, the fatal letter arrived, and was inspected with the usual precautions: the bramin who read it, and to whom the letter was addressed as second in command, stands absolved from all suspicion of prior design by the very act of reading its contents; but in the perilous condition of Ayâz he durst not confide in a secrecy, at best precarious, even for a day: without a moment's hesitation, he put the unfortunate bramin to death to prevent discovery; put the letter in his pocket, and returning to his attendants, instantly mounted, and without leaving any orders, went off at speed to the citadel, to make the arrangements for surrender which have been related. It may well be presumed, that this horrible scene could not have been enacted, without some intimation reaching the ears of the attendants; and the very act of abandoning the scene of danger contrary to his usual habits, spread abroad among the troops those rumours of undefined treachery which abundantly account for their dispersion and dismay.

On the arrival of Lutf Aly Beg at Sheemoga,

(Simoga) about forty miles to the eastward of Bednore, he learned the disastrous issue of public affairs, and began to collect the scattered remains of the troops who had been abandoned by their leader. An English detachment was marching to take possession of Anantpoor, about 30 miles north-west of his position, this and most other dependencies of Bednore having surrendered on receiving the orders of *Aydz* to that effect, and the garrison and inhabitants had sent an agent to offer their submission. On receiving intelligence of these events, Lutf Aly sent a trusty officer with 300 Chittledroog peons to anticipate the arrival of the English detachment, and with positive orders to supersede the actual commandant, and to admit no farther communication of any kind with the enemy. On the approach of the troops, it was pretended by Lutf Aly, that repeated signs were made to them to withdraw, that on persisting to advance, the flag of truce was fired at. No disparagement to the accuracy of either representation is involved in the supposition, that the English confident of admission recognise only the second part of the statement, in retaliation for which no quarter was given to the garrison on the capture of the place by assault. Such is the amount of fact involved in the atrocities imputed to the English on the capture of Anantpoor. The touching tale descriptive of 400 beautiful women, "all bleeding with the wounds of the bayonet, and either already dead, or expiring in each other's arms;" the soldiers "stripping them of their jewels and committing every outrage on their bodies, while others, *rather than be torn from their relations*, threw themselves into large tanks and were drowned," has long since been traced to its author, a silly young man, whose amende honorable for dressing his adventures into a romantic tale, is not so generally known as the historical record of that supposed event in the respectable pages of the Annual Register. Of a conduct so

atrocious, if true, the reprobation could not be too severe, and if unfounded, the disproof could not be too anxiously established: the author of this work has therefore not neglected the ample means within his reach, of ascertaining that the tale in all its parts is destitute of every shadow of foundation in truth.*

The capture of Anantpoor occurred during the period that Lutf Aly was waiting the slower approach of the infantry from Coromandel, and on its arrival, he was arranging the means of its recapture, when he received orders from Tippoo, to proceed with all expedition by the pass of Soobramonee, to prevent, if possible the fall of Mangalore; but before he could arrive, the place had surrendered by capitulation, on the 9th of March. General Matthews, after descending to the coast to direct this operation, now prepared to return for the defence of Bednore. The unconditional orders had been revoked, which formed the apology for disclaiming responsibility, and he was now left to the guidance of the general instructions with which he left Bombay, on the 11th of December; a document as wise and judicious, as the subsequent order had been precipitate. The invasion of Bednore had been suggested in these instructions from the Government, as the plan of all those submitted to their consideration which seemed best adapted to the actual scope of their resources, and combined the most reasonable hope of success with the greatest facility of communication and support. Permanent conquest was excluded from their views of possible contingency; the plan of securing such a footing as could safely be held, and the view of alarming Hyder with the threat of relinquishing to the Mahrattas that country which they were known to covet, was expressly suggested as a probable means of disposing him to

* Without the fort, the body of one woman was some days afterwards found, who had fallen into a well; but it was not known in what manner, or on what occasion, the accident had occurred.

peace; and these temperate views concluded with the widest latitude of discretionary authority.

Thus circumstanced, General Matthews, incessantly reporting the approach of powerful bodies of troops from Coromandel, stated 400 Europeans and 1,200 sepoys to be the largest force with which he could meet the enemy *in the field*, and represented the indispensable necessity of large reinforcements, "without which it would be next to a miracle if he could preserve his footing." Instead, however, of concentrating at the point which he considered most defensible, the greatest possible number of his avowedly insufficient force, he continued up to the moment of his last departure from the coast, to narrate with complacency that he was "in possession of the whole country westward of the range of mountains from Sedasheeghur to Mangalore; beyond the passes, he possessed Bednore, Anantpoor, and the fort of Cowlydroog, 15 miles east" (more nearly south) "from Bednore, with their dependencies; and a detached body was seeking to obtain possession of the distant province of Soonda." The only explanation which has been attempted, of the blind confidence with which he frittered away his means of defence, relates to his hope of a simultaneous invasion of Mysoor, by the troops under Colonel Fullarton, from Coimbetoor, to whose operations we shall presently advert; but a hope better founded than any he possessed, would furnish a rational motive for concentration and certainly not for dispersion. The tenor of General Matthews's dispatch, written on the day of his first entrance into Bednore, is strongly tintured throughout with the belief of supernatural interposition, in a success of which the true secondary causes do not appear to have reached his knowledge, or that of any of his officers; and it is difficult to account for the conduct which we have just stated, without supposing the existence of a similar superstition with reference to his future fortunes; a confidence

in the divine protection, implying direct insanity, if the corrupt rapacity imputed to him before, and still more explicitly after the capture of Bednore, have the foundation which various circumstances seem to confirm. The charge, however supported, of insubordination, producing in the army a conduct "loose and unfeeling as that of the most licentious free-booters," retorted on his accusers; and the direct announcement of bringing them to military trial, cannot obliterate the strong grounds of original accusation. The publicity given to this unhappy controversy in the Annual Register of 1783, had induced the author to examine all the documents with scrupulous care, and to prepare an abstract of the whole, which, on farther reflection, has been expunged: the subsequent unhappy fate of General Matthews, without the opportunity of defending his reputation, might seem to expose any such abstract to the imputation of an *ex parte* statement; and mourning over a large portion, at least of impropriety, which pervades the reciprocal discussion, we shall close the subject with observing, with reference to the countless treasures supposed to be found in Bednore, that Tippoo Sultaun, in narrating,* with the utmost bitterness the defection of Ayâz, states, that he carried along with him a large property in cash and valuables. The minister of finance, Poornea, ignorant of the contents of Tippoo's book, states, in his manuscript, the embezzlement at upwards of a lac, and the detailed account afterwards rendered by Ayâz to the Government of Bombay, of the amount and appropriation of his pecuniary possessions in Bednore, gives a total of one lac and forty-eight thousand pagodas,† the balance of which he claims

* Sultaun-û-Towareekh.

† A considerable amount of valuables, constituting what is usually called the Tōsha Khana, or store of articles provided for public presents on occasions of ceremony, as stated both by Poornea and Ayâz, is exclusive of this pecuniary amount.

from the justice of that government, as secured to him by the terms of capitulation : nor can the fact with propriety be suppressed, that General Matthews, in a testamentary memorandum delivered to his fellow prisoners, to be used only in the event of his death, declares that the public was indebted to him for money advanced from his private fortune during his command, in the sum of 33,000 rupees, besides the arrears of his military allowances.

On the approach of Tippoo with the whole of his army, Ayâz had too much wisdom to await with General Matthews the supernatural aid which was to protect him from disaster ; his flight to the coast was so precipitate that he lost the small remains of his property, and in a few months afterwards we find him soliciting the means of subsistence from the English Government. Tippoo Sultaun in narrating the flight of this person, affirms that the most explicit assurances of protection and encouragement had been conveyed to him on the occasion of his father's death, and amuses himself with the parallel and well known anecdote of that Ayâz * from whom he was named, the slave and unhallowed favourite † of Sultaun Mahmood. This Sultaun after exhausting his imagination in procuring for his favoured slave every gratification and convenience that empire can command, asked him one day if any one wish remained ungratified. Yes, said the slave, I have one remaining caprice, I think it would be pleasant to run away.

On approaching Bednore the army divided into two columns, one of which took the southern route of April 7.

* He quibbles very successfully, by naming him Ayâz-ê-na Mahmood, for the purpose of the double meaning, Ayâz, not he who belonged to Mahmood, or Ayâz, the unhallowed ; or more literally unglorified.

† This part of the parallel certainly did not apply, and I do not impute to either Tippoo or his secretary, the intention of such insinuation, however obviously implied in the tale.

Cowlydroog¹ and Hyderghur, which fell without material opposition, and cut off all communication with the coast; the other column proceeded by the most direct north-eastern road, leaving a force to mask Anantpoor, and completely invested the place. The English troops were found in possession of the extensive lines which surround Bednore, and after some skirmishing to ascertain the most vulnerable points, a disposition was made for a general assault and escalade in several columns, which completely succeeded; the English troops who had attempted a defence to the extent of which their numbers were altogether inadequate, retiring with great loss but in excellent order to the citadel. The author has had no access to accounts of this service written by any of the besieged; the work of Tippoo Sultaun* gives ample details in which Monsieur Cossigny is represented as an inexperienced officer, whose blunders were of course corrected by the commanding genius and personal intrepidity of the Sultaun himself; but in the most inflated exaggeration of his own exploits, and affected contempt of his enemy, an unwilling homage is rendered to the energy, the spirit, and the bravery of the besieged, until the place became a heap of ruins, and farther resistance unavailing. Under these circumstances, General Matthews, in conformity to the opinion of a council of war, sent out a flag of truce, with proposals for a capitulation in seven articles, detailed by Tippoo Sultaun, to which, however unfavourable, he declares that he was induced to accede, from considering the short interval which remained for the recovery of Mangalore before the rains. The first of these articles affords a fair specimen of the taste and veracity of the royal author:—

“1. When the English garrison shall march

¹ *Cowlydroog*.—Kavale-durga, in Shimoga District, Mysore, ten miles south-east of Bednur; a hill in a wild inaccessible region, with a fort. It was a stronghold of the Bednur chiefs.

* Sultaun-û-Towareekh.

out, the holy warriors of Islam shall not ridicule them, nor call them by abusive names, nor throw stones at them, nor spit at them."

Two other articles however, appear to be correctly stated, and provide for the safe conduct of the garrison to the coast, and for the security of private, and the surrender of public property. Neither the well-known fate of former prisoners, the precarious aspect of their own destiny, nor yet those principles which regulate, under the worst misfortunes, a sense of what is due to individual and national character, could restrain a predominant passion.* For the purpose of appropriating the remaining public treasure, which by capitulation was the property of Tippoo, the officers were desired to draw for whatever sums they pleased, to be accounted for on their return to Bombay. The garrison marched out in conformity to capitulation on the 3d of May. There May 3 is abundant reason to believe, that Tippoo had pre-determined to seek some pretext for infringing its conditions; but, an empty treasury, together with the money (and as he states *jewels* public property) found on searching the prisoners, exempted him from the necessity of recurring to fictitious pleas; and it will not escape the reader's observation, that the probable sum so recovered reconciles in a satisfactory manner the apparent difference between the statement of treasure lost at Bednore, as furnished by Ayâz, the late governor, and by Tippoo's minister of finance. The breach of faith was speedily announced to the garrison, by their being marched off in irons to different destinations; and Tippoo, for the first time since his accession, gave public audience, seated on a musnud and ordered a salute to be fired for this his first victory, after which he proceeded in person and without delay, for the recovery of Mangalore.

Colonels Macleod and Humberstone, the two

* See Annual Register.

senior of His Majesty's officers, had some time before departed to Bombay, in consequence of the imputed malversations already adverted to, and the command of Mangalore had devolved on Major, now Colonel Campbell, of the 42d, whose memorable defence is well recorded in a little volume* before the public, which furnishes in a plain and unambitious journal of facts, an interesting and instructive military lesson, and develops the rare combination of professional talents and mental resource possessed by this lamented officer.

- Previously to the surrender of Bednore, Tippoo had dispatched a respectable force which was to appear before Mangalore with the intelligence of that event, in the hope of rendering his own approach unnecessary; this corps, however, was attacked and defeated with the loss of its guns, at the distance of twelve miles from the place, in consequence of which
- May 6. Tippoo marched with his whole army, in the expectation that the appearance of such an overwhelming
20. force would terrify the garrison into an early surrender. An outpost on an eminence commanding the principal access to the place, distant upwards of a mile, and although of some strength, requiring two battalions for its occupation, continued to be maintained three days after the place had been invested, and after positions had been taken which enabled the enemy to intercept the retreat of the troops. The consequences of this first and only error, were
23. perceived on the morning of the 23d, when a sudden and simultaneous attack commenced, of several heavy columns of infantry, supported by batteries previously prepared, and the discharge of an incessant shower of rockets: the sepoys appointed for the defence of the post, broke in spite of the efforts of their officers, and were driven in the utmost disorder

* Published in 1786; the author is also in possession of a manuscript journal of the siege, which accords with the printed narrative in all points of importance.

down the hill ; a reinforcement consisting of the 42d, supported by a sepoy corps, was too late for the defence of the post, but arrested for a moment the progress of the enemy, and afforded time for the fugitives to escape ; but the panic soon extended to the sepoys of the reinforcement also, and even the veteran 42d, did not altogether escape its influence. The casualties of this day amounted to four officers, ten European and two hundred native soldiers, including three officers, and two companies of sepoys, whose retreat was entirely cut off. All outposts not under the complete cover of the body of the place, were in consequence withdrawn, and all the arrangements adopted necessary for a long siege. Tippoo did not permit himself to doubt, that the impressions arising from this first success, would produce an immediate surrender ; he had, however, the mortification to find opposed to him, a commander who viewed his mighty hosts with the most perfect composure, and considered the driving in of his outposts, however early and unfortunate in its circumstances, as an event in the ordinary course of the service. He dismissed, without condescending to give an answer, the flag of truce bearing a summons for the immediate surrender of the place as he valued his life ; and Tippoo perceiving a regular siege to be indispensable, and the thunder storms preceding the monsoon to have already commenced, thought proper to send above the ghauts and beyond the influence of its greatest severity, the whole of the stable horse ; they were however overtaken at the bottom of the ghaut by its full violence, and not more than half the horses survived, to reach their eastern cantonments.

Kummer-û-Deen, with the troops composing the personal command of his late father *Meer Sahab*, was dispatched at the same time to his jageer at Kurpa, in consequence of one of the diversions in that quarter planned by the Government of Madras,

under the command, first of Captain Edmonds, and afterward of Colonel Jones. On the capture of Kurpa in 1779, Seyed Mahommed, a son of one of the principal religious persons at the tomb of the celebrated Gesoo Derâz at Culburga, and married to a daughter of the vanquished Patan nabob, was among the prisoners; and Hyder, in examining and giving his orders for the disposal of his captives, ordered this fakeer, as he contemptuously named him, to be liberated. This person, however considering the death of Hyder to be a favourable crisis for adventure, collected a force in the vicinity, with which he had entered the province of Kurpa, supported by the English Government under the designation of *the Nabab of Kurpa*, and by an English corps which obtained possession of the fort of Cummum, and some minor posts. Kummer-û-Deen's cavalry had suffered considerably, though not in the same degree as the stable horse, whose riders had no direct interest in the preservation of the animals; he had therefore to encounter delay in recruiting his cavalry; but on commencing operations, the troops of Seyed Mahommed, a weak, inexperienced person, were totally discomfited, and an English battalion in advance, during a parley to ascertain whether the enemy considered himself bound by the conditions of the armistice of Cuddalore, was treacherously charged and cut to pieces. The subsequent history of this diversion does not challenge much admiration of English diplomacy. Apajee Ram, charged with a mission to Madras, preparatory to a negotiation for general peace, had the countenance to propose, and the rare fortune to obtain, the intermediate exchange of the fort and fertile territory of Cummum, for Chittapet in Coromandel, which, on being occupied by an English detachment, was found to be a heap of ruins ¹

¹ In the middle of May 1783, the 2nd and 17th battalions of Madras sepoy under Captain Edmonds marched from Ongole

Meanwhile the siege of Mangalore was pressed with all the virulent energy of the Sultaun, regulated by the professional science and experience of Monsieur Cossigny. Three regular attacks embraced the faces of the fort, accessible by land: the excessive violence of the monsoon was unfavourable to rapid progress; but a proportion of the faces attacked, instead of a few breaches, rather exhibited masses of continuous ruin: mortars for projecting stones attached to plugs prepared for the purpose, although inferior in effect to a regular bombardment, produced constant annoyance and numerous casualties throughout the night; as operations advanced, a great extent of lodgement on the crest of the glacis, and of covered sap for filling the ditch, brought the assailants and defendants into incessant contact, and attempts to penetrate by assault were repeated and repelled in every quarter, until they became almost

in the Guntur District to Cumbum in the Kurnool District. After taking Cumbum in July, Major-General Jones arrived from Masulipatam with the 102nd Foot, and Captain Edmonds returned to Ongole. Captain Montgomery, with eight companies of the 2nd and two 6-pounders, was directed to advance to Badvel in the Cuddapah District to support Syed Ahmed. On the 29th July General Jones sent orders that hostilities might cease pending the discussions of a treaty of peace. Kamar-ud-din appeared with a force of 6,000 horse, 2,000 infantry and 6 guns. During a parley with Captain Montgomery, he advanced his guns and cavalry and suddenly attacked the Madras troops. Three ensigns were killed with several Indian officers; Captain Montgomery was taken prisoner, about 270 men were killed, wounded or missing; the rest made their escape to Nellore. (Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II. pp. 95-96.)

The land round Cumbum is of extraordinary fertility. The tank at Cumbum has a circumference of 14 miles and an area of four square miles, and the town, though surrounded by land under irrigation, was formerly not unhealthy. About 60 years ago, however, a malarious form of fever appeared and almost decimated the population. It forms the richest area in the Kurnool District and a great contrast to the dry country round Settapatta (Chittapet). When in 1783 this place was given up by treaty in exchange for Cumbum, it was no doubt a very poor exchange.

an affair of daily routine. It is remarkable, that although the conduct of the sepoys was unsatisfactory in the first operation, and daily desertions occurred in the first part of the siege, the firmness and gallantry of the remainder was particularly prominent during its most trying periods, and was distinguished by the repeated and animated public thanks of their excellent commander.

On the 19th of July, after fifty-six days open trenches, Colonel Campbell having, on the preceding day, received advices which gave him reason to expect early relief, ordered at noon, guns well shotted
 y 20. and pointed, to fire a regular royal salute, and the garrison, paraded on such parts of the ramparts as still afforded any cover, were directed to conclude the ceremonial with three hearty huzzas. The intimation thus conveyed to the besiegers, of some acceptable information, having reached the garrison, produced, on the same day at four o'clock, a letter signed "Peveron de Morlay, envoy from France, to the nabob Tippoo Sultaun," informing Colonel Campbell of the peace in Europe; the cessation of arms at Cuddalore, and his possessing a letter from the English commissioners to Colonel Campbell, which he had been enjoined by Tippoo to deliver in person. This letter from Messieurs Sadlier and Staunton had been delivered to Monsieur Bussy for transmission on the 2d of July; the commandant of Mysorean troops at Cuddalore was on the spot to transmit it at a moment's warning, and the author will venture to state a probability, little short of conviction, founded on his knowledge of the routine of the Mysorean post, that these dispatches had been in the camp before Mangalore, at the least ten days before their existence was announced, during which ten days the most desperate efforts had been made to carry the place by assault, and were discontinued on finding that the garrison had obtained some intelligence unfavourable to the hopes of the besiegers, and which

they erroneously supposed to be no other than the stated intelligence from Cuddalore. Without venturing to conjecture at what time these dispatches had been delivered to Monsieur Peveron, or to question the inference that he might not have been at liberty to announce their arrival, it shall only be added, that no explanation appears to have been offered of any such impediment, and that the same Monsieur Peveron afterwards permitted himself to threaten Colonel Campbell with the continuance of the French aid to the besiegers, if he should persevere in certain conditions connected with the observance of the capitulation of Bednore, and this after he had been repeatedly admitted into the fort, *not blindfolded*, on his own positive requisition as an envoy, founded on the existence of a general peace, and after Monsieur Cossigny as a man of honour had quitted the posts which he occupied during the siege, and established himself in a separate encampment.

On first intimating the necessity of refraining from affording him any farther aid in the siege, nothing could exceed the Sultaun's rage and astonishment, and when even Lally and Boudenot were compelled by Monsieur Cossigny to follow his example, Tippoo was incapable of understanding this conduct in any other light than that of base treachery, and an abandonment of the cause in which they were engaged. Boudenot well knowing the danger of continuing to serve a prince against whom he had conspired, resigned his command, and retired with Monsieur Cossigny, whose retreat would apparently have been cut off, as his subsistence was stopped, if he had not required and accepted the aid of his late enemy against his ally.

It is not intended to express surprise at the dark stupidity which could induce Tippoo Sultaun, however mortified and foiled, to think, that under such circumstances he could obtain an accession of military fame, by determining to persevere by whatever

treachery, and whatever sacrifice of men, of time, and of honour, to obtain the fort of Mangalore, before concluding a peace, which would give it to him without an effort: and we can only explain this strange political suicide, by the miserable pride of attempting to shew that he could achieve by himself an exploit, which French troops could not accomplish. On all this political and moral darkness we have no astonishment to bestow. But it is mournful to observe the envoy of a civilized state lending* himself indirectly to such proceedings. Under cover of the arrangements made for the first reception of Monsieur Peveron, into the fort, troops were landed for the attack of a detached work which covered the entrance of the harbour, in consequence of which it was taken; every operation was continued with augmented vigour, under the reiterated simulation of abstaining from hostility; and the admission of the French envoy, as a mediator, was generally the occasion of springing a mine in a situation not conveniently accessible at other times, or some other profligate treachery followed by the most childish explanations. Tippoo however, apparently convinced of the utter hopelessness of farther efforts to reduce the place by force, agreed to an armistice for Mangalore, Onore, and the

Aug. 2. English posts in Malabar, on the 2d of August. The only article (the 3d), which will require particular observation, provided for the establishment of a bazar, where the garrison might buy its provisions, to the limited extent of ten days' stock at a time, and stipulated that such articles as the bazar did not afford, might freely enter from other places, to an amount not exceeding one month's supply at one time; and the whole spirit of the article obviously provided for the garrison remaining during the armistice, with regard to provisions, as in all other

* The reader who may desire to examine the grounds of this inference, is referred to overt facts, from which it is drawn, as detailed in the published journal of the siege.

respects, in the same state as at its commencement.

In an interview with Colonel Campbell, which Tippoo requested soon after the armistice, he paid that officer the most extravagant compliments on his defence of the place, which it must be added, he always continued to hold up with unqualified admiration and applause, as an example to his own officers: but, on the very day preceding this interview, he tried his first experiment, by the erection of a new work on the southern, as that which he had already treacherously obtained, covered the northern entrance of the harbour; an insolent and open violation of the 10th article of the armistice, which it is very remarkable that Colonel Campbell does not seem to have denounced. But this was less important than a systematic violation of the 3d article regarding provisions, which he commenced on the very first day of the armistice, and continued by a series of mean simulation and falsehood, which it would be disgusting to follow, and unnecessary to detail.

Fifteen days after this armistice, Brigadier-General Macleod, now invested with the chief command, on the coast of Malabar and Canara, arrived in the offing, and on the following day, appeared the ^{Aug.} Bristol and Isis from Madras, with a detachment of Hanoverians, destined to reinforce Mangalore; but as the design of starving the garrison into surrender, had not yet been sufficiently matured, to infuse into the minds of General Macleod or Colonel Campbell, any suspicion of the gross falsehoods which were adduced to explain the successive delays, this reinforcement was ordered to land at Tellicherry, about a degree to the southward. On the 20th, General 20 Macleod landed and took up his residence in the town of Mangalore, where accommodations were prepared for him by Tippoo's desire. The record of some of his conversations with that personage, in the presence of Colonel Campbell, contains, among other

matters, a prominent recurrence of the demand of reparation for the fraud at Trichinopoly in 1752, which, notwithstanding the peace of 1769, had also formed the basis of the last propositions made by his father. Tippoo, however, exhibited some knowledge of secret history, in adding that Mahommed Ali was the true cause of the war: that he had poisoned the minds of the English against his father and him, and had even deputed persons to England to injure them in the opinions of the king and people of that country; that he was equally false to the English and to him, and had even recently proposed to him a negotiation to unite for their expulsion from India: the French, he said, had mediated the armistice, but he would not have them or any other to mediate the peace: you shall make the peace, he added, and expressed surprize when General Macleod pleaded his want of powers. Why cannot the military officers make peace? they are the proper persons to do it. You shall go with me to Seringapatam; you shall send my propositions to Madras; you shall make the peace, and in the meanwhile I will gratify you and Colonel Campbell, by complying with your request for the release of all your prisoners; they shall be delivered into your own hands at Seringapatam. And all this was seriously believed by General Macleod and Colonel Campbell, to the extent of the latter,

Aug. 23. considering himself on the 23d, as having succeeded to the general command on the coast of Malabar, by the sudden departure of General Macleod, who, in the same confidence of immediate departure, had written to Bombay to avert this pretension.

Oct. 9. It was not, however, until the 9th of October that General Macleod appeared fully awake to the effects of the practice which had been in constant operation from the 2d of August, of affecting a liberal supply of certain articles, while of those essential to the native troops, the limitations were so managed as to compel Colonel Campbell to make frequent

drafts on the garrison stores, the necessity for each of which was in itself a distinct violation of the terms of the armistice; and these stores were now so far reduced, that Tippoo, conceiving the object to be secured, of compelling the garrison to surrender for want of food, threw off the mask, openly avowed the deception of his professed departure for Seringapatam, declared that the garrison should not be supplied with provisions, and finally told the General that he was at liberty to depart: a permission which, under all the circumstances of the case, the General would have been entitled to consider as the most fortunate result of his diplomacy. He accordingly sailed for Tellicherry to collect the means of relieving the garrison, which was now reduced to twenty days' stock. From this period forward, Tippoo was openly and actively employed in repairing his old works, and erecting new batteries in every direction, a proceeding which the garrison could not retaliate, on account, not only of their reduced numbers and declining health, but the necessity of employing as fuel, not only all the spare materials convertible to military uses, but even of demolishing, for the same purpose, the buildings which protected them from the inclemency of the weather.

By the simulation which Tippoo did not yet entirely abandon, and Colonel Campbell, in such extremity, did not think proper to reject, of permitting a few unimportant articles to enter the fort, the twenty days' stock had, by short allowance, been made to last forty-four days, when, on the 22d of Nov. 22. November,* two fleets appeared, one from the north ward, the other from the south, both standing into the roads. After some preparation, "the ships of war took their stations so as to cover, in the most effectual manner, the boats employed on this service;

* Stated in the published journal the 24th, which must be an error of the press. as the remarkable letters in the text are dated the 23d.

the garrison lay on their arms; the signal was made that the troops would land to the southward; they were discovered in the boats; every moment promised a speedy attack. Confidence and joy appeared in every countenance; even the poor, weak, emaciated convalescent, tottering under the weight of his fire-lock, boldly stood forth to offer what feeble aid his melancholy state admitted of. But how great the change!"* The correspondence between General Macleod and Tippoo Sultaun, which terminated in this change, if not the most interesting, is certainly among the most remarkable in the history of diplomacy. The General's first letter complained, among other violations of the truce, of the Sultaun having stopped the messengers with letters to and from himself and Colonel Campbell. To this accusation the Sultaun answers, (in English, it should seem, written by a Frenchman,) "It is a *lie or mensonge*, as I never see any letters from Bombay, Madras, or Tellicherry." The General, before noticing this part of the letter says,—“You say you have supplied them from your bazâr; the signals from the fort say you have not; *you will not permit an officer from the fort to inform me of its real situation*; therefore I must believe Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell's signals, rather than your assertions.” “You, or your interpreter, have said, in your letter to me, that I have lied, (or made a *mensonge*,) permit me to inform you, Prince, that this language is not good for you to give, or me to receive; and that if I was alone with you in the desert, you would not dare to say these words to me;” and again, “You have said that I lied or made a *mensonge*; this is an irreparable affront to an English warrior. I tell you our customs; if you have courage enough to meet me, take 100 of your bravest men on foot, meet me on the sea shore. I will fight you, and 100 of mine will fight with yours,” &c. These extracts are made from General Macleod's official

* Published narrative of the siege.

dispatches, entered on the records of Bombay, which furnish no continuation of the chivalrous branch of this correspondence, nor have I been able, by other means, to trace its true termination.

The answer recorded in Tippoo's memoirs written by himself, and given at length in the preface to the first volume of this work as a specimen of his style, ought probably to be deemed a fable, of subsequent and more elaborate fabrication, destined to transmit to his successors, together with the evidence of his romantic prowess, the record of his wonderful polemic talents. The military results of the negotiation are more distinctly unfolded: It does not appear that General Macleod succeeded in the indispensable object of receiving a personal report through an officer, of the real situation of the fort, to which in the commencement of the negotiation he attached such reasonable importance. "It was agreed" says the journal, "that the garrison should have a supply of one month's provision, but on being examined, it was found to consist of no more than twenty days' rice: no dhol, ghee, *or salt*, no refreshment for the officers allowed admittance; a great scarcity of fire wood, hospitals crowded, improper diet; and the whole of the troops in a weakly state." "In this situation most of the ships and vessels got under way on the 1st of December, and made sail to the Dec. 1. southward." "Every officer spoke mutiny; every soldier was outrageous:"* the author of these observations appears to ascribe this ungenerous treatment exclusively to the Government of Bombay; if he should still be alive and should happen to peruse this narrative, he may presently see cause to qualify that opinion. "On the day" says the General "that the squadron sailed from Mangalore, Colonel Campbell was so impatient that he made the signal, 1st, that he wanted to be succoured, though he received the provisions only the day before; 2d, that he could

* Published narrative of the siege

hold out no longer, which I disregarded as proceeding from the peevishness of disappointment;" and on Dec. 2. the 2d, General Macleod's ship alone remaining, he repeated the signal "that he had not a month's provisions; this comforted me as much less desperate than his former signals;" "but these signals have planted a dagger in my breast."

Before proceeding in our narrative, it will be necessary to examine the reasons officially assigned for not executing, with a force which all representations concur in stating to be sufficient, the effectual relief of Mangalore. The preliminary articles of peace between the French and English, had stipulated that a term of four months should be allowed to the belligerent powers of Hindostan to accede to that pacification, and the Government of Madras had notified to Tippoo's political agent, that if within four months from his reception of the invitation to peace (which they think proper to date on the 2d of August, twenty-four days after Tippoo's public acknowledgment of its reception, and thirty-four after its actual arrival), he should not have evacuated their territory, hostilities should recommence on the 2d of December, and the Government of Bombay had given corresponding instructions to their dependencies in Malabar: "though," says General Macleod, "the 2d of December was so near, the ships and boats had not water to last: to wait for the 2d of December was impossible, to make the attack before it, after he had consented to receive provisions, appeared to me to be contrary to good faith, to your instructions, and to the interests of the Company, nevertheless, prompted by affection for the garrison, I was tempted, till Captain Mitchell (the officer commanding His Majesty's squadron) assured me, that by the Admiral's instructions he did not think himself authorized to assist me in any hostile measures, after the nabob's offer, and would act accordingly." Combining the whole of these

facts, and abstaining from remark on the unhappy combination by which water should be wanting on the precise day that it was deemed regular to commence operations, it is difficult, at this distance of time, to conceive on what grounds it could be deemed, by officers of rank and experience, that a general armistice offered and observed by one belligerent during a period allowed to the other for determining whether he would or would not accede to certain conditions for *a general peace*, but notoriously broken by the party to whom it was so offered, by the flagitious, flagrant, and contemptuous violation of *a particular convention* and consequently of the general truce, could, by any construction, be deemed binding on the other, or restrain it from relieving a place reduced to the last extremity by the direct consequences of that violation; and the grounds appear to be equally questionable of the impression conveyed by the tenor of this dispatch, that the spirit of a general instruction to avoid open hostility, has ever been promoted by a connivance at open insult. This reasoning has been purposely confined to the subject of our previous narrative, but there was another, and if possible a stronger, because a more unmixed act of undisguised hostility: of three hundred men who were coming from the northward to join Brigadier General Macleod at Telli-cherry, in the beginning of November, two hundred were caught in a storm, driven on shore at Mangalore, and made prisoners by Tippoo, who distinctly refused to release them; and the naval and military officers thus openly insulted by a new, distinct and separate act of hostility, assumed the merit of good faith in submissively sailing away, although in retaliation for the similar detention of one hundred of the same number at the same time at Cannanore, the possession of a subject of Tippoo, that place was attacked and carried by Brigadier-General Macleod in the very same month, and his report to Lord

Macartney of this achievement contains, among other matter, the very curious admission, that Tippoo, at Mangalore, had "broken the cessation of arms in every possible manner."

- Dec. 2. The General sailed from Mangalore on the 2d, with the signal flying of "speedy succours arriving." In addition to the ordinary consequences of a siege, the sea scurvy now began to make great havoc among the troops, and the garrison was again on short allowance from the 20th of December. "On the 27th a vessel, with General Macleod's flag, with a snow and five boats, appeared in the road. On the 31st a supply of provisions was permitted to be landed, consisting nearly of the same quantity of rice and biscuit as before, but less beef and arrack: no refreshments were landed for the officers, nor the least intercourse allowed between the vessels and the garrison, the provisions which were landed being sent in Tippoo's boats, and under charge solely of his own people, who attentively examined each article before its admittance. The garrison, so far from conceiving this second supply as an alleviation to their sufferings, were highly dissatisfied and clamorous, and looked upon it as a most glaring insult." "In the night of the 1st of January, Brigadier-General Macleod's vessel and boats went off. A very small part of the last supply of salt meat was eatable, and the biscuit was full of vermin. The scurvy continued to rage: many whose wounds had been healed, broke out afresh; and the hospital, notwithstanding the sad decrease in numbers, was more crowded than during the siege. On the 12th a vessel, with Brigadier-General Macleod's pendant flying, came to anchor off the bar from the southward; on the return of a boat which she had dispatched on shore on the 10th, she weighed and made sail to the northward." On the 23d the crisis seemed to have arrived: the hospitals were filled with two-thirds of the garrison; the deaths were from twelve to fifteen

a day: a large portion of the sepoys doing duty were blind, a malady supposed to proceed from eating rice alone, without salt or any other condiment, and the remainder so exhausted as frequently to drop down on parade in the act of attempting to shoulder their arms. It were equally painful and unnecessary to describe the loathsome food and cadaverous countenance of the Europeans, and the mixed aspect of resentment and despair which preceded the ultimate measure of a council of war for the surrender of the place. The articles, honourable in all respects, for the garrison, were agreed to on the 26th, but not signed until the 30th. The intermediate arrival of Colonel Gordon, second in command, with another month's provisions in two ships, made no change in conditions to which Colonel Campbell's faith was already pledged, but probably had some influence regarding their performance; for strange to tell, they were all most faithfully executed, and the remains* of the garrison reached Tellicherry; the fatigues of a tedious and harrassing service had exhausted all that was mortal of this brave and interesting officer: he was compelled by illness to quit the associates of his sufferings on the 15th of February and died on the 23d of March.

A place of contemptible strength had thus for nearly nine months from the capture of Bednore, locked up the services of the Sultaun's main army. He had, for nearly seven months of that time, wantonly and unnecessarily neutralized its efforts for the continuance of war, or the promotion of peace; he had, as we shall presently see, invited by the same means, the invasion of one of his richest provinces. The revenues of Canara, Malabar, and Coimbetoor, for the greater part of the year, were either totally lost, or

* The numbers for duty, including officers, were on the 24th May, 1783, after the outposts were driven in, 412 Europeans, and 1488 natives; and on the 30th January, 1784, 235 Europeans, and 619 natives.

suffered great defalcation ; and all for the purpose of exhibiting himself to the world, foiled by a common country fort of the fourth or fifth order, and mending his military inferiority by the effects of famine. Such, it must be admitted, were the only inferences which an European reasoner would draw from these premises ; but Tippoo appeared to propose to himself the further object, and that eventually was not a small one, of shewing to the powers of India, in those and further transactions to be narrated, that he could dare to treat the English power with open contempt and derision ; and ultimately exhibit them as humble supplicants for peace, while suffering similar indignities, even in the persons of their ambassadors. The very respectable force collected at Tellicherry, after being withdrawn in the manner we have described, from the intended relief of Mangalore, had in the mean while been employed in the capture of Cannanore, the seat of an opulent Mahommedan chief, the acknowledged subject of Tippoo, in retaliation for the detention of some sepoy's shipwrecked on the coast ; an hostility at least as direct as the forcible relief of Mangalore could have been deemed, and in public opinion of very inferior public advantage ; and General Macleod had proceeded to Bombay, having looked into Mangalore on the 12th, as already noticed.

An incident exhibiting much of character which occurred during the siege, has for convenience of narrative, been suspended till its close. Rüstum Ali Beg, the officer who refused to give up Mangalore, to the order of Ayâz, his former superior surrendered it by a favourable capitulation, on the appearance of an adequate force under General Matthews ; and the apology of its being *an untenable post*, against a regular siege, was admitted by a committee of investigation, and not rejected by his sovereign. When, however, that sovereign found himself and his French allies completely foiled by the garrison of

this untenable post, he began, very logically, to question the fact on which the apology was founded, and to declare his suspicion of the treachery of the kelledar : but when, after the expiration of six months, the appearance of relief, under General Macleod, on the 22d of November, seemed to give further proof, that this strange garrison was neither to be starved, nor beaten, it was evident, that either Rûstum Ali Beg had been a traitor, or himself but a bungling soldier ; his rage exceeded all bounds, and he ordered the unfortunate kelledar, with all his principal officers, to be led out to instant execution.

Mahommed Ali, the same person whose name is familiar to the reader by the massacre of his wounded, by a signal victory achieved over the Mahrattas, and a variety of important services, was the ancient and intimate friend of Rûstum Ali. He had presided at the investigation of his conduct in the capitulation, had made the most favourable report regarding its expediency, and had repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, interposed his good offices to effect his restoration to favour. Mahommed Ali was considered by Hyder as one of the best officers in his army : he was a man of abrupt manners, described by his associates with whom I have conversed, as resembling those of the Mahomedan bigots, who, under the title of religious mendicants, and the mask of spiritual sanctity, may well be designated as rude and sturdy beggars : he was considered as a sort of privileged person, whose requests or demands, however abruptly conveyed, had scarcely ever been refused by Hyder. He was not, however, exempt from the suspicion of duplicity ; and in the war of Coromandel, he had certainly received some of the secret service-money of Sir Eyre Coote ; and had on discovery been suspended from his command. " You know," said he to Hyder, " that I am an extravagant fellow ; and as you won't give me the money I want, I take it from your enemies. If I had told you beforehand, you

have such an insatiable maw of your own, that I should never have seen a rupee of it." He was in arrest at the time of the battle of Pollilore; and after its close, while Hyder was seated to receive reports, came loaded with various trophies, which he had picked up on the field, and throwing them down, rather over Hyder than at his feet; "there," said he, "are the offerings of a traitor." Hyder smiled, and ordered his immediate restoration to command. He had with whatever design been carrying on a secret intercourse with Colonel Campbell for some time before the appearance of this relief; but this fact was unknown to Tippoo. Mahommed Ali was nearly as great a personal favourite with the son, as he had been with the father; and had presumed in a few cases to take the same liberties; and on the occasion of his friend being led out to execution, he adopted a mode which cannot be satisfactorily explained on the supposition of his having been serious in his negotiations with Colonel Campbell. Instead of marshalling his whole command, he merely paraded a single battalion, rescued the prisoner from the guard, and openly declaring that he would not suffer him to be executed, remained on the spot, crying out "justice, in the name of God!" instead of marching direct to the fort, which he might suddenly and safely have effected.

Tippoo on receiving this intelligence instantly put himself at the head of several battalions of Chélas and proceeded to the spot. Being unwilling on every account to proceed to extremities, he sent frequent messengers to *Mahommed Ali* to dissuade him from so absurd a proceeding, and among them *Booden Deen* the commandant of rocket men, one of his most intimate friends; some accounts insinuate that this person was intoxicated at the time; but it is certain, that instead of returning with the acquiescence of his friend, he remained with him: such is one of the statements of actual spectators, while another, on

the same authority, represents Mahommed Ali as having casually met the party proceeding to the place of execution; that Rûstum Ali threw himself at his feet; that Mahommed Ali, the senior General in camp, desired the guard to halt, until he should explain matters to his sovereign; that while conversing on the subject in his usual rough manner, some hundred soldiers gathered round him, and it was reported to Tippoo that he was collecting his troops. However this may be, it is certain that Tippoo made a disposition for surrounding them, that only seventy-two persons remained to be surrounded, and that they were secured without the least resistance. Booden Deen was led on with Rûstum Ali, and the other prisoners to public execution; which was distinctly seen from the English fleet. To execute Mahommed Ali in the presence of the army would have been too serious an experiment. Whatever may have been the amount of actual crime on this occasion, his eminent services pleaded for mercy, and almost every officer of reputation interposed the most earnest intreaties for the preservation of his life. Tippoo publicly declared his acquiescence in this request, and on the ensuing day he was sent off in irons to Seringapatam.. Sheikh Hummeed, a young, ambitious, and expectant officer of cavalry was charged with the escort of the prisoner; and before his departure, was called into Tippoo's tent of private audience, where he was furnished with a written order to dispatch Mahommed Ali on the road, and with verbal instructions for his farther guidance. On the second day he had the humanity to apprise Mahommed Ali of the order; and the victim, after a short period, employed in devotion, quietly acquiesced in the arrangements for strangling him without noise, by means of the common groom's cord for leading a horse. Sheikh Hummeed returned in conformity to orders, surrendered his credentials, and reported that Mahommed Ali had destroyed

himself. Tippoo affected the most violent grief and indignation; accused Sheikh Hummeed of having connived at his taking poison, and ordered him into strict confinement, from which he was not released without the forms of powerful intercession after the lapse of some weeks. The latter part of the narrative is given on the personal authority in 1808, of a near relation of Sheikh Hummeed, who had died a short time before that period; and it affords some illustration of the state of moral feeling under a despot, that the narrator extolled the mildness and clemency of Tippoo in not having murdered his relation for the purpose of keeping his own secret. There was, however, a farther motive and a more important secret. Mahommed Ali had shortly before the invasion of Coromandel, conspired* with Tippoo himself for the dethronement of his father, and

* Stated on the authority of one of the conspirators.

[Kirmani (Miles: *History of the Reign of Tipu Sultan*, pp. 19-29) gives a different account of the end of Muhammad Ali. According to him Kasim Ali, Governor of Bednore, intrigued with Iyaz Khan to surrender that fort to General Matthews. On its recapture by Tipu, he was sentenced to death. Muhammad Ali interfered to prevent his execution. Tipu then sent for Muhammad Ali and argued with him, on which Muhammad Ali was disrespectful, whereupon Tipu repeated his orders. Muhammad Ali again interfered and took Kasim Ali with him on the road to Seringapatam. One Syed Humid was sent after him, and brought them back to Tipu, who ordered Kasim Ali to be instantly impaled and Muhammad Ali to be placed in a palanquin and sent to Seringapatam. Tipu punished the followers of Muhammad Ali by mutilating them, and they then followed Muhammad Ali, reproaching him for having brought about their ruin. Muhammad Ali struck with remorse then killed himself by cutting out his own tongue or swallowing a diamond, and he was found dead in his palanquin. Muhammad Ali is represented as having been universally known for his liberality, and having died a very poor man, having given away all his wealth to religious mendicants and numerous poor who lived on his charity. Wilks, who no doubt heard from many persons who knew the facts, gives what is more probably the correct version of what actually happened.]

although their plans had not been sufficiently matured, and were frustrated by the activity of the subsequent campaigns, the preservation of such a secret was very necessary to his own security

CHAPTER XXVIII.

Retrospect to the affairs of Malabar—Mr. Sullivan's communications with Colonel Humberstone—The talents with which he retrieved the affairs of the South—Extension of his views to an eventual invasion of Mysoor—frustrated by Sir Eyre Coote's disapproval of his plans—Consequent danger of Colonel Humberstone's operations—Mr. Sullivan opens a negotiation with Tremalrow, the supposed agent of the imprisoned Ránee of Mysoor—Character and history of that person—Opinion of the Governor and Council—of General Stuart—Treaty ratified—its conditions—delays—Colonel Lang, accompanied by Tremalrow, besieges and takes Caroore—Hoisting the Mysoor colours deemed inexpedient—Tremalrow fails in his first conditions—Discussion of his probable means—Aravacourchy—Dindigul—Supercession of Colonel Lang—Colonel Fullarton invested with the command—receives contradictory orders from Government, and from the Commander-in-chief—takes a just view of the public interests, and risks the responsibility of disobeying the superior authority—marches on Cuddalore—On the cessation of arms ordered to return to the South—Financial difficulties—Receives intelligence of the treachery at Mangalore—moves west—takes Palgaut—communicates with General Macleod—Reasons for returning eastward—takes Coimbatore—prepares to ascend the Ghauts—Confidence of disaffection in Tippoo's army, founded on the execution of Mahommed Ali, and a late conspiracy at Seringapatam—Account of that conspiracy—Shamia the reputed head—

Defective communications—The plot discovered on the night prior to its intended execution—Punishment of the conspirators—Discussion of the facts of the case—Colonel Fullarton influenced by these supposed proofs of disaffection, to prepare for the ascent of the Ghauts—stopped by orders from the English plenipotentiaries, proceeding to the court of Tippoo.

DURING the period of the wantonly protracted siege of Mangalore, a service which has occupied a more than usual portion of detail, as well from its peculiar character as from its direct connection with other more important events, it has seemed most convenient to suspend the narrative of those corresponding transactions which now remain to be described. We have seen that in the early part of 1782, Mr. John Sullivan,¹ political resident at Tanjour, charged with a general superintendence over the southern provinces, and unlimited powers of political communication with both coasts, had in the course of the confidential authority committed to him by his government, opened to Colonel Humberstone, recently arrived on the coast of Malabar, his views regarding that employment of the forces under his

¹ John Sullivan was one of three brothers who served in Madras. The eldest, Benjamin, arrived in India as a barrister in 1777, and was appointed successively Government Advocate, Attorney-General and a Judge of the High Court. The second brother, John, entered the Civil Service in 1765, at the age of 17, successfully tendered in 1771 for the erection of the Madras arsenal and new hospital, and afterwards served in Masulipatam and Tanjore. From 1801 to 1805, he was Under-Secretary for War in England and he survived until 1839. His younger brother, Richard Joseph, became a writer in 1768, was afterwards Secretary in the Military Department at Fort St. George and was created a Baronet in 1804. John Sullivan was appointed Resident at Tanjore in 1780. It was said he had made a large fortune at Tanjore by being concerned in providing grain, provisions and stores for the troops in the south. (Love: *Report on the Palk Manuscripts*, pp. 29-354.)

command which would best promote the general purposes of the war; and there is in the whole of his extensive correspondence at that period, a manly, energetic, and enlightened grasp of mind, which leads us incessantly to regret its limited sphere of operation; and the inadequacy of his means to the accomplishment of his conceptions. The recent defeat and capture of Colonel Brathwaite's corps in Tanjour had produced the greatest degree of despondency in the southern provinces, and even considerable alarm for the safety of the provincial capital: but the ample authorities committed to Mr. Sullivan, were exercised on this occasion with so much energy and address, as speedily to revive the public confidence; he had even found resources for raising and equipping troops, to replace, at least numerically, the losses of the late disaster, and had reason to hope for the early organization of that force, which afterwards took the field under Colonel Lang. The plan proposed in the first instance, involved little more than the general views of the Governments of Bengal and Madras, officially communicated to him, for an efficient diversion on the coast of Malabar, which among benefits of a more general nature, would relieve the pressure and liberate the resources of the provinces committed to his charge: but on farther correspondence with Colonel Humberstone, these views extended to a combined operation by the route of Palgaut, to unite with Colonel Lang in Coimbetoor, and eventually to prosecute farther offensive operations. These ideas were approved by his own Government, and afterwards recommended to the adoption of that of Bombay, but the displeasure of Sir Eyre Coote, which has been already noticed, and his disappointment at Colonel Humberstone's landing in Malabar, gave to his opinions, if not an original bias unfavourable to the measure, at least the character of intemperate disapprobation; the landing therefore of Colonel Humberstone, approved by the Government of

Madras, but disapproved as we have seen in the first instance, by that of Bombay, and by Sir Eyre Coote, instead of being, as it might have been, rendered an efficient branch of an important combination, was left to assume the character of an insulated and eminently dangerous diversion.

Mr. Sullivan, who in consequence of the difficulty of communication, long remained ignorant of the opinions of Sir Eyre Coote, and the dissensions at Madras, sought to strengthen a plan approved by his Government, by means of such political support as circumstances might admit. For about six years past, a bramin named Tremalrow, had been residing in Tanjour, who gave himself out as "the son * of the minister of that Raja of Mysoor, who had been deposed by Hyder," that he had been deputed on a secret mission, from the imprisoned Rānee† to Lord Pigot in 1776, and on hearing of his revolutionary supercession, retired to Tanjour. In this situation he had ingratiated himself with the Raja, by whom he had been announced to Mr. Sullivan, through the medium of Mr. Swartz, whose knowledge of the languages, joined to his personal character, gave weight to every representation which he consented to convey. Tremalrow was a person of considerable talents and acquirement, and shewed himself to possess extensive information regarding the government and resources of Mysoor. It is known, that he had served in a subordinate capacity,

* A genealogy, with which I am furnished, traces the family of Tremalrow up to Govind Achāree, the Gooroo, (high priest,) of the Kings of Vijayanuggur: from him is said to have descended Tremalayangar, the minister of Chick Deo Raj. Vide vol. i. page 108, the alleged ancestor of Tremalrow. I have the authority of the brother of Tremalrow, for stating, that he is entirely unconnected with either of these families, and that the second is not lineally descended from the first, and is of a distinct subdivision of cast; but it is right to add, that these brothers were at variance.

† The personage described in vol. i, page 418.

in some of the departments of Hyder's government, at first as a writer in the office of Assud Ali Khân, minister of finance, who died in 1772, and afterwards in the department of the post-office and police, under Timmapa, (the predecessor of Shâmia,) by whom he was patronized and employed on several missions; and it is understood in Mysoor, that while absent on one of these, he heard of the intended disgrace of his patron, and apprehensive of being involved in its consequences, fled from Mysoor. This person stated himself to possess political powers from his imprisoned mistress, and means of communication which enabled him to receive from her letters addressed to Lord Macartney, and Sir Eyre Coote, and political instructions for his own guidance. Original letters, addressed by Colonel Wood, Colonel Smith, and Mahommed Ali, during the war of 1767, to Madana,* Hyder's governor of Coimbetoor and Malabar, produced to support the authenticity of his present communications, were scarcely conclusive to that extent, although affording evidence of confidential access either to the supposed conspirators of 1767, or to the records of Hyder's police; and after a voluminous correspondence, Mr. Sullivan was authorised to conclude a treaty with Tremalrow, in behalf of the imprisoned Ranee; the main purport of which was, on the one part, the eventual restoration of the ancient family; and on the other, the payment of stipulated contributions, as the army should advance into the provinces of Mysoor; with other ulterior considerations reciprocally advantageous, but cautiously guarding the English Government against any inconvenient pledge. This treaty was sent for ratification to the Government of Madras, every member of which had entire confidence in the authenticity of the powers, and the reasonable prospect of success. Sir Eyre Coote, although originally inimical to the plan, had, before his departure to

* The person mentioned in page 610, &c. of volume I.

Bengal, encouraged Mr. Sullivan to persevere. General Stuart alone, after the departure of Sir Eyre Coote, a member of the Select Committee of Government, not only stated his opinion that the whole was a delusion, but converted into a source of festive merriment at his public table, this official proceeding of the secret department of the Government. The treaty was however ratified on the 27th November, 1782, subject to the confirmation of the Government-General.

We have already seen, that the death of Hyder and the recession of Tippoo, from his attack on the corps of Colonel Humberstone, to join his army in Coromandel, followed in early succession the date of these arrangements, and left an open field for the operations of Colonel Lang. The difficulty of efficient equipment, and delays of doubtful necessity, protracted the movements of this officer ; until, on receiving intelligence of the capture of Bednore, he was urged, by arguments drawn from that example, to contribute without delay to the farther distraction of the enemy's efforts : he accordingly marched, accompanied by Tremalrow, and on the 2d of April, 1783, obtained possession of the fort of Caroor, after a defence which cost about one hundred and thirty killed and wounded. The Hindoo colours of Mysoor were hoisted on the ramparts of this its frontier post in Coimbetoor, and the management of the district was committed to Tremalrow ; measures which Mr. Sullivan deemed to be premature, not only on account of giving unnecessary publicity to the connection, and thereby risking disclosures at Seringapatam, but because it had been his intention to exact the corresponding stipulation of the payment of one lac of rupees, which it appears that Tremalrow was unable immediately to accomplish. His individual private fortune might perhaps have enabled him to make this first pecuniary advance ; but independently of the evidence of this first failure, it is difficult to

conceive the existence of those secret funds, which he affirmed to be at his disposal, sufficient for the payment of the larger successive contributions, except such as he should derive from the resources of the countries to be occupied, in consequence of the advance of the army. Avaracourchy¹ was carried by assault on the 16th of April, and Dindigul surrendered on the 4th of May.

At this period a promotion in His Majesty's army placed Colonel Lang below the two next officers serving under his command ; the announcement of this event was accompanied by orders for another destination, and the command was conferred on Colonel Fullarton, an officer who, although he had recently embraced the military life, exhibited an aptitude for that profession, which longer experience does not always confer, and political talents which had been improved by experience. His first operation after succeeding to the command was the capture of Daraporam² on the 2d of June, the capture of Bednore on the 3d of May was still unknown ; and the advance of Colonel Fullarton to draw off a part or the whole of the pressure on General Matthews, although with forces confessedly insufficient to encounter Tippoo's main army, was deemed of such vital importance as to justify the risk. The Government accordingly repeated their injunctions to General Stuart, to issue no orders to Colonel Fullarton except in the case of some urgent necessity, the nature of which necessity he was to explain to them, either before issuing the order, or on the date of its issue. These instructions

¹ *Avaracourchy*.—Aravakurichi, a town 17 miles south-west of Karur, in Trichinopoly District. The fort was built by a Mysore Raja. The fortifications were destroyed when the English occupied the place in 1790. It is situated on the road to Dindigul.

² *Daraporam*.—Dharapuram, 42 miles south-east of Coimbatore. It was a point of strategical importance, captured by Colonel Wood in 1768, but retaken by Haider in the same year. In 1792 the fort was dismantled. It is now a town of about 8,000 inhabitants.

were dated the 27th May, and on the 31st, General Stuart addressed to Colonel Fullarton a positive order to march towards him at Cuddalore, with the utmost expedition ; these orders obliged him to desist from farther operations and move in an opposite direction. At Trichinopoly, where the rivers were unfordable, some delay was incurred in the operation of crossing in basket boats. Arrived on the opposite bank, he experienced the full force of that miserable state of dissension, which paralyzed the public weal, in the receipt on one and the same day of farther instructions from General Stuart to march without delay to Cuddalore ; and orders no less explicit from Lord Macartney to recross the river and continue to the southward.* We have already noticed the tone of being abandoned by his own Government, which General Stuart assumed on the private receipt of this information, officially withheld from his knowledge ; but it is highly creditable to the memory of Colonel Fullarton, the personal friend of Lord Macartney, and placed by his Lordship's patronage in this honourable separate command, that he ventured to disobey. Intelligence had reached him that "Suffrein had anchored at Cuddalore after the action of the 20th of June, and that a disembarkation of many thousand men was intended ;" he inferred that "the public safety could have no existence if General Stuart's army was defeated,"† and risked the responsibility of marching with every possible expedition towards Cuddalore. It is no disparagement to the merit of this public-spirited decision, that he would probably have been too late if the armistice had not intervened. On his arrival within three forced marches of the camp before Cuddalore, he received intelligence of the cessation of hostilities, the supercession of General Stuart, and his departure for Madras ; and it must be added in justice to the

* Fullarton's view, page 114.

† Ibid, page 115.

Government whose orders he disobeyed, that they afterwards expressed their approbation of his conduct.

The termination of the French war, the absence of Tippoo's army from Coromandel, and the ostensible accession to an armistice preparatory to peace, rendered disposable a large portion of the army assembled at Cuddalore, and Colonel Fullarton was ordered to return to the southward, reinforced to an extent which nearly doubled his numbers. Some intermediate operations against dependent chiefs who had exhibited a refractory spirit, during a period of public pressure, occupied the force under his command for some months ; and he had been ordered to abstain from farther hostility against Tippoo, unless a violation of the armistice or farther instructions should authorize the measure. The single fact of the native troops and their European officers under Colonel Fullarton, being at this time twelve months in arrear, and in other situations a still greater number, furnishes in itself the truest picture of public finance, and the allegiance of these troops received its highest eulogium, in the contrasted condition of His Majesty's regiments, whom an act of parliament required to be regularly paid : a ration of rice constituted the only means of subsistence to a sepoy, the very condiments necessary for rendering it fit for food, were procured on credit, from the native merchants of the camp bazars ; a class of men whose conduct during this trying war, was scarcely less meritorious than that of the troops. The personal responsibility of Mr. Sullivan, and the gentlemen charged with the superintendence of supply procured equipments not to be obtained on the broken credit of the Government ; and Colonel Fullarton, after exhausting the provisions of our own districts, in keeping his army together for future contingencies, was induced by necessity to "solicit a latitude of purveyance, even in the enemy's country, in case his protractions should endanger the safety of the troops

so critically situated.”* At this exact period, (the 16th Oct. 16. of October,) an official letter from the members of the residency at Tellicherry informed him of the broad and insolent violation of the convention of Mangalore, which had induced General Macleod to depart from that place on the 9th of the same month, and determined him on moving to the westward. The topography of those countries was then imperfectly understood, and Colonel Fullarton, reducing the intermediate posts, moved on Palgaut, with the view of uniting his forces to those of General Macleod, and marching in force for the relief of Mangalore. After a difficult and tedious route, cut through the centre of a stately teak forest, which covers this immense break in the Alpine chain of the Peninsula, the army keeping close to the stupendous hills on their left, penetrated to Palgaut, and after a short but active and meritorious siege, carried the place on the 15th of November. The honourable Captain (now Nov. 15 Sir Thomas) Maitland, being on duty in the trenches, had taken advantage of a heavy fall of rain, to drive the enemy from the covered way which was not palisaded, and pursuing the fugitives through the first and second gateway, struck such a panic into the garrison, as to cause its immediate surrender.¹

* Fullarton's view, page 154.

¹ Colonel Fullarton, in his march to the south through Madura and Tinnevely Districts, had been successful in recovering arrears of tribute from the Sivaganga Raja, and almost one and a-half lakhs of rupees from the Panjalamkurichi Raja; the latter was distributed among his troops. He returned from the south and at Dindigul was met by two strong detachments from the main army. This raised his force to 13,600 men of whom 2,050 were Europeans. He then marched to Palghaut, through the Anaimalai forests. "We had to force our way through a forest, twenty miles in depth, extending thirty miles across the pass of Palghaut. " "The frequent ravines required to be filled up before it was possible to drag the guns across them; innumerable large trees which obstructed the passage required to be cut down and drawn out of the intended track, and then the whole road was to be formed before the carriages could pass.

After communicating with Tellicherry, it was found that it was incapable of furnishing the expected provisions and stores, that the troops under General Macleod could not be provided with a field equipage in less than two months; and that the whole extent of 500 miles to be traversed, like every narrow stripe of low country, interposed between an elevated range of mountains and the sea, was intersected by a succession of rivers, ravines, and other impediments, which rendered hopeless a rapid advance in that direction. The possession of a respectable post of communication between Malabar and Coimbatore, was however in itself an important acquisition; provisions were furnished in profusion, by the zamorin and his Nairs, eager to be emancipated from Mahomedan tyranny; and not only on this account, but with reference to the alternative of ascending towards Seringapatam, by the pass of Gujelhatty, the occupation of Palgaut was, if not indispensable, at least of eminent utility: and, on a comparison of all the routes presented to Colonel Fullarton's choice, he assigned the preference to the last stated, and moved for that purpose to the capital of Coimbatore, on the 26th of November. Independently of a respectable field force, comprizing a total of 13,636 men, Colonel Fullarton had motives of confidence in the success of his enterprise, founded on the supposed state of the enemy's troops. The death of Mahomed Ali, and

The brigades were distributed to succeed each other at intervals, preceded by pioneers in order to clear what the advanced body had opened for the guns and stores that were to move under cover of the rear division. While we were thus engaged, an unremitting rain, extremely unusual at that season, commenced. The ravines were filled with water, the paths became slippery, the bullocks lost their footing, and the troops were obliged to drag the guns and carriages across the whole forest." The sum of one and three-quarters of a lakh of rupees were found in Palghaut, which was divided amongst the troops in consideration of their necessities. (Wilson: *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II, pp. 85-93.)

the executions before Mangalore, were reported and considered as the result of an extensive disaffection, and a recent conspiracy had occurred at Seringapatam, which will require a separate recital.

Whatever doubts may have been entertained of the authenticity of the documents produced, and the communications reported by Tremalrow, in 1782, while Hyder was still alive, there can be none of his correspondence with the members of this conspiracy, and of the having aided in promoting a crisis, which if well combined, might have produced the most decisive results. To trace with any certainty the secret history of a combination, every member of which who was discovered, or even strongly suspected, was put to death, and every subsequent mention of which was treason, would, in every instance, be an arduous attempt; and the difficulty in this case is augmented by other circumstances. On the restoration of the Hindoo dynasty in 1799, Tremalrow was one of two candidates for the office of minister, and the effects of rival pretension on the principals as well as their adherents, gave plain and abundant cause for distrusting the statements of each. Seyed Mahommed Khan, the kelledar of Seringapatam, who discovered the conspiracy, and directed the executions, became a pensioner of the India Company, and was totally independent of every influence but theirs. His written and personal narratives, the published journals, and oral information of English prisoners, and conversations with numerous witnesses of the overt facts, have been the principal checks on a secret narrative, obtained by the author under circumstances which precluded the ordinary means of scrutiny.

The advancement of *Shamia* to be minister of the post-office and police in 1779 has been stated, and we have seen that the influence of this office had even a wider range, and more perfect organization than can readily be apprehended by the subject of a free state. The secret terrors of his active admini-

stration had even been felt by his colleagues, and produced a jealousy which sought for his removal. It was sufficient for this purpose to give obscure hints of the good fortune of his family, the means of accumulating wealth, and the power to expose every secret but their own; these insinuations were not long concealed from the emissaries of *Shâmia*; but at what period he began to contemplate revolutionary plans has not been ascertained. Shortly after Hyder's death, he perceived the early certainty of ruin, and veiled his projects with augmented zeal in the service of his sovereign, whom he of course accompanied to Mangalore. His brother *Rungeia* was at the head of the department at Seringapatam, and the name of the relation is mentioned, whom he sent from Mangalore to concert with his brother, the plans of proceeding. At the period of his arrival *Singeia* the provincial head of the department at Coimbetoor, was on business at Seringapatam, and with Narsing Row (Choukee Nevees) a sort of muster-master, pay-master, and town-major, was called to the secret consultations. The Hindoo Raja was to be nominally restored, and *Shâmia*, *Rungeia*, and *Narsing Row*, were to form the administration; the last named person was included, on the ground of his undertaking the actual execution of the plot, for destroying the kelledar, with Assud Khân, and the whole of his faithful battalion, and seizing the gates and the treasury. The communications with the English army which was to ascend at the period agreed, was left to *Rungeia*, through the medium of *Singeia* at Coimbetoor; all the Hindoo, and a few Mahomedan commandants of corps were gained, and sworn to secrecy; the English prisoners were to be released, and placed under the command of General Matthews; and *Rungeia* had for the first time visited the English prison, about ten days before the intended explosion; had enquired into their wants and desired them to be of good cheer. It was

deemed necessary that an instrument should be prepared of sufficient authenticity to convince the English of the nature and extent of the conspiracy, and to this the seals and signatures were obtained of the persons already named, of the commandants of corps, and of *Souberaj*, ostensibly the representative of the imprisoned royal family, but in fact a descendant, by the female line, of the late Dulway Deo Raj.* It is not clear from the narrative whether this instrument ever reached the English army, but intelligence from *Singeia* at Coimbetoor gave assurances of that army being ready to advance at the concerted notice whenever it should be given. The narrative states the attempt to have been premature, but that *Rungeia* considered farther delay to be hazardous, on account of the number of persons entrusted with the secret, and the danger of treacherous or accidental discovery: he therefore pressed *Narsing Row* to strike the blow, and every thing was prepared for nine o'clock on the 24th of July,† 1783. It was the pay-day of Assud Khân's and some other Mahommedan corps, he would be present to superintend its distribution to the corps in waiting and without arms at the Cutcherry,¹ where the kelledar always attended before the appointed hour; the treasury attendants, the corps of pioneers employed in moving the treasure, a body of jetties² who had the

* Stated on the authority of Seyed Mahommed Khân.

† Seyed Mahommed states eight months, (lunar,) after his appointment, which would bring it to about the first week in August. I take the date in the text, from the journal published in "Memoirs of the War in Asia, 1789;" but adverting to the restraints under which that journal was kept, it may not be exact to a day.

¹ An office of administration; a court house. Hindustani: *Kacheri*.

² "The Jatti or Jeti, also called Mushtiga in the western districts, are professional athletes or wrestlers or Malla." A number are maintained in connection with the Palace. (Lewis Rice: *Mysore*, Vol. I, p. 257.)

guard of that part of the palace, were all provided with daggers, to commence the work with the destruction of the kelledar, and his attendants; while large bodies of Hindoo peons were ready to fall, in every direction, on the unarmed Mahommedans. Matters being thus arranged, Seyed Mahommed Khân on returning from the hall of business to his house on the night of the 23d, was accosted in a whisper by an obscure individual, who said he had something of importance to communicate; and on hearing his tale, he was enabled in the course of the night to seize a dispatch prepared for transmission to the English army; to secure the principal conspirators, and to adopt measures for defeating the intended explosion. Narsing Row made a full disclosure, in the hope of pardon, which he did not receive; and all the minor agents confessed to the degree of their actual information. As an example to intimidate, a considerable number of the conspirators were immediately executed, by the horrible process of being loosely tied to an elephant's foot, and dragged in that state through the streets of the town. Tippoo's orders were required for the disposal of the heads of the conspiracy, and on the arrival of these orders, *Narsing Row*, *Souberaj*, and the heads of corps, and of the jetties, were executed. *Shamia* was sent in irons from Mangalore, and with his brother *Rungeia* was exposed to every contumely in separate iron cages, where they are said to have persisted to the last in denying their participation in the crime; although the torture extracted considerable treasures. Many adherents of their family continue to this day to interpret all the overt facts, into a pretended conspiracy contrived by the other ministers; on which most improbable supposition, *Narsing Row* must be considered as the voluntary victim of the calumny. *Shitau*, the former kelledar of Seringapatam, superseded by Seyed Mahommed, was seized on the first alarm, simply on conjecture; and was released at the close of the

investigation on a perfect conviction of his innocence. Neither evidence, nor the unlimited use of the torture, had directed the slightest suspicion towards the imprisoned Rānee; it is just possible, that she might afterwards have been induced by the political rivalry to which we have adverted, to assume a disguise in her confidential conversations with the late Sir Barry Close, and with the author; but the absence even of suspicion, when so strongly excited by circumstances, added to her uniform and consistent assurances, convinced them both, of her entire ignorance of every part of the correspondence conducted in her name. But that conviction must not be understood to impugn the reality of Tremalrow's projects for the subversion of the actual government. Long before the usurpation of Hyder, the Hindoo prince had been kept in ignorance of acts purporting to be his own, as profound as was the ignorance of the imprisoned Rānee in 1783; and simulated authority had been the familiar habit of the court.

On a fair consideration of all the authentic facts which have been disclosed, we must ascribe to the conspirators at Seringapatam, a precipitancy rendered necessary by circumstances; and a more confident assertion for the encouragement of their friends, than they were justified in making, regarding the immediate advance of the English army; for we cannot ascribe to Tremalrow, the imprudence and impolicy of having encouraged that expectation, at the particular period when he knew the English to be restrained from action by the armistice of Cuddalore, when Colonel Fullarton was preparing to march from Trichinopoly, (as he did on the 4th of August,) in the opposite direction of Sevagunga. In what manner the conflicting pretensions of Tremalrow and Shāmia, might in the event of success have been adjusted, it may not now be necessary to conjecture.

Such, however, were the two circumstances, namely the execution of Mahommed Ali, at Mangalore,

and the detected conspiracy at Seringapatam, which induced Colonel Fullarton to infer a disaffection in Tippoo's army favourable to the success of his enterprise; but there may be ground for questioning the accordance of this inference with the opinion raised by some authorities to the dignity of an axiom, that every detected conspiracy, instead of weakening, has a direct tendency to strengthen the hands of a despot; and exclusively of these two examples, there was certainly no sufficient ground for crediting the existence of defection, sufficient to form the ground of political action. The confidence of Colonel Fullarton was better founded, in officers eminently distinguished for talents and professional experience, and troops of an excellent quality, although containing too large a proportion of young soldiers. He had arrived as we have seen at Coimbatore, on the 26th Nov. 28 of November, and on the 28th, two days before his intended advance, he received instructions from plenipotentiaries, duly authorized, on their route to negotiate at Tippoo's court, directing him, not only to suspend his intended operations, but unconditionally to abandon all his conquests and to retire within the limits possessed by the English on the 26th of the preceding July.

CHAPTER XXIX.

Preliminary events which had led to the appointment of these plenipotentiaries—Advances from Lord Macartney before Tippoo's departure from Coromandel—his messenger returns, accompanied by an envoy, at first without powers, and afterwards equivocally conferred—Conferences broken off—resumed in consequence of the peace in Europe, the armistice of Cuddalore, and the invitation of Monsieur Bussy—Tippoo sends Apajee Ram—His demand of Ayd as the slave and property of Tippoo—Discussion of the conditions of a treaty—Apajee skilfully suggests the deputation of English ambassadors to Tippoo's court, to obviate the delays occasioned by reference—Real intention—Messrs. Staunton and Sadlier named—Tippoo's pretended accession to the treaty of Salbey—Plenipotentiaries arrive at the camp of Seyed Saheb, at Arnee—Prompt order to Colonel Fullarton, to abandon his conquests and retire—Examination of its expediency—Colonel Fullarton, knowing the state of facts at Mangalore—waits farther orders before retiring—Seyed Saheb professing to be in full march on his return, stops—Negotiations—Proposed conditions inconsistent with these hasty orders—Plenipotentiaries differ in opinion—a third added to the number, Mr. Huddleston—Government of Madras review their situation—Erroneous conclusions—Direct Colonel Fullarton to obey the order of the plenipotentiaries, literally—he obeys at the moment that Tippoo's troops continued to occupy Coromandel—and furnishes Tippoo with direct excitements to persevere at Mangalore—Swartz the

missionary—his acute observations—The troops scarcely in cantonment, before the Madras government sees its error, and countermands the order—Journey of the Commissioners Plenipotentiary—by dangerous routes to prevent the stipulated communication with the prisoners—Contemptuous deceptions—Arrive near Mangalore a few days after the evacuation—Gibbets erected in front of their tents—General Macleod arrives in the offing—Communication prohibited—He considers them as prisoners—Alleged intention to escape—Mysterious silence—discussed—The escape prevented by the officer commanding the escort—Reasons of Tippoo for a separate peace with the English, independently of the treaty of Salbey—Conditions—Cautionary retention of two places on each side—Cannanore, one of these places, restored by Brigadier-General Macleod, in violation of the treaty and the orders of the Commissioners—Prisoners detained contrary to the treaty—Interesting fate of the boys—Contrasted conduct of the officer commanding the escort, and of the Commissioners—Two examples—Treatment of the prisoners—by Hyder—by Tippoo—General description of their condition—Europeans—Sepoys—THE GOOD SEYED IBRAHIM.

THE preliminary communications which had led to the appointment of these plenipotentiaries, had commenced at so early a period as the 12th of February, before Tippoo's departure from Coromandel. Lord Macartney had, with the concurrence of his council, engaged a bramin, proceeding on his devotions to Conjeeveram, to communicate with some of his friends in the Mysorean service, and endeavour to obtain, through their means, a better treatment of the English prisoners, and through the same medium to sound Tippoo's dispositions regarding a separation from his French allies, and a treaty of peace with

the English nation. It was obvious that nothing could divest this advance of that apparent anxiety for peace, so dangerous in Asiatic diplomacy, and so strongly deprecated by Mr. Hastings. The bramin (named Sambajee, an agent at Madras on the part of the raja of Tanjour,) was too full of self-importance to decline the consequent opportunity of appearing at Tippoo's durbar in the character of English envoy; and that prince, glad of an opportunity to provide against unfavourable contingencies, and to ascertain the grounds on which he could command peace, directed a person, named Sreenowasrow, to accompany Sambajee on his return to Madras; at first without any written powers, but afterwards furnished with an equivocal letter, addressed to himself under Tippoo's seal, authorising him to confer on the subject of peace. The conferences were opened by this man with the demand of reparation for the everlasting grievance of the fraud at Trichinopoly, in 1752; and answered by reference to the subsequent treaty of 1769. The principle of mutual restitution seemed likely to be the basis to which each would ultimately assent. The difficulty of Tippoo's separation from the French, and abandoning them to be overwhelmed by the superior power of the English, was met by the proposition of returning them in safety to the Isle of France. In this state of the negotiation, Sreenowasrow returned to his master for further instructions; and these abortive advances were suffered by Tippoo to rest in contemptuous silence, until, on the occasion of the cessation of hostilities between the French and English at Cuddalore, on the 2d July, in consequence of the peace in Europe, Lord Macartney, in conformity to the tenor of his agreement with Monsieur De Bussy addressed a letter to Tippoo, inviting him to accede to the conditions provisionally fixed for his acceptance, and announcing a suspension of all hostility on the part of the English, until his answer should be obtained.

The Sultaun's reply, received on the 5th of October, was full of amicable profession, at the very moment that he considered his plans for starving Mangalore, to be approaching maturity. Apajee Ram, whose diplomatic talents have been already noticed,* was the envoy charged with this letter, and the customary credentials. His demands were as usual, at first extravagant, but gradually sunk into an apparent assent to the principle of mutual restitution of prisoners and places. Of prisoners the English had actually none, but a strenuous attempt was made so to consider *Aydz* the late governor of Bednore, who was specially demanded by the Sultaun not only as a prisoner, but as his domestic slave and private property. It would not have been difficult to satisfy the mind of such a man as Apajee Ram, that so gross a violation of faith and hospitality was a hopeless demand, but he could not decide, in opposition to official instructions, without reference. He next attempted the establishment of an offensive and defensive alliance, and this proposition was rejected on the ground of past experience, regarding the treaty of 1769, which was stated to have furnished to Hyder, a *pretence* for the present war. Difficulties purposely created, were made to prolong the time, until Apajee Ram suggested, with every appearance of frankness, that the frequent references which his master's habits of distrust compelled him to make, would continue to protract the negotiations, and that he saw no mode so likely to accelerate the conclusion of peace, as the deputation to the Sultaun's court of two gentlemen of character, sufficiently masters of the views of their government, to render reference unnecessary.

This proposition which the Government describe as "fully meeting their wishes" was certainly no less acceptable to the Sultaun, from whom it pro-

ceeded, and who had no object so much at heart, as to exhibit the English to the powers of Hindostan, in the posture studiously assigned to them in his work of *suppliants for peace*. Mr. Sadlier, second in council, and Mr. Staunton, private secretary to Lord Macartney, were the commissioners named, and they departed from Madras on the 9th of November, with Nov. 9. prospects of success materially improved, by information received immediately previous to their departure, of Tippoo's declared accession to the treaty of Salbey, signified by himself in his letters to the Pêshwa and Sindea. On the 19th, they arrived in the camp 19. near Arnee, of Meer Saheb commanding the Sultaun's forces still in Coromandel: and the order to Colonel Fullarton already described to abandon his conquests and retire within the limits possessed on the 26th of July, was promptly dated on the succeeding day. It might be reasonably concluded, that a 20. British officer of some intellect would not recommence hostilities on doubtful information, but having commenced, it would seem to be sufficient for the purposes of amicable negotiation that they should simply cease; that their origin should be investigated, and if groundless that reparation should be promised; but unconditionally to abandon, without any investigation, the fruits of such hostilities, appeared like gratuitously throwing away, at the commencement of a negotiation, the best materials for bringing it to a successful conclusion. The commissioners however deemed themselves at liberty to act upon the assurances of Indian diplomatists, in opposition to the grounds of belief which have been stated, and assumed as the foundation of their orders "that the cessation of arms appeared to have been disturbed in partial instances by accidental circumstances, and without any authority from government on either side;" and these orders, so founded reached Colonel Fullarton at a period (28th of November) when he 28. was in possession of official advices from Brigadier-

General Macleod, stating that he had actually sailed, for the purpose of forcing his way, at all events, into Mangalore, in consequence of the infraction which he had personally witnessed of the armistice and convention with Colonel Campbell. Colonel Fullarton treated these orders with a wise combination of military feeling and political prudence : he knew that they were founded upon gross deception ; and although he testified obedience by causing hostility to cease, he declared his determination to retain his conquests until he should be furnished with further orders. Meanwhile Seyed Saheb, who professed to be evacuating Coromandel, and to be in full march to Seringapatam, stopped ostensibly for the celebration of a festival, not twenty-five miles from the ground near Arnee, where the commissioners found him, at a place (*Calispalk*¹) which, although on the actual road to the pass of Changama, yet relatively to the provinces of Coromandel, is a more central position than that which he had left : a discussion intervened which it is difficult to reconcile with the hasty orders, of which we have ventured to question the propriety. The early release of the numerous English captives in the prisons of Mysoor was of course a main object of attainment ; and the commissioners desired to stipulate, that all places to the eastward of the ghauts should first be reciprocally restored, and both parties be satisfied on these points before ascending into Mysoor : that the release of all the English prisoners should then ensue, and finally that on the English being satisfied regarding the execution of this condition, the restoration of all places taken by the English on the western coast should close the process of reciprocal restitution. To this last essential condition the plenipotentiaries of Tippoo Sultaun, raised a variety of objections, they demanded

¹ *Calispalk*.—Kalasapakam, North Arcot District, 20 miles south of Arni, on the railway line from Villupuram to Vellore.

that the surrender of Mangalore should precede the release of the prisoners, and offered "to pledge their faith that the delivery of the prisoners should immediately follow the evacuation of Mangalore." The first commissioner, Mr. Sadlier, declared his readiness to assent to this proposal, observing that he "deemed farther security to be unnecessary, beyond that pledge on which the commissioners themselves had committed their own persons, to the disposal of Tippoo Sultaun *without hostage*." The second commissioner, Mr. Staunton, feeling perhaps the improvidence of his first concession, and beginning more justly to appreciate this "pledge of faith," positively declined his assent to the surrender of Mangalore, and the other western conquests, until perfectly satisfied of the release of every prisoner, to be determined by the certificate of their existence by the first commissioner in the form of an official message to Seyed Saheb. These adverse opinions could no otherwise be decided, than by reference to their superiors, who determined in favour of Mr. Staunton, and to provide against their probable recurrence, a third member, Mr. Huddleston, was added to the commission. Under these circumstances, and with this degree of information before them, the Government of Madras proceeded, on the 8th of December, to review their actual condition. Ruined finances, broken credit, and a supreme Government reposing no confidence, and supposed still to meditate their suspension, threw a gloom over all their deliberations: they had already determined that the release of prisoners should precede the restitution of Mangalore; and instead of considering whether an armistice had been violated, and by whom; and whether a national insult had been received or repaired, or retaliated; they declared, that in the distressed condition of their affairs, it was not worth while continuing the war for the possession of Mangalore; that a peace ought to be made with Tippoo, on the ground of each party retaining their

Dec. 8.

former possessions, and no more; (a point which had been decided long before the appointment of commissioners, and apparently constituting no part of the question before them) and they determined that Colonel Fullarton should be required to fulfil the order of unqualified restitution, enjoined by the commissioners; a conclusion apparently depending on the question which they had evaded, and not on that which they had considered. The Colonel, having received this determination, and the reiterated orders of the commissioners, evacuated the whole of his conquests, and retired within the prescribed limits, at the very time that Tippoo's troops remained in force in Coromandel, occupying to the southward a line of posts, north of the Coleroon, from Terriore to Arialore, and Palaincotta to the sea; and in the centre, the main body of Seyed Saheb, instead of a pretended departure with the commissioners, continued to occupy all that he held on their arrival, with the exception of the ruins of Chittapet, already adverted to, without any part of its district. It were difficult for human ingenuity to devise more direct excitements than were thus held forth to Tippoo Sultaun, to persevere in his barbarian conduct at Mangalore. On Colonel Fullarton's first march from Coimbeetoor, he was met by Mr. Swartz, the person whose mission to Hyder in 1779, has been related: he had consented to act as interpreter to the commissioners, and was proceeding for that purpose, by the route of Gujelhutty, with the view of joining them at Seringapatam; but in conformity to the system of universal insult which Tippoo deemed requisite to his views, Mr. Swartz was soon afterwards stopped at the bottom of the ghaut, and was never permitted to proceed. On meeting Colonel Fullarton, and learning the orders under which he was acting, this excellent and venerable preacher of peace and christian forbearance, in spite of a simplicity in the ordinary affairs of life sometimes amounting to

weakness,* thus describes his astonishment. "Alas! said I, is the peace so certain that you quit all before the negotiation is ended? The possession of these two rich countries would have kept Tippoo in awe, and inclined him to reasonable terms. But you quit the reins, and how will you manage that beast? The Colonel said, I cannot help it." Such, indeed, was the general tone of humiliation, that even Colonel Fullarton a few days before, had submitted to have a Captain and a small advanced guard cut off, and to be satisfied with a lame explanation: "this affair," says Mr. Swartz, "was quite designed to disperse the inhabitants, who came together to cut the crops, and to assist the English:" but Colonel Fullarton's distribution of his troops into cantonments, in obedience to these reiterated orders, were not yet completed, before the Government pronounced the most unqualified sentence on their own precipitation and credulity by ordering him "not only to retain posses- Jan. 26.
sion of Palgaut, should that fort not have been 1784.
delivered, but likewise to hold fast every inch of ground of which he was in possession, till he should have received accounts of the result of the negotiation!!"

In the meanwhile, the commissioners had been proceeding on their journey in a style exactly corresponding to the general character of those transactions; all preliminary principles having been fixed before their departure from Madras, they were considered as proceeding to the Sultaun's court, merely to adjust the definitive details; and conformably to this view, it was distinctly agreed, that in traversing Mysoor, they were to have personal intercourse with the English prisoners, and an opportunity of delivering to them, stores of clothing and other requisites, which were provided and carried for that special purpose; and arrangements were made for a regular

* See his praise of Hyder, for converting his young captives into slaves.

and speedy transmission of letters, to and from the commissioners, in all directions. They had scarcely passed the frontiers, before they discovered all communication to be cut off. Partly with the intent of avoiding the common route within sight of Bangalore, containing a considerable depôt of prisoners, and partly for the purpose of contemptuous exhibition, they were led over routes, impracticable to ordinary beasts of burden, in which several of the camels were destroyed. As they advanced farther, they were met by a letter from Tippoo Sultaun, assuring them that all the prisoners had, with a view to the arrangements for their liberation, been removed to the frontiers, from Seringapatam (from which place unhappily no prisoner had been removed, except for the purpose of assassination,) and inviting them to continue their route to his camp at Mangalore. Submitting to a violation of the preliminary evidence of sincerity, stipulated to be evinced in a free communication with the prisoners, they were permitted to proceed as fast and no faster than the progress of famine at Mangalore; when only twenty miles distant from that place, the evacuation took place, and they were met by a letter from the Sultaun, informing them, that at the earnest desire of Colonel Campbell, he had agreed to take charge of the fort of Mangalore. Arrived and encamped near the place, every successive interview with Tippoo Sultaun or his ministers, presented such various and contradictory views of his sentiments and intentions, that no judgment could be formed of the probable result of their mission, excepting that in a character, hitherto held sacred by the most savage nations, they were destined to fill the measure of his barbarism, by secret assassination, or open murder. Three gibbets were erected, opposite to the tent doors of each of the commissioners, and every species of indignity was studiously practised; a post dependent on Honour, (Onore,) was carried by surprise; another open hostility was committed, by

cutting up a subaltern's detachment from Colonel Fullarton's army, and even refusing to release the officer, who was desperately wounded. Distinct intelligence was received of the murder of General Matthews, and several other officers in prison, and nothing seemed wanting to the catastrophe, but the practical employment of the gibbets.

Shortly after the arrival of the commissioners at Mangalore, two Company's ships from Bombay, on one of which Brigadier-General Macleod was embarked, anchored in the roads, and the slight additional indignity was imposed, of interdicting all communication, with rare exceptions, so managed as to make the rule more insulting. General Macleod very reasonably declared, that until an unlimited intercourse was permitted, he would consider them as imprisoned men whose orders were of no force, and before his departure to assume the command of his troops, he sent on shore a messenger with a letter addressed to the Sultaun, and another to the commissioners, for the purpose of bringing this question to a decided issue: the messenger was detained—he had no answer, and he sailed. A letter dated 1st of March from the commissioners to the Mar. 1 commander of the Company's ship has the following passage, "the circumstance (the difficulty of sending a boat) will be made known by the signal to be settled with the bearer, as in the former case, and on such signal being made, you will please to order one of the Patamar boats to anchor about four miles to the northward of your present station, and as much in-shore as possible, in the hope that some communication may be effected by that means from the beach. The Patamar must have an intelligent European on board, and one of the ship's boats must accompany her, and must endeavour to come to the beach, on seeing a gentleman near it on horseback, holding as a signal a white handkerchief in his hand." "The adventure of the white handkerchief,"

says General Macleod in his observations on this Mar. 9. letter written on the 9th of March, "was an intended escape of the commissioners from Tippoo, leaving behind them their baggage, retinue," &c. It is remarkable that no intimation is to be found in the official record of the proceedings of the commissioners of the existence of an intention to escape, which is thus affirmed by General Macleod, who must have conversed with the bearer of the letter and the commander to whom it was addressed. It is not so much the question of propriety, as of apparent mystery, that has induced the author to institute farther enquiry, and the following narrative is founded on high and incontrovertible living authority.

It has been seen, that Mr. Swartz the interpreter provided for the commissioners, was forcibly prevented from joining them; neither they, nor any of their diplomatic suite, understood either of the country languages; and the native interpreter, *Vencaty Rangia*, was one day taken ill, and unable to officiate; under these circumstances, the commissioners had recourse to a menial servant of the officer commanding the escort, to be the medium between the two states in this important diplomacy. On the evening of the same day, this man came to his master's tent, in the greatest apparent alarm, said, that he had intelligence of the most urgent importance to communicate, and even begged that the candles might be extinguished, to prevent observation. These precautions being taken, he proceeded to relate, that after being kept standing for several hours, interpreting between the commissioners and Tippoo's ministers, finding himself much fatigued, he lay down without the tent wall; and after the dismissal of strangers, and the retirement of the senior commissioner, he heard the two other commissioners discussing and arranging a plan for removing on board ship, where they would have at least the advantage of personal safety in conducting their negotiations; the arrangements for embarka-

tion were to be conducted with the utmost secrecy, and to be adjusted on the ensuing day, by the surgeon, Mr. Falconer, by means of a pretext for getting on ship-board, which was also related; the first commissioner was only to be apprized of it, by their calling at his tent on their way to the boat, and giving him the option of accompanying them; the escort and attendants were to be left to their fate, and the only persons in the secret were to be the two commissioners, and Mr. Falconer, (the memory of the living narrator does not enable him to state whether the secretary was also included). A faithful service of many years, and a considerable portion of sagacity, gave weight to the statement of the servant, and his master retired to rest, and to reflect on what was proper to be done. The next morning, at breakfast, Mr. Falconer appeared to be suddenly taken ill; it was necessary that he should be sent on ship-board to be bled. A boat was applied for and obtained for this special urgency, and he embarked. All this minutely accorded with the plan reported by the servant on the preceding night. The officer distinctly saw the first part of the project in operation, and immediately after breakfast assembled the military officers of the escort, consisting of four besides himself, including the aide-de-camp of the commissioners. He apprised them of all the facts with which he was acquainted; stated his own determination not to desert his men; but observed to them, that the case was peculiar, and nearly hopeless; that they were all bound by ties of affinity or of friendship to one or other of the commissioners; and that in circumstances so desperate, he should exact no military obedience, but leave to each the free option of acting as he should think expedient. All instantly declared their determination to adhere to their duty, and obey his orders, whatever they might be. He awaited the return of the surgeon in the evening, and the following conversation ensued:—"Well, Falconer, how has the bleeding

answered? I hope you feel better?—*F.* Very much better; I was so sea-sick going on board, that bleeding was found unnecessary.—*Officer*, I am glad to hear that you are so much recovered; but when does the boat come on shore to carry off the commissioners?—*F.* (turning pale) What boat?—*Officer*, I could not have suspected you of active concurrence in a plan for deserting your friends.—*F.* In God's name how came you acquainted with it?—*Officer*, That is another affair: it is enough for you that I know it; (and then recited the particulars of the plan.)—*F.* It is too true, and I have arranged with Captain Scott, but I am not at liberty to tell you the particular time.—*Officer*, Then you may proceed, if you choose, to the commissioners, and report to them, as the sequel of your arrangement, that I am here to obey all their lawful orders; but also to do my duty to the troops committed to my protection. If there be any embarkation, I hope to see the last private into the boats; but my sentinels have orders to give me precise information, and I have a party saddled in the lines ready to seize as a deserter any and every person who shall attempt a *clandestine* escape.—The surgeon departed, and shortly afterwards the officer commanding the escort was sent for, and privately assured by the second commissioner, that "there was no intention of effecting an escape, or of any person going on board ship."

The negotiation, in the meanwhile, was assuming alternately every intermediate aspect from hope to despair. To the observations already noticed regarding the uniform impolicy of ostensible advances for peace to an Indian power, Mr. Hastings added the opinion, that the head of Colonel Fullarton's army would have been the proper station of the commissioners; and the same remark had, without communication, been made before their departure by Mr. Sullivan, whose public and private correspondence exhibits a steady and uniform reprobation of the

whole course of these disgraceful negotiations. Tippoo perceived, by the active military preparations in every quarter, that the Government of Madras had a poignant sense of the consequences of its errors. He knew, that in consequence of his feigned assent and practical rejection of the terms of the treaty of Salbey, arrangements between the English and Mahrattas, for a combined attack on his dominions were in forwardness, and, if commenced, could not terminate but in a joint peace; and even arrogance did not extinguish the reflection, that his designs against the Mahrattas would be most conveniently effected when they should be unaided. The terror of his name had been sufficiently established, by the submission of the English to every form of derision, humiliation and contempt; and at a period when imagination could scarcely picture an additional insult, he condescended, on the 11th of March, to Mar. 11 sign the long pending treaty of peace.¹

Treachery and infamy had removed from the arena the object which divided the opinions of the ambassadors in the commencement of their mission. Tippoo had almost every thing to concede, because on his side, every thing had been treacherously held; and on the other, almost every thing had been gratuitously abandoned; and a postponement in the mutual delivery of two places on each side, until all the other restitutions should be completed, was

¹ Barrow in his *Life of Lord Macartney*, Vol. I, pp. 202-207, defends Lord Macartney in his dealings with Tippu. But he admits that the Governor was badly served by his Commissioners. "Yet honourable and beneficial as the terms of the Carnatic peace were, it was a general opinion that, had Mr. Staunton, with whom private considerations always yielded to the public interest, proceeded alone, his great abilities, temper, and firmness would have procured still more advantageous terms. In his colleague, Mr. Sadlier, he had to encounter much petulance, unsteadiness and a timidity which sometimes rendered him ridiculous, and which did not escape the observation of the ministers of Tippoo Sahib."

treated by him as a shew of theoretical reciprocity, proceeding merely from his lenity and compassion. The two places retained by Tippoo were Amboor¹ and Sautgur²; by the English, Dindigul and Cannanore; and it was the professed object to hold them until all the prisoners should be released, and all the captive inhabitants of Coromandel permitted to return. Cannanore had been an object of some discussion during the negotiations. Brigadier-General Macleod, had, without any powers, concluded a treaty with the Beebee (Dowager Chief,) and although the authority had been disavowed, and the instrument annulled, yet, as emancipation from Tippoo's authority, had been one of its provisions, it was deemed expedient to restore the place to the person from whom it had been taken, and Tippoo's scruples were satisfied, by stipulating, that the surrender should be made in the presence of one of his officers, without troops. A copy of the treaty was delivered to Brigadier-General Macleod for his information and guidance, and he was ordered to hold Cannanore, with a strong garrison, until he should receive information of the release of all the prisoners. On the 17th of April, however, without receiving any such information, and without complying with the express provisions of the treaty, the words "Cannanore is evacuated," is stated by the Government to be the only intelligence or explanation they ever received from Brigadier-General Macleod: the breach of faith was loudly represented by Tippoo, and the reparation was offered, of even recapturing the place, for the purpose of effecting its restitution

¹ *Amboor*.—Ambur, a town in the Vellore Taluq, North Arcot District, on the south bank of the Palar river. The fort commands a pass into the Carnatic. In 1749 Anwar-u-din was defeated here.

² *Sautgur*.—Satghur (seven hills with forts on them) in the Gudiyattam Taluq, North Arcot District. The Nawabs of the Carnatic had large gardens here famous for oranges and mangoes.

in terms of the treaty : great importance was attached on this occasion, to the security which it afforded for the liberation of the prisoners and inhabitants ; and the Government, on discovering abundant ill faith on this head, even announced to Tippoo Sultaun, that they would retain Dindigul, until the residue should be released. Exclusively of all artificers, without exception, and about two hundred other persons, who from terror or compulsion had submitted to be enrolled in his service, an account was officially rendered to Government of about fifty names, chiefly boys, who had been forcibly subjected to the painful rite* of an abhorred religion, and many of them instructed to perform as singers and dancers for the future amusement of the tyrant. Some of these unhappy beings had been occasionally placed in situations to observe and be observed by the English prisoners in Seringapatam ; the journal of an officer describes them as shedding a flood of tears, while attempting by gestures to describe their situation ; and imagination may revert to the story of a more ancient people for the picture of their sorrows : " They that wasted us, required of us mirth ; saying, sing us one of the songs of Zion : How shall we sing the Lord's song in a strange land ? " But neither the fate of these interesting captives, nor of the immense mass of a deported population, officially known to be forcibly detained, prevented the final humiliation of surrendering Dindigul.

Two of the commissioners returned to Madras by sea, the third by land, and the officer commanding the escort was officially charged with the arrangements for the reception of the prisoners to be released, in virtue of the provisions of the treaty. The spirit and decision of this officer obtained some liberations, and it is a relief from the prostration of spirit which has pervaded our late narrative, to record two in-

* According to the usual practice with their own children, the boys were compelled to partake of a soporific electuary, and in that state the operation is performed.

cidents for contrast and for reflection. Before leaving Mangalore, he caused proclamation to be made even within Tippoo's camp, that he was authorized to receive all inhabitants of Coromandel who chose to accompany him. The blacksmith of his troop discovered his son, long supposed to be dead, as the slave of a horseman, who blustered and brought his comrades. The officer gave the requisite explanations, placed the boy under his own guard, with orders delivered in the presence of the horseman to put to death any one who should touch him, and he accordingly returned in safety. At the last barrier of Pedanaickdoorgum he knew that an attempt would be made to stop the return of the deported inhabitants; and he was aware that in great and ostensible masses they might find impediments on the intermediate road, he therefore suggested dispersion and re-assembling at the passage of the barrier. A guard of 100 men was drawn up at the gate, to prevent the passage of any individual excepting those of whom an account had been rendered, as formally released. After all these had passed, the escort followed: the two companies of native infantry were suddenly drawn up exactly opposite Tippoo's guard; the detachment of cavalry was suitably placed, and the officer announced that any person who should stop or touch an individual in his train should be instantly put to death. About two thousand inhabitants passed, but at least one hundred times that number remained in captivity.

On the release of the prisoners,* an opportunity was afforded to all of comparing with each other the history of their sufferings, but the reader whose attention has been too long detained on objects of horror and disgust, shall be spared the recital of details, and

* Officers	180
Soldiers	900
Sepoys	1600

presented with the shortest possible abstract. Hyder had no scruples of delicacy regarding the safe and cheap custody of his European prisoners, and assigned as a reason for keeping them in irons, chained in pairs, that they were unruly beasts, not to be kept quiet in any other way. He had also little compunction in using severity, and sometimes direct force, to procure the services of gunners and artificers. But here terminated the sum of his barbarity; it was reserved for Tippoo Sultaun to destroy his prisoners by poison and assassination; and the infamy was heightened, by his selecting for this purpose all those who were observed or reported to have distinguished themselves in arms. and might hereafter become dangerous opponents: fortunately, his defective information spared many who were eminently entitled to this fatal honour. Colonel Baillie's death preceded Tippoo's accession. Captain Rumley who led the charge against Tippoo's guns on the morning of Baillie's tragedy, Lieutenant Fraser, one of that officer's staff, and Lieutenant Sampson, captured with Colonel Brathwaite, were the first victims of this policy of the new reign. Brigadier-General Matthews, and most of the captains taken at Bednore, were the next selections; and afterwards, at uncertain periods, other individuals in the several prisons were either carried away to Cabbal Droog, to be poisoned, or if that were deemed too troublesome, they were led out to the woods, and hacked to pieces; but with this savage exception, the treatment of the remainder was not materially changed. The prison fare was not exactly similar in different places of custody, nor even uniform in the same; in the best, it amounted to a bare subsistence; and in the worst, accelerated death: the bare earth was every where their bed, without distinction of rank; a seer of rice or ragee,* and a few small copper coins, capriciously varying in number, without any assigned cause, was the

* *Cynosurus Coracanus*. Ainslie. [*Eleusine Indica*.]

general scale of allowance, and the number of the coins, combined with the relative avarice of the jailor, determined whether a meal could be procured sufficient for average sustenance. In answer to petitions for medicine or medical advice, they were generally informed that "they had not been sent thither to live;" no medicines were procurable excepting by stealth; and the spratts * nut, cassia fistula, jaggery, † tamarinds, and a rude blue pill, formed by the trituration of quicksilver with crude sugar, constituted the whole extent of their materia medica and pharmaceutical skill; and a periodical contribution of a copper coin from each to what was called the doctor's box, provided a little store for general use. Blows were inflicted on the most trivial pretences; individuals were selected to be freed from irons, and without explanation again shackled, for no other apparent reason than to excite conjectures and agonize the feelings. The Europeans were deemed too unmanageable to be worth the trouble of superintending their labour, in the description of irons thought necessary for their safe custody; the sepoys were kept at hard labour, and these faithful creatures, whenever they had an opportunity, sacrificed a portion of their own scanty pittance to mend the fare of their European fellow soldiers. A more cruel treatment was considered due, and was unfeelingly inflicted on those native officers who could league with strangers against their countrymen, and among them many sustained the severest trials with a fortitude which has never been surpassed in the history of any country: by an inexplicable caprice, the most respectable of these were, for a considerable time, confined at Seringapatam, in the same prison with the

* *Jatropha Curcas*. Ainslie.

† The crude sugar, combined with the treacle, as it comes from the boiler, in which state it is most usually sold; it is procured, not only from sugar cane, but from the sap of the cocoa nut and palmyra, (*borassus flabelliformis*.) Ainslie.

European officers ; and the *good commandant, Seyed Ibrahim*, the theme of their prison songs,* and the object of their veneration, continued, till removed for farther torture, to animate the despondent, to restrain the rash, and to give an example to all, of cheerful resignation and ardent attachment. When removed from the prison he mildly bespoke attention to his family, if his fellow-prisoners should ever return, and some years elapsed after their release before accumulated sufferings brought him to the grave. On the extinction of the dynasty of Hyder, a mausoleum was erected over his remains, and endowed by Lord Clive on behalf of the East-India Company, with a view to perpetuate the remembrance of his virtues, and the benefit of his example.

* In most of the prisons, it was the custom to celebrate particular days, when the funds admitted, with the luxury of plantain fritters, a draught of sherbet, and a convivial song. On one occasion, the old Scotch ballad ; " My wife has ta'en the gee ;" was admirably sung, and loudly encored. The " haute police," had a particular cognizance of all that was said and sung, during these orgies ; and it was reported to the kelledar. that the prisoners " had said and sung, throughout the night, of nothing but *ghes*," (clarified butter) ; this incident occurred but a short time previously to their release, and the kelledar certain that discoveries had been made regarding his malversations in that article of garrison store, determined to conciliate their secrecy, by causing an abundant supply of this unaccustomed luxury to be thenceforth placed within the reach of their farthing purchases.

[At the end of *The Life of Hyder Ally* by Francis Robson, 1786, is given a " Narrative of the treatment of the prisoners taken with Brigadier-General Richard Matthews, by the Nabob Tippoo Sultan Bahauder, April 28, 1783." The story gives a graphic account of the sufferings of the prisoners.]

CHAPTER XXX.

Tippoo's own account of his long detention at Mangalore—The defection of the French—Treachery of Mahommed Ali—Delicacy regarding his treaties with the Mahrattas and Nizam Ali—delayed the English vakeels on various pretences till his allies should declare themselves—Abject conduct of the Commissioners—Ridicule of the prisoners—Return to statements of fact—Horrible expatriation and forcible conversion of the Christians of Canara, related in his own words, highly characteristic—Army marches through Bullum into Coorg—State of that country during the war—Capture of the late Raja's family, and among them the future Raja—Tippoo's recital of his own adventures—His moral harangue to the inhabitants—Return—Progress to Bangalore, where he establishes his harem—New insurrection in Coorg, from the forcible violation of a woman—Zein-ul-abu-deen sent to command—his history and character—fails—Tippoo again enters Coorg—Plan for seizing all the inhabitants—succeeds in a great degree—Driven off to Seringapatam—and circumcised—Separation of the adscripti glebæ—to be slaves to the new landholders—The design fails—Intermediate proceedings—Tippoo's views in the peace of Mangalore—Early pretensions of superiority over Nizam Ali—who tries to propitiate Tippoo, but leagues with the Mahrattas who have a separate ground of quarrel with Tippoo—Circumstances connected with Neergünd—Interference of the Mahrattas resisted—Tippoo sends a force against the place under Burhân-u-Deen and Kummer-u-Deen—Opposed by Perseram

Bhow—Raise the siege and defeat him—Carry the advanced post of Ramdroog, and resume the siege—Absurd distraction of authority—Tippoo's ferocious and unprincipled instructions—Pre-meditated infraction of the capitulation—Imprisonment of the Chief—Infamous violation of his daughter—Mahrattas and Tippoo each procrastinate—Force of Kummer-u-Deen destined to make a treacherous attack on Adwānee—countermanded to Seringapatam—Suspicious route and supposed connexion with Nizam Ali—Report of the Sultaun's death, propagated for the purpose of inveigling Kummer-u-Deen—succeeds—He comes post to Seringapatam, and is seized—Erroneous conception of his influence and authority.

BEFORE proceeding to other matters, it may gratify the curiosity of many readers, to contemplate the colour assigned by the Sultaun himself to his long sojourn at Mangalore. In consequence of a peace treacherously concluded at Cuddalore, without the participation of his commander, between the English who had been uniformly victorious over the French alone, and the latter people, for whose preservation he had been induced to afford aid, at an enormous expence; Cossigny, who had been permitted as a favour to accompany him with 300 men, not as an aid, (for the addition of 300 men to his countless host, was as the load of an ant to the army of Solomon, but merely that the refusal might not break his heart,) this said Cossigny refused to fight, and still more strange to relate, the other French, who had been in the service twenty years, withdrew also from the trenches. In one page, this conduct is stated to have prevented the immediate capture of the place; and in another, the aid of the French is represented as contemptible and useless. He calls them into his presence; he reproaches them; and he

philosophizes ; and they have no reply to his unanswerable arguments, but downright refusal. He resumes the siege, and had made all his dispositions for a general assault, when at the repeated solicitation of Monsieur De Bussy, he spared the garrison out of pure mercy. Mahommed Ali had intrigued with General Macleod, while permitted to reside on shore, as he had formerly corresponded with Coote and the Christian ;* the accursed Macleod went to Tellicherry, for troops to execute their treacherous designs, and on his return, finding the treason to be discovered, he retired in dissatisfaction and disgrace, after writing the recited challenge, and being confounded and alarmed at the Sultaun's answer. There was yet a longer delay to be accounted for. Although he knew that the Mahrattas had concluded a separate peace with the English, he declined, from a scrupulous and delicate observance of his own engagements, to withdraw from the triple confederacy, until he should receive from themselves, as well as from Nizam Ali, an official intimation of the fact. This detained him six months, during which time "he had delayed the English vakeels in their journey, on a variety of pretences." Considerable skill and flimsy ingenuity are displayed, in weaving together these several causes for his detention before Mangalore, which miserable post is described as an impregnable fortress, surrendered to the English by the treachery of its former commandant. He had been anxiously intreated by Colonel Campbell to take possession of Mangalore, and allow him to depart ; and had long resisted, until the commissioners should arrive, from the same delicate attention to even the appearance of good faith, and the apprehension of injurious construction of his conduct ; but at length he yielded to the entreaties of the garrison. On the occasion of the signature of the treaty, the English Commissioners stood with

* See preface, page xxxii.

their heads uncovered, and the treaty in their hands, for two hours, using every form of flattery and supplication to induce his compliance. The vakeels of Poona and Hyderabad united in the most abject entreaties, and at length was softened into assent. The prisoners, on being released, were found unable to march, and for want of other conveyance, begged the asses of the salt merchants, and marched in this procession, to the great amusement of the people of Mysoor ! !

From fiction we return to fact ; and the first material fact in the history of the new reign, after the return of the army to the upper country, is so peculiar, and the narrative given by the Sultaun himself, contains so unusual a portion of truth, and where defective in that quality, is so full of character, that it shall be given nearly in his own words.*

“ Among the memorable events of this wonderful year, was the making Mussulmans of the Nazarene Christians. Now, *Christian*, in the language of the Franks, is applied to designate a new convert to the religion of Jesus, (on whose race be benediction and peace ;) and as a compound word, it is synonymous with *Eesovian*, (persons of the religion of Jesus) for in the language of the Franks *Chris*—is a name of the Lord Jesus ; but to proceed with our subject. The Portuguese Nazarenes, who for a long period have possessed factories on the sea coasts, obtained, about three hundred years ago, an establishment of this nature, on pretence of trade, on the coast of Soonda, at a place situated midway in the course of a large river and† estuary ; and in process of time, watching their opportunity, obtained from the raja, a country, yielding a revenue of three or four lacs of rupees. They then proceeded to prohibit the

* In his own work it is placed after the expedition to Coorg, in my other manuscripts before that event. .

† Goa is intended.

Mahommedan worship within these limits, and to expel its votaries : to the bramins and other Hindoos, they proclaimed a notice of three days, within which time they were at liberty to depart, and in failure to be enrolled in the new religion. Some, alarmed at the proposition, abandoned their property and possessions ; and others, deeming the whole to be an empty threat, ventured to remain ; and on the appointed day, the Nazarenes enrolled them in their own foolish religion. In process of time, and by means of rare presents, and flattery, and pecuniary offerings, they prevailed on the senseless rajas of Nuggur, Courial, (Mangalore), and Soonda, to tolerate their farther proceedings, and began gradually to erect shrines and chapels, (Keleesha—eclesia), and in each of these *idol temples*, established one or two *padrès*, that is to say monks, who, deluding the weak and pliant populace, by a fluency of tongue, alternately soothing and severe ; and by liberal and munificent gifts, led the way to their *abolished** religion ; and in this manner made a multitude of Christians, and continued to that day the same practices. When His Majesty, the shadow of God, was informed of these circumstances, the rage of Islam began to boil in his breast : he first gave orders, that a special enumeration and description should be made and transmitted, of the houses of the Christians in each district : detachments, under trusty officers, were then distributed in the proper places, with sealed orders, to be opened and executed, on one and the same day, after the first devotions of the morning : and in conformity to these instructions, sixty thousand persons, great and small of both sexes, were seized, and carried to the resplendent presence : whence, being placed under proper guardians, and provided with every thing needful, they were dispatched to the royal capital, and being formed into

* By abolished he means merged, in the subsequent revelations of Mahommed.

battalions of five hundred each, under the command of officers well instructed in the faith, they were honoured with the distinction of Islam*: they were finally distributed to the principal garrisons, with orders for a daily provision of food, apparel, and other requisites ; and the year of their reception into the pale of Islam, is designated in the following distich, each hemistic of which contains the date.† The firmament is enlightened by the sect of Ahmed—God is the protector of the religion of Ahmed ; and, as a distinctive appellation for this race, they were thenceforth called Ahmedy.” A proceeding of this horrible nature, recorded in his own words, and sung by the laureat of the court, as one of the exploits of his reign, gives an authentic impress of mind, which no professed delineation of character is capable of conveying : the true numbers were about thirty thousand : the murderous consequences of thus wartonly driving off the peaceful and unoffending inhabitants of his own country into captivity and agony, were not so fatal as in some subsequent cases when the captives were exclusively from the sea coast ; but as far as could be ascertained from conjecture, one third of the number did not survive the first year.¹

In returning to the upper countries the route through Bullum afforded an opportunity of quelling,

* Actually the males of every age !

† Dates for inscriptions, are always recorded in verses, the powers of whose numerical letters amount to the required numbers. Ahmed and Mahommed are from the same root, which signifies, praise, not generally, but exclusively *the praise of God*. The Chélas of the western coast received the name of *Ahmedy*, in the manner described in the text : those from Coromandel were named *Assud Ullah*, Lions of the Lord.

¹ Kirmani, in his *History of Tipu Sultan* (Miles, 1864, pp. 81-82) does not mention this raid on the people of the west coast, but he states that Tippu carried off eighty thousand men, women, and children from Coorg, who were made Mussulmans and styled Ahmedees, and formed into eight risalas or regiments.

for a time, the long protracted rebellion of these mountaineers : and thence the army proceeded, for a similar purpose, into the adjacent hills and forests of Coorg. The brave and unconquerable natives of this country, yielding occasionally to overwhelming force, had never failed to re-assert their independence, whenever the pressure was removed ; and held in a perfectly impartial repugnance the Mahommedan faith, and the braminiical code, to which it had succeeded in Mysoor, as well from religious abhorrence, as from the common invasion of all the rights of landed property practised by the professors of both religions. We have seen that early in 1782 Hyder had made a considerable detachment under Woffadar to the woods of Coorg, where a fort (Mercara) which he had built for overawing the natives, had been invested soon after his descent into Coromandel, and provisioned with difficulty by the provincial troops. Woffadar was so far successful as to capture the family of the Raja recently deceased, among whom was a youth aged fourteen, afterwards Raja, the author of the historical tract noticed in the preface ;* but had entirely failed in tranquillizing the country, or possessing any portion of it beyond the ground actually occupied by his military posts. When Tip-poo entered it with his whole army, the inhabitants yielded, as usual, to necessity, and apparent quiet was restored. The Sultaun, after reciting, in a style worthy of the thousand and one nights, his adventures in a cave† of several leagues in extent in pursuit of the head of the insurgents, Oootè Naig,‡ who escaped and died at Tellicherry, relates his having called together the inhabitants to harangue them on the subject of their moral and political sins. " If " says he, " six brothers dwell together in one house,

* Page xxix.

† Ghâr, divested of fable, it was probably a deep glen.

‡ The person, whom he nicknames Cootè Naick, Captain Dog ; see preface.

and the elder brother marries, his wife becomes equally the wife of the other five, and the intercourse, so far from being disgraceful, is familiarly considered as a national rite;* not a man in the country knows his father, and the ascendancy of women, and bastardy of children, is your common attribute; from the period of my father's conquest of the country, you have rebelled seven times, and caused the death of thousands of our troops; I forgive you once more, but if rebellion be ever repeated, I have made a vow to God, to honour every man of the country with Islam; I will make them aliens to their home, and establish them in a distant land, and thus at once extinguish rebellion, and plurality of husbands, and initiate them in the more honourable practices of Islam."

A considerable period intervened between this pacification and the next revolt, in which (independently of Mahratta affairs and the regulation of his government, to both of which subjects we shall return) he made a progress to Bangalôre, accompanied by the whole of his harem, which he established in this salubrious spot, and did not remove until the siege of 1791. A person named Zeen-ul-ab-u-Deen-Mahdavee was left as foujedâr of Coorg, and in the exercise of a power too customary among Mussulmans, forcibly carried off the sister of a person named *Mummatee*, who being enraged at the indignity, incited the inhabitants, who sought but an ostensible motive, and a leader, to rise in a general revolt; and the foujedâr soon found his possessions limited to the walls of Mercara. Among the Sultaun's officers, was a person of the same name, as the foujedâr, surnamed Shusteree † (from Suza, the birth-place of his ancestors) who had entered his service in Coromandel; in the interval between his father's death and his departure for Bednore, this person had, with a view to his

* Perfectly true.

† The person noticed in the preface, page xxx.

future fortunes, made himself well acquainted with the English system of tactics: he had travelled into most of the European settlements, and had observed in an acute, but superficial manner, the institutions which might be introduced as improvements among his countrymen, and his taste for innovation coincided with the ruling passion of his new master; he would any where in India be deemed a man of letters, and at Tippoo's court was decidedly at the head of the few who possessed any literary pretension. Among the improvements already introduced was a repudiation of the infidel words of command in the exercise of the infantry, and the substitution of terms adopted from the Persian language, which, with a corresponding treatise on tactics, Tippoo had distributed as his own for the guidance of his officers. Among the most masterly branches of this performance was esteemed the instructions for military operations in a close country; and the Sultaun thought he could not do better than send the author who held the rank of brigadier, attended by a suitable reinforcement, to suppress the rebellion. The military flame did not seem to blaze with much lustre in the breast of the man of letters; no progress was made; he wrote to the Sultaun that nothing but his own presence with the main army would terminate the war, and Tippoo answered with the bitter taunt of wondering why he could not execute his own theory. He did, however, move late in October, and entering Coorg in two columns, burned and destroyed the patches of open country, and compelled the inhabitants to take refuge in the woods, where they, as usual, refrained from any decisive operation. Some delay was necessary in making strong detachments to the frontier, in every direction, with a view to his ultimate measures for the future tranquillity of Coorg; but every thing being ready along the whole circumference, his troops began to contract the circle, beating up the woods

before them as if dislodging so much game,* and by these means closed in on the great mass of the population, male and female, amounting to about 70,000, and drove them off like a herd of cattle to Seringapatam, where the Sultaun's threats were but too effectually executed. The proprietors of land constitute the greater portion of the military population of Coorg; the labours of husbandry are chiefly performed by a perfectly distinct race (*adscripti glebæ*) conjectured to be the aboriginal possessors, and their masters to be descended from the conquering army of the Cadumba Kings. These slaves were separated from the other prisoners, and assigned to new Mahomedan settlers, who were to be encouraged to remove thither from various parts of his possessions; but this scheme, at first attended to, and soon afterwards falling into neglect and abuse, from the prevalence of some newer project, shared the common fate of a large portion of his abortive designs.

In the interval between these two expeditions to Coorg which convenience of narrative has drawn together, operations were in progress which ended in more serious hostility. The peace of Mangalore was evidently concluded to avert an impending confederacy with a distinct view to the separate subjugation of its members: at the very moment of signing this peace, and at every subsequent period of his life, the Sultaun openly avowed to his own subjects, and to his French† allies, the determination

* The description of Aurungzebe's field sports, in Somerville's *Chacô*, is a true picture of the actual Eastern hunt.

† Kirkpatrick's Tippoo's letters; a performance to which I acknowledge great obligation in fixing a variety of dates, from the early part of 1785, to the beginning of 1787. I have carefully compared the translation in Colonel Kirkpatrick's work of the manuscript memoir of Tippoo's life, in his possession, with the corresponding passages in the *Sultaun-u-Towareekh*, and find little or no variation, excepting that the latter appears to have been much better written: the reader has had the opportunity of appreciating the small portion of truth contained in either.

of waiting a more favourable opportunity to unite with them for the destruction of the English power; and any European interference being for the present effectually removed, he was at liberty to begin with either of his other enemies, the Mahrattas or Nizam Ali, the latter of whom had certainly been unfaithful to the confederacy against the English, whatever the original merits of that confederacy may have been. Immediately after the Sultaun's return from Mangalore in 1784, he had tried the effect of terror on this prince by asserting claims of sovereignty over Vijayapoor, and the consequent royal right (whence derived over the successor to the kingdom of Golconda does not appear) of enforcing the adoption of his newly invented measures of length and capacity, and other novelties, sealed standards of which were transmitted for the purpose. In what manner this absurd insult was received does not distinctly appear, except in the early arrival at Seringapatam of an envoy from Nizam Ali; and the very obvious consequence of his seeking a closer union with the Mahrattas against these alarming pretensions of the Sultaun, with whom they were known at the same time to have a separate ground of quarrel.

When Hyder, in consequence of his negotiations with Ragoba, possessed himself of the Mahratta territory, between the Kistna and Toombuddra, he felt the expediency of conforming to the suggestions of Ragoba's envoy, in leaving certain of the forts and territories in the hands of their Mahratta possessors, satisfied with the usual loose profession of allegiance to the state of Mysoor: among these was the Dêshaye of Neergoond, a hill fort of considerable strength, situated between two branches of the river Malpurba.¹ This chief was connected with the family

¹ *Malpurba*.—Malprabha. This river lies to the north of Nargund, in the Dharwar District, Bombay. Nargund is situated thirty-two miles north-east of Dharwar town. It was taken by Sivaji from the Sultans of Bijapur. The desai was a Brahmin

of Purseram Bhow, of Meritch, a leader of considerable power, by a double intermarriage of their respective sons and daughters; and his refusal of certain demands made by Tippoo, was followed by an intimation from Poona early in 1785, that an arrear of three years' tribute* was due by Mysoor. The debt was not denied, but evaded; in order that by the previous possession of Neergöond, and other similar places, he might have a stronger hold of this new line of frontier, before the commencement of a Mahratta war: and the Mahrattas, who did not on the other hand question his claim of customary tribute from Neergöond, declared that they would not suffer the exaction of the larger demand made by Tippoo, founded on the allegation of plunder and misconduct. Tippoo for once argued reasonably, that there was an end of his authority, if a foreign power were at liberty to dictate his conduct to his own subjects; and dispatched a respectable force under his cousin and brother-in-law Burhân-u-Deen. Kummer-u-Deen (his cousin german) who had previously been ordered from Kurpa to Seringapatam, was directed to change his route and proceed in the same direction. Burhân-u-Deen appears to have commenced the siege late in February or early in March; Kummer-u-Deen did not join before the 10th March or 12th of April; and immediately afterwards the April forces which had been collected by Purseram Bhow, 12. for the purpose to which they were sufficient, of relieving the place when besieged by only one of the corps, were attacked by the combined force which raised the siege for that purpose; there was little serious fighting, and the superiority was claimed by both; but the result was clearly testified, by the forward movement of the Mysoreans, which enabled

of the Bhawe family, who held the village and some surrounding country. (Edwards: *Grant Duff's History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. II, p. 166.)

* Eleven lacs a year; see page 762, of volume i.

May 5 them to reduce on the 5th of May, the fort of Ramdroog, beyond the northern or true Malpurba, an acquisition which covered and facilitated their subsequent operations against Neergöond. The siege of that place was accordingly resumed; but the absurd arrangement of ordering the two divisions to co-operate, instead of vesting the command in one superior officer, soon produced its natural effects: no dramatic representation can exceed the childishness of their reciprocal complaints to the Sultaun, or his simplicity in desiring them to be good friends, and follow the advice of three excellent old officers, assigned to them as a sort of military council, either of whom would have finished the siege in half the time. In spite of these blunders, the place was reduced to such extremities, that Kāla Pundit (or Kallapa), the Dēshaye, was induced to capitulate: this extremity had been deemed imminent very long before it actually occurred; and the Sultaun's ferocious and unprincipled mind was abundantly unfolded in his orders "*to put to the sword in the event of assault, every living thing, man, woman, child, dog, or cat; with the single exception of Kāla Pundit (of course, for future torture); but to employ every contrivance of truth or falsehood* which may induce the besieged to surrender the fort.*" The unhappy Dēshaye demanded for his security the sanction of oaths;—"But what," said the Sultaun, "*is the use of oaths on this occasion? You must conjointly by every possible artifice and deceit persuade the besieged to evacuate the fort.*" The possession of his own letters gives a picture of premeditated atrocity, which, however practised by other tyrants, has seldom been established by evidence of equal authenticity; and the sequel can excite no surprise. The Dēshaye descended under the escort of a select guard of his own men, on the faith of personal security, and free

* Such is the literal translation of the words rendered by Colonel Kirkpatrick; *means, fair or foul.*

permission to depart ; he was detained under a variety of pretences, and the vigilance and desperate aspect of his little guard, was such as to restrain Burhân-u-Deen for nearly two months from overpowering them by open violence, the object however was effected on the 6th of October. The unfortunate Kala Pundit Oct. 6. was dispatched in irons to Seringapatam, and thence to the well known fort at Cabaldroog, with his family, one individual excepted, a daughter, who was seized for the harem of the Sultaun. Kittoor¹ the residence of another Dêshaye, was next seized by a similar treachery, and Burhân-u-Deen cantoned in the neighbourhood of Darwar.

The Mahrattas being foiled in their purpose of saving Neergôond, and being desirous before undertaking a serious invasion of Mysoor, to insure the co-operation of Nizam Ali, and if possible, of the English; postponed, until the ensuing year, the execution of their designs; and Tippoo's envoys at Poona, continued by a series of deceptions to prolong their stay; the mind of the Sultaun seeming to fluctuate between the alternative of paying the money due, or attempting by a war to relieve himself from past and future claims.

Meanwhile, the force under the separate command of Kummer-u-Deen was ordered to return to Seringapatam. The Sultaun had originally planned the seizure, by surprise, of Adwânee, the jageer of the late Bazâlut Jung, and now the possession of Nizam Ali, with whom he was at peace, by directing this force, on the pretext of returning to Kurpa, to cross

¹ *Kittoor*.—Kittur is in Belgaum District, Bombay, twenty-six miles south-east of Belgaum town. For a fuller account of Tippu's action and how the Mahrattas met it, see Edwards' *Grant Duff's History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. II, pp. 167-169. Tippu forcibly circumcised many Hindus who came from the south of the Krishna river and two thousand Brahmins are said to have destroyed themselves to avoid this outrage. For the engagement at Nargund, see *Malet's Diary*, June 30, 1785. (Forrest: *Selections, Mahratta Series*, Vol. I, pp. 517-28.)

the Toombuddra at the ford of Comply,¹ to the eastward of Vijayanuggur, a direct route which would lead him without suspicion within reach of his enterprise; but the state of affairs in Coorg requiring at this juncture a large portion of his disposable force, he directed the route to be changed for the more direct road to the capital. Kummer-u-Deen, however, continued the eastern road for the alleged convenience of forage, and was reported at court to have sent an envoy to Hyderabad, and to have shewn direct indications of a design to join Nizam Ali with the force under his command, and to place himself and his jageer under the protection of that prince. While the Sultaun was engaged in the arrangements preparatory to entering Coorg, the second time, the death occurred of a person of some eminence, Serâj-u-Deen Mahmood Khân, formerly Mufti at Arcot, and afterwards the chief officer in Mysoor of the department of Justice. The Sultaun ordered his remains to be placed in a palankeen, and conveyed, with all the circumstances of honourable distinction, to be interred at Seringapatam. As the procession drew near, the rumour was spread, that the Sultaun was dead, and his corpse approaching. This report circulated with the utmost rapidity over all India, including the European settlements, and was so entirely and steadily credited, that Mr. Macpherson,² then Governor-General of the English possessions, actually dispatched from Bengal an embassy * to the

¹ *Comply*.—Kampli, a village in the Bellary District, on the Tungabhadra river, about thirty miles north-west of Bellary town.

² John Macpherson, originally a purser in one of the Company's ships, was sent to England in 1768, by the Nawab Walajah, to seek the king's protection against the Company. He was then appointed by the Directors to a writership in Madras. In 1776 he was dismissed from the service by Lord Pigot, but reinstated by the Directors, and in 1781 returned to India as a member of the Bengal Council, and succeeded Hastings as Governor-General in 1785.

* The error was discovered before they could leave Madras.

successor, or rather the Lord Protector, in behalf of the infant heir; an office which the same rumour assigned to Kummer-u-Deen. The designed propagation of such a rumour was, in all subsequent times, so steadily denied at court, that the general opinion in Mysoor refers it to the accidental circumstance above related: but any other foundation than design would involve an early anxiety to contradict the rumour, and Kummer-u-Deen, for whom it was evidently designed, deceived by reiterated assurances of the fact, acted as might reasonably be expected on the supposition either of good or of bad intentions; he left orders with his troops to follow by forced marches, and proceeded post to the capital, where he was instantly placed under arrest; stripped of all his jageers and offices, and the troops which had hitherto been subject to his immediate authority, were dispersed and incorporated with the other divisions of the army. For two years after this event, Kummer-u-Deen remained in disgrace, and without any provision for his maintenance; at the expiration of that time, a monthly pay of five hundred rupees, or 750l. a year, was assigned to him, and such was the highest amount of personal provision ever made by Tippoo, for a chief who, in the opinion of the English Government, held the first place and the highest influence at his court. In effect, Kummer-u-Deen, together with the troops of his immediate contingent, had immediately after his father's death in 1781 been placed by Hyder under the orders and particular protection of Tippoo; and the former, an enterprising and indiscreet young officer, was in the habit of treating with levity both the commands and the military pretensions of his relation: on Tippoo's accession to empire he was not of a disposition to be scrupulous in finding pretexts, if they did not exist. The overt precipitation of Kummer-u-Deen in seeking to avail himself of his sovereign's supposed death, formed a sufficient ground for the indulgence of avarice as well

as resentment : and it is no novelty in the history of oriental despotism, that in a predicament to quench the ardor and shake the allegiance of a native of the west, he was afterwards employed on occasions of difficulty, to execute particular services ; but although exercising occasional command, he never did, after 1785, possess any other influence or authority than what might eventually arise from the good opinion of the troops.

CHAPTER XXXI.

Negotiations of the Poona Mahrattas, for the eventual conquest of Mysoor—Sindea's experiment on the new Governor-General, Mr. Macpherson—Demand of Choute—Forced apology and disavowal—Nana Furnavese persuades himself, that he may consider the English as a reserve at command, in case of danger, but is unwilling to allow them a participation of advantage—Begins the war confederated with Nizam Ali only—Tippoo assumes the rank of King—Circumstances attending the ceremonial—Reasons—Confederates open the campaign with the siege of Baddmee—Burhân-u-Deen acts defensively—The Sultaun makes his first marches in that direction—but deviates to Adwânee—Reasons for this line of operation—Siege pushed with precipitation—Assault repelled with great slaughter—A second assault repulsed—Confederates approach—Tippoo raises the siege—Reasons for evacuating the place—Operation covered by a partial action—River fills immediately after they had retired across it—Tippoo returns to resume the siege—but the garrison march out at the opposite gate, and he takes quiet possession—Removes the stores, and dismantles the place—Determines to remove the seat of war across the river—A daring attempt, which succeeds from its great improbability—Confederates arrive too late—Operations—Tippoo's junction with Burhân-u-Deen—Hostile armies encamp in view of each other, near Savanoor—Night attack, and cannonade in the morning, favourable to Tippoo—Confederates assume a position near Savanoor—Dislodged—Tippoo enters the town—The Nabob

takes the protection of the Mahrattas, in preference to that of his son-in-law—Cause of the disagreement—Demands exacted in a manner ruinous to the country—and consequent resentment—Quiet celebration of an annual festival in both armies—Negotiation—Tippoo's challenge to Holkar—and his reply—A more successful night attack—Corps mounted on camels—Tippoo moves to Behauder Benda—Siege and capture—Infraction of the capitulation—Subsequent movements—Night attacks—Reasons of each for severally desiring peace—Conditions ultimately settled—Cessions—Pecuniary payments by Tippoo—Instances of bad faith and inhumanity—Confederates retire—Tippoo instantly re-occupies one of the ceded places—Sultaun's account of his night attacks—Seizure and murder of the poligars Raidroog and Harponelly, and assumption of their territory.

IN the meanwhile Nana Furnavese, the minister at Poona, was employing all the arts of Indian diplomacy, to frame such a confederacy as should ensure, not only the exaction of the unpaid tribute, but the recovery of the territory between the rivers, lost in the civil war of Ragoba. To the moment of the ratification of peace with Tippoo, Mr. Hastings had not only encouraged his advances, but actually urged their execution; and when he had given his reluctant assent to the treaty of Mangalore, which he greatly disapproved, he was deemed by the Mahrattas to have considered it as a truce of short continuance. Mr. Macpherson succeeded him early in 1785; and Sindea, who had paid to the talents and energy of Mr. Hastings the homage of a very sincere desire to preserve the relations of amity, considered the nerve and intellect of the new Governor-General the fair object of a decisive Mahratta experiment, the requisition of choute. A mere refusal did not seem to

the new Governor-General to meet the character of the demand; and he declared without hesitation, that it Sindea should decline to apologise for the insult, and instantly to disavow all claim of choute, on any and every part of the British possessions, his refusal or his silence should be considered and treated as a declaration of war. The disavowal was prompt; and this incident was considered by Nana as direct evidence of a disposition to give effect to an opinion known to be nearly universal among the English, that the peace of 1784, was a history of indignities incompatible with that character which formed the basis of their power. There is ground for believing, that a construction to this effect was annexed by the envoy to some observations which fell from Mr. Macpherson in conversation on the subject, and the communications of Mr. Anderson at Sindea's court, did not at any time discourage such opinions. On the occasion of the supposed death of Tippoo, the avowal of the Governor-General of his wish to improve the alliance with both Nizam Ali and the Mahrattas appeared to them an indirect advance for an offensive treaty; and it is supposed that the Mahratta envoy at Calcutta stated his own conviction, that English co-operation was attainable, on such conditions as they should deem advantageous to themselves. This was the precise issue which Nana desired; for he believed that the object might be attained by the union of every branch of the Mahratta confederacy with Nizam Ali; and excepting in the case of urgent necessity, he did not seek the participation of the English in the expected advantages of the war, which extended in prospect to the entire partition of the Mysorean dominions. All the preliminary conditions, including the previous exaction of a considerable sum by way of choute from Nizam Ali, were adjusted; and the armies assembled for field operations, early in 1786; and soon after-1786. wards formed a junction near the Kistna, where a

personal conference was held between Nana and Nizam Ali, for the purpose of digesting the plan of the war; after which they returned to their respective capitals, leaving the command of the Mahratta contingents of all the chiefs to Hurry Punt, and of Nizam Ali's to Tohuvver Jung.¹

Tippoo Sultaun's return from Coorg to his capital took place early in January, when the question of peace or war was still undecided. Previously to the act of circumcision, on one and the same day, of the great mass of the Coorgs, it was necessary to fix on an auspicious moment, and none could be so proper for proclaiming the royal dignity which he had now determined to assume, as that on which so great a number of infidels should be converted to the true faith: the services of all the astrologers were accordingly put in requisition. The whole intention does not seem to have been publicly announced, but all Mahommedans were summoned to attend the reading of the Khutba, at the mosque of the Lall Baugh. Rumour had announced that something extraordinary was to occur, and an immense croud was assembled. The officiating priest does not even seem to have been intrusted with the secret, and Ali Reza (the person afterwards known to the English as one of the guardians of the hostage princes) ascended the mimber (pulpit;) when he came to that part of the Khutba in which prayers are offered up for the reigning sovereign, instead of the name of *Shah Aalum*, as then customary over all the mosques of India, he substituted that of Tippoo Sultaun, to the entire astonishment of the great body of the auditors:

¹ Nana Furnavis met Nizam Ali twice, first in June 1784, at Etgir near the junction of the Bhima and Krishna rivers, when a general treaty of alliance was arrived at, and secondly, near the same spot, in 1786, when it was decided to reduce the whole of Tippu's territories and divide the conquests between the Nizam, the Peshwa, Sindia and Holkar. (Grant Duff: *History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. II, pp. 164-173.)

the reason assigned by the Sultaun, in one of his official letters, is sufficiently conclusive, that Sha Aalum was "the prisoner or servant of Sindea, and none but an idiot could consider him as a sovereign." From that day forward, the chôbdars and attendants were ordered, in announcing the salutations of persons who entered the durbar, to observe the formalities of the court of Delhi, and proclaim the presence of a king, by which title (Padsha) he was ordered to be addressed and designated by all his subjects; and it was during the march to Bangalore for the Mahratta war, that the change of title became universally known to the army.

The confederates opened the campaign with the siege of Badâmee,¹ a place of strength possessed by the Sultaun, near his northern frontier; the town was carried by a general assault on the 20th of May, May 20. and the citadel soon afterwards surrendered. The Mahratta horse spread themselves over the country, while the regular troops were employed in the reduction of the fortresses, in order that they might ultimately advance in strength, having nothing hostile in their rear. On the part of the Sultaun Burhân-u-Deen although reinforced by the disposable troops of Bednore under Budr-u-Zemân Khân his father-in-law, an able and experienced officer, was too weak for offensive operations, but continued to hold the army in check, prudently keeping within a moderate distance of the woods of Soonda and Bednore, as a security for his eventual retreat. The

¹ The two forts, which were both dismantled about 1845, are named *Bavanhande* (fifty-two rocks) and *Ranmandal* (battle field). Badami is now a village in the Bijapur District, and a station on the Madras and Southern Mahratta Railway. It was captured by General Munro in 1818. In 1840 a band of 125 Arabs from the Nizam's territory, headed by a blind Brahmin, seized the village, plundered the government's treasury and market, and carried the booty into the Nizam's territory. (*Indian Gazetteer*, Bombay, 1909, Vol. II, p. 44. Grant Duff: *History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. II, p. 173, note.)

Sultaun, instead of moving as expected by the enemy in the direction of the confederate army, to form a junction with Burhân-u-Deen, as indicated by the early direction of his march from Bangalore, suddenly diverged to the right, and proceeded by forced marches to Adwânee, (Adoni), the strong frontier post of Nizam Ali, south of the Toombuddra; and the fact of its containing the family* of his late brother, and his nephew, Mohabbut Jung, is the reason expressly assigned by Tippoo for attacking it: if the confederates should march to oppose him, he would give them battle, and an open field would be left for Burhân-u-Deen; if they should persevere in their actual line of operations, he would take Adwânee, and carry off the harems of the brother and nephew of Nizam Ali. The operations of the siege were pushed, not only with vigour, but precipitation; and an assault was ordered before the breach was deemed practicable, in any opinion but that of the Sultaun. Mohabbut Jung who commanded, knowing the insufficiency of the garrison, and feeling like a Mussulman, the delicacy of his charge, had on Tippoo's arrival, offered a large sum to purchase his forbearance, and the widow of the deceased had addressed to him a letter of the utmost humility, imploring his commiseration. To both of these propositions, the most coarse and contumelious answers were returned, and having determined that the assault should be given, and would succeed, his orders were less directed to those combinations on which its success must depend, than to the subsequent security of the treasure and captures; and his mind seemed to be far less occupied with the possibility of failure, than with obscene jests, regarding the future destination of the inhabitants of the harem. But Mohabbut Jung, on the rude rejection of his first offers, had made the most manly and determined arrangements for a

June.

* "Nâmoos," the honour;—meaning the females of the family.

desperate defence, and repelled the several columns of assault, at every point, with great slaughter, and soon afterwards a similar assault of another breach, was repulsed with the same energy and effect. The approach of the confederates had probably contributed to this premature attempt, for not only their united army but a separate force from Hyderabad, were in forced march to save the place.—In about ten days, therefore, after this failure, he necessarily raised the siege, having previously removed all his guns and stores from the batteries, and occupied a position a few miles to the southward of the place.

The period of the annual swelling of the rivers had arrived, it was therefore for the confederates to decide on transferring the seat of war to the south of the Toombuddra, on this new line, where no depôts or communications had been previously established, or after removing the women, to leave Adwānee to its fate; and they adopted the latter alternative. Moghul Ali Khān, youngest brother of Nizam Ali, made a forward movement, with a large division of the army, and brought on a partial action, while the remainder June 27 manœuvred to impress on the enemy the intention of a combined attack on the ensuing day, but in effect to compel a concentration of his force, and restrict his intelligence of the actual evacuation of the place, which commenced on the instant of their arrival, and was completed in three days, a degree of haste which proved to have been fortunate, as regarded the plan of operations actually adopted, for they had scarcely recrossed the river when it filled, and rendered it impracticable for Tippoo to follow them, if he had been so disposed. And this inconsistent reasoner, who incessantly bestows on his enemies epithets to designate their being the objects of divine wrath, ascribes their escape on this occasion to the aid of the Almighty. The arrangements for retreat, however precipitate, must have been conducted with ability, as the nearest ford of the river is distant

twenty-five miles, and the Sultaun had no opportunity of molesting even their rear-guard. The filling of the river left him free, as he supposed, to resume the siege; but on his return, he found this labour unnecessary. Such were the miserable combinations of the confederacy, that this strong and important frontier fortress was not provided with the stores deemed requisite for a siege; and whether by order, or through fear, the garrison left for its defence, marched out by the west face, while the Sultaun's troops entered it by the south, without an attempt at dismantling the place; the guns were found mounted on the works, the arsenal and storehouses, the equipage of the palace, down, as Tippoo affirms, to July 11. the very clothing of the women, was found in the exact state of a mansion ready furnished for the reception of a royal establishment. The Sultaun, however, foresaw the probability of being obliged to relinquish the place on the conclusion of peace, as he immediately removed the guns and stores to Gooty and Bellary, and effectually destroyed the fortifications.

The confederates deemed themselves secure, during the season in which the rivers should be full, of an unmolested scope for their operations to the northward of the Toombuddra, and moved to the more western line on which they had commenced their operations, and where little was to be apprehended from the inferior force of Burhan-u-Deen. The Sultaun affirms that he determined to remove the seat of the war to the northward of the river, contrary to the opinion of a council of his generals, who predicted the destruction of the first division which should pass, before it could be supported; but it is certain that the actual operation was founded on the remote distance of all means of effectual resistance; the greater portion of basket-boats required for the passage of the river were constructed in the province of Bednore, and floated down the river, to various

points higher up the stream than the intended scene of operation: an arrangement indicating not much respect for the vigilance of an enemy, who could allow their unobserved descent. On the 23d of August a detachment of a thousand men crossed in the night at a place named Kurrucknaut,* and seized a small village fort which commanded the passage. In the morning of the 24th, the infantry and guns commenced passing in basket-boats and rafts, and on the 30th the whole army and all its equipments had gained the northern bank without any opposition, during those seven critical days, that amounted to more than mere skirmishing. The operation had really succeeded from its great improbability; for the confederates had never reckoned on an attempt so daring and dangerous among the grounds of calculation. They approached however when too late, and encamped within a few miles of the Sultaun; the ground was found to be unfavourable to the employment of their superior cavalry, and after examining the position, they moved in the direction of Savanoor with the view of drawing the Sultaun into the plain country. He followed, keeping the river as close on his left as the ground admitted, drawing his subsistence from the opposite bank; and determined to avoid a general action until he should be joined by Burhan-u-Deen who was descending by the left bank

* I have omitted to make any written note of the exact situation of this place, and cannot supply the defect, either from memory or a reference to any of the maps.

[Grant Duff calls the place Gurkghaut, but cannot state its situation. The fords across the river are numerous, and probably the name has disappeared. There is no village of that name in the Bellary District at the present time. Kirmani, in his *History of the Reign of Tippu Sultan*, mentions that Tippu marched through Sandur and then marched towards "Kopli" and on to "Huspunth" and pitched his tents on the river at the ford of Guruknath. The crossing must have been east of Sandur. "Huspunth" may be Hospet, and the ford may be the one near Bellahusi, about ten miles east of Hospet.]

of the Werda,¹ pressed by superior numbers. Two night attacks were attempted by the Sultaun as he
 Sept. 11. approached Savanoor, the first on the 11th of September, and the second a few days afterwards; neither was attended with any decisive effect. On ascending towards the confluence of the two rivers, a considerable bend occurs in the united stream and a plain is to be crossed to attain the point on the Werda most favourable for effecting the junction; but before attempting this combined movement, he detached by a circuitous route a reinforcement for Burhân-u-Deen of two brigades, and some irregulars under Ghâzee Khân, the Sultaun's earliest military preceptor, and esteemed by Hyder the best partisan in his army. Every thing succeeded. The junction was formed, without serious impediment; the confederates encamped some miles in front of the fort of Savanoor, and the Sultaun occupied a strong position in full view of their camp, with the river Werda, then fordable, in the rear of his right.

For two or three days, Tippoo made every afternoon demonstrations of a serious attack, and after driving in the outposts, returned to his position. On the third or fourth night, when he expected the enemy to reckon on no more than a similar bravado, he made his dispositions for a serious attack, of which his own narrative corresponds in all material circumstances, with more authentic information. He divided his force into four columns, the left centre of which was commanded by himself; and after retiring from his afternoon's bravado, and merely giving the troops time for their evening meal, he moved off by a considerable detour of the two right columns, for the purpose of a combined attack on the enemy's left and centre, about an hour before day-light. It was concerted, that on the head of his own column reach-

¹ *Werda*.—The Varada river, which rises in the hills, in the north of Shimoga District, Mysore, and runs northwards into the Dharwar District, Bombay, south of Savanur.

ing its destined point of attack, he should fire a signal gun, (a strange branch of an attack by surprise,) which was immediately to be answered by the heads of the other three, in order that each might ascertain the position of the others, and instantly afterwards commence the attack. On approaching a small outpost, his own column was challenged; and the Sultaun, as if determined on communicating information of his approach, personally gave orders for the discharge of a few platoons of musquetry. He then advanced, and when near the camp fired the signal gun, but looked and listened in vain for reply : after much delay and anxiety he fired another signal, which was answered by one only. He however moved on, and entering the camp a little before the dawn, he Oct. 1. actually found himself accompanied by no more than three hundred men. A dark and rainy night had caused the heads of all the columns, excepting his own, to lose their way, and each column had, from the same causes, been broken into several divisions, each pursuing at random separate routes; fortunately, as the light became more perfect, all were within view, and he was enabled to make a disposition; but the camp was empty, and the hostile army appeared regularly drawn up on a height which overlooked their late ground: a cannonade ensued, and according to the Sultaun's account, he ordered no return to be made from his guns of good calibre, for the purpose of encouraging the enemy to advance* in the confidence of their being left in camp; the deception is said to have succeeded and the enemy to have been repulsed with heavy loss; and there can be no doubt of the day having terminated unfavourably for the confederates, who fell back to a position resting its left on the fort of Savanoor.

* The peculiar phraseology of the Sultaun has been noticed in the preface; a particular term for describing the *movements of the enemy*, was there omitted; *hurrukut-e-musboohy*; "the convulsive motion of a slaughtered animal."

From this position they were dislodged after an interval of two days, and the Sultaun entered without opposition into Savanoor, which had been evacuated by the nabob Abd-ul-Heckeem, who placed himself at the mercy of the Mahrattas, in preference to the protection of the person whom he had been accustomed to address as a son. We have seen* that on the occasion of a double marriage between the families in 1779, one of the conditions of enlarging the possessions of Savanoor, was the maintenance for Hyder's service of a body of two thousand select Patán horse, to be commanded by one of his sons, and this body had joined Hyder for the invasion of Coromandel. The hardships of the service, and particularly Tippoo's improvidence in marching cavalry into the low countries of Canara in 1783, had destroyed great numbers of horses, and the same cause had induced individual horsemen, mounted and dismounted, to abscond and return to their homes. On the Sultaun's return from Mangalore, in 1784, he ordered a muster of this contingent, and 500 men and horses only were forth-coming. He therefore commanded the ministers of Savanoor, to repair to Seringapatam, and settle the account of deficiencies, and he made out a balance in his own favour, of 21 lacs of rupees, for which the ministers gave the conditional engagement of two soucars, (bankers) who had the usual collateral security of the revenues, and the sanction of a guard of the Sultaun's troops, to enforce the collection. Abd-ul-Heckeem, who had debts, and not treasures, gave up, in the first instance, all his family jewels, estimated at only three lacs, and desired his ministers and soucars, to levy the remainder on the country, in the best manner they were able. It is only for readers unacquainted with the details of Mahommedan finance, that it may be requisite to relate the ordinary consequences of anticipated revenue, put into such a train of liquidation.

* Vol. i. page 759.

These harpies, exclusively of the regular receipts, found pretexts for seizing and putting to the torture, all landholders suspected to possess money; an amount superior to the balance was supposed to be levied, but the ministers and bankers taking into their joint consideration, how large a portion was due by ordinary usage, for their own trouble, allowed about one-half the amount to reach the Sultaun's treasury, and represented the impossibility of raising the remainder. One of the bankers paid the debt of nature, in the midst of his iniquities, and the other was remanded to Seringapatam. According to precedent, he ought to have been able to compromise this bad debt, for a small sum, but he actually remained in prison, and was murdered (perhaps contrary to intention) in the general massacre of prisoners in 1791. Abd-ul-Heckem continued to be goaded and threatened for the balance, up to the very opening of the campaign, when the Sultaun began to relax and endeavour to deceive: but this unfortunate and improvident chief, disgusted to the last degree, by the harshness and cruelty inflicted on himself and his country, determined to join the confederates with the handful of men he was still able to keep together, and on this occasion, the retreat of his friends, leaving his capital at the Sultaun's mercy, he fled to their camp, and thence as a fugitive, a wanderer, and a pauper, he was advised for the present to take refuge behind the Kistna. Oct. 29.

After these movements, neither party seemed desirous for some time of coming into serious contact, the confederates moving eastward for better forage, and the Sultaun establishing his head quarters about nine miles from Savanoor; in which situations both the Mahommedan armies quietly proceeded to perform the ceremonies of the Moherrem, during which period no attempt was made on either side beyond the desultory skirmishing of Hindoo partisans and foragers, and on the Sultaun's the uninterrupted

Nov. 4. plunder of every thing of value left in Savanoor. From this ground he dispatched a diplomatic messenger, really to treat of peace, but according to his own statement for a very different purpose. The incident of Brigadier-General Macleod's challenge in 1783 was too rich and original to be dismissed with one specimen of eloquence and prowess. He accordingly relates, that the herald was charged to deliver to Tuccajee Holkar (in the absence of Nizam Ali to whom the precedence was due) a speech to the following effect. "You have obtained experience in feats of arms, and are distinguished among the chiefs for superior valour. Now that war has commenced its destructive career, and thousands are doomed to fall; why should we longer witness the causeless effusion of human blood? It is better that you and I should singly descend into the field of combat, let the Almighty determine who is the conqueror and who the vanquished, and let that result terminate the contest. Or if you have not sufficient confidence in your own single arm, take to your aid from one to ten men of your own selection, and I will meet you with equal numbers. Such was the practice in the days of our prophet, and though long discontinued, I desire to renew that species of warfare. But if prudence should dictate your declining the second proposition also, let the two armies be drawn out, select your weapons, and let us, chief opposed to chief, horseman to horseman, and foot soldier to foot soldier, engage in pitched battle, and let the vanquished become the subjects of the victors." This speech (not more fictitious perhaps than parallel records of classical literature, but presenting an efficient contrast to the taste and intellect of those admired productions) is represented to have caused Holkar to tremble for his life, not a very consistent effect on an individual distinguished for rash fearlessness. But the reply exhibits a nearer approach to the national character; the passion for fighting

(he is made to say) had not descended to him from his ancestors, but rather the hereditary trade of flying, plundering, burning, and destroying, and the petty warfare which involves but little danger." The warlike herald of romance was however the real harbinger of peace, he was charged with separate instructions to propitiate some of the chiefs by bribery: and with assurances of a pacific nature to the confederates at large. Under cover however of the negligence and security which he expected these demonstrations to produce; the Sultaun moved on pretence of forage, and by a forced march from his new ground he made another and more successful night attack, in which, without encountering any serious opposition, he got possession, among other booty, of the splendid camp equipage of Tohuvver Jung,* and the camels which conveyed it; variously estimated, in different manuscripts, but in none at less than five hundred animals; a vain impediment which caused the capture of nearly the whole of the useful stores of that army: the Mahrattas, who on all occasions are entitled to the praise of vigilance, lost neither animals nor stores; and the retreat of both was conducted with so much rapidity, as to produce no other military consequences of importance. It is probable that the number of camels captured, considerably exceeded five hundred, for that exact number was immediately formed into a corps of 1000 men, each camel carrying two foot soldiers armed with muskets, who in the spirit of contempt for established practice which marked all the Sultaun's theories, were also charged with the care and feeding of those delicate animals,† a business which every child in his army knew to be the trade, and not an

* He commanded the forces of Nizam Ali.

† Hardy, as regards thirst, but in every other respect requiring great care to keep them in working condition: this remark is confined to the south of India, the only situation to which the author's means of personal observation have extended.

easy one, of a particular class of men ; and few of the animals survived that single campaign.

From the ground thus precipitately abandoned, the confederates moved north-east towards Gujjender Ghur,¹ and Tippoo, in a more easterly direction towards Copul, and Behauder Benda, two little forts near to each other, which had (treacherously as he states) been surrendered to the confederates in the early part of the campaign. After a short siege, of which a long and inflated account is given, the latter place surrendered by capitulation ; the Arabs, composing a portion of the garrison, were suffered to depart with their arms, but in violation of the terms, the Hindoo match-lock men, formerly of Tippoo's garrison, who had transferred their allegiance to the Mahrattas, were punished by the excision of their noses and ears, and Hamaumut Naig their chief, by the amputation of both his legs.

The subsequent movements, which, on the Sultaun's part had chiefly for their object, the disturbance of the enemy's night-quarters, were generally unfavourable to the confederates, and particularly to the ill organized troops of Nizam Ali who had reason to be weary of the war. On the part of the Mahrattas the confidence had been such at its commencement as to keep back a large portion of their contingents, and particularly the respectable infantry of Sindia. We have stated the grounds on which Nana Furnavese had hoped for the eventual support of the English, but Lord Cornwallis, who had in this year succeeded to the Government-General, had anticipated the question, by directing all equivocal expectations to be extinguished, and a distinct avowal to be made, that the English would engage in none but defensive wars. A gratuitous declaration ; of dubious expediency ; uncalled for by any demand of

¹ *Gujjender Ghur*.—Gajendragarh, a village in the Dharwar District, Bombay, about 20 miles due north of Kopal (Gopal).

explanation; and exclusively advantageous to his expected enemy.

There is reason to conclude that Tippoo believed in the original expectations of his adversary, and distrusted the pacific intentions of the English, whose military establishments, directed for the first time by military governors,¹ were at this period organized with a degree of care, which seemed to indicate the expectation of war; for on any other grounds it would be difficult to explain his open anxiety for terminating a contest in which he had uniformly triumphed. However this may be, on the return of answers to the letters which he had *really* addressed to Holkar and Rastia,² through whose mediation the advances were made, he sent a public deputation of two persons of the highest rank in his service, Budr-u-Zemân and Ali Reza Khân, a measure of Indian diplomacy liable to the construction of inferiority. The negotiations however were drawn to a considerable length, chiefly by reciprocal subterfuge, but at length were terminated on the following principles. Tippoo was indebted in the whole sum of four years' tribute, which, previously to the war of Coromandel, Hyder had stipulated to pay, on the condition of being acknowledged as the undisputed lord of every thing south of the Kistna from sea to sea. The annual

¹ Mr. Alexander Davidson became provisional Governor of Madras on Lord Macartney's resignation in June 1785, and in April 1786, Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell arrived in Madras as Governor. He had been in the Royal Engineers. He saw service in America in the 71st Foot and had been Governor of Jamaica. When in Madras, he united in himself, after General Sir John Dalling went home in 1786, the offices of Governor and Commander-in-Chief. Before that time, the Governor had held the office of Commander-in-Chief within garrison limits only. (Love: *Vestiges of Old Madras*, Vol. III, pp. 319-20.)

² *Rastia*.—The Raste (Rastia) family, Brahmins, were connected by marriage with the Peshwas. They had estates in Bundelkand, Khandesh, Nasik and Satara, and members of the family were influential in Mahratta affairs. (Grant Duff: *History of the Mahrattas*, passim.)

sum was twelve lacs of rupees tribute, and three lacs durbar expences, total sixty lacs, from which a deduction was obtained of fifteen lacs in compensation of damages* sustained by the war; of the remaining forty-five lacs thirty were actually paid, and fifteen were promised at the expiration of a year. The cession of Badâmi and the restitution of Adwânee, Kittoor, and above all of Neergôond, the original cause or pretext of the war, completed the indications of submission, and confirmed the existence of some motive more powerful than the apparent state of the campaign. Of the payment and restitutions not a word is to be found in the King of histories, excepting that on adjusting the conditions, the Mahrattas begged, for the gratification of their prince, who was an infant, something to buy sweetmeats, and one or two villages as a jageer dependent on the Sultaun. On his ill faith and inhumanity, it may be received as an illustration, that on the very day that the conditions were finally settled, he ordered his commandant at Adwânee, "to collect with the utmost expedition, all he could from the country, to encompass completely two or three towns, and getting together five or seven thousand people, report the particulars, *as men are wanted for the Assud Illahee corps.*" The Mahrattas were too well aware of character to move before all the conditions were completely fulfilled; but this accomplished, they had scarcely re-crossed the Kistna before Kittoor was re-occupied by the Sultaun's troops.

The success of his night alarms, in the late campaign, had been really considerable, and he is diffuse in his description of various stratagems, by which he kept his enemies perpetually awake, and made them spend their nights "like the owls of ill omen, in the mountains and forests:" of his sending sixteen rocket men in four detachments, to represent the four columns in which he usually moved, and by the dis-

* "Pai-maulee;" what is trodden under foot.

charge of a signal rocket each, to put the confederate army into motion ; at length, he says, it became the enemy's custom, to load the baggage after sun-set, and change their ground, in order that he might not know where to find them * : an universal practice of the Indian partisan cavalry, from which he borrowed the tale or they the imitation ; and it is certain, from the impression produced in every part of India, by the events of this campaign, that it must have been conducted, on the part of the Sultaun, with a degree of energy and enterprize which established a general opinion of his military superiority.

On his return by a route passing nearly midway between Harponelly¹ and Raidroog,² he made detachments, on the pretence of dispersing his army in cantonments, of two brigades, with secret instructions to each of those fortresses ; and having previously removed all grounds of suspicion, by repeated personal acknowledgments to the poligars of those places, for the distinguished services they had rendered in the late campaign, he seized their chiefs and their prin

* Among the royal jests, is one regarding Hurry Pundit, the Mahratta Commander-in-chief, who, on the occasion of a night attack, called to his valet for his drawers, and in the dark thrust his two legs into the place intended for one : "you rascal," he exclaimed, "you have given me a bag ;" and groping about, found the under garment of his wife, with which he adorned himself, to the great amusement of the beholders, when day light enabled them to discover the mistake.

¹ *Harponelly*.—Harapanahally, a town in the Bellary District, 67 miles W.S.W. of Bellary. It was the seat of a powerful Poligar of the Boya caste. One of his descendants married a daughter of the Poligar of Chitaldrug. The Poligars at different times paid tribute to the Nizam, to Morari Rao of Gooty and to the Peshwa. In 1786 Tippu took the place. But one of the followers of the Poligar escaped and joined the Mahrattas and was set up as Poligar. He was expelled by Tippu, but returned during the Second Mysore War, and eventually surrendered to General Harris in 1800. The fort is now deserted and in ruins.

² *Raidroog*.—Rayadurg, a town in the Bellary District, 30 miles south of Bellary. A rock 1,200 feet high, overlooks the town—a rugged granite mass, connected by low hills with Chitaldrug in

cipal officers in camp on the same day and hour that the brigades overpowered the unsuspecting garrisons. The cash and effects of every kind, not excepting the personal ornaments of the women, were carried off as royal plunder, and the chiefs were ultimately sent to the accustomed fate of Cabaldroog. The Sultaun relates with complacency the success of his arrangements for the annexation of these dependencies to the royal dominion; their allegiance to his father had been precarious; and on every invasion, they had shewn more attachment to the enemy than to him. In the late campaign, they had concurred in a conspiracy for the assassination of the Sultaun, and the time of retribution had at length arrived! On reading this statement to one of the Sultaun's most zealous advocates, he uttered an involuntary exclamation of its absolute falsehood; and declared, that no two officers, Mahommedan, or Hindoo, had given more distinguished proofs of allegiance to his father and himself than these unfortunate men.

Mysore. About 1517, the fort was given by the Vijayanagar Raja to a Boya chief. It became tributary to Bijapur after the fall of Vijayanagar. It was afterwards taken and occupied by a Telugu Raja of the Balji caste. Haidar took the fort, but reinstated the chief. When Tippu took the fort, the Poligar was sent to Seringapatam, where he was assassinated in 1791. Lord Cornwallis took the fort in that year. But in 1799, a nephew of the Poligar attempted to get hold of the fort; he was taken prisoner by the Nizam's troops and sent to Hyderabad. He was afterwards surrendered to the English and sent to Gooty, where he died and pensions were given to his descendants. The family is now extinct. (Dr. Maclean: *Madras Manual of Administration*.)

CHAPTER XXXII.

The Sultaun destroys Mysoor—Curious example of vicissitude—Descends to Malabar—Extract from his own work, descriptive of the singular habits of the women—Discussion of that subject—Habits of the ancient Britons—Impolitic demolition of Calicut—The monsoon—Impious pretensions—The word prophet—Arrival at Coimbetoor—Suspected madness—French physician—Influence of European politics—Visits Dindigul—Alarm of the Raja of Travancore—Tippoo returns to Seringapatam—Arrangements—Coorg and Malabar in general rebellion—caused by the supercession of Arshed Beg Khán, and the crude measures of his successor—That respectable man disgraced—Died of grief—Tippoo proceeds to Malabar—hunts the Nairs—Alternative of circumcision or deportation—Opinion of the spontaneous appearance of small-pox without contagion—examined and discussed—Nair Raja Chercul is received with distinction—Reciprocal suspicions of treachery—Killed—The corpse treated with base indignity—Destruction of the temples—Marriage of the Sultaun's second son, to the daughter of the Beebee of Cannanore—Astrology—Arrangements for forcible and universal conversion—Reconnoissance of the Travancorean frontier—Returns to Coimbetoor—End of the King of histories—and specimen in its concluding page—Embassador from Nizam Ali received—proposes a strict and solemn alliance—rejected except on condition of a previous intermarriage in the families—which Nizam Ali declined.

WHATEVER may have been the Sultaun's motives for concluding the late peace, they had certainly no influence in diminishing the arrogance of his subsequent pretensions. On returning to his capital, some months were employed in the enlargement of those numerous innovations in the interior, which will be most conveniently described in a subsequent part of this work. The town and fort of Mysoor, the ancient residence of the rajas, and the capital from which the whole country derived its name, was an offensive memorial of the deposed family and he determined that the existence, and if possible the remembrance of such a place, should be extinguished. The fort was levelled with the ground, and the materials were employed in the erection of another fortress on a neighbouring height, which he named Nezerbâr *: and it is a curious example of that vicissitude in human affairs, which history so often preaches in vain, that the very same stones were re-conveyed to rebuild the same old fort of Mysoor, in 1799. The town was utterly destroyed, and the inhabitants were ordered to remove at their option, to Gunj-aum on the island of Seringapatam, or to the Agrâr (bramin village) of Bumboor, now to be named Sultaun-pet, a little to the southward of that island.

1788
Jan. When the season was sufficiently advanced to make the march convenient, the Sultaun, at the head of his army, proceeded by the route of Tamburcherry,¹ to visit and reform his possessions in Calicut. "The country of Calicut," as he informs us, "is situated

* I have been assured by two of his secretaries, that he meant to intimate by this name, "the place visited by the eye of the Almighty;" an evidence, as I apprehend, of his imperfect knowledge of the language in which he wrote. The name, however, gives the date, and the numerical power of the words may have been considered more than their grammatical import.

¹ *Tamburcherry*.—Tamarassheri. The Pass leads from Gundlupet in Mysore, over the hills of Wynaad to Calicut. There is now a good road from the top of the Pass at Vayittri down the side of the valley into Calicut.

on the coast of the ocean, and is named Malabar : its breadth does not exceed twenty-three coss,¹ and its length is nearly two hundred. The Mahommedan inhabitants are called Pilla (Mapilla) and the infidels Naimars; and as the rainy season lasts six months, and mud continues throughout the year, the roads are excessively difficult, and the inhabitants prone to resistance, dividing their time between agriculture and arms. Such is the excess of infidelity, that if a Mussulman touch the exterior wall of a house, the dwelling can only be purified by setting it on fire. From the origin of Islām in Hind, to the present day, no person had interfered with these practices, excepting the revered,* who is in paradise, after the conquest of the country, in the manner which has been narrated †; and during the twenty-five years that the country of Calicut had belonged to this dynasty, in as much as twenty thousand troops were maintained for its occupation, and the revenues never equalled their monthly pay; the balance, to a large amount, was uniformly discharged from the general treasury. Notwithstanding all this, the actual circumstances of the country were never properly investigated, until his Majesty, the shadow of God, directed his propitious steps, &c. &c. and remained three months in that country. He observed that the cultivators (instead of being collected in villages as in other parts of India) have each his separate dwelling and garden adjoining his field; these solitary dwellings he classed into groupes of forty-houses, with a local chief and an accountant to each, an establishment which was to watch over the morals and realize the revenue; and a Sheikh-ul-Islām ‡ to each district for religious

¹ Indian league. One coss = 2½ miles. In Mysore, the Sultauny coss is about 4 miles. (Dr. Macleane: *Madras Manual of Administration*.)

* Hyder Ali.

† It will be recollected, that this part of the Sultaun-u-Towareekh, although referred to, was never written; see preface.

‡ This is the title of the chief of Medina.

purposes alone; and addressed to the principal inhabitants a proclamation to the following effect. "From the period of the conquest until this day, during twenty-four years, you have been a turbulent and refractory people, and in the wars waged during your rainy season, you have caused numbers of our warriors to taste the draught* of martyrdom. Be it so. What is past is past. Hereafter you must proceed in an opposite manner; dwell quietly, and pay your dues like good subjects; and since it is a practice with you, for one woman to associate with ten men, and you leave your mothers and sisters unconstrained in their obscene practices, and are thence all born in adultery, and are more shameless in your connexions than the beasts of the field; I hereby require you to forsake these sinful practices, and live like the rest of mankind. And if you are disobedient to these commands, I have made repeated vows, to honour the whole of you with Islām, and to march all the chief persons to the seat of empire. Other moral inferences, and religious instruction, applicable to spiritual and temporal concerns, were also written with his own hand, and graciously bestowed upon them."

The account here given of the manners of the women of Malabar, corresponds in its principal features, with the narratives of all the voyagers, and this inversion of the usual acceptation of polygamy, has produced strange theories, founded on very questionable facts. In hot climates, according to Montesquieu, females are marriageable at eight, nine, or ten years of age, and they are old at twenty: when beauty demands the empire, the want of reason forbids the claim; when reason is obtained, beauty is no more: polygamy is therefore the natural effect of the climate: this enlightened author does not seem to have been aware that the great mass of the Indian population are monogamists; with the

* "Sherbet;" literally drink.

modification of being enjoined a second marriage after the first has ceased to augment population. "That the law of polygamy is an affair that depends on calculation," is the title of one of his chapters. According to the calculations which he quotes, in some countries there are born more boys than girls,* as in Thibet, where there is a plurality of husbands, and in others the proportion is inverted; and with a lubricity and reserve which shews the weakness of his ground, he treads lightly on a theory which would make the will of God to depend on the vices of man. In a work which professes to deliver the theory of every fact, and generally, it must be admitted, with eminent success, we must expect to find some failures; and in the very next chapter, forgetting the theory of the last, he explains the plurality of husbands in Malabar, by adverting to the military spirit of the Nairs, which makes it inconvenient to be shackled with a wife. The facts without theory, are described in the official report of the first commissioners for Malabar; after its cession to the English Government in 1792, to the following effect. The rajas are generally of the second Hindoo cast, some are of the fourth: but in all, the line of succession is not (as in other countries) in favour of their own sons, but those of their sisters; who do not marry according to the acceptation of that term in other countries, but form connections of a longer or shorter duration, with a race of bramins named Nambouries; who thus provide heirs for all the principalities of Malabar.—The same line of succession prevails among the Nairs, (soldiers and husbandmen of the fourth class); and their women (in the southern parts, however, more than in the north,) indulge with more or less freedom in fugitive connexions with various men of their own or of

* Ten women to one man in Bantam. In Meaco, according to Kempfer, 182,072 males, and 223,573 females.—*Spirit of Laws*, book xvi. chap. 4.

higher casts ; and strange to tell, the same rule of succession extends to the Mapillas, the descendants of Arabs, settled in Malabar, long before even the Christian æra, and converted by their countrymen to the new religion of Mahommed, after these domestic habits had been so fixed, as not to be shaken even by the positive law of the Korân. The rule of direct filiation is only observed by foreign Hindoos, and by the indigenous tribes, inferior to that of Nair, among whom prevails the custom, as if to discredit the influence of climate, common to the two extremes of Coorg and Thibet, of several brothers having one and the same wife. The account, thus officially rendered, of which the above is an imperfect abstract, is however qualified by the explanations of several highly enlightened correspondents, who have favoured the author with the result of their personal observations, after a long residence in Malabar, and who bear honourable testimony to the respectable conduct of the Nair ladies of Northern Malabar ; it is however admitted, that the wife, if such she may be named, usually continues to reside in the paternal mansion, where she is visited by her lord, or sallies forth to visit him ; and that the natural marks of tenderness and affection to children, are lavished by the men on nephews and nieces, and scarcely ever on reputed sons and daughters ; the statement indeed which most strenuously denies a plurality of husbands, admits the occasional prevalence of lax morals, and a tendency to various intercourse, but states the practice to be deemed disreputable. Not so, however, in the south, the parties are betrothed in childhood, and united at the age of puberty, but if after a short cohabitation, the lady disapproves the choice of her parents, she is at liberty to make her own, by accepting a cloth (a dress) from the man of her own selection, and declaring in the presence of four witnesses that she discards her husband, and accepts the donor of the cloth ; and this she may repeat as

often as the donor of a new cloth can be found, but never without the declared dismissal of her old companion, *who of course must be deemed equally free to form a new connection*. In a condition of morals which acknowledges so wide a licence, it must be inferred, that the privileged line is frequently overstepped: but, however this may be, it is obvious that no departure from those general laws of nature, which regulate population, is necessary for the production or continuance of a state of society, which, as far as regards the question of relative numbers, may as correctly be deemed a plurality of wives, as a plurality of husbands. With regard to the marriage of one wife to a family of brothers, an ingenious friend long resident in Malabar, whose attention had been drawn, after answering my first enquiries, to Cæsar's description of the manners of Britain, at the period of the Roman conquest, declares his belief in their general coincidence with the actual practice of Malabar,* not only in the lower, but the higher classes, with the exceptions regarding filiation, which have been recited; the original passage is inserted at the bottom of the page, and Sir William Temple,† who has some curious observations on these associations of ten or twelve families as practised by our ancestors, relates the apology made on the subject by a British lady, who had been admitted to some intimacy with Julia Augusta in the time of Severus. "We do that openly with the best of our men, which you do secretly with the worst of yours."

For a similar reason to that which induced the demolition of Mysoor, the Sultaun ordered the

* *Uxores habent deni duodenique inter se communes, et maxime fratres cum fratribus, et patres cum liberis. Sed qui sunt ex his nati eorum habentur liberi a quibus primum virgines quæque ductæ sunt.*—Cæsar, lib. v. cap. 14.

Sir William Temple deviates a little from the sense of the original, which he probably referred to from memory. Henry doubts Cæsar's accuracy.

† Temple's Works, vol. ii. page 592, folio edition, 1720.

entire destruction of Calicut, and the erection at a few miles distance of another fortress, with the new name of Ferruckhee, a fancy which afterwards nearly proved fatal to his troops, by leaving them the choice of a ruin, or an unfinished work, as points of retreat and rendezvous; and while loitering over these and other equally fruitless projects, and rioting in imagination over bigoted schemes of converting the infidels, he was apprised by men of cooler heads, that the monsoon had commenced: he determined to march through the depth of it to Coimbetoor, answering those who attempted to dissuade him, that he would *order the clouds to cease discharging their waters, until he should have passed*. It may be difficult to determine whether this was intended as an impious jest, or a blasphemous pretension; but it is certain, that about this period, he frequently placed his own exploits in the cause of religion, particularly in the number of his converts, above those of Mahommed; the word *Peighamber* he said signified no more than a bearer of tidings (to the uninstructed,) and that Mahommed was but such a man as Tippoo Sultaun: on which subject it may not be out of place to remark, that neither this nor any other term by which Mahommed is distinguished in Mahomedan writings conveys any meaning approaching our word *prophet*, the customary translation* of those terms. But pretensions of this nature gave great offence to the orthodox, and if the Sultaun's arrogance had not been checked by the subsequent English war, there is abundant reason to conjecture, that, drunk with flattery, and uncontrolled dominion, he would have openly claimed the apostolic character, and as his followers believe, a still more impious assumption. However this may be, the clouds were not controlled, and the army suffered

* "Russool," an apostle:—"nubbee," a person who awakes or admonishes:—"peighamber,"—a bearer of tidings, but nothing approaching *prophet*, a person who predicts future events.

the greatest hardships, in their tedious march through the swamps, the floods, and the unceasing torrents of rain, until their arrival at Coimbetoor.

A variety of incidents occurred in this and the succeeding year, which confirmed in general opinion the inference that an intellect too weak for such a giddy height occasionally tottered on the verge of insanity; and among them a tale is related, the accuracy or incorrectness of which may possibly be ascertained by persons still living in France. The Sultaun's letters shew that he had written to Louis XVI. to send him three medical persons, a physician, a surgeon, and an apothecary, and on the return of his embassy, which we shall presently notice, two of these gentlemen were presented to him at Coimbetoor. The physician after being introduced, demanded his dismissal, but however strongly vouched, I cannot venture to determine whether the tale be founded, of his having assigned as his reason, to Heckeem Wâsil, the native physician in waiting, that he perceived in the Sultaun symptoms of incipient madness, nor whether it be an embellishment of Heckeem Wâsil, that the Sultaun overheard some of the conversation which ensued, and called a council to deliberate on the case, which council gravely and unanimously determined that it was the physician, and not the patient, who was mad.

Among the causes which had influenced the Sultaun in the decided measures which he had executed, and was preparing in Malabar, was a combination of European politics, deeply and deliberately planned, but ultimately never executed.

The faction in Holland, inimical to the house of Orange, and leaning on France for support, had, as the price of that support, and the means of effecting their own objects, secretly consented to a plan suggested by the French for their own aggrandizement, for surrendering to that power the port and fortresses of Trincomalee, to be employed as a naval station, in

furtherance of those operations necessary for the restoration of the affairs of France, on the continent of India; and the combined and determined efforts of France and Holland, were at a proper time, and immediately, if necessary, to give effect to these projects, which were studiously concealed from the knowledge of the Orange party.

General Conway, Governor of Pondicherry, was charged with the execution of this measure, and sailed from Pondicherry, ostensibly for the Isle of France, with a suitable armament, comprising nearly the whole of his garrison; in the confidence of obtaining the unresisted possession of the place, and occupying it in force, before the English, who were expected to consider the transaction as little short of a declaration of hostility, should have any intimation of the design.

The original machination, however, did not entirely escape the vigilance of the Government of Holland. Secret instructions were sent to the Governor of Ceylon, to provide against the attempt; and when General Conway arrived at Trincomalee, he found the means of defence so perfectly prepared, by a staunch adherent of the house of Orange, that he felt the necessity of desisting from the attempt, and returned to Pondicherry.

Sir Archibald Campbell, on receiving the first intelligence of the object of General Conway's departure, determined, without waiting for any authority, to counteract a proceeding so decidedly hostile, by immediate preparations for the siege of Pondicherry; but General Conway's failure at Trincomalee, caused the whole of these designs reciprocally to subside. The Sultaun was for the present left to his own measures on the continent of India, without the co-operation of his French allies; and the interior distractions of the Government of Holland, of which the affairs of India formed no more than a subordinate branch, had in the meanwhile assumed a new aspect,

through the co-operation of Prussia and England; and the celebrated expedition of the Duke of Brunswick into Holland; and an amicable explanation between the courts of France and England, produced the abandonment of those preparations, by sea and land, which appeared to threaten an early and general war in every part of their respective possessions.

From Coimbetoor the Sultaun made a progress to visit Dindigul, a jageer conferred by himself on his relation Seyed Saheb, (Moyeen-u-Deen), by whom he was splendidly entertained, and it was soon after this period, that the raja of Travancore entertained the first serious alarm, which he communicated to the Government of Madras, of being invaded at one and the same time from the east and the north, in consequence of the minute investigation of routes on each of these frontiers.* Before leaving this quarter, he laid waste with fire and sword, the countries of such of the poligars dependent on Dindigul and Coimbetoor, as had recently failed in obedience, and returned by August. the route of Gujelhutti to Seringapatam, where, according to his own statement, four months were exclusively devoted to the operation of embodying all the seyeds of his infantry into separate brigades, and the sheicks into others, leaving for the present the Patâns and Moguls † to be intermixed with the Hindoos. He had scarcely accomplished these

* The difficult pass of Goodaloor, at the bottom of the vale of Dindigul, and the access by the coast of Malabar.

[Gudalur at the extreme south-west of the Madura District, on the border of Travancore.]

† A stranger, on making enquiries, will find the four divisions of Mahommedans mentioned in the text, considered by the multitude as so many sects. In fact, Patan and Moghul are merely national appellations. The only original distinction of a general nature, being that of Seyeds, descendants of Mahommed, and men of Arabian family, not so descended, who, in India, are usually named *Sheickhs*. The numerous religious sectaries, who have subsequently arisen, are to be found in every country and every race.

separations before he received intelligence, that all Coorg and Malabar had risen in simultaneous rebellion, and even, according to his own statement, were every where pressing his troops with the most desperate valour.

Arshed Beg Khân, as we have seen, had been appointed by Hyder, shortly before his death to the office of civil and military governor of Malabar; he was a Mussulman of rare talents, humanity, and probity, and by adapting the scheme of his government to the actual circumstances of the country, had brought the province into a state of comparative tranquillity and contentment. But the Sultaun had composed rules and regulations, to which all circumstances must bend, and they must be equally applied to all his dominions. Among these was the separation of authorities, and the consequent supercession of Arshed Beg Khân in the civil, while he retained the military powers. On the arrival of his new coadjutor, (Meer Ibraheem, a relation of the secretary for the department of innovation,) this excellent servant distinctly perceiving the inevitable consequences of the new system, wished to retire; and in 1786, requested that permission to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, which in Kirkpatrick's notes on Tippoo's letters is ascribed to another cause. The new Asoph (civil and fiscal governor) broke through all his cowles, (written engagements,) substituted new exactions, and set the inhabitants in a flame. Arshed Beg Khân employed the influence which his virtues had commanded, in the maintenance of quiet, and attempted in vain to impress on his colleague the duty of maintaining inviolate the public faith. His urgent intreaties to his master to avert the destruction of Malabar by his own presence had caused the Sultaun's visit to that country in the beginning of 1788. He found the conduct of Meer Ibrahim to have really placed the province on the verge of rebellion, and he removed and confined him;

but he also removed and disgraced Arshed Beg Khan, and invented other novelties for the misgovernment of Malabar. The Sultaun's arrogance could not contemplate the possibility of his having himself created the rebellion by changing the order of things which was already as successful as could reasonably be expected, for in spite of his assertion, Arshed Beg Khan had uniformly realized a surplus revenue. This venerable man, whose name alone would have commanded the tranquillity which an army could not achieve, was still in prison, not with the hope of extorting money, for calumny acknowledged he was poor, but because calumny and injury, when inflicted by a tyrant, constitute in the sufferer an unpardonable crime; and he soon afterwards died of grief and disgust.

The Sultaun, however, who simply observes, 1789. that the infidels of Malabar had disregarded his Jan. preaching, and had risen in rebellion, pitched his tents, and marched with his whole army, and after some delay in traversing Coorg, and restoring a temporary quiet, descended by the pass of Tambercherry into Malabar. The report of the arrival of the whole army, caused the Nairs to retire as usual into their woods and mountains; and Tippoo divided his troops into numerous detachments for the purpose of apprehending them. While the detached divisions were conducted with various success, his own took the direction of a place named *Gootipoor*, where about two thousand Nairs with their families, occupied an old fortified position, which they defended for some days, but finding it untenable against the superior number and means by which they were invested, they were ultimately compelled to surrender at discretion. The alternative was signified to them of a voluntary profession of the Mahommedan faith, or a forcible conversion, with deportation from their native land. The unhappy captives gave a forced assent, and on the next day the rite of circumcision

was performed on all the males, every individual of both sexes being compelled to close the ceremony by eating beef. This achievement being completed, it was held out as an example to the other detachments of the army, and it is certain that great numbers of Nairs incessantly hunted out of their places of concealment, at length came forth to be circumcised, as the only mode which remained to them of avoiding a more cruel fate.

It has been stated, that this alternative presented to the imaginations of the Nairs, the apprehension of death as well as banishment ; and it is necessary to explain, that the very singular opinion was entertained at that period, and prevails in Mysoor at the present day, that small-pox is generated without contagion, by the mere act of a crowded deportation from Malabar to the upper countries. The fact appears to be incontestable, that former emigrations were followed by the appearance of small-pox, and the death of a large portion of the population, and in some instances of nearly the whole. The earlier could not be traced by the same means of personal enquiry, as some of the later deportations, in which the precaution is stated to have been taken, of moving in smaller divisions, with express orders to avoid all possible communication which could risk the conveyance of infection. Officers who have been charged with this service, have assured the author, of the exact execution of these precautions, and of the spontaneous appearance of the disease, soon after passing from the summits of the hills into the plain table land. It is not intended to attach importance to the opinions and inferences of men, who are confessedly careless observers, and frequently inaccurate narrators ; but it does appear of importance to the human race, that a fact, which can scarcely be deemed an unfit subject of philosophical enquiry, should be watched and examined by more competent observers, in that country where the disease is stated to have

originated : not only as the investigation may regard small-pox, (whose destructive powers have been happily arrested in every part of the habitable globe,) but as it may relate to all those diseases, which are referred by general opinion to contagion alone.

It is evident that small-pox was either coeval with the creation, or had a subsequent beginning; and it is an inference deducible from the first principles of reasoning, that *the same causes which originally produced may re-produce it without contagion*. A late author* who has combined the most profound and interesting historical research, with the story of a loathsome disease, thinks that it has been known in China and India for at least three thousand years: there are reasons which shall presently be discussed for assigning to it a more modern origin, but the general proposition is not affected by comparative antiquity. It is now familiarly known that the small-pox was without a name in the ancient languages of Europe; and Mr. Moore has established, in the most satisfactory manner, that it was equally unknown in Arabia, in Persia, and in those Asiatic countries which are deemed to be the cradle of the human race, before A. D. 569,† when it was first introduced into Arabia by vessels trading with India. During the latter part of the 6th and the whole of the 7th century, it was spread over the remaining portions of Asia, and all that part of Africa which is washed by the Mediterranean sea. In the 8th century it accompanied the conquests of the Arabs into Spain, Sicily, Italy, and France; Saxony, Switzerland and England received it certainly in the 10th and probably in the 9th century; and lastly it travelled into Hispaniola, and soon afterwards to Mexico, in the beginning of the 16th century.‡

The early antiquities of China and India have

* Moore's History of the Small-pox.

† Ibid. p. 110.

‡ Moore, *passim*.

become nearly synonymous with fable. In China* the first appearance of small-pox, is fixed by one authority with suspicious accuracy, at 1122 years anterior to the Christian æra, before which period it was unknown; and at least as remote an origin is claimed by the legends of India. In that country, we find apparent indications of long experience in the treatment, rather than the legendary history of the disease. That the presiding deity is a low bred goddess, whose temples are never approached by a bramin, and are frequented exclusively by the outcasts, furnishes little ground of inference; but the immemorial practice of the bramins of Orissa near Ganjam, of inoculation by means of a sharp steel instrument, of exposure to the cool open air, to prevent the confluent disease, and even of the cold † affusion for a day or two before the eruptive fever is expected—although indicative of successful experience, affords no evidence of antiquity beyond the 6th century.

Mr. Moore ascribes to the deserts, which separate India from Persia, the long exemption of the latter country from infection; and assigns satisfactory reasons, why contagious diseases should rather follow the irruption of an invading army than its return. He seems, however, to lean to the opinion, that the eruptive disease mentioned by Quintus Curtius, which carried off great numbers of Alexander's army, at the mouths of the Indus, may have been an ill described small-pox; and was prevented by the intervening deserts from making its way into Persia. Now the fleet, with which Nearchus navigated the Persian gulf, was not built by Alexander, but chiefly found ‡ upon the Indus; the facts of the voyage shew, that these vessels were equal to the coasting trade, and even to a communication with the

* Moore, page 22.

† Doctor Ainslie.

‡ Vincent's Voyage of Nearchus, page 11.

opposite and not distant shores of Arabia ; a country which, from the earliest periods of history or tradition, possessed the productions of India. The neighbourhood of the Indus near its mouths, and particularly the northern vicinity, is shewn by the historians of Alexander to have possessed a considerable population ; which must have received from Alexander's fleet and army, the contagious disease described by Quintius Curtius ; or the small-pox, at an earlier date, if it had previously existed in the interior. And it is difficult to conceive its being arrested at that spot without extending northwards into Persia by land, or coastwise, by means of the Arabian trade. The hardships sustained by the army of Alexander in its march through Gedrosia were unquestionably severe, but the daring travels of Lieutenant Pottinger have recently established the existence in that route of the ruins of cities and palaces, which now half-covered by the encroaching sands, must in the days of Alexander have sustained a population at least sufficient to receive and transmit a contagious disease, by its shores, or inland, although producing too little surplus food to meet the wants of the Grecian army. The Arabian trade is described by the earliest authors as a coasting* voyage, more likely perhaps than a direct one to afford the means of successive infection ; and other authorities supply the intermediate links of an unbroken chain, extending from the earliest to the latest periods of authentic history, to support the uninterrupted existence of an intercourse between India and Arabia, sufficient for the propagation of an infectious disease. Moses † specifies the appropriation to religious uses, and in large quantities too, of cinnamon and cassia, the productions of Ceylon and Malabar ; which shews that a communication of some kind or other was open between India and

* Vincent's Periplus, page 45.

† 30th, Exodus, verse 23, 24.

Egypt, even in that early age. From that period until about two centuries before the Christian æra, the aromatic productions of India were supposed in the west to grow in Arabia; whether the chintz and other fabrics introduced into Media may have been referred to their proper country before the age of Alexander does not distinctly appear*; after that period the information becomes more precise. Agatharcides, who wrote 146 years after the death of Alexander, and 177 A. C. tells us, not only that the Sabeans possessed the trade from India to Arabia, as the Egyptians monopolized the same trade from Arabia to Europe; but is the first to relate that ships from India were met with in the ports of Sabea,† that the mariners of Sabea sail in very large vessels to the country where the odoriferous productions grow,‡ *and plant colonies there* (the progenitors of the Mapillas of Malabar). The embassies of Porus and Pandion to Augustus; the incident of the freedman of Plocamus being blown off the coast and carried by the monsoon to Ceylon; his return from that island accompanied by ambassadors from its king to Claudius: the voyage of Hyppalus consequent on that discovery, in the first century of the Christian æra, and the more direct communication which ensued, are so many links in a chain of incessant and immemorial intercourse: and even before the discovery of Hyppalus, the direct proof of the arrival at Rome of bales of muslin from Bengal in the earliest part of the first century, (and probably long before) is furnished by the reproaches of a licentious poet addressed to the Roman matrons for their public semi-nudity in garments of “woven §

* Vincent's Periplus, page 17.

† Ibid, 36.

‡ Ibid. 32.

§ Quo Margarita cara tribuosa Indica ?

An ut matrona ornata phaleris pelagiis,

Tollat pedes indomita in strato extraneo,

Smaragdum ad quem rem viridem pretiosum vitrum ?

wind," or "a texture of cloud." Excluding then the abundant proofs of earlier date, we find that for seven centuries at the least before the introduction of the small-pox into Arabia from India, the ships of each country were received into the ports of the other; and for upwards of five centuries before that period, we have testimonies of an intercourse in its first stage, exclusively between India and Arabia, which brought into Italy the productions of Bengal: the whole exhibiting authentic evidence of an unceasing intercourse apparently sufficient for the transmission of infectious disease. The inference therefore appears to rest on something more than probability, that in the 6th century the small-pox was a new disease in India, and according to a similar chain of probability in China also: and in reverting to our first proposition, that *the causes*

Quo Carchedonias optas ignes lapideos
 Nisi ut scintillent? Probitas est carbunculus.
Æquum est induere nuptam ventum textilem?
 Palam prostrare nudam in *rebula linea?*

Petronius, page 53. London, 1711.

This is the true muslin, *the shebnum*, the dewy vesture, the gossamer of Dacca. That cotton, and not flaxen is intended, is evident from the following description, in the same century of the plant which produced the *Xylina lina*. "Superior pars Egypti in Arabiam vergens gignit fruticem, quem aliqui Gossipium vocant, plures *Xylon*, et ideo *lina* inde facta *Xylina*. Parvus est, similemque barbatæ nucis deferit fructum, cujus ex interiore nuce lanugo netur, nec ulla *lina* sunt iis candore molliumque preferenda." Pliny. Hist. Mund. 19. 1. The term *Xylon*. was certainly not derived from the Arabs, who name it *Kuttun*, cotton, but it bears a close resemblance to the common Indian pronunciation of Ceylon, (*Cylon*, with the accent on the first syllable,) as muslin from *Moosul*, and calico from *Calicut*, the emporia from which these substances became known in the west. The above passage, in the feast of Trimalcion was pointed out to me for purposes totally unconnected with the present subject, by Doctor Kay, one of the most enlightened men, and accomplished scholars of the age in which he lives; whose elegant mind has been lost to the literature of his country, by a residence of nearly half a century in the island of St. Helena.

which originally produced, may reproduce it without contagion, I am persuaded that the members of a liberal and estimable profession will distinguish between the suggestion of a new and interesting subject of research, and those dreams of planetary* influence, or medical theory equally visionary, which disgraced the literature even of the 17th century.

Although the particular condition and change of atmosphere, supposed to generate small-pox, be vaguely indicated in the apprehensions of the Nairs, the opinion of its spontaneous appearance is not peculiar to Malabar and Mysoor, but may be traced in many provinces of Decan and the south. Its periodical disappearance and return would seem to be the necessary consequence of the periodical exhaustion and accumulation of subjects, but its sudden appearance in the centre of a district, without introduction from abroad, although an impression on minds little distinguished by habits of accurate investigation, will not be treated with levity by men who really possess those habits; and who will at least find an apology for the error, if such it be, of men habituated to observe the disease named *the hill (or jungle) fever* invariably contracted by the inhabitants of the shore who visit particular hills, and the very same disease contracted by the inhabitants of those same hills, in consequence of visiting the shore, and named by them the *sea fever*: an error, of men accustomed (with whatever inferiority of science) to consider in these reciprocal predispositions to a fatal endemic, not only the quality of the air to be breathed, but the previous condition of the person who is to breathe it.

The Nair raja of Chercul¹ had been induced, by the most sacred promises, to pay his personal respects

* Moore's History of the Small-pox, page 198, and *passim*.

¹ *Chercul*.—Chirakkal, now the most northern of the taluqs in Malabar, adjoining the district of South Canara. The Raja, formerly a powerful chief, belonged to the Kohattiri family, and

to the Sultaun, and was, for several days, treated with considerable distinction, and dismissed with costly presents to his little principality. Immediately after his departure, real or pretended information was received, of his being engaged in a secret conspiracy to revenge the cruel indignities of his countrymen; and Tippoo detached two brigades to effect his destruction, or ascertain his obedience, by directing him instantly to return to camp. His attendants, justly alarmed at these appearances, prepared for defence, and before any explanation could be given, a skirmish ensued, in which the raja and some of his attendants were killed, and a few prisoners secured: and Tippoo, considering the accusation to be established, ordered the most base and unmanly indignities to be offered to the corpse,* and that the dead and the living should afterwards be hanged on the same tree. These indignities recounted by the Sultaun himself, although free from his usual obscenity, are too brutal for translation; and he relates, among the incidents pertaining to this raja, that he had, during their personal intercourse, offered 400,000 rupees, and the plates of gold with which a particular temple was roofed, on condition of sparing the temple itself; to which proposition the Sultaun is made to reply, that he would not spare it for all the treasures of the earth and the sea. He states the

it was with that family that the Portuguese adventurers first entered into relations. Chirakkal, the former headquarters of the Raja, is a village four miles N.N.W. of Cannanore. The descendants of the family still live in the neighbourhood. (Dr. Maclean: *Madras Manual of Administration*.)

* Another account says, that he was accompanied by a detachment, to aid in seizing the insurgents, under the command of a confidential officer, charged with instructions to use the raja as an instrument, till the purpose was accomplished, and then to seize himself; and that the raja having obtained information of this design, sent forward secret instructions to his family to escape by Tellicherry; when he heard of their safety, he attempted his own escape, and finding that impossible, shot himself.

destruction in the course of this holy war, of eight thousand idol temples, many of them roofed with gold, silver, or copper, and all containing treasures buried at the feet of the idol, the whole of which was royal plunder : but when crimes are deemed to be virtues, we may infer that their amount is much exaggerated. Before leaving Malabar, he paid a visit to Cannanore, and solemnized the first ceremonies of a marriage between the daughter of the dowager chief, and one of his sons, Abd-ul-Khalic. A minute detail is given of the fortunate conjunctions of the planets, and the astrologers unanimously pronounce, that such an auspicious hour would not return for 120 years. From this place, he made a progress along the coast, as far south as Chawgaut,¹ for the purpose of making the local investigations, and instituting the intrigues, necessary to the attack on Travancore in the ensuing season ; and in returning to Coimbatore for the rains, made yet another change in his plans for propagating the faith and plundering the country. Six divisions, consisting of two brigades each, were left in Malabar, with distinct establishments of officers, spiritual, civil, and military, charged with the three-fold duty of surveying the lands, numbering the productive trees, and seizing and instructing the remaining Nairs. All that related to the fiscal management was put into bad hands, and was ill executed ; the joint duties of the spiritual and military officers were performed with horrible precision.* The Sultaun had, during the two last years, been gradually encreasing his infantry, and in

¹ *Chawgaut*.—Chavakkat, a village 98 miles S.S.E. of Cannanore, half way between Cochin and Calicut.

* Palgaut was captured by the English in the ensuing year, and an officer of the staff, in searching the records of the place, for military intelligence, found one of the circular orders for conversion under the Sultaun's seal and signature, which was at that time deemed a curiosity of the highest order. It directed, " that every being in the district, without distinction, should be honoured with Islām, that the houses of such as fled to avoid

preparation for the war which he now evidently contemplated as near, made a further augmentation, while at Coimbatore, of two cutcherries* of infantry, amounting to 11,376 men. At the same place he employed himself, as he informs us, in a profusion of "new inventions and creations of the mind," among which the example which he selects, closes all that was written of the King of histories,† and as it affords a fair specimen of the subjects which occupied his thoughts, and exhibits his ostentatious lore in judicial astrology, we take leave of a guide which has demanded incessant suspicion, by presenting an abstract of his concluding page.—"Aurengzebe, from the commencement of his reign, which happened on a Sunday, ordered the sounding of the noobut (royal band) five times on that day of the week; and for want of due consideration, the practice had since continued. His Majesty, the shadow of God reflecting

that honour should be burned, that they should be traced to their lurking-places, and that all means of truth and falsehood, fraud or force, should be employed to effect their universal conversion."

* Four appears to have been the fortunate number; four companies, (yeuz,) one battalion, (teep,) four teeps, one cushoon, (which I have generally rendered brigade,) four cushoons, one cutcherry. The establishment of these cushoons, with their artillery, was only 1422, and a cutcherry of course 5688; but these numbers fluctuated with the Sultaun's caprices, and at one time a cushoon with its cavalry attached, was a legion of about 3000.

[Kushun was a term which was affected by Tippu Sahib in his military organisation, for a brigade, or a regiment in the larger continental use of that word. His *Piddah 'askar*, or regular infantry, was formed into 5 Kacharis composed in all of 27 *kushuns*. A manuscript note on the copy of Kirkpatrick's *Letters* in the India Office Library says that *kushoon* was properly, Sanskrit *kshuni* or *kshauni*, "a grand division of the force of an Empire, as used in *The Mahabharata*. But the word adopted by Tippoo appears to be Turki." (Yule and Burnell: *Hobson Jobson*, p. 492.)]

† The memoirs of the Sultaun's reign found in the palace, and written in the first person, is supposed by Colonel Kirkpatrick

on this subject, ordered the substitution of Friday for this ceremonial. Because, Sunday is appropriated by the Nazarenes; Saturday, by the Jews; and Friday is the festival of the Mussulmans; and the excellence of that day is impressed on every mind by numerous traditionary texts. The Almighty, on that day created the heavens; on that day occurred the martyrdom of the heads of the church; on that day commenced the flood of Noah; besides other holy coincidences. Therefore, in a propitious hour, when the moon was in the mansion of Taurus, Mercury and Venus in the mansion of Virgo, the Sun in Leo, Saturn in Aquarius, and Venus in opposition to Libra;—the royal mandate descended, directing the noobut to be performed in the royal hall, and by all Mussulmans entitled to that distinction, five times on every Friday."

It is evident, from the insolent letters of the Sultaun to Nizam Ali, shortly after the peace of Mangalore, in 1784, that he contemplated the early subjugation of that chief. The termination of the war of 1786-7 had induced some amicable communi-

to be the rough draft from which the Sultaun-u-Towareekh was prepared by Zein-ul-ab-u-Deen by the Sultaun's command: but if his opinion (page 32, preface) be correct, that the rough draft bears internal evidence of having been composed subsequently to the peace of Seringapatam in 1792, the supposed relation of the manuscripts is more than doubtful, as the last page of the Sultaun-u-Towareekh appears to me to have been written in 1789, and it contains no allusion throughout to any subsequent event. I am not aware of the nature of the internal evidence relied upon; and if it had not been so strongly stated, I should have been disposed to conjecture that Colonel Kirkpatrick's manuscript which terminates in 1787 was put into Zein-ul-ab-u-Deen's hands at that date, from which period he became the historian instead of the Sultaun, who, although an incessant writer, was an exceedingly bad scribe; however this may be, they entirely coincide in substance in those portions which have been published by Colonel Kirkpatrick. I find on referring to my notes, that one of my copies was in the hand writing of Zein-ul-ab-u-Deen.

cations, in consequence of which Nizam Ali had dispatched an ambassador, named Hâfiz Fereed-u-Deen Khân, who, in conformity to directions previously sent to Seringapatam, waited the Sultaun's arrival at Coimbetcor. This envoy was charged with the proposal of a strict and indissoluble union between these only remaining Mahommedan powers of Decan and the South. A splendid Korân was sent for the Sultaun's acceptance; and the return of a similar pledge, was to establish the most sacred and solemn obligations of friendship and alliance. To this proposition, the Sultaun distinctly replied, that he was ready to return the pledge, and establish an offensive and defensive treaty, on the condition of an intermarriage in the families, but not without this preliminary alliance; but on this subject the envoy had no orders, and could give no reply. The forms of ordinary courtesy did not admit of his suggesting objections from himself; and the Sultaun, foreseeing no impediment, sent an embassy in return, consisting of Kuttub-u-Deen and Ali Reza, who accompanied the envoy in his return to Hyderabad. Nizam Ali, however, distinguished between political union, and the degradation which he attached to the proposed alliance; and it seems extraordinary, that so acute a courtier as Ali Reza should not have been able to ascertain Nizam Ali's intentions, and save his master the awkwardness of a public refusal. "We are desirous," said Ali Reza, "of partaking of the Sheker-Bhât," the dish of rice and sugar sent as the first preliminary ceremonial of marriage; to which intimation Nizam Ali made no sort of reply, and there the negotiation and the embassy terminated.

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